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Over the last two decades, following a long history of mass violence in Burundi and Rwanda, 
transitional justice (TJ) efforts were deployed in the two countries. Observing, particularly 
after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, that cycles of violence had devastated these two nations, a 
number of international organisations encouraged and financed socio-political and judicial 
responses with the aim of building sustainable peace in the region. The gacaca courts have 
been at the centre of the TJ process in Rwanda, and the negotiations over a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) remain the key focus in the Burundian TJ process. The 
local contexts have not been the sole influence on the design and implementation of the 
initiatives: the consolidation of TJ as a field of practice on a global level has also been of 
paramount importance. Under scrutiny in this thesis is the ‘battlefield’ in which TJ 
practitioners argue about the past, a battlefield created by the frictions between the universal 
TJ discourse, the resulting technocratic aid practices and the often silenced, but highly 
politicised negotiations and implementation on the ground. 
My research establishes that while TJ practitioners disseminate a positive discourse designed 
to help societies emerging from violence, their practices are actually embedded in trenchant 
hierarchical structures and tensions from the violent past. I argue that their efforts, delivered 
through performative and technocratic work, too often ignore the hierarchical social and 
political structures in which they operate. Furthermore, the assumption that their technical 
work can fix dysfunctional states results not only in a silencing of the social and political 
dynamics in play, but also demonstrates a form of imperialism and colonialism, leading to the 
reproduction of multi-layered unequal structures, paternalistic behaviours towards 
beneficiaries, privileging of implementers over supposed beneficiaries, and the repetition of 
counter-effective practices. These efforts and silences have the potential to exacerbate the 
issues rather than to alleviate them. 
This analysis engages with two academic debates: first, the questionable capacity of 
‘professionalised’ and ‘universalised’ TJ mechanisms to deal with past crimes; and, second, 
whether aid practices can effectively contribute to ‘sustainable peace’, ‘development’ and 
‘democracy’ in post-conflict contexts. My analysis is driven by the following research 
questions: Why is the role of practitioners and their everyday crucial to understanding TJ 
processes? How does the professionalisation of aid and TJ shape the practices of TJ in Burundi 
  
and Rwanda? How and why do frictions between academic theory, policy discourse and 
everyday practice of TJ impact on outcomes on the ground?  
In conclusion, my research illustrates the way in which TJ professionalised practices constitute 
a battlefield, with “ongoing struggles in the battle for the nature and direction of the transition” 
being a metaconflict ‒ a “conflict about what the conflict is about”, in which TJ victors tilt all 
transitional mechanisms “towards an end point for transition that approximates” to their 
“battlefield goals” (Bell 2009). Within these everyday battles, TJ practitioners are playing a 
crucial role in the implementation of TJ. Through the dissemination of their expertise, they act 
as ‘brokers’ and ‘translators’ of the TJ toolkit approach. They, particularly the most powerful 
practitioners, produce interpretations and offer “scripts into which others can be recruited for 
a period” (Lewis and Mosse 2006, 13). As Norman Long (1992, 275) points out in looking at 
development actors, their professional practices constitute a “knowledge battlefield” in 
relation to “the issues of conflicting loyalties, of negotiation over ‘truth’ claims, of battles over 
images and contesting interests.”  
Describing how TJ practitioners work around policy and practice in Rwanda and Burundi, I 
demonstrate how the gacaca law and the Burundian TRC law, and their policy frameworks 
and implementing activities, have all been created around the same global discourse. But the 
actual negotiations of specific prescriptions and implementation have led to very different 
practices being moulded around different dynamics of power by actors and organisations 
involved in these processes. Whereas these dynamics are but natural, silencing them behind 
technocratic knowledge, however, has severe implications. In contrast to most of the TJ 
literature making reference to civil society and international donors, my research underlines 
the role and consequences of their everyday politics, through which the directions of the TJ 
agenda are decided and implemented. Building on social anthropology and development 
studies, I underline the entanglement formed between TJ and aid, and bring attention to 
unattended effects of TJ practices, including how power has a play in policy implementation 
and how unequal relations are reproduced. Doing so, I expand the critical TJ scholarship and 
the calls for ‘localising transitional justice’, as well as developing the understanding of the 
limitations of TJ processes in Rwanda and Burundi.  
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In 2006, while preparing my application to undertake an MA in peace studies, I decided at the 
last minute to drop my previous research topic (a territorial conflict over a 200-square-metre 
island between the Republic of Korea and Japan). I was looking for a more meaningful and 
powerful area that would stimulate me enough to wake me up feeling motivated every morning 
for two years. In a hurry to reach the application deadline, I decided to look at aid and 
peacebuilding as means of dealing with the consequences of genocide and mass violence in 
Rwanda and Burundi. It was an effective decision, because on many occasions over nine years, 
this research topic would certainly keep me awake at night. With an ethnographic approach, 
my whole process has relied on people who engaged in and supported the research, including 
the research participants and beyond. This long research project was possible only with the 
support and patience (or even impatience) of a great network of friends, informants, colleagues 
and supervisors. 
Along with curiosity, sadness, phases of incomprehension, and breakthroughs, I built beautiful 
relationships in spite of the dark dimensions of the research topic. Throughout my experiences 
in Kigali and Bujumbura, I gradually brought my critical lens to practitioners ‒ aid workers 
themselves ‒ trying to understand how they implemented transitional justice (TJ) policies. 
Such research was only possible thanks to the participation of numerous TJ practitioners in the 
two countries, who accepted an engagement with me and my project, invited me into their 
professional activities, and opened up to me. 
Despite my weird questions, and with limited returns for them, they have participated and they 
have patiently shared their own perspectives and experiences with TJ in Rwanda and Burundi. 
I am deeply grateful for their help and contributions in recalling the human beauty, 
unpredictability and horror at the centre of academic debate on the issues of aid and TJ. Thanks 
to all these anonymous research participants. 
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This thesis is the result of a long journey, demanding not only for me but also for the people 
who supported the process. I did not obtain any sacred scholarship, and instead relied on a 
much more valuable network to undertake this journey, without which it would have been 
impossible, literally. During my distance-learning time and the regular commuting between 
the UK and Belgium, I was lucky enough to have great housing support. In the UK: Ananda, 
Aurora and Jay, Katie and Jack (thanks a million for your very reliable sofa and best humus 
beach talks), Wanying and Brad, Sara, Eka, Nick, Jens and Weixin, Alexis, Hayate and 
Yannick, Alo, Yasmin, Lindsay, Layne, and Nicky; in Rwanda: Joëlle and Albert, Philippe, 
Asel, Wannes, Larissa and Alexandre; in Burundi: Antoine and Audrey, Yvonne and 
Redempteur, Valérie; finally, in Belgium: Fang-Yu, Charlène and Filip. Each and every one 
of you, thanks for opening up your home to my project. During these years, it was not only a 
bed that you offered but a home, friendship and support, all of which has made this an amazing 
journey that would otherwise have been a very lonely one without you. 
All my fieldwork friends ‒ Mieke, Stéphanie, Miwa, Marlène, Hervé, Aimable, Florence, 
Malik, Claire, Rodrigue, Mamita, Nyoni, Elena, Cristian, Emma, Pauline, Céline, Caroline, 
Nicolas and Myriam ‒ were essential for sharing happy and relaxing moments in the Rwandan 
and Burundian hills, dance floors and beaches. Especially, Quartile, my fake-twin, who was 
always available to take me to the dance floor and bring some joy out of me. Annelies and 
Damian, not just for taking me on their jogging training and finally getting lost together in the 
Nile Creta on a marathon in Burundi, but also for supporting me in the most difficult moments 
of my fieldwork. My very special friend from fieldwork, Lore, who was always available to 
support me in the hardest times but also the most fun ones.  
I am also very grateful to Dieudonné, Léonard, Chantal, Tharcisse, Cassien, Pasteur and 
Clavair, who prepared me the best dishes, drove me around, and helped to make everyday 
living way too easy in Bujumbura.  
Yvonne and Redempteur were the best proxy parents in Bujumbura. They always made sure 
my room was ready in their home whenever I needed it, that Primus was in the fridge, and that 
they checked on me and could report back to my Belgian family. They also often acted as my 
cultural translators when I was confronted with situations that did not make sense to me. 
Yvonne, along with Clavaire, came to rescue me in one of the worst situations: they got out of 
their beds in the middle of the night to meet me at a security checkpoint waiting for the very 
angry policeman (who did not appreciate my negotiating skills) to calm down and let us go 
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home. Even though you all know that you will always be welcome in my home, I can never 
thank enough for all the hospitality, care and friendship you have provided me.  
Salif Nimaga helped me to put together the summer school to read critical scholarship on TJ 
with Burundian practitioners. It was one of the most exciting and experimental parts of my 
research. I learnt a lot from this experience and from Salif’s approach to work ‒ thank you. 
Sonia and Patricia also provided great support to running the summer school ‒ I am very 
grateful for their trust in our work and their help.  
The research also grew out of stimulating academic discussions with a varied group of scholars 
and practitioners. Ananda Breed encouraged me to see all these policy documents and legal 
frameworks as scripts that were performed; Fairlie Chappuis accompanied me for sundown 
drinks around Bujumbura, resulting in a fascinating exploration of emotions and research; Bert 
Ingelaere and Dominik Kohlhagen shared useful thoughts and material, Lars Waldorf 
commented at a very early stage of the research proposal; Valerie Rosoux invited me to 
memory workshops in Louvain-La-Neuve, which provided me with some academic support 
while based in Belgium. Further, all the following engaged in great discussions about our 
common research interests, shared their analysis and documents, and also helped in 
maintaining my motivation during my doubtful moments: Katie McQuaid, Raminder Kaur, 
Ross Wingal, Suhas Basme, Stef Vandeginste, Zarir Merat, Carina Terstaskian, Lewis Mudge, 
Pierre Lebrun, Benoit Joanette, Pierre Vinck, Mathilde Renault, Albert Muhayeyezu, Fanny 
Cachat, Damien Roulette, Samira Usman, Jean-Pierre Havyarimana, Gérard Birantamije, Jen 
Melvin, Ombeline de Bock, An Ansoms, Emanuel Klimmis, Sydney Leclerq, Jastine Barnet, 
Jean-Benoit Falisse, Adrienne Lemon, Benjamin Chemouni, Patricia Naftali, Maria Martin de 
Almargo, and Myriam Malo Irakoze. The thesis also immensely benefited from dedicated 
feedback from my examiners Anne-Meike Fechter and Lars Waldorf. 
The Sussex C333 (relocated to C217) crew and wider Arts C community created a wonderful 
and vibrant writing environment. Suhas, Valerio, Chris, Santiago, Nabeela, Carmen, Ellen, 
Mariana, Dora, Paul, Layla, Markus, Faisal, Yavuz, Stephan, Gabrielle, Mathilde, Titi, Elisa, 
Dave, Georgina, Monica, Sajida, Marieke, Andrea, Pedro, Beatrice, Abraham, Katie ‒ thanks 
so much for listening and sharing your thoughts about writing, ideas, challenges, commenting 
back on my work in all the workshops, the coffee, the walks in the Downs. Gemma Houdley 
and Daniel Watson for long coffee breaks discussing my theoretical conundrums and acting 
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as my guinea-pig audience before many presentations. My sincere apologies for any names 
that have slipped my mind at this last-minute stage of writing. 
I also wish to thank Sara Green for her editing support, the new Edinburgh team for being so 
supportive and flexible in the very final stage prior submission. Reading Lisa Smirl’s work 
was very inspiring. While reading it, I wished she could have been part of this journey as well, 
even though life decided otherwise.  
Nigel Eltringham and Lyndsay McLean were the best supervisors. They were always one step 
ahead in guiding me forwards, with immeasurable patience in reading, and providing the most 
useful comments on my messy drafts, helping me to put order in my mind and in my writing, 
and helping to get rid of my most redundant of Frenchy expressions! I will miss writing to 
them with my regular research updates, but both will certainly remain my writing voices, 
challenging me on what my argument is and whether I support it sufficiently. I am profoundly 
grateful for their support.   
Least but not last, my family and childhood friends were the most important part of the support. 
Ingrid, Dad and Mathilde were always on the other side of the phone when I needed to share 
very hard or happy moments. Mum, Dominique, Frédéric, Liga, Frida, Frédéric Jr., Julia, Irene, 
Mamy, Harry, Coucou, Françoise, Annette, Véronique and Dewez all provided me with the 
best emotional and financial support. By believing in my project, they were the cornerstone 
crucial to keeping me going through this long research journey. 
Finally, Mark was not only the most dedicated editor, but he also dealt with my demanding 
writing mood, tested my food experiments and channelled my last-month stress into fun. I can 
never be sufficiently grateful for his triple-checking of every line of my writing, spending the 
last weekends at home helping me to put the thesis together and, more importantly, for his 
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Over the last two decades, following a long history of mass violence in Burundi and Rwanda, 
transitional justice (TJ) efforts were deployed in the two countries. Observing, particularly 
after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, that cycles of violence had devastated these two nations, a 
number of international organisations encouraged and financed socio-political and judicial 
responses with the aim of building sustainable peace in the region. The gacaca courts have 
been at the centre of the TJ process in Rwanda, and the negotiations over a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) remain the key focus in the Burundian TJ process. The 
local contexts have not been the sole influence on the design and implementation of the 
initiatives: the consolidation of TJ as a field of practice on a global level has also been of 
paramount importance. Under scrutiny in this thesis is the ‘battlefield’ in which TJ 
practitioners argue about the past, a battlefield created by the frictions between the universal 
TJ discourse, the resulting technocratic aid practices and the often silenced, but highly 
politicised negotiations and implementation on the ground. 
Using ethnographic methods to look at aid practices, I undertook an ‘aidnography’ (e.g., Gould 
2014) of TJ practitioners by scrutinising the everyday of the local and expatriate professionals 
who were involved in the negotiation and implementation of gacaca courts in Rwanda and the 
preparations for TRC in Burundi. I aim to address in this thesis the intersection between the 
global norms around TJ and its local practices. I unpack the preformatted understanding of 
concepts and practices related to aid and TJ, and explore the way in which international norms 
become entangled in the local context, and how frictions are created. My research describes, 
in addition to the well-established limits between discourse and practice, the micro-social 
negotiations entailed in dealing with a violent past. Describing TJ as a “battlefield”, Christine 
Bell (2009, 25) considers that:  
Transitional justice mechanisms, with their capacity to adjudicate on the rights and wrongs of a 
conflict, not only as regards individual culpability but also in relation to institutional and social 
responsibility for the genesis and sustenance of the conflict, are a key site of ongoing struggles in 
the battle for the nature and direction of the transition. Control of the transitional justice mechanism 
can enable victory in the metaconflict – the conflict about what the conflict is about – and thereby 
enable the victor to tilt all transitional mechanisms towards an end point for transition that 
approximates to the victor’s battlefield goals. 
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Following Bell, my research explores how TJ practice is constituted by continual and multi-
layered battles over the representation of the conflict, concealed in technocratic and apolitical 
efforts. A pretence to the latter tends to be held by TJ practitioners, at least in policy and public 
speeches; whereas the inherently political nature of TJ was acknowledged by many of my 
research participants. Therefore, I refer to TJ practices as professional efforts that are 
inevitably marked by burdens and legacies of the conflicts. More specifically, the local 
practitioners’ personal experiences of the violence, and the position of international 
practitioners, will influence the framework of an adopted model, as well as every step of its 
implementation. From such an understanding, I argue that everyday TJ professional practices 
create an illusion of rational actions but conceal ubiquitous contradictions within complex 
battles over the past (see Lefebvre 1971). 
My research establishes that while TJ practitioners disseminate a positive discourse designed 
to help societies emerging from violence, their practices are actually embedded in trenchant 
hierarchical structures and tensions from the violent past. I argue that their efforts, delivered 
through performative and technocratic work, too often ignore the hierarchical social and 
political structures in which they operate. Furthermore, the assumption that their technical 
work can fix dysfunctional states results not only in a silencing of the social and political 
dynamics in play, but also demonstrates a form of imperialism and colonialism, leading to the 
reproduction of multi-layered unequal structures, paternalistic behaviours towards 
beneficiaries, privileging of implementers over supposed beneficiaries, and the repetition of 
counter-effective practices. These efforts and silences have the potential to exacerbate the 
issues rather than to alleviate them. 
This analysis engages with two academic debates: first, the questionable capacity of 
‘professionalised’ and ‘universalised’ TJ mechanisms to deal with past crimes (Kritz and 
Mandela 1995; J. N. Clark 2009; Hinton et al. 2010; Gibson 2005; Hayner 2010; Leebaw 2008; 
Lefranc 2010; Mani 2008; Orentlicher 2007; Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006; Shaw, 
Waldorf, and Hazan 2010; Subotić 2012); and, second, whether aid practices can effectively 
contribute to ‘sustainable peace’, ‘development’ and ‘democracy’ in post-conflict contexts 
(Boutros-Ghali 1995; Escobar 1992; de Guevara 2012; Goodhand and Walton 2009; 
Goodhand 2006; Zürcher et al. 2013). There is already a vast literature dealing with these 
debates in general, which I will examine in chapters 2 and 4. My two cases studies, the gacaca 
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process and the delayed TRC in Burundi, have been widely addressed in the existing literature, 
but gaps remain. 
The pieces of research addressing my case studies have considered: how the legal and policy 
frameworks have been implemented and interpreted within given groups (regarding gacaca 
Rettig 2008; Rettig 2011; Ingelaere 2009; Ingelaere 2008; regarding Burundi Rubli 2013; 
Rubli 2011; Matignon 2012; Taylor 2013a); to what extent these policies achieved their stated 
aims (e.g Clark 2010; Pozen, Neugebauer, and Ntaganira 2014; Kanyangara et al. 2014); the 
opportunities and limits of the legal frameworks (Waldorf 2006; Longman 2006; Thomson 
and Nagy 2011; Meyerstein 2007; Stef Vandeginste 2011a; 2010; 2012; Matignon 2012); and, 
finally, the difficult dynamics between donors and local authorities (Schotsmans 2011; 
Hayman 2008; Jamar 2012; Taylor 2013b; Taylor 2014). This literature does not, however, 
comprehensively examine the global dimensions, the entanglements between aid-dependent 
local contexts, the socio-political dimensions, and their impacts on policy implementation and 
outcomes.  
Adding to the existing literature, my focus on the everyday of TJ practitioners aims to highlight 
the social and political dynamics taking place behind the public scene of these TJ policy 
efforts. My thesis explores how TJ practitioners reinterpret the ‘universal discourse’, how they 
construct the specific, national legal and policy frameworks, and how they implement and 
negotiate their activities among or with their partners and beneficiaries. This overall 
introduction presents: (1) the development of the field of TJ, (2) the two case studies, (3) two 
vignettes that illustrate the approach adopted for a scrutiny of everyday TJ practices, (4) an 
outline of the research questions, and (5) an elaboration of the thesis structure.  
The Global Field of TJ in Rwanda and Burundi 
My research is empirically focused on two case studies of TJ process: the gacaca courts in 
Rwanda and the TRC negotiations in Burundi. At first sight, the two processes seem very 
different, but their daily practices and implementation share many similarities. Gacaca courts 
terminated in 2012 having ruled on over two million cases, and the Burundian TRC is at a 
deadlock after 14 years of difficult negotiations over its legal framework. Both TJ processes 
have been heavily influenced by foreign intervention and domestic dynamics. In both cases, 
international support has been promoted as technical and apolitical. I argue, however, that in 
reality, TJ practitioners implemented a set of activities that, according to their own 
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understanding and experiences, were based on their reinterpretation, negotiation and 
dissemination of the international ‘TJ discourse’. While international support has included 
expertise for the writing of laws and policy documents, the organisation of training and 
sensitisation programmes, support to civil society, and funding of research and monitoring 
projects, it has given limited attention to the political and social dynamics in play. From such 
observations, I approached the two case studies as localised TJ practices dependent on and 
affected by international aid. I present, below, the consolidation of the TJ field as the global 
context in which the two specific processes have been taking place. I then present the two 
cases and underline the similarities and differences. 
The Consolidation of the TJ Field in the International Scene 
In parallel with these two localised TJ processes, two major developments took place at the 
international level. First, TJ and international criminal justice have been consolidated through 
the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court (e.g. Orentlicher 2007; 
Arthur 2009; Lefranc 2010; Hazan 2007; Subotić 2012 - see more details in chapter 2). By the 
end of the 1990s, Western donors integrated the TJ project into their international agenda as a 
common search for accountability in the fight against impunity. This further materialised in: 
the creation of new international organisations such as the International Centre for Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ) in New York in the USA in 2001, and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 
(IJR) in Cape Town in South Africa in 2000; new funding being made available for TJ projects; 
and the appointment in 2012, by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UN OHCHR) in Geneva in Switzerland, of a UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of 
truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.  
A range of technical documents and lobbying activities based on these international 
developments have influenced the TJ policy framework in various contexts around the world 
(Lefranc 2010; Subotić 2012); these have been depicted in academic literature as a ‘toolkit 
approach’ followed globally by TJ practitioners and in local contexts. The term toolkit 
approach addresses the strong patterns or the formulaic nature of the approaches and activities 
in current TJ practices (e.g., Shaw et. al. 2010; Hinton et. al. 2010; Sriram and Pillay 2010 – 
see chapter 2). It involves a set of aims (peace, reconciliation, rule of law, democracy and 
accountability) achieved through a set of mechanisms (truth-seeking, judicial, reparations, 
 
 
Transitional Justice Battlefield: Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice 
 
14 
reform of institutions and vetting). Despite being widely used in critical scholarship on TJ, the 
term persists with a lack of both clear definition and empirical scrutiny. My contribution aims 
to unpack what the toolkit approach is, how it has been consolidated and implemented, and its 
effects in specific, local, but aid-dependent contexts. 
Second, the ‘new aid paradigm’ has simultaneously reformed aid delivery for more efficiency, 
while TJ practices have been increasingly entangled with aid structures. Although the agenda 
for efficiency has been criticised (Renard 2007; Holvoet and Rombouts 2008; Molenaers and 
Renard 2009), the changes have impacted on the organisation of donor agencies, receiving 
authorities and aid-dependent NGOs, including an impact on the global implementation of the 
TJ toolkit approach in localised contexts. In order to receive funding, local and international 
organisations have had to comply with increasing bureaucratic obligations, such as aligning 
with national development policy, harmonising with institutional and civil society partners, 
paying attention to local ownership and gender, and, more importantly, having to be managed 
for efficiency (Second High Level Forum on Aid Efficiency 2005; Third High Level Forum 
on Aid Efficiency 2008; Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Efficiency 2011).  
While these reforms have responded to legitimate concerns, they have created heavy 
technocratic obligations, such as elaborating on logical frameworks and defining objectives in 
measurable outcomes, with frequent reporting and quantitative monitoring and evaluation. 
These obligations are time-consuming, but they also open the door to political manipulation 
that is hidden behind a technocratic discourse (Hayman 2009; Merry 2011; Giovalucchi and 
Olivier de Sardan 2009). With a focus on two TJ policies, my thesis illustrates this process of 
professionalisation, through technocratisation and bureaucratisation, that silences the social 
and political dynamics inherent in TJ processes – both in the case of the gacaca process and 
the Burundian TJ process, as I introduce now. 
The Gacaca Process 
From 2004 to 2012, 15,300 gacaca courts ruled on over two million cases of genocide crimes 
committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994, during which an estimated one 
million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed (e.g., The New Times 2012; Avocats Sans 
Frontières 2010). The gacaca (Kinyarwanda for ‘grass’) process is a popular tribunal system 
inspired by a traditional form of conflict resolution, which was modified to deal with the 
judicial and penitentiary burden created by the genocide (e.g., Digneffe and Fierens 2003; 
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Tertsakian 2008). The Rwandan population, after electing Inyangamugayo (Kinyarwanda for 
‘persons of integrity’) among themselves to serve as judges in gacaca courts, had to “recount, 
disclose the truth and participate in prosecuting and trying the alleged perpetrators” for 
genocide crimes that took place in their own community (Preamble of the gacaca Law, Official 
Gazette 2004).  
The 2004 gacaca law and subsequent revisions framed the process. While it has often been 
depicted as a traditionally based system in policy discourse, it became a strictly defined 
process, in: its categorisation of crimes (Art. 9, Official Gazette 2008);1 the roles of benches 
according to their level (divided against existing territorial entities: cell, district and appeal 
courts – see Arts. 2, 3, 4, 7, 23 and 24, Official Gazette 2008);2 court procedures, particularly 
the guilty plea (enabling a reduction of sentence length and part commutation in community 
work when the plea was accepted by the court – Arts. 12, 13, 16, Official Gazette 2008); as 
well as the general sentence calculation framework (Arts. 17-21, Official Gazette 2008). 
The preamble of the 2004 gacaca organic law establishes various aims, such as to establish 
truth, to instil reconciliation, to reinsert victims and culprits into society, and to fight against 
impunity. It refers to international and national legislation, and Rwandan culture, creating the 
illusion that gacaca practices are embedded in legal international standards and Rwandan 
traditions of conciliation. This complex legal framework was the culmination of long 
negotiations between various positions and concerns expressed by national and international 
actors involved in the gacaca preparation. Most academic literature addressing gacaca has 
focused on this abstract framework (e.g., Drumbl 2005; Corey and Joireman 2004; Meyerstein 
2007); or as Bert Ingelaere describes (2012, 391), most analysis is marked by “magical 
legalism” embedded in “a theoretical model that is primarily based on law or law talk” rather 
than giving attention to the real practice. 
                                                 
1 The Rwandan judicial system divided crimes in three categories. The first category included the most serious 
crimes, initially all dealt with in classic justice. From 2008, the subcategories 3, 4 and 5 were transferred to gacaca 
courts, which included those who incited and supervised crimes of genocide, authorities from sub-prefectures 
and communes who committed crimes of genocide, rape or sexual torture. (The sub-categories 1 and 2 remained 
within classic courts, dealing with planners, organisers, and authorities from the national level who committed 
genocide crimes.) Category 2 included notorious murderers and perpetrators of torture acts and of dehumanising 
acts on the dead. The third category included crimes against property such as looting, and destruction of houses, 
goods and crops. All the categories included the accomplices.  
2 The gacaca cell courts were in charge of data-gathering by listing committed crimes and alleged perpetrators 
and ruled on category 3 crimes. After the category transfer in 2008, the district courts ruled on category 1 and 2 
crimes in first instance while appeal court ruled on appeals and undertook reviews of category 1  
and 2 crimes. 
 
 
Transitional Justice Battlefield: Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice 
 
16 
The gacaca process inevitably deviated from the framework: each community experienced and 
implemented the gacaca law according their experience of the genocide and current 
circumstances; this in turn resulted in various forms of infiltration of social and political 
dynamics (Avocats Sans Frontières 2010; Rettig 2011; Ingelaere 2009; Penal Reform 
International 2006; Penal Reform International 2007a; Penal Reform International 2003; Penal 
Reform International 2008; Waldorf 2006; Waldorf 2008). 
Regarding international aid, the Rwandan authorities, prior to and during the implementation, 
received important support from various international actors (Oomen 2005; Da Camara 2001; 
Hayman 2008). My research highlights how the technocratic pretention of these interventions 
enabled the silencing of inevitable ‘deviations’. In Rwanda and around the world, conferences 
and consultancies were organised to discuss the legal, social and political dimensions, such as 
legal guarantees, protection of witnesses and victims, and trauma (see chapters 5 and 6). 
During these preparations, a lack of legal training for Inyangamugayo and a lack of legal 
guarantees raised severe concerns over the respect for the right to a fair trial. These concerns 
led to the establishment of a massive monitoring project to be organised by a number of local 
and international NGOs, which was mostly funded by international actors (see chapter 6). 
Donors also provided direct funding to the National Service of Gacaca Courts (or SNJG, the 
French acronym for Service National des Juridictions Gacaca). This was the entity of the 
Ministry of Justice in charge of the implementation of the gacaca law – through coordination 
of gacaca courts, training of Inyangamugayo and sensitisation of the population, a process that 
relied on foreign funding for at least 60 per cent.3 Throughout the empirical chapters, the 
scrutiny of these negotiations between TJ practitioners, local authorities, NGOs and aid 
agencies illustrates how the socio-political drives these technocratic efforts.  
At the time of writing, some 20 years after the genocide, the national political agenda has 
moved away from TJ matters to the strengthening of Rwanda’s development (e.g., Kagame 
2012). 4  Former donors of gacaca have gradually disengaged from the process; the main 
                                                 
3 Various sources indicate a budget for gacaca of US$43 million for 2003–05 (Oomen, 2005: 903), US$5 million 
in 2005 (Journal Inkiko Gacaca, 2006: 10), later reduced to US$1.92 million in 2008 (Presentation at the Peer 
Meeting, 2008).  
4 As illustrated by the speech of President Kagame at the official closing of gacaca court, “Gacaca has empowered 
Rwandans in ways few could have envisaged. It has illustrated the liberating value of truth. When truth came out 
in court, from both the perpetrators and survivors of genocide, from witnesses and the community – freely, not 
at the prompting or tutoring of paid lawyers – it set everyone free and prepared the ground for the restoration of 
social harmony. … We should all be pleased that today, Rwandans live and work together for their wellbeing and 
common good as we look forward to the start of another chapter in our nation’s development.”    
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supporters have reorientated their aid towards strengthening the classic justice sector, good 
governance, creating archives for gacaca files and supporting the pursuit of genocide 
perpetrators internationally. 5  At the same time, the law that terminated gacaca courts 
transferred competences to other institutions (Official Gazette 2012). This transfer  
received limited attention from the practitioners interviewed during my fieldwork, to the point 
that one donor representative in charge of justice matters asked me to forward him a copy of 
the law. 
Negotiation over the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Burundi 
In Burundi, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreements (APRA) were signed in 2000 
under strong international pressure to put an end to the civil war that started after the first 
democratically elected president was assassinated in 1993 (Curtis 2012; Dupont 2007; Bentley 
and Southall 2005). Two armed groups, including the current ruling party,6 refused the Arusha 
agreements and they did not lead to a total ceasefire until 2008. Still, the APRA established 
that the TJ pathway in Burundi should adopt three mechanisms: an international inquiry, a 
National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (NTRC – later renamed Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, TRC) and a judicial mechanism (Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement 2000, Protocol I, Chapter II, Art. 6 and 8).7 
After the adoption of a first TRC law in 2004, the TJ process proceeded roughly with difficult 
negotiations among the authorities, UN representatives 8  and civil society organisations 
(Vandeginste 2011a; Vandeginste 2012; Taylor 2013b). It was also marked by many periods 
                                                 
 
5 Author’s interview with donors’ representatives, Kigali 2012 and 2013.  
6 The ruling party today: the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of 
Democracy (CNDD-FDD from its French acronym, Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces 
de Défense de la Démocratie) and the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People – National Forces of Liberation 
(PALIPEHUTU-FNL from its French acronym, Parti pour la liberation du Peuple Hutu – Forces Nationales de 
Liberation which turned into the FNL due to interdiction to strict ethnic affiliation for political parties (however, 
it is divided into the ‘official faction’ and the non-recognised faction led by its previous leader Agathon Rwassa 
faction). 
7 In the APRA, an International Criminal Tribunal for Burundi  (such as the ones established for Rwanda and 
Former-Yugoslavia) was considered to undertake judicial prosecutions against the main perpetrators. Through 
discussions with the UN, the International Judicial Commission of Inquiry was dropped as perceived as a 
duplication of the TRC for truth-seeking purpose, and due to high critique towards the ICTR and ICTY, it was 
alternatively consider establishing a special chamber dealing with judicial dimensions at a national level. Since 
2010, it has been implicitly agreed that the judicial mechanism will be put in place after the TRC. 
8 Specifically the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB- Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi) from 
2004 to 2006; United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi from 2007 to 2010 (BINUB - Bureau Integré des 
Nations Unies au Burundi), United Nations Office in Burundi from 2011 to 2014 (BNUB – Bureau des Nations 
Unies au Burundi).  
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of inaction. As a way to move forward, national consultations were organised from 2007 to 
2010 to gather views of the population with regard to TJ mechanisms (see chapter 6). In 2011, 
a presidential decree formed a technical committee to look into TJ matters; which wrote a draft 
law providing for the TRC that was widely criticised by several NGOs. Matters were put on 
hold again until a new TRC law came along containing fewer guarantees, to be adopted in 
May 2014. On December 2014, the 11 commissioners of the TRC took an oath in front of the 
parliament, which officially launched the implementation of the TRC law. Most research in 
Burundi has focused on the legal and political dimensions of this process, with neutral or 
positive opinions regarding towards foreign interventions (more details in chapter 3). I 
contribute to this research by providing an account of the role and limits of international 
interventions in these dynamics.  
Ahead, there remains a difficult implementation, and an even more difficult path towards a 
judicial mechanism. The current scholarship about the Burundian TJ process does not, 
however, sufficiently highlight that the implementation of the TRC, even in better 
circumstances, would certainly not be a smooth process, nor likely lead to the specified 
objectives. Instead of blaming only national politics, my research attempts to demonstrate the 
limits of current TJ discourse and practices (‘TJ toolkit approach’) and how these also play a 
role in the difficulties of implementing TJ initiatives. I will do so by unpacking the technocratic 
efforts of aid-dependent local and international NGOs. Indeed, over the last decades, they 
organised various TJ-related activities such as training and sensitisation on TJ concepts (see 
chapter 5), and lobbying and research activities (see chapters 4 and 6), with limited capacities 
to set off the official process or achieve the set goals. 
The Rationale of the Two Case Studies 
Often considered faux jumeaux, non-identical twins, because of their entangled histories (e.g., 
Lemarchand 1970; Marysse, Ansoms, and Cassimon 2006), Rwanda and Burundi also have 
many overlaps in terms of their TJ journeys. The two neighbours of the Great Lakes region of 
Africa share similarities in terms of culture and social organisation, as well as the colonial and 
post-colonial background. Instability in one country, along with the situation in eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, has severely affected the situation in the other. The dynamics 
related to the general security and political situation have been widely addressed in academic 
writing (Lemarchand 1970; Guichaoua 1995; Uvin 1999; Deslaurier 1998; Prunier 2009; 
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Reyntjens 2009). My research illustrates how these historical, geographic and political 
connections are also relevant in the implementation of TJ policies. 
Following the prescriptions of the globally promoted ‘TJ toolkit’ approach, the two 
mechanisms under scrutiny ‒ the gacaca process and the Burundian TRC ‒ have in common 
the pursuit of grand ambitions, such as fighting impunity, consolidating reconciliation, and 
establishing truth, individual responsibility and retribution through short-term policies. Being 
the most prominent dimensions of the TJ policy framework in the two countries, both 
processes have been heavily marked by the intervention and financial support of foreign donor 
organisations and Western countries. A number of donors and NGOs have been involved in 
both processes, and several international members of staff have worked in both countries. 
Regional desks in head offices are often in charge of the two countries.  
In several instances, my two case studies have referred to each other. Examples of this include 
gacaca being mentioned in the Burundi TJ discussions, particularly in relation to the eventual 
use of Bashingantahe (the traditional mediators in Burundi), an idea that was later rejected); 
Burundian victim associations visiting Rwandan commemorations and Rwandan associations; 
and the hiring of myself to give a presentation about gacaca to Burundian victim associations 
during their visit to Kigali for the 20th Commemoration of the genocide. 
At the same time, the differences between the two processes also introduce interesting 
variations for the analysis. The Burundian process was in a deadlock situation for a decade 
while Rwanda’s gacaca courts ruled on over two million cases of genocide crime. The gacaca 
process officially came to an end on 18th June 2012, whereas the TRC has at the time of the 
writing not yet been launched. These different timeframes provide an opportunity to look at 
different stages of TJ implementation. The Rwandan case enables an examination of the 
dynamics from preparation to closure, and an observation of the gradual disengagement of 
initial supporters. The Burundian case offers the chance to observe complex negotiations over 
the mechanism’s modalities in its initial stages.  
Looking into TJ processes in Rwanda and Burundi underlines how aid-dependent practitioners 
operate similarly in very different contexts. Investigating the processes reveals that these 
similarities go beyond cultural dimensions and regional proximity. An organisational approach 
to deal jointly with the two countries was evident in examples such as donor and NGO head 
offices having desk officers for the Great Lakes, various regional offices covering both 
countries, and in practitioners interchanging their positions between the two. Consequently, 
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technocratic approaches that were similar ‒ brought in by international aid ‒ shaped TJ policies 
to deal with the past in two different countries. However, local social and political dynamics 
took over these global influences to shape the actual implementation of TJ. 
With an interest in the intersections between global and local contexts (e.g., Tsing 2005), my 
doctoral research looks into the everyday of TJ practitioners, with the aim of bringing into the 
academic debate the challenges faced by practitioners in their daily lives as a result of the 
complex legacies of colonisation, violence and aid structures. Using ethnographic methods, 
the thesis illustrates how, by implementing the TJ toolkit approach locally, TJ practitioners 
have contributed to the professionalisation of TJ, which through a repetition of technocratic 
and bureaucratic practices, has silenced social and political dynamics inherently in play in TJ 
processes. The following two vignettes illustrate the approach adopted in the overall thesis.  
TJ Practice through Two Ethnographic Vignettes 
Technocratic Approach and Social Aims:  
“The Gacaca Law does not Say How to Pardon” 
My first experience in Rwanda was an internship within the legal unit in Kigali of the National 
Service of Gacaca Courts in Rwanda (SNGJ), undertaken during my MA studies in the summer 
of 2008. I arrived a few weeks after a major modification of the gacaca law: the transfer of 
cases of the most serious crimes from classic courts to gacaca courts. The decision was widely 
criticised by most who had previously supported gacaca, particularly monitoring organisations 
(Amnesty International 2007; Avocats Sans Frontières, Penal Reform International, and 
Human Rights Watch 2008; Jamar 2012, 85–6). A few days before my arrival, Human Rights 
Watch (2008) released a report about the weaknesses of the Rwandan justice system; this had 
created strong reactions from government authorities. The tension created by these two events 
marked heavily in my time at the SNJG, and was widely discussed in the interviews I 
undertook with various people from local authorities, donors and NGOs dealing with the 
justice sector in Rwanda. 
Whereas I initially considered my time in the SNJG not to be so productive, it actually gave 
me the opportunity to observe the gacaca policy environment from behind the scenes. The 
legal unit in which I was based comprised ten lawyers. Each lawyer was in charge of 
supervising the cases and the district coordinators of one province, as well as being responsible 
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for giving legal advice to the population through free phone lines open every day, and office 
time every Wednesday. This created an apparently efficient structure for the national overview 
of gacaca, while in reality it was understaffed to support all the district coordinators (around 
100) and the 15,300 courts in total. 
In my daily discussions with the lawyers, they mostly presented me with a positive discourse 
by considering gacaca to be an important step for Rwandan reconciliation while also 
acknowledging some of the challenges. When addressing relations with NGOs, they had 
different positions. One told me “the monitoring agents from NGOs call us and inform us 
about problems so we can fix them”. Another warned me that “NGOs like HRW do not inform, 
they misinform ‒ you should not listen to what they say”. 
Most of the activities within the SNJG legal unit were taking place in Kinyarwanda, but 
colleagues would give me translations of the content of their conversations a few times a day. 
I was most surprised by the office hours every Wednesday, during which people could come 
for legal advice. Each time, there were around 100 people coming from all the over the country. 
Some travelled for a day to get there and then queued for long hours to meet a legal expert. I 
often did not understand what was being discussed, and my attention was turned to the 
emotions on the faces, mainly concerned-looking and gloomy.  
On one occasion, a colleague explained that the young man who had just left the office had 
come to seek advice on how to forgive the person who was the killer of his father. The killer 
had pleaded guilty and the gacaca bench ruling on the case accepted his demand of pardon, 
but the son of the victim still found it difficult to pardon him. My colleague, a formally trained 
lawyer, advised him to pray to God. He considered that only God could help, as the gacaca 
law did not say how to pardon. 
This episode was one that showed how the gacaca law often did not provide appropriate 
answers for lawyers, or offer them the capacity to act on the problems brought to them. Other 
examples of the limits of the law and legal support included: a woman who came and asked 
for advice on how to get her husband, an alleged perpetrator, released; one man who came for 
advice on how to receive the financial reparation that the gacaca court had ruled on for their 
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These interactions between the population and the lawyers did not match the official, positive 
discourse and the assertion that each problem was fixed, one by one. People were expressing 
concerns and grievances, and expecting to receive legal advice to overcome their situations. 
The legal framework and technical expertise left many from the population with a burden that 
could not be fixed by a technical solution. 
By beginning to describe the role and everyday practices of the legal unit of the SNJG, this 
vignette illustrates that while technical support for the population gives an impression of a 
problem-solving approach and rational action, a latent irrationality lies beneath. In other 
words, the unpacking of such a technocratic façade underlines the disjuncture between the 
model of gacaca and its practices. Furthermore, by pretending to provide only technical and 
financial support, donors have left themselves without responsibility, which has enabled them 
to neglect the ‘non-technical’ social and political issues created by the process. 
A Deserted Meeting: When the Universal Approach Creates Disenchantment  
The second vignette illustrates how disappointment can be created when the positive and 
emancipatory discourses of international aid are not matched with concrete actions. One 
morning in July 2013, an email headed “Urgent – Kivyuka” arrived in my mailbox. It had been 
sent by an INGO, Impunity Watch (IW), via the mailing list of the Reflection Group of 
Transitional Justice (GRJT) in Burundi. The email informed recipients that the road under 
construction over the Kivyuka mass graves had resumed that morning. The sender was calling 
for the mobilisation of civil society organisations to visit the site and support the Association 
of Survivors of the Kivyuka Massacre (Association des Rescapés des Massacres de Kivyuka 
– ARMK), and it suggested a meeting the next morning. I had just returned for the second and 
final part of my doctoral fieldwork in Bujumbura and decided to attend the meeting. I was one 
of only six people there. This was peculiar because, throughout the fieldwork, I would attend 
many meetings in Bujumbura during which nothing major was discussed, but many people 
would gather. Here, a major event was taking place but few people came along. 
During the meeting, a representative of ARMK first showed us a video depicting the 
construction work, in which a few people were digging out human remains and clothes, and 
amassing them randomly into coffins. Interviewed local inhabitants were calling for truth, 
justice and dignified burials. The meeting informed us of the presence of the governor of the 
province and armed police during the exhumation. During discussions about what to do and 
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how to react, there was a lot of disappointment in the room. A participant of the meeting asked 
with a trembling voice, “Where is the international community?” Within such a context, I 
personally shared the disappointment and wondered why there was not greater mobilisation 
around this well-known issue among TJ practitioners. In discussions over subsequent days, 
one INGO worker explained to me that he was waiting for the authorisation from his embassy 
to visit Kivyuka; others found it politically too sensitive to intervene, or were simply 
unavailable. 
From 2010, IW and ARMK attracted attention to this massacre in which at least 300 people 
were shot dead by military soldiers at the local market on 5th May 1996. This was presented 
as a reprisal for the action of FDD rebels who had pulled down an electric pole nearby. During 
two years, IW and ARMK pressured international actors and the Burundian government to 
investigate the massacre, build a commemoration site, exhume and bury victims with dignity 
(according to both ‘international standards’ and Burundian culture), and redirect the road to 
keep the mass grave intact. The road construction was then on hold at that junction (Impunity 
Watch 2012; Impunity Watch 2013). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
perceived as an expert organisation on the matter, had promised forensic support to exhume 
the Kivyuka mass grave, but the government decided to operate without this (International 
Commitee of the Red Cross 2013, 120).  
Until that point, the lobbying undertaken about this specific case had been considered as a 
successful mobilisation of civil society, diplomats and Burundian authorities. In the end, 
however, these efforts were extinguished by authorities giving priority to the construction of 
a road over the request of ARMK and IW. Good practices and international standards for 
exhumation and other related TJ aims (accountability, truth-seeking and commemoration) had 
been presented to local CSOs by international actors, without acknowledging the inherent 
political struggles that would sit behind. Sensitising and training activities had raised 
expectations within victims associations and the population, but they would be left 
disenchanted.   
This second vignette illustrates the highly political and social nature of TJ practices, 
particularly when dealing with mass graves, exhumation and judicial accountabilities 
associated with exhumed bodies. The manner in which TJ practitioners reacted to such matters, 
and the contradictions between the technocratisation of TJ practice and the very real political 
nature, have become obstacles for many TJ organisations. The realities of how to deal with 
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mass graves will be a central challenge in the implementation of the TRC, because the TRC 
law includes in its mandate to map and identify mass graves, protect them, and to enact 
eventual exhumation for the burial of remains in dignity (République du Burundi 2014, Art 6, 
1, d). 
Along with other recent examples of damage to mass graves, this example underlines the 
questionable commitment of local and national authorities to give the appropriate social and 
judicial attention when dealing with mass graves and the related questions of accountability 
and reparations to victims’ relatives. Also shown is how the various organisations usually 
involved in TJ discussions have preferred to avoid such discussions or disengaged themselves 
from them, finding them politically too sensitive. The vignette underlines the socio-political 
and judicial problems that the TRC will have to face in future that are not considered in current 
technical preparations of the TRC. 
These two vignettes introduce my specific empirical approach to TJ practices, and the 
ethnographic dimensions of the research looking at actual implementation. Such methods 
enable us to understand the implementation of TJ in practice, at the everyday level, beyond its 
policy documents. 
The last part of this introduction presents the research questions and the structure of the thesis.  
Research Questions and Thesis Structure 
My analysis is driven by the following research questions:  
• Why is the role of practitioners and their everyday crucial to 
understanding TJ processes?  
• How does the professionalisation of aid and TJ shape the practices of TJ 
in Burundi and Rwanda?  
• How and why do frictions between academic theory, policy discourse 
and everyday practice of TJ impact on outcomes on the ground?  
These questions are answered through six chapters. The first three chapters set the framework 
of the research by depicting the methodology, the theoretical discussions and the contextual 
background. The last three chapters are the empirical descriptions of different aspects of the 
everyday of aid and TJ practices. I review now the key questions and arguments of each 
chapter in turn. 
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Chapter 1 describes the ethnographic methods and reflexive process I employed while 
working, living and researching in ‘Aidland’. It also defines my understanding of TJ 
practitioners and of the ethnography of aid. The chapter details my ethnographic approach 
based on a “thick description” (Geertz 1973) of policy negotiations and implementation by 
observing the everyday of TJ practitioners in Rwanda and Burundi. In this methodological 
chapter, I document the data-gathering and data-analysis processes and their theoretical and 
conceptual backgrounds, as well as the ethical and epistemic implications of research in post-
conflict settings. 
The chapter recounts that for nine years, most of my professional and personal life has centred 
on my research into Rwandan and Burundian TJ processes. Throughout this research, I have 
been confronted with, and acted on, many pragmatic choices that have had important ethical, 
emotional and epistemic dimensions. This research, driven by my individual professional 
journey, is undeniably implicated in methodological and reflexive perspectives. The 
mainstream guidelines on methodology, however, proved to be insufficient for dealing with 
the ethical challenges that I faced. I argue that gathering empirical data on war-affected 
environments requires researchers to engage with the hard realities of life in the so-called 
‘field’, and to engage with the people who face these realities daily. As ‘real people’ 
themselves, researchers who engage in discussions with local respondents about war, 
accountability and reconciliation, have interactions that are frequently charged by feelings of 
empathy, frustration, anger, helplessness, hopelessness and guilt. Chapter 1 concludes that 
only by acknowledging this reflexive process can a researcher work effectively on the 
continuous construction and deconstruction of their understanding of the research object. 
In chapter 2, I present my theoretical framework. I first review chronologically the 
development of the field of TJ. Originally, TJ referred to institutional processes put in place 
by post-authoritarian regimes during the transition to democracy. Today, it refers to a wide 
range of initiatives undertaken by various organisations and communities to deal with a violent 
past. Contemporary TJ scholarship addresses this evolution and underlines the conceptual 
crisis that this young field is going through (e.g., Bell 2009; Arthur 2009; Fletcher, Weinstein, 
and Rowen 2008). A number of authors in this debate have used the concept of a ‘toolkit’ to 
denounce the ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution that some key international actors (such as the ICTJ 
and the UN OHCHR) have promoted globally to nations in ‘need’ of dealing with their violent 
past. There has been limited discussion, however, of what this TJ toolkit entails. 
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This theoretical chapter aims to expand the understanding of the TJ toolkit by unpacking the 
mechanisms, concepts and claims around it. The chapter addresses the following two 
questions. How was the TJ toolkit developed? How can the entanglement of TJ in aid structures 
be analysed? Based on the consolidation of the TJ toolkit, the chapter demonstrates how 
development studies are relevant to a deepening of the understanding of TJ practices. It also 
outlines how aid structures have impacted on practice through the use of programme and 
organisation logic, management tools, and accountability and bureaucratic obligations, 
implemented through channels that claim to be apolitical and technical. 
Chapter 3 provides a brief description of the wider socio-political contexts in which TJ has 
been implemented in Rwanda and Burundi. How are specific TJ models framed according to 
the global TJ toolkit approach? And how do the specific political and historical contexts frame 
TJ policies in Rwanda and Burundi? By responding to a violent past, TJ practices aim to break 
with a cycle of violence and build a sustainable peace. It is therefore evident that not only TJ 
policies, but also all socio-political dimensions, are affected by these legacies. In other words, 
the Rwandan and Burundian socio-political contexts in which TJ has been taking place are 
entangled in the legacies of violence. Dealing with the past is therefore more than responding 
to the past through TJ policies; peacebuilding and reconstruction are constrained and 
challenged by burdens of the past.   
The historical and political backgrounds to mass violence in Burundi and Rwanda have been 
approached by a number of historians (e.g.,, Guichaoua 1995; Reyntjens 2009; Lemarchand 
1970; Newbury 1993; Uvin 1999). Without the ambition of adding to this body of literature, 
the chapter explains why these contextual factors are important to understanding how the 
everyday of TJ practitioners is organised around (and affected by) wider responses to the 
burden of the past. For each country in turn, this chapter traces the global influences of the TJ 
toolkit on each TJ model, its integration into local dimensions, the wider peacebuilding and 
development strategies in which TJ fits, and how it affects current political affairs. 
The first empirical chapter, chapter 4, explores typical day-to-day activities in the private and 
professional spheres of TJ practitioners. The chapter addresses the following two questions. 
How is the everyday of TJ practitioners organised? And how are everyday relations affected 
by social and hierarchical dimensions? The unfolding of a typical day, and day-to-day 
obligations, in Burundi and Rwanda demonstrate that TJ matters are not the only concerns that 
most practitioners have to deal with. Above all, this analysis of their everyday highlights the 
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ways in which routines and day-to-day obligations are framed within an unequal structure and 
a political bureaucracy that both impact further on TJ practices.  
The review of a typical day scrutinises everyday contradictions beyond a simple divide 
between the international and the local, and argues, rather, that international and local 
dimensions are intertwined in the reproduction of unequal relations and structures. TJ practice 
is premised on a positive emancipatory discourse to help societies and victims emerging from 
violence to recover from past suffering. Yet this chapter describes how actors disseminating 
the emancipatory discourse for TJ, and promoting human rights, are actually embedded in 
highly hierarchical structures. A number of scholars argue that the assumption that technical 
work can fix dysfunctional states leads to Western paternalistic behaviour by donors towards 
recipients (see e.g., Duffield and Hewitt 2013; Escobar 2011; Paris 2002). Bringing such an 
analysis to TJ practice, I argue that these efforts and working patterns, focusing on 
performative and technocratic work, fail to appreciate the hierarchical social structures in 
which they operate. 
Focusing on training and sensitisation activities, chapter 5 describes the different patterns in 
the widespread activities through which TJ practitioners engage with ‘beneficiaries’. Training 
is supposed to contribute to capacity-building and sensitisation in order to enhance social 
change. What it really brings to the people being targeted and the wider community remains 
questionable. Looking at the repetitive use of undefined concepts and the silenced 
reinterpretation and adaption of a simplistic discourse through activities, this chapter 
highlights how TJ practice has institutionalised the position of claiming that ‘justice’, ‘truth’ 
and ‘reconciliation’ can be achieved through training and sensitisation initiatives. I address in 
this chapter the following three questions. What does the ‘TJ toolkit’ concretely entail in terms 
of discourse and activities? What are the frictions between policy discourse and practice? And 
what are the power dynamics in play? 
The activities that I was able to observe promoted unclear concepts such as ‘truth’, ‘pardon’, 
‘justice’, ‘reconciliation’, and ‘reparation’. The projects were presented as a form of technical 
support, yet I observed a number of dynamics related to social and political matters, such as 
how the trainers’ experience of the conflict and their political positions were revealed in their 
interpretations of TJ concepts, and how messages would be interpreted in light of the identity 
(gender, age, social position and experience of the conflict) of both the conveyers and 
recipients. Vignettes describe five different projects delivered by international aid 
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organisations to enhance capacity-building and empowerment. Before reaching the 
conclusion, I discuss a four-month workshop that I put together to encourage creative and 
critical thinking among TJ practitioners. Such experimental research proved interesting to an 
exploration of the challenges and limits of training to transfer knowledge and enhance changes 
beyond the mainstream technocratic approach. 
Finally, chapter 6 looks at TJ research projects. Whereas reporting practices are widespread 
in ‘Aidland’, there has been limited academic research to question their impacts. Against such 
an examination, the chapter is guided by three main research questions. How is a report’s 
production organised (from practical and social perspectives)? What are the socio-political 
dynamics in play that impact on the content and dissemination of a report? And how is report 
production relevant to TJ implementation? 
In contrast to sensitisation and training tools, policy-orientated reports promote the view of 
authoring organisations, with TJ professionals as the main audience rather than direct 
beneficiaries. From an academic perspective, this chapter aims to increase attention on the 
epistemic implications of the social processes behind a printed NGO report that is often 
presented with a strong scientific value. On a pragmatic level, the chapter aims to encourage 
reflexivity over the practices of report production. It scrutinises the rationales, processes and 
institutional conflicts beneath the otherwise apparently technical work of report production. 
First, I provide a general overview of the hundreds of reports produced in relation to the two 
TJ policies under scrutiny. I then look closely at two prominent research programmes: the 
gacaca monitoring in Rwanda and the national consultations in Burundi. The analysis of these 
two research projects will highlight the role played by political negotiations and social 
dynamics in the production of reports, at both the internal (to define the normative framework 
of the authoring institution) and the external level (relating to battles over representation). 
In conclusion, I consolidate how aidnographic methods have been useful in unpacking TJ 
practices in Rwanda and Burundi, and contribute to the understanding of TJ in Rwanda, 
Burundi and hence to the TJ academic field as a whole. I clarify my definition of the TJ toolkit, 
TJ technocratisation and TJ depoliticisation in everyday aid-dependent professional practices. 
Overall, the thesis provides a detailed account of the structures in which TJ practitioners 
operate. Against such a description, I argue that in trying to fix an unfixable society affected 
by irreparable experiences, frictions are inevitable. Such an approach, with its inevitable issues 
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but without the appropriate attention to dealing with them, is morally questionable. Placing 
aid for TJ under critical scrutiny is a first step. 
On a chronological note, sudden political changes resulting from the recent Burundian crisis 
are not reflected fully in the thesis, given that its body of work resides in an earlier time in 
which my research was undertaken and reported.9   
                                                 
9 I undertook my fieldwork in 2012 and 2013 in a period considered to have been relatively calm; I submitted my 
thesis in September 2015, at the rise of the recent political crisis. The corrections were submitted in August 2016, 
with the conclusion given the partial inclusion of a political update, for this underlines the key limitations of the 
TJ process in promoting a democratic transition. 
Chapter 1
Aidnography of TJ Practitioners:
Working, Researching and Living in 
Rwandan and Burundian ‘Aidland’
All © Astrid Jamar
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Chapter 1: Aidnography of TJ Practitioners: 




For nine years, most of my professional and personal life has centred around two questions: 
how can a society recover from mass violence, and how can international aid support such a 
process? From my MA studies in Tokyo, an internship in London, and a consultancy in Kigali, 
through to my doctoral studies based in Brighton, these two questions have orientated my life. 
I have worked on and researched the transitional justice (TJ) processes in Rwanda and Burundi 
throughout this time, but my occupation, location and positionality have changed. 
In my doctoral research over the past three years (2011-2014), I have used ethnographic 
methods to form a ‘thick description’ of policy negotiation and implementation in the TJ field 
by observing the everyday of TJ practitioners and their professional practices in Rwanda and 
Burundi, who I define as local and expatriate individuals involved in the implementation of TJ 
in one of the two countries. Throughout this research, I have been confronted with, and acted 
on, many practical choices that have had important ethical, emotional and epistemic 
dimensions. My journeys between policy-orientated and academic research have been 
triggered in part by my personal frustrations with the tensions between the claimed and the 
tangible contributions of a theoretical discourse, as well as by its problematic translation into 
policy and practice. Thus, my research is driven by my individual professional journey. Both 
the research object and process reflect my personal search for meaningful engagement with 
these issues, and reflection on this is brought to this methodological chapter. 
While in the field, I built on the networks formed through my previous professional 
experience, and I benefited from the relatively small size of the TJ and aid environment in 
Bujumbura and Kigali. I quickly gained access to research participants, and thence to TJ 
meetings, activities and interviews, and I collected numerous documents related to the policies 
under scrutiny. In preparation for fieldwork, I complied with ethical guidelines required by my 
university and covered some of the literature about qualitative research methods in post-
conflict countries. Most of this literature promotes a ‘do no harm’ approach, using strategies 
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that do not expose informants to any risk because of their implication in the research (that is, 
their security and psychological wellbeing, particularly in the case of vulnerable informants 
and sensitive contexts). Despite such preparation, I still felt under-equipped to deal with the 
many ethical challenges presented. 
Beyond my personal experiences, the questions driving the research are not limited to an 
analysis of the technicality, professionalisation or efficiency of aid and TJ; they also aim to 
reveal how and why international efforts to support TJ policies give no recognition to the 
politicisation in the processes and the complex social realities that shape TJ efforts ‒ both of 
which are heavily marked by colonialism and violence. In the case of Rwanda, my research 
asks why the Rwandan population, and genocide victims in particular, were given so much 
responsibility for establishing accountability for their own suffering. It implicitly questions 
why no better protection was provided for the people unjustly condemned through gacaca 
courts for genocide crimes. Why did aid actors enable such injustices to take place in the name 
of reconciliation, accountability and the rule of law? Why did international supporters and 
donors turn their backs so readily from confronting the contradictions of gacaca once the 
process was under way? 
There are similar questions in the often-neglected case of Burundi. Why do international actors 
keep lobbying, in spite of the apparently limited benefits, for mechanisms not welcomed by 
authorities? Why do aid actors disseminate such a simplistic and idealistic vision of truth and 
reconciliation to an already resilient Burundian population? Why do so many actors maintain 
that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission will bring accountability while there is the context 
of continuing political instability and extrajudicial killings in Burundi? Why expect that the 
current regime will deal genuinely with crimes of the past when it does not deal with those of 
the present? 
The discussions with my research participants, based on these kinds of sensitive questions, 
entailed serious ethical concerns, particularly when dealing with people affected directly by 
the conflicts and genocide. The resulting challenges faced in fieldwork encouraged me to 
reflect retrospectively on previous working experiences, and reflect critically on methods for 
post-conflict research. I engaged with the limited reflection that exists academically on 
emotions in empirical research in war-torn societies. Analysing how emotional responses are 
silenced in both academic and policy-orientated research in conflict-affected regions, I 
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developed an analytical framework to deconstruct these conventions that exclude emotionality 
and normative commitments from the research process. 
Following postmodern epistemologies (e.g., Foucault 1982; Foucault 1977; Sylvester 1994), I 
reject the idea that researchers can credibly protect their research from the influence of their 
own underlying emotions and normative commitments, and instead promote the idea that such 
commitments should be made plain in research. I consider that it is only by acknowledging 
this that a researcher can continually and effectively construct and deconstruct their 
understanding of the research object. 
In this methodological chapter, I document the data-gathering and data-analysis processes by 
detailing the theoretical, conceptual basis of the ethnographic methods I employed, as well as 
pragmatic steps and ethical and epistemic implications. In the first section, I focus on the data-
gathering process by defining my methodology conceptually and theoretically; describing how 
I gained access to my field site and what type of information I gathered, and how I complied 
with official ethical guidelines that proved to be inadequate for dealing with the challenge 
faced. In the second section, I discuss my reflexive processes and the positionality emanating 
from my previous working experiences, the emotional dimensions of my fieldwork, and the 
resulting construction of my epistemic framework, and I do so with some reflection on this 
inadequacy of mainstream ethical guidelines in post-conflict contexts. 
  
Section 1.1 
Data-Gathering Process: Ethnography 
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1.1. Data-Gathering Process: Ethnography of Aid in Post-Conflict Contexts 
1.1.1. Aidnography of Transitional Justice: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
In this first section, I describe the theoretical and conceptual framework that constitutes my 
research methods by defining in turn ‘aidnography’, ‘practitioners’, and ‘everyday practices’. 
‘Aidnography’ is a term derived recently to describe the increasing use of ethnographic 
methods to research aid practices. From a general perspective, Hammersley and Atkinson 
(2007, 3) consider that ethnographic data collection 
usually involves the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an 
extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking questions 
through informal and formal interviews, collecting documents and artefacts – in fact gathering 
whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are (the) emerging focus of inquiry. 
This definition of ethnography implies that the researcher approaches his or her research 
participants by entering their everyday life rather than reporting from “a context created for 
the researcher” (Ibid., 3–4). With an “embrace of multiple techniques” (Wolcott 2008), I have 
hence gathered rich qualitative data to develop an understanding of the everyday of TJ 
practitioners involved in two particular TJ processes in Rwanda and Burundi. Creating a “thick 
description” of these TJ processes, my thesis aims to “clarify what’s going on in such places, 
to reduce the puzzlement” (Geertz 1973, 16). Based on “small but very densely textured facts”, 
I explore “the meanings that particular social actions have for the actors” under inquiry (Ibid., 
25 & 27). Specifically, I look into the everyday activities of TJ practitioners at the professional 
and private levels: such as their work duties, usual and unusual professional practices, 
trajectories and motivations, lifestyles and habits, and power and hierarchical dynamics, as 
well as examine their understanding and approaches to the TJ process.  
As ethnography of aid, the aidnographic data collection is therefore unstructured and 
undergoes a redefining process along every step of the research. By giving attention to how 
individuals working on aid-dependent TJ processes relate to each other and their everyday 
practices in terms of power, agency and structures, my research constitutes an ‘aidnography 
of TJ practitioners’ and this analytical position has been adopted through both the gathering 
and the analysis of dense qualitative facts in these areas. At a conceptual level, applying 
ethnography to the field of aid can help us to deconstruct and deepen an understanding of 
concepts and practices associated with this field (e.g., Crewe and Harrison 1998, 14-19).  
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This approach was initiated by scholars who pushed anthropology beyond the “traditional 
role” of cultural brokerage that had been gained in the aid industry (Escobar 1991; Ferguson 
1990). Introducing aidnography, Gould highlights that ethnography turned out, as an in-depth 
qualitative approach that privileges “agency over structure, experience over theory, and 
diversity over uniformity” (Gould 2004, 264), to be an ideal research tool for looking at the 
aid industry. From a general description of aid practices, Gould (2014, 6) also notes that 
Aid works through individual and corporate agency, and its actors are embedded in matrices of 
complex social relations. The true nature of these relations is typically obscured by ideologically 
defined subject positions (benefactor, donor, expert, partner and recipient). Furthermore, the forms 
of social awareness within which this vocabulary makes sense are contradictorily embedded in and 
disconnected from domestic (i.e., national) contexts. 
TJ practitioners, in aid-dependent countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, are operating within 
similar structures, and exercising agency in contexts marked by legacies of colonisation and 
conflict, as well as their practices resulting in complex social relations among them. An 
aidnography of TJ practitioners can therefore bring more clarity to the professional practices 
that are taking place in the global fields of aid and TJ while embracing their local socio-
political realities. 
While the term ‘aidnography’ emerged only in the last decade, ethnography of aid has a longer 
history. One of the first and most prominent pieces was James Fergusson’s research into a 
rural development programme in Lesotho. Arguing that “even a ‘failed’ development project 
can bring about important structural changes,” he considered “the actual transformations that 
were brought about by the project were in no way congruent with the transformations that the 
conceptual apparatus planned” (Ferguson 1990, 275). More recently, ethnography of aid has 
put forward a focus on intermediaries coined ‘aid brokers’ ‒ aid practitioners who interact and 
negotiate with beneficiary groups on the implementation of development policies (Bierschenk, 
Chauveau, and Olivier de Sardan 2000; Lewis and Mosse 2006). These pieces of research 
supported theoretically and methodologically my scrutiny of TJ practitioners as key 
intermediary actors whose agency and role are crucial in designing and negotiating the 
implementation of TJ policies.  
As the first to promote an actor-orientated approach to research on development, Norman Long 
(1992) suggested looking at the interactions of social local actors in which agency and power 
operate. Long (1992: 20) considered that 
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Social actors are not simply seen as disembodied social categories (based on class or some other 
classificatory criteria) or passive recipients of intervention, but active participants who process 
information and strategise in their dealings with various local actors as well as with outside 
institutions and personnel. 
Within this perspective, agency refers to the social interactions through which one individual 
operates within given contexts and power structures. Expanding on this, Lewis and Mosse 
(2006, 13) observe that such an actor-orientated approach opens up “the study of intermediary 
actors … operating at the ‘interfaces’ of different world-views and knowledge systems, and 
reveals their importance in negotiating roles, relationships, and representations.” Borrowing 
from Bruno Latour’s understanding of social and institutional realms, they developed the 
concepts of development ‘brokers’ and ‘translators’ by considering that “all actors (and not 
just the sociologist) produce interpretations and powerful actors offer scripts into which others 
can be recruited for a period” (Lewis and Mosse 2006, 13). In this sense, development brokers 
and translators, as intermediaries who implement development policies, “prove themselves by 
transforming the world in conformity with their perspective of the world” (Latour, 1996, 194-
195 cited in Lewis and Mosse 2006). 
Continuing the ethnographic scrutiny of aid workers, Raymond Apthorpe coined the term 
‘Aidland’, as an environment with “its own mental topographies, language and discourse, lore 
and custom, and approaches to organisational knowledge and learning” (Apthorpe 2011, 199). 
A group of scholars have continued to expand this literature about Aidland, to form an 
emerging paradigm of aidnography (e.g., Mosse 2011; Denskus 2014; Fechter and Hindman 
2010). Among these authors, Fechter (2010, 2) has justified the approach on the basis that the 
scholarship on development “often neglect(s) the day-to-day experiences of those doing aid 
work. In the rush to offer either prescriptions or critique, the human actors who transform 
policy into projects are neglected.” She suggests “that the structure of the work itself influences 
the outcomes of development.” Following this same conceptual framework, I aim to 
demonstrate how the everyday practices and experiences of TJ practitioners are influencing 
policymaking and implementation in TJ ‒ and hence its outcomes. 
Harrison (2013, 264, 274) has challenged the concept of Aidland for being almost narcissistic, 
by taking the focus away from the problems addressed by development practices, and failing 
to focus on the impact of the geopolitical shift in aid. While taking into account her critique of 
self-centred aidnography, this thesis confronts daily work practices with the complex realities 
in which they intervene – and how technocratic nature of aid helps to disguise its complexity. 
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Most Aidland studies have placed the emphasis on expatriate aid workers, their ‘technical’ 
role, mobility and parochial culture. In contrast, my research of Aidland expands out to a wide 
range of individuals connected to each other by the policies on which they work: the 
implementation of the gacaca courts in Rwanda and the negotiation over the TRC in Burundi. 
My definition of TJ practitioner includes any individual whose professional obligations have 
to do with these two processes, including: heads of mission, project coordinators, 
representatives of aid agencies (multilateral and bilateral donors), diplomats (political officers, 
heads of governance/justice, ambassadors), activists, representatives of victim associations, 
consultants, and representatives of local authorities (judicial and executive sectors ‒ see 
appendix for the list of organisations approached).  
Having researched the everyday of TJ practitioners, I aim to establish how they operate and 
how they approach the consequences of mass violence in Burundi and Rwanda, which shape 
the contexts in which they intervene. Henri Lefebvre (1971, 197) considers everyday life as a 
social territory whose analysis “reveals its latent irrationality beneath an apparent rationality, 
incoherence beneath an ideology of coherence, and sub-systems or disconnected territories 
linked together only by speech.” Similarly, I aim to unpack how the everyday of TJ 
practitioners is organised, resulting from an apparently coherent policy and giving the 
impression of rational actions, yet obscuring incoherent interventions. The thesis demonstrates 
how individual experiences, professional obligations and personal understanding of TJ are 
crucial elements framing TJ processes.  
In the same way that aidnography researches aid practices, aidnography of transitional justice 
seeks to clarify how aid-dependent TJ projects work in practice, and how policy models are 
constructed and then implemented. This is a crucial exercise for a field criticised for being too 
professionalised (see chapter 2). The thesis provides further empirical evidence of the 
processes of TJ professionalisation and technocratisation.  
1.1.2. Doing Research and Living in Rwanda and Burundi: Accessing Data through 
Fieldwork 
Building on my previous research experience (details in the second section), I have undertaken 
ten months of fieldwork based in Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi, with frequent travel to 
Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. Following Hammersley and Atkinson’s (2007, 1) understanding 
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of fieldwork, I have been “living with a group of people for extended periods … in order to 
document and interpret their distinctive way of life, and the beliefs and values integral to it.” 
I have drawn on a range of ethnographic methods, including participant observation ‒ that is: 
attending meetings, workshops, and sensitisation and training sessions about transitional 
justice; attending professional and festive official events that gathered TJ and aid practitioners; 
and conducting semi-structured individual and group interviews.  
By entering the everyday of a specific group, it is only to be expected that different directions 
might be taken by the research schedule and fieldwork than planned, or that challenges would 
be faced (e.g., Fuji 2014). Initially, I decided to go for six months of fieldwork in Burundi and 
Rwanda, from August 2012 to February 2013. This initial fieldwork was heavily interrupted 
by a consultancy job that lasted longer than expected, and involved a lot of difficulties (see 
next section). I returned for a second stage of fieldwork from June to October 2013. As I had 
predicted, the follow-up of the gacaca process after its closure was almost non-existent. In 
contrast, the preparations for the 20th Genocide Anniversary were receiving important 
attention at both national and international levels. I returned for ten days to Rwanda in April 
2014 to attend the main events of the genocide anniversary in Kigali; I aimed to observe how 
references were made to gacaca and how my research participants approached the post-
genocide context at that particular moment.10 
Throughout all these stages of fieldwork, I interviewed 70 people, and attended dozens of 
GRTJ meetings (le Groupe de Reflexion sur la Justice Transitionelle or Reflection Group of 
Transitional Justice in Burundi; regular gatherings of around 30 different organisations, such 
as local and international NGOs, victim associations, UN agencies and donors dealing with 
TJ), internal NGO meetings, and academic and press conferences, as well as several training 
and sensitisation sessions. Furthermore, I shared innumerable informal discussions with key 
research informants over coffee, beers and days off. I have personally attended dozens of 
training sessions and workshops. Events that I did not attend were studied through the analysis 
of gathered textual and multimedia materials as well as through interviews with informants 
(participants, donors and organisers ‒ see chapter 5). As described in chapter 6, I have received 
                                                 
10 On the way, I stopped in Burundi to organise brief update interviews with research participants. They all 
expressed severe concerns about the degradation of the security and political contexts over the preceding months 
(since the completion of my fieldwork). In parallel with reading in the media about the continuing degrading 
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an important number of reports through fieldwork and I have been involved myself in the 
production of reports. I analyse these policy documents as social objects holding key roles in 
practitioners’ everyday work. I additionally ran a 13-session workshop with TJ practitioners 
to create dialogue between the practice of TJ and its academic literature (see chapter 5).  
I filled up dozens notebooks with handwritten interview transcriptions and field notes, and 
gathered thousands of paper and digital documents. Four elements have facilitated my access 
to data:  
1. Previous work experience in the field: From 2008 to 2011, I worked with five 
organisations involved in the implementation of TJ in Rwanda and Burundi, through which I 
spent 12 months in the two countries and four months in a European head office. I gained 
contextual understanding and experienced the working patterns and lifestyles of TJ 
practitioners with various NGOs (see section 2). More importantly, this meant that previous 
colleagues were pleased to act as gatekeepers or direct informants. When I returned to 
undertake my doctoral fieldwork, this was particularly important in the case of Rwanda, where 
the gacaca process had finished just before my arrival in the region, and most stakeholders had 
withdrawn from the process earlier. 
2. Pre-existing connections with Rwanda and Burundi: The post-colonial history shared by 
Belgium (my home country), Rwanda and Burundi led to many interactions among the three 
countries and their populations. My family (who have never been in the region) have close 
friends in Bujumbura and Kigali. I have known these friends since my childhood and they 
helped me to settle, hosted me on many occasions and provided important clues for my 
understanding of Rwandan and Burundian cultures. During high school, I also had a Rwandan 
penfriend who lost his parents during the genocide. Furthermore, I had a circle of university 
friends working in the two countries during my fieldwork who facilitated access to some 
diplomats and aid institutions (Burundi and Rwanda, being the main recipients of Belgian aid, 
offer many job opportunities to Belgian aid workers in the region). Despite all these 
connections, I regularly travelled with my Mexican passport in Rwanda to avoid complications 
with research clearance and visa procedures (officially longer only for Belgian citizens as a 
result of difficult relations between the two countries). 
3. The proximity of aid workers in living settings: By living in Burundian Aidland, I 
benefited from a constant proximity to expatriates and the local elite working in aid, of which 
TJ practitioners are a part. Expatriate aid workers constitute a small network of foreign people, 
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particularly in Burundi, and frequent the same restaurants, bars and beaches. Most of my 
housemates in Burundi and Rwanda were expatriate aid workers. I also lived for several 
months with a Burundian family and a Belgo-Rwandan family (the family friends mentioned 
above) and all these ‘host parents’ also worked in the aid industry. Some informants were or 
had been my housemates; others were colleagues of friends, or friends of friends. I frequently 
spent time informally with some informants: I would be invited to TJ related events by 
bumping into someone in the bakery or at the swimming pool. In Kigali, given that I was not 
based in Rwanda and that the gacaca process was over, the situation was slightly different. 
4. The small numbers of TJ practitioners and relative openness to researchers:  In both 
countries, there are just a dozen or so organisations dealing with TJ matters. Therefore, 
‘snowball sampling’ was relatively easy to employ to obtain contact information and meet 
members of most of the organisations under scrutiny. Moreover, a number of platforms 
regularly gathered various groups of TJ practitioners. The main platform was the Reflection 
Group of Transitional Justice in Burundi, which meets to exchange regularly around TJ 
matters. The group also has a mailing list about meeting invitations, policy documents and 
policy progress. Other academic circles sometimes also invite similar actors, such as the 
conferences at the Institute of Development Policy and Management (IOB), the University of 
Antwerp attended by Belgian NGOs operating in the region, or the Grapax Conferences that I 
attended in Brussels and Bujumbura (Groupe de recherche en appui aux politiques de paix – a 
research group financed by the Belgian Ministry of Cooperation with close ties to some INGOs 
working in Burundi and Rwanda).  
These four entry points have played a crucial role in accessing and sourcing data. Most 
participants showed great interest in my research at initial contact. The opportunities to 
socialise with TJ practitioners, attend meetings and obtain a first interview were relatively easy 
to access. Discussing different cultures of ethics, Didier Fassin (2006, 523) underlines that 
ethnographic “participant-observation … is characterised by its informality. It blurs the 
boundaries between research and life. Fieldwork is everywhere … Obviously, all these 
heuristic moments should not be excluded as sources of information in a scientific 
investigation.” Similarly, it was through many informal discussions that I gained trust and 
valuable information. Beyond access, these discussions brought important insights about 
people’s positionality, aspirations and concerns. 
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Access to a deeper perspective of their everyday lives required a much larger commitment on 
the part of research participants. This immediately raised issues of trust, my role and the 
purpose and/or utility of the research (see Omidian 1994). Negotiating access was not just 
about the initial access, but an ongoing preoccupation throughout the research to gain 
observation permission, to access internal documents, and to gain sufficient trust to hear 
participants’ personal positions (rather than a repetition of the official positions of their 
organisations). I frequently encountered implicit and explicit reluctance to hear about 
weaknesses and institutional limits, and, although rare, I was refused interviews (on the basis 
that the informant did not know enough about TJ, or that I had already interviewed another 
member of their organisation). Several people from authorities or diplomatic offices did not 
respond when I contacted them. During the time of my fieldwork, the Burundian authorities 
had no appointed representative on TJ matters; this left it unclear to me the people I should 
approach and created limited opportunities to engage with authorities. I was refused access to 
meetings, particularly diplomatic ones. The sensitivity of the context was certainly a key factor 
explaining such reluctance, on which I will expand in the next sub-section. 
I chose all my research participants because of their professional experiences. Participants 
were drawn from national institutions, embassies, aid agencies, international and local NGOs, 
and victim associations involved in the negotiations over and the establishment of transitional 
justice in Burundi and Rwanda. I approached participants via email and/or telephone to arrange 
interviews. When emailing, I always included the participant informant sheet, and when 
seeking arrangements over the phone, I provided a brief description of the research. The 
appendix contains a list of the actors and institutions I approached in both countries. 
I undertook semi-direct interviews with most informants (70 people), which lasted around 90 
to 120 minutes. Many were interviewed twice and some up to six times. With key research 
informants, I encountered them so frequently that we never sat together for a formal and 
structured interview; rather we exchanged our different positions and experiences in everyday 
conversations (with the practitioners involved in the Summer School, for example). These key 
informants were coming from various background and positions (including diplomats, head of 
programmes and head of missions of local and international NGOs). The majority were 
interviewed individually. The few group interviews were organised under the initiative of the 
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Table 1: Overview of interviewed sample 
Working at the time of the interview for/as Among which  
Embassy 17 Expatriates 41 
International NGO 21 Locals 29 
Local NGO 14   
Aid agency 3   
Local authority 6   
Consultant 2 Undertaken in/through 
Academic engaged politically 2 Burundi 39 
UN  5 Rwanda 29 
Total 70 Skype 2 
 
The discussions in semi-structured interviews were based on the following predefined themes: 
the career path of the interviewee, and what led them to work on TJ matters; the general 
mandate and programmes related to TJ matters of the organisation they worked for; their 
individual role and obligations; their opinion on the TJ process; in Rwanda, how they 
perceived gacaca’s closure; in Burundi, how they perceived ongoing obstacles to the 
implementation of the TRC; and everyday difficulties. Depending on the context, I added 
specific questions, such as clarification on elements related to their work that I had heard about 
from other sources or the perceptions of their own organisation’s programme. Every couple of 
months, I undertook update interviews with people who were happy to contribute to my 
research, asking for more details on the contextual progress and additional information 
according to re-tailored research questions. In Rwanda, some in position at the time of research 
had not been personally involved in the implementation of gacaca courts. I questioned them 
on the institutional position and their perception of the legacy of gacaca. I complemented this 
data with interviews I had undertaken in previous research projects, as well as by interviewing 
people who were previously involved in gacaca.  
In Rwanda, most expatriates I interviewed in charge of justice and governance matters were 
not up-to-date on the gacaca situation as it was not part of their priority and/or they considered 
that the matter was closed. To move further in the discussions, I often had to explain the details 
of gacaca. While the need to do this was a good indicator of donors’ disengagement, it meant 
that my comments would influence the discussions that followed. Similarly, I was often asked 
my opinion on particular points, or engaged in debates that brought in my own opinion. My 
negative description of the situation might have affected some discussions. In the presentation 
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of my analysis below, I have attempted to account for my own position and my influence on 
conversations with my research participants. 
Throughout, I received spontaneously and gathered thousands of written documents. At every 
interview, I asked for a copy of documents mentioned in discussions and for publications and 
statements about TJ matters. I also gathered documents through Internet searches and received 
documents by email. In addition, I had gathered hundreds of documents in previous research 
projects. Gathered by Stef Vandeginste and Bert Ingelaere from 1994 to 2009, I was also given 
the loan of several boxes containing 543 policy documents related to the gacaca process. The 
documents acquired were varied: minutes of meetings; internal and unpublished reports; NGO 
publications; working papers, and policy, parliamentary and legal documents; media releases 
and press cuttings; speech transcriptions; programme documents; funding proposals; logical 
frameworks; job descriptions; NGO programme and monitoring reports for donors; internal 
monitoring and evaluation reports; aid agreements. Chapter 6 of this thesis reflects on the 
production of policy-orientated research reports. The other documents have been useful for 
identifying the official positions of institutions, the formation and use of concepts and 
narratives, and for explicit and implicit rules of validation as well as contextual information 
(e.g., Apthorpe and Gasper 1996, 6–9). 
1.1.3. Post-conflict Ethics: Sensitivity, Rapport and limits of ‘Do not harm’ 
As mentioned in the introduction, the research aim is not only to look behind the 
technocratisation and bureaucratisation of TJ practices. A main aim is to highlight how and 
why international efforts deny the political and social realities that structure the evolution and 
outcome of TJ processes. By identifying current working patterns and structural obstacles, I 
want to open the ‘black box’ of TJ mechanisms to underline their limits. My research does not 
directly address the central aims of transitional justice; that is, identifying victims and people 
responsible for crimes, establishing the ‘truth’ about the conflict, and whether people have 
been reconciled or received reparation. The social, political and judicial dimensions around 
these questions are intrinsically related to what does concern my work by looking at 
professional practices that design and implement TJ policies. For these reasons, the research 
confronts a number of serious ethical concerns. This sub-section describes the official ethical 
procedures I complied with during fieldwork preparation and fieldwork. But as will be shown, 
these precautions turned out to have their limitations in dealing with the challenges faced. 
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In preparation of the obligatory ethical review process at my university, I followed the ethical 
guidelines of the Association of Social Anthropologist (ASA), and I complemented the ethical 
reflection with support from literature about research methods (for example, Association of 
Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth 2011; Sriram et al. 2009; Goodhand 
2000; Camino and Krulfeld 1994). These guidelines implied that I should anticipate all the 
potential risks that research participants would be exposed to by taking part in the research. 
These precautions included paying particular attention to obtaining informed consent, 
maintaining confidentially and ‘doing no harm’, as in striving not to aggravate the 
psychological wounds of vulnerable people. 
The university team of the ethical review approved the research after requiring me to add more 
precision on how I would deal with my own security as well as with data related to 
malpractices and criminal acts. The Rwandan Ministry of Education did not consider the 
research required further ethical approval and I received the research clearance one day after 
submitting my application. 
The nature of TJ and the fragility of my research contexts called for further political and 
psychological sensitivity. Some TJ practitioners, particularly local individuals, put themselves 
at substantial risk by fighting for truth, justice, accountability and reparation of past crimes. 
Their working environment is stained by diplomatic, political and competitive concerns 
demonstrated by intimidation and arrests of local activists, extrajudicial killings of political 
opponents and difficult relations between donors and authorities, particularly in Rwanda (e.g., 
Waldorf 2007; Longman 2011; Ghoshal 2010; Louw-Vaudran, n.d.; Soudan 2014a; Soudan 
2014b). I wanted to ensure that their involvement in my research should not increase these 
risks. 
The authoritarian nature of the political regimes in both countries would also create a 
suspicious and paranoid environment on both sides of research interactions (researcher-
researched), particularly in Rwanda (Reyntjens 2011; Begley 2009; Thomson 2013). Given 
this, I expected that self-censorship and silence would occur often. I experienced implicit and 
explicit reluctance on the part of some potential respondents to engage with some parts of my 
research. My presence in some meetings was refused, many interviewees gave replies that 
contradicted themselves or offered irrelevant answers. Learning to navigate these elements 
was difficult and frustrating, particularly when I was listening to those who would not speak 
beyond the public discourse. I gradually learnt to rephrase my questions, search for alternative 
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entry points and accept that I would not obtain clarification or a coherent response on some 
dimensions. Such evasiveness and reluctance to be part of my research were also useful pieces 
of data towards understanding TJ professional practices. 
Given such a context, I took a number of precautions to protect the research project and 
participants. The ethical guidelines of the Association of Social Anthropologists explicitly 
require the researcher to be fully transparent about research objectives and to obtain consent 
from all respondents (Association of Social Anthropologists 2011). This means the researcher 
must communicate all information likely to influence the willingness to participate. Ruth 
Krulfeld (1998, 24) notes that informed consent “is not possible for every bit of information 
we collect,” particularly in cross-cultural contexts. In my case, it was also unlikely that I would 
obtain research authorisation from authorities if I directly introduced my interest in the 
politicisation of aid, the inefficiency and incoherence of TJ practices, and institutional limits. 
The process for asking for informed consent was often challenging. It required me to balance 
different aspects of ethical concerns and frequently redesign how I presented my research so 
as not to jeopardise it. 
More importantly, without maintaining confidentiality and anonymity, information could 
jeopardise the informant’s job, institution and, in the case of local activists, even personal 
security. Due to the small size of the community of TJ practitioners in these countries, 
maintaining confidentiality and anonymity was difficult, particularly through the writing 
process. Precautions included explicit discussion about confidentiality with the research 
participants; storage of field notes in a safe place in a password-protected computer; and 
references to interviews anonymised as far as possible in the writing process (Association of 
Social Anthropologists 2011, 4).  
Most informants were interviewed regularly and were aware of the risks; and they certainly 
filtered the information they conveyed. In some cases, individuals asked me to not anonymise 
them and were willing to express their own position publicly (in all cases, these were 
practitioners who held different positions from the organisations they worked for). The 
interviews were not recorded with an audio-recorder but transcribed by hand. Despite such 
precautions, I often heard the request, ‘this is off-record’ ‒ once, I was even asked to put my 
pen down. Some informants needed to whisper in their own office when they addressed a topic 
they found sensitive. Besides ethical concerns, previous research contractual arrangements 
included confidentiality clauses.  
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As Silke Roth (2015, 177) underlines with her methodological discussions of her research on 
aid workers, changing names is not enough to maintain confidentiality. The particular 
sensitivity and risk for critical voices in Rwanda and Burundi, and previous contractual 
obligations to confidentiality that tie me under agreement with previous employers has 
required me to pay particular attention on this matter. Even anonymised, or in vignettes that 
contain no contextual information, the socio-political dynamics described in this thesis are 
relevant to many aid-dependent contexts beyond my research. As a result, the description of 
each vignette in this thesis is after careful consideration of these elements and the amount of 
information required for the reader balanced against respect for the confidentiality of research 
informants. 
In view of rumours that the Rwandan context was unfriendly to researchers (for example, 
Begley 2009; Hirondelle News Agency 2008; de Lame et al. 2013; Jessee 2013; Nicaise 2013), 
I felt paranoid, especially when crossing borders and customs or when interviewing informants 
considered to be close to the regime. Due to fears that I might be expelled or could jeopardise 
my research, I introduced my topic with a lot of precaution, and refrained from exposing my 
critical position. Whenever I felt that could trust informants, however, I fully engaged in 
debates with participants.   
Furthermore, due to the scale of violence in both countries, every Rwandan and Burundian 
national would have been affected in some way. Even though past violence is part of their 
daily work (on transitional justice), I had to remain cautious not to re-open old wounds and 
needed to set boundaries on the conversation when necessary (Goodhand 2000). Their 
experiences of the conflict sometimes emerged through discussions about their professional 
trajectory and their perception of TJ progress. Although the interviews were not directly 
addressing these experiences, a number of local practitioners explained that it was their 
experiences of the conflict that had led them to become interested in TJ matters. These 
included, for example, losing family members, witnessing or escaping from killing scenes, 
having family members involved in the perpetration of violence.  
Even though the pieces of information that emerged provided clear indications that personal 
experiences strongly impacted on people’s political positions and views about who was to be 
held responsible, I did not deter interviewees from sharing this information, and nor on the 
other hand did I seek to expose informants reluctant to address their own suffering. The need 
for caution in handling the emotions of respondents is a key feature of the literature (e.g., 
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Goodhand 2000; Chandra Lekha Sriram et al. 2009). Methodological and ethical guidelines 
for social science research in sensitive contexts, including conflict-related research, require 
researchers to adopt a ‘do no harm’ approach. Most of this literature is concentrated on the 
elements mentioned above ‒ strategies to secure the protection of informants and gatekeepers, 
to protect the data gathered, and to pay special attention not to aggravate the psychological 
wounds of vulnerable people. 
That said, the most difficult and sensitive data gathered during fieldwork came from 
participant observation ‒ that is, in activities organised by NGOs and authorities, such as: 
sensitisation workshops, some of which I found were considerably traumatic; visits to 
commemoration sites, with testimonies from participants explaining how they survived and 
how people were killed around them; a visit to a field in which bones and clothes from the 
mass killings in 1972 were poking up through the ground; or discussing the killings of high 
school students at commemoration sites. Among these difficult moments, the atmosphere at 
the Amahoro stadium for the 20th commemoration of the Rwandan genocide was extremely 
traumatic, being surrounded by people crying (including the person helping me with 
translation), screaming and being carried away by psychosocial workers. Though I had no 
direct responsibility for the reactions, nor control over the situations, I expressed sympathy 
with the people directly affected and found it difficult myself to digest the data, the emotions 
and the scenes.  
As it affects in-depth engagement with research participants, ethnographic research ethically 
requires us to acknowledge the power asymmetries in play. As an extension of the approach 
to do no harm, this encourages researchers to empower their research participants, by giving 
them a voice through listening, writing and research dissemination (as detailed in the second 
part of the chapter, these premises have already criticised ‒ e.g., Opie 1992; Behar 1996, 26). 
However, as Steven Sampson (2013, 1) highlights, all the precautions mentioned in this section 
assume that we as researchers hold more power, and “we have to act ethically”, “to compensate 
for our power.” For myself, it was not systematically the case that I was ‘the powerful one’ in 
relation to participants. TJ practitioners come from very different geographical, educational, 
social and political backgrounds. They have different experiences with the genocides and 
conflicts at the centre of the two TJ policies.  
From international and local elites, to members of victim associations, my engagement with 
them implied various sets of power asymmetries and a consequent variety of ethical concerns. 
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For higher-level informants, my impression was that the image projected of me was of a young 
and inexperienced white woman, and, for some locals, of an overeducated, privileged 
‘muzungu’ with financial means to fly to Burundi and frequent the fancy expatriate centres. 
Between these two extremes, the rapport created by the research led to various forms of 
relation, from friendship to hostility. This variety of power asymmetries also meant that 
adopting an ‘empowering position’ was not appropriate in many settings. Conversely, I felt 
myself to be the disempowered party on several occasions. 
Looking into elites, Sampson (2013, 3) encourages different ethics when “studying up”, by 
exposing the privileged positions held by the elite rather than understanding the subalterns, 
“because elites have power and because the anthropological project is to reveal, to lay bare 
how power works”. His position supports my approach to engaging in debates with elite 
participants and encouraging them to ‘think outside the box’, rather than just give them a voice. 
I often felt guilty and challenged during fieldwork about not always positioning myself as the 
neutral observer. By gradually accepting my own positionality, I learnt to expose it with more 
ease and engaged progressively in more constructive ways to create a space for debates with 
research informants; through these exchanges I also aimed to encourage critical thinking 
towards their practices and listen to their reactions.  
Finally, it is clear to me that an approach to do no harm fails to build resilience for the difficult 
experiences and to feel confident with my engaged position. I accumulated personal 
frustration, guilt, increasing feelings of powerlessness and had severe sleeping issues. This 
combination worsened during the fieldwork, and it took me to ‘break down’ on my return 
before I could create time for reflection. Among alternative approaches to the consideration of 
ethics, other scholars have brought attention to additional challenges and ethical implications 
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1.2. Data Analysis Process and Reflexivity: Positionality, Emotions, 
Epistemology 
While the previous section addresses the minimum requirements for ethical clearance, it 
demonstrates that these did not provide me with sufficient guidelines during my fieldwork. 
This second section goes beyond mainstream ethical guidelines by deepening the reflexive 
process according to the particular sensitivity of conflict-affected contexts. Research on TJ 
practitioners inevitably involves discussions about war, violence and suffering, and so is 
frequently charged with feelings of empathy, frustration and helplessness on either side of the 
interaction.  
In order to address my own positionality, I reflected on my previous working experiences 
related to TJ in Rwanda and Burundi. In spite of these appointments being challenging for 
various reasons, a pattern started to emerge. Many of the difficulties (detailed below) were 
caused by the micro and macro politics of the research projects resulting from legacies of the 
conflict and the consequently sensitive contexts; these difficulties were not to be brought into 
the professional settings and to be kept at the personal level. Out of such reflection, I came to 
consider that emotional responses were not only inevitable elements but could also be accepted 
as channels to traditionally silenced empirical data, particularly in heavily charged post-
conflict context. 
As Kay Warren underlines (2006, 214), most social sciences (anthropology in this case) now 
widely acknowledge the researcher’s position and the impossible objectivity. 
Many anthropologists now embrace a more fluid, non-essentialised view of identity and recognise 
the partiality and interestedness of any observer's account of social life. As a result our studies 
incorporate the observer within the scope of the study. No longer is there an authentic or 
comprehensively true image of social and cultural groups, no singular language of protest and 
revindication, but rather partial, shifting, and clashing representations, each with its own paradoxes 
and erasures. 
Still, emotional responses from both sides of the interaction are ignored in most academic 
literature with post-conflict contexts. I argue in this chapter that the (resulting and pre-existing) 
positionality and normative framework of both the researcher and the researched are 
consequently silenced within mainstream methodologies. In some academic literature, 
reflection on the role of emotions in research is given some importance, but there is only 
limited analysis of the impact, either on the research findings or the researcher personally 
(Dickson-Swift, James, and et. al. 2009; Kleinman and Copp 1993; Davies and Spencer 2010; 
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Hubbard, Backett-Milburn, and et. al. 2001). These authors underline and challenge how 
mainstream methodologies perceive emotional reactions as a threat to credibility and thus 
silence their impacts on the research process and outcome. These pieces of research on the 
influence of emotion in social work and emotionally sensitive labour have drawn increasing 
interest within social science research over the last two decades.  
By perceiving emotions as a risk for credibility, mainstream approaches aiming to do no harm 
deal only with the avoidance of provoking negative emotions in the respondents involved in 
the research. Such a position does not take into account the innate nature of emotional labour 
in post-conflict research, and it also creates an additional filter over academically relevant data. 
Overall, I argue that silencing emotions has repercussions for the researchers and the 
researched at the individual level, as well as consequences for ethical and epistemic 
dimensions. 
The next section reviews my reflexive process by first describing my previous working 
experience, which had a crucial impact on my positionality. Second, I unpack the different 
levels at which emotions are silenced, and underline how unexpected bias is thereby created. 
Finally, I support the call for post-modern methods by highlighting how positionality, 
emotional responses and epistemic framework are interrelated and affect the research object 
and process. 
1.2.1. Previous Working Experiences in the Field Framing my Positionality 
Throughout this thesis I refer to my previous working experiences with local authorities and 
INGOs dealing with TJ processes in Rwanda and Burundi. As discussed earlier, these 
experiences constituted key resources for securing access and for my understanding of the 
research object. Above all, reflecting on them formed the basis of my doctoral research, by 
framing my understanding and interest in this research topic; the experiences inevitably have 
methodological and epistemological implications for my research. Hammersley and Atkison 
(2007, 18) encourage the inclusion of “our own role within the research focus, and perhaps, 
even systematically exploiting our participation in the settings under study as researchers,” as 
this enables us to produce “accounts of the social world and justify them without placing 
reliance on futile appeals to empiricism, of either positivist or naturalist varieties.” Recounting 
how I previously approached TJ practices, the following paragraphs indicate how my personal 
experiences framed my doctoral research.  
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Through this chronological review, I briefly describe my roles and the difficulties faced, with 
limited opportunities to deal with them institutionally and the expectation to conceal them at 
the personal level. Throughout, I learnt to silence emotional challenges and consequently never 
gave them the attention they deserved in both academic and policy-orientated research in post-
conflict settings.  
I started to question the problems of aid coordination within peacebuilding practices during 
the research for my masters degree in Tokyo, Japan in 2007. In the exploration of practical 
obstacles in aid coordination, I focused on the implementation of gacaca. As explained briefly 
in the main introduction, I entered the field of practice through an internship within a Rwandan 
public institution (National Service of Gacaca Courts) in Kigali, Rwanda (Summer 2008). 
From within such an environment, I quickly figured out that coordination problems were not 
due to simply technical and pragmatic dimensions, but also to political and diplomatic ones. 
The first task I was asked to achieve was to summarise the Human Rights Watch (HRW) report 
about the Rwandan justice system that had just been released and had created a strongly 
negative reaction from the government of Rwanda. I was also asked to translate a letter of 
reply to INGOs about their critiques of the newly adopted 2008 gacaca law. These tasks put 
me in the front line to observe tensions between NGOs and Rwandan authorities. 
Whereas my colleagues were relatively open to discussing their everyday challenges, there 
were many points of discussion that I did not dare to mention with them ‒ for instance, the 
pro-RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front)/pro-governmental position within the organisation (as 
displayed during the office celebration on Liberation Day by singing RPF songs and giving 
the floor to a former RPF fighter to recount how the RPF had liberated the country). I found 
myself in a difficult and sensitive position hearing narrations of violence and descriptions of 
complex relations with essential aid actors, gathering many contradictory perspectives on the 
process. Every day confronted me with politically sensitive events.  
After completion of my studies, I interned in head office of an INGO to work on the data 
management of the few thousand files that had been gathered through the body’s gacaca 
monitoring. An expatriate was initially hired to organise the database in Kigali, but the funding 
came to an end before the database could be completed. It seems there were a lot of logistical 
and political challenges in the process ‒ for example, there were rumours that the data had 
been stolen from office computers in Kigali, and when I arrived, DVDs containing data had 
disappeared on their journey to the head office. I had to wait several weeks for new copies to 
 
 
Transitional Justice Battlefield: Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice 
 
54 
be transferred, enabling me to get started with the work. The time frame I had been given was 
insufficient for completing the database. Still, I read and sorted out hundreds of documents 
that contained material about violence and individual difficulties with the gacaca process. 
There were security and confidentiality concerns for making these documents public, as they 
contained names and locations of research informants, many of whom reported negative 
dimensions of gacaca. The project would later be abandoned. During this time at the head 
office, I observed strategic discussions about whether the Rwandan office should be kept open 
given the difficulty of the collaboration with Rwandan authorities.  
I was then hired by another key INGO involved in the gacaca process to produce their last 
analytical report based on their previous two years of gacaca court observations. Reviewing 
500 gacaca court transcripts from a legal perspective, this role based in Kigali put me in a great 
position to acquire a deeper knowledge of gacaca implementation. Again, a number of 
problems characterised this working experience. I was given a very limited timeframe to go 
through an immense amount of data. The project showed a kind of lethargy: after eight years 
of monitoring, it had made only a limited contribution to gacaca. There were different positions 
and disagreements within the local team and with the head office in a European country with 
regard to the gacaca process and the perspective the report should adopt. Major internal 
problems also existed in the form of allegations of corruption levelled at logistical and 
financial staff. 
In retrospect, I also found it difficult to have to read genocide trials all day long. I had regular 
nightmares about dead bodies, I felt overwhelmed with the job, had difficulties with sleep and 
lost a great amount of weight. Whereas today all these elements seem entirely predictable 
within such a project, at the time they led to me suffering a ‘breakdown’.  
The experience opened the door to me assisting a professor of applied theatre for 
reconciliation, looking into narrative analysis of these 500 gacaca trials featured in my 
previous role. This enabled me to further my understanding of frictions between truth-telling, 
reconciliation, justice and the societal stakes. I then decided to pursue research through a 
doctoral programme. These experiences had raised many questions, and the academic 
environment seemed the best for exploring them. After discussing my decision with a previous 
colleague, a semi-voluntary position in Burundi was created by two INGOs in line with my 
PhD research proposal while dealing with the application process. 
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During the six months in the new position based in Bujumbura, Burundi, I worked on three 
research projects looking at different dimensions of the TJ process: gender, sensitisation 
activity, and the role of the international community in the process. During the time, I attended 
GRJT weekly meetings, and many coordination meetings and conferences. I established a 
rapport with most of the people who would become informants for the doctoral research. It 
was, however, a laborious exercise to comply with the agendas of two NGOs and four different 
managers located in three different countries. It was once more a chaotic human resources 
situation. The head of mission of one NGO left the week after I arrived; the other head of 
mission was later expelled from the country by Burundian authorities. I was nonetheless able 
to observe the crucial re-dynamisation period of TJ, characterised by hope that the TRC project 
would finally be implemented. 
Two years later, I thought I was in a good position to promote better research practices after 
identifying methodological problems in a number of policy-orientated projects. I also needed 
to gather more funding to continue my PhD. I was then hired for a consultancy, supposedly 
for 35 days spread over four months, based in Bujumbura in parallel with the fieldwork. I was 
in charge of methodological supervision for a regional qualitative research project on refugees’ 
aspirations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Tanzania. In reality, I worked 
around 120 days and used every day off for the doctoral research.   
As soon as I started the position, I experienced further difficulties sleeping. My first 
interviewee explained how he had fled South Kivu after his brother had been killed by his half-
brother, who had also raped the interviewee’s wife. The next interviewee related how her 
family had escaped after she was raped. Another came to me to alert me about weapons being 
brought into the camp. Once again, academic preparation (mainly through reading) for a 
conflict-sensitive context did not provide much help to deal with the emotional responses these 
interactions would create. I could not sleep and in the time awake was taking the opportunity 
to work longer and longer hours for several months. 
Again, I allowed myself to become overwhelmed by the stress, and the physical and emotional 
fatigue ‒ which worsened after contracting malaria. I also encountered problems with the 
project manager. During the last month of the first set of doctoral fieldwork, I was still dealing 
with harsh negotiations over payment and author rights. I felt vulnerable, given the small world 
of the aid industry in the region; some previous colleagues and research informants became 
involved in these discussions, which made it all the more complex. Returning home did not 
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leave the burden behind. For several months I had nightmares, sleeping issues, and would cry 
for no apparent reason. Finally turning to professional support, I was diagnosed with a 
‘burnout’. This abyss was the culminant point of experiencing the everyday reality of gaps 
between policy and practice. 
All these experiences constituted preliminary pieces of research and have framed my personal 
understanding of general policy and of the working context of donors and NGOs. My 
positionality is characterised by an unclear placing as insider-outsider, and the experiences 
certainly brought my attention to practitioners as individuals, and to everyday tensions within 
teams, and how all these elements are related to structures and agency, power, and socio-
political negotiations over technical knowledge.  
These very personal elements are also brought forward here to illustrate how wider structures 
and war-torn contexts impact on individuals and their emotional responses. For instance, when 
I discussed my experience with practitioners close to me, several mentioned they had had 
similar experiences, as illustrated in this interview excerpt: 
The burnout, it is something that happens to many people, they break down internally. You cannot 
go and say so to an ambassador [that you broke down]. Most people [expatriate aid workers] stay 
for two years. Or they become extremely pessimistic and cynical. At the end of my time in Rwanda, 
I was certainly in burnout without being conscious about it. It was a perpetual crisis (Interview 
with NGO worker, 2014). 
The lack of guidance and deontology to approach difficulties of aid in post-conflict countries 
has already received some academic attention (Duffield 2010; Smirl 2012). In line with 
Duffield’s (2010) analysis of risk management practices, I was briefed about security on 
arrival for most positions as an expatriate aid-worker/volunteer deployed in a post-conflict 
country. This involved travel, communication and evacuation procedures. While increasing 
my level of fear, it did not touch on how to deal with the job sensitivity, such as the 
vulnerabilities of colleagues or the difficult relationships caused by different experiences of 
violence.  
To the contrary, I have been trained through all these experiences to filter out emotion. To be 
professional and credible, emotion must be left out, confined to the personal level. It is 
common knowledge that stress is part of the job, due to the contexts, deadlines and 
expectations from head offices and donors. There is insufficient institutional reflection, 
however, about how the content of the work and the legacies of violence affect everyday 
relational tensions. At a general level, the impacts of aid work on individuals’ wellbeing, the 
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impacts of sensitivity on researchers, respondents and hence research, are insufficiently 
tackled; which leaves researchers with nothing but their emotional burden. Even if space is 
being gained for discussions today,11emotional responses are still silenced in most professional 
settings ‒ yet they play an important role, as addressed in the following sub-sections. 
1.2.2. From Filtering Emotions to Un-silencing Emotions 
Through the reflexive process about our fieldwork, Chappuis and I, as fieldwork friends who 
both undertook research in relation to the conflict in Burundi, engaged in wider reflection 
about emotions and conflict-sensitive research methods. I unpack here how silencing emotions 
inadvertently affects different levels of research.12 The manner in which emotional responses 
are relegated to the personal sphere, because they are considered a logistical challenge, 
underlines how emotions are deemed irrelevant. While acknowledging the role of the 
researcher’s interpretations in social construction, emotional responses are not taken into 
account specifically. Indeed, scientific approaches and emotions have long been perceived as 
contradictory concepts within academia (Lutz and White 1986).  
The treatment of emotion in professional working environments is often “downgraded to 
notions of female intuition” and consequently “the caring and affective aspect … is denigrated 
to secondary status” (Hubbard, Backett-Milburn, and et. al. 2001, 122). When addressed, 
emotions do figure prominently in discussions of methodology, but these are not the emotions 
of the researcher. As mentioned in the previous section, the need for caution in handling the 
emotions of respondents is a key feature of the literature (e.g., Goodhand 2000; Mackenzie, 
McDowell, and Pittaway 2007). Despite the increasing focus on emotions in social science, 
and research as the object of enquiry, emotions expressed by researchers themselves continue 
to be treated with suspicion (Kleinman and Copp 1993, 2; Wood 2006). 
Few authors draw attention to the contribution of their emotional reaction to research processes 
and outcomes. Indeed, given the dominant conventions governing academic and policy 
research, few authors could afford to take the personal and professional risk involved in 
divulging the actual role of emotional engagement in their research processes because this is 
                                                 
11 See e.g., http://www.whydev.org/tag/well-being/; http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-
professionals-network/2014/mar/03/post-traumantic-stress-disorder-aid-workers; 
http://trauma.blog.yorku.ca/2012/02/trauma-and-the-humanitarian-aid-worker/ 
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perceived as a serious deviation from what are in effect idealised and unrealistic disciplinary 
benchmarks.  
This approach, writing from an academic perspective within dominant methodologies, aspires 
to exclude the expression of the emotional dimensions of research, because of the normative 
implications these imply, expressed as a potential bias. However, this is also an approach that 
fails to exclude emotionality (and hence normative or methodological bias) completely, 
because even the acknowledgement of emotion introduces the possibility that the research has 
been polluted by its influence. 
Relating specifically to war-affected contexts, research on emotion remains exceptional and 
scattered (Thomson, Ansoms, and Murison 2012; Begley 2009; Behar 1996; Nordstrom and 
Robben 1995; Wood 2006). Even when acknowledged, emotion is mostly perceived as a threat 
if it is not accounted for, a source of difficulty. According to Wood (2006, 384), emotional 
dynamics need to be mentioned because she is “persuaded that inadequate attention to them 
may lead field researchers to make errors in judgement that may have significant consequences 
for their research subjects as well as themselves.” Such a perception fully acknowledges the 
exchange of emotions between participants and field-researchers, but as a negative component 
that might lead to errors (rather than valuable data).  
Drawing on our experiences, Chappuis and I aimed to contribute to the insufficient discussion 
of the emotionality of research in war-affected settings, by stressing the impact on the 
researcher, the ‘researched’, the research process and ultimately the outcome. We categorise 
the relationship between emotions and research, and the modes and impacts of silencing these 
at different interconnected levels: personal, methodological and conceptual on the one hand; 
researcher and researched on the other. Table 2 summarises the empirical examples drawn 
from our own research experience of how silencing emotionality impacts on each level of 
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Personal A.1. Professional obligation to 
handle emotions in the private 
sphere 
B.1. No consideration of the 
effect on the informant, leading 
to ‘emotional impunity’ 
Methodological A.2. Emotions pose a threat to 
scientific objectivity 
B.2. Emotional exchange 
interferes with data collection 
Conceptual A.3. Emotional responses affect 
normative commitments that 
frame research 
B.3. Emotional responses as a 
subject of research 
 
The table is discussed in detail in the article I have coauthored with Fairlie Chappuis (Jamar 
and Chappuis, 2016 forthcoming). The following lines summarise the relevance of the above 
table in relation to knowledge production in post-conflict contexts.  
A1: The researcher is expected to keep emotional responses at the personal level. 
B1: First, by ignoring the emotional responses of respondents, ‘emotional impunity’ places an 
enormous emotional burden on field-researchers to deal with the tensions created. Second, it 
creates the possibility of escape from their responsibility for the emotions that may be engendered 
in respondents by the research. 
A2: Silencing emotional dimensions as part of methodological concerns results inadvertently in 
another type of bias.  
B2: The emotionally charged data is frequently just left aside and not integrated into the data 
analysis, as considered irrelevant. 
A3: While the normative commitment is openly acknowledged, its effect on the research produced 
is silenced: specifically, the fact that the report focuses on one single type of critique, due to 
normative commitments, is left unspoken for concerns of credibility and coherence. 
B3: These emotional dimensions may well be the basis on which members of the community and 
practitioners will act. This also applies to the everyday practice of TJ. As elaborated below, I 
consider that un-silencing these effects of emotionality and the resulting normative framework 
through transparent methodologies will be more efficient for dealing with inherent emotions that 
are part of research. 
1.2.3. Call for Inclusion of Emotions in Post-Conflict Research Settings 
Chappuis and I consider that emotional sensitivity to the harsh realities of lived human 
experience at the centre of conflict-related research creates and encourages normative and 
political engagement on the part of researchers. Indeed, the point here is to do away with the 
idea of the researcher as a neutral instrument of the research process: it is as patently absurd 
to believe that the external researcher does not bring his own normative and political 
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predilection into the research context as it is to believe that normative and political 
predilections do not already exist within the individuals and communities under study. 
In contrast to mainstream methodologies researching conflicts and violence, we support the 
post-modern call for an open acknowledgement of our positionality, by approaching social 
realities through the prism of power, the subjective nature of social relations and representation 
and hence rejecting the idea of an objective truth (Foucault 1982; Said 1995; Sylvester 1994). 
We argue that our emotionality shapes our normative commitments, which in turn become 
epistemic filters for our research, and that the same applies to the social actors at the centre of 
our research field.  
The key authors defining ethnography and ethnography of aid are already embedded in post-
modern epistemologies (e.g., Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Lewis and Mosse 2006). Their 
approaches to reflexivity fully incorporate the notions of rapport, power, agency and 
hierarchies that define both the research process (through interactions between researchers and 
researched groups) and the researched environment (through interactions among the 
researched community); and how these dimensions affect the production of knowledge. 
However, their approaches fail to address emotions more deeply, which is particularly 
important to do within heavily charged post-conflict contexts. As a result, in ethical guidelines 
and requirements for research in war-affected regions, important gaps remain between ethical 
concerns and their emotional components. 
If we begin from the premise that research in war-affected contexts is motivated fundamentally 
by the willingness to first understand better why people face such suffering, and then to 
question what could be done to alleviate this suffering, it is certain that the contributions of 
research are necessarily affected by our emotional response to the subject at hand and our 
normative perspective. Although this concern appears to emanate naturally from the above-
mentioned literature, both academic and policy-orientated research have developed unspoken 
conventions that serve to silence emotions and their expression. If we accept that silencing 
emotions and normative frameworks provides a patently inappropriate epistemic basis for 
social science research in which the researcher is an inevitable social actor interacting with 
other social actors in the research setting, it makes sense to consider the emotionality that 
inevitably arises from such human interactions, both as an inevitable aspect of the research 
process, and as a potentially useful source of social information.  
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Indeed, as mentioned above, research approaches inspired by postmodern epistemologies 
across a range of social science disciplines have rejected the idea that researchers can credibly 
protect their research from the influence of their own underlying emotions and normative 
commitments, and have instead promoted the idea that such commitments should be made 
plain in research (e.g., Sanford and Angel-Ajani 2006; Behar 1996; Nordstrom and Robben 
1995; Malkki 1995; Wood 2003; Thomson, Ansoms, and Murison 2012). If we accept the 
premise that emotionality contributes to framing the research endeavour, yet remains a 
conventionally silent influence, then the most reasonable response is to encourage 
transparency in both emotional responses and the consequent normative engagement in 
relation to the research object. In other words, because emotionality and its consequent 
normative commitments cannot be extricated from the research context, we ought to display 
transparency in writing and reporting this through a clearer interpretation of the research 
process and outcomes that constitute our production of knowledge. 
In extension, the production of knowledge about TJ processes in highly sensitive contexts such 
as Burundi and Rwanda inevitably arises from a puzzling myriad of subjective experiences 
and perceptions of the conflict and its policy response. Within the field of TJ that aims to 
establish ‘truth’ and ‘accountability’, the multi-level interactions of different narratives are 
crucial in the reflexive process, through both collecting and appreciating the various 
interpretations and creating one’s own interpretation. Among the extended literature about the 
Rwandan genocide, several scholars underline the complex challenges of representation due 
to epistemic and political dimensions in the work examining memory within Rwandan society 
(Lemarchand 2007; Waldorf 2007; Longman and Rutagengwa 2004; Burnet 2009) and within 
academia (Ingelaere 2010; Eltringham 2003).  
These pieces of literature underline that “divergent narratives are inevitable” (Eltringham 
2003, 98, 108) when addressing a series of events as colossal and complex as the Rwandan 
genocide. Nigel Eltringham considers that, as researchers: 
our representations of conflict are amalgams of multiple message fragments …  pieced together in 
a never-to-be-complete mosaic. Some fragments are observed or empirical, some intuitive, some 
specific to the conflict itself and some universal and abstract. Message fragments are potentially 
infinite, so the mosaic is constantly augmented and modified…. Still too few would admit that any 
attempt to describe or explain the Rwandan genocide of 1994 will encounter multiple perspectives, 
many of which defy synthesis. 
It is only by exposing fundamental, shaping influences that we can discuss their relative impact 
on the research process, and also begin to understand what alternative forms of knowledge 
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they might bring. In practice, this affirmation translates into a much greater emphasis on 
methodological transparency.  
This acknowledgement creates space for more pragmatic approaches that better balance the 
inherent and irreducible tensions typical of most research endeavours in war-affected contexts. 
This can help open space for more conducive discussions about pragmatic approaches by 
making clear why we prioritise a particular goal over another, and the nature of the trade-off 
to be struck in achieving a balance. It also holds the potential to create less polarised academic 
literature about Burundi and Rwanda, as well as their TJ processes. In my case, transparent 
methodologies, as summarised in this chapter, trace the way in which my experiences led me 
to narrow down my research objectives, as well as give emotionality the place it deserves in 
the writing of ethnographic vignettes throughout the thesis.   
Conclusion 
This chapter detailed the data gathering and reflexive processes followed in the doctoral 
research. A description of conceptual and practical dimensions explained how I approached 
the everyday of TJ practitioners and ethical challenges encountered throughout. It described 
how mainstream ethics and methodologies provided insufficient guidance for the challenges 
that arose within both policy-orientated and academic research settings. Going through 
emotional ‘burnout’ as a result, I turned my academic attention to emotionality, and finally to 
how emotions are inherent and crucial elements of research at many levels, particularly in 
conflict-affected contexts.  
From a methodological perspective, there is no single solution fit for all the ethical and 
emotional challenges encountered during fieldwork. However, Chappuis and I concluded that 
identifying challenges and providing transparency about strategies adopted and integrated into 
the research process are key elements for acknowledging rather than silencing emotions. In 
conclusion, I insist again that ethical concerns need to go beyond ‘do no harm’ principles, and 
pay more attention to ethical implications for TJ research and practices. 
Beyond Do No Harm 
Conventional research ethics require us to ‘do no harm’ (for example, Goodhand 2000; 
Mackenzie, McDowell, and Pittaway 2007). Given practical limitations for the protection of 
respondents, the conflicts of interest inherent to the assessment of harm, and the fact that 
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professional conventions systematically marginalise emotional experience, how can we as 
researchers credibly claim to respect ethical requirements to do no harm? More attention to 
the emotionality of the research experience would be one step towards taking greater 
responsibility for the potential emotional damage that research may do for both the researcher 
and the researched. On the one hand, research can affect the researcher personally. Dickson-
Swift, James, Kippen, and Liamputtong (2009, 70–71) point to the “human costs” that 
emotional labour can inflict on researchers, including feeling “phoney”, emotions of guilt and 
self-blame, difficulties sleeping, anxiety, gastrointestinal upsets, and depression. Researchers 
may develop personal strategies to distance themselves from the data. However, such 
strategies may not be sufficient to protect the personal wellbeing of the researcher. On the 
other hand, silencing respondent emotions allows the negative emotions that research may 
have engendered to be conveniently ignored, a dimension particularly important for TJ 
practices. 
In my case, going beyond ‘do no harm’ also implied finding grounds for engagement with 
research participants, and in future with a wider public audience. Following the example of 
Nancy Scheper Hughes (1995), some researchers have given increasing importance to their 
political roles as researchers (e.g., Sanford and Angel-Ajani 2006; Kalir 2006). This group of 
researchers challenges the idea that researchers must observe morally odious realities with 
feigned ethical neutrality in order to preserve an artificial theoretical distance. On this basis, 
they consider it is part of their obligation as subject-area experts to engage with the politics 
and policies of the real world. This type of reflection pushed, for example, Warren (2006, 229) 
to question herself daily about her contributions, not only to academic endeavour but to the 
plight of the research subjects central to her study. 
Among other reasons, the ethical challenges that confronted me, the encounters that I had with 
Rwandans and Burundians of impressive resilience and coping capacity, and the contributions 
of aid workers to a better understanding of these people’s challenges, motivated me to pursue 
the doctoral research and to seek a meaningful engagement with the research object. Through 
interviews, discussions and workshops with TJ practitioners, I tried to encourage a deeper and 
critical understanding of mainstream TJ concepts and mechanisms, and of the limits of current 
TJ patterns, and to inspire them to look at the wider structures and agencies of their work. 
These initiatives aimed to create a wider debate and encourage TJ practitioners to put their 
work focus on the communities they work with, rather than vernacularise TJ concepts with a 
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blurry discourse about international standards and working patterns promoted as the most 
efficient by the New Aid Paradigm and the TJ toolkit approach (as I elaborate in the next 
chapter). Some of these experiences are addressed in more detail in chapter 5, which also 
underlines difficulties entangled with engaged research. 
Ethics in TJ Practices  
Beyond the ethical concerns related to TJ research, this reflection also brings to the fore crucial 
ethical shortcomings of TJ practices. In promoting traumatic storytelling, most TJ practitioners 
embraced purported benefits of accountability, truth-seeking, empowerment and cathartic 
effects for victims (see chapter 2). Such a simplistic vision nevertheless ignores complexities 
inherent in dealing with the past. TJ processes are also inevitably charged with a range of 
human emotions. A number of researchers have underlined the ethical issues implicit in this 
commodification of trauma narratives, with insufficient consideration given to people sharing 
their stories (Ross 2003; Colvin 2008).  
Discussing the Guatemalan truth and reconciliation process, French (2009) observes that 
survivors’ testimonies have been reformatted and censored to fit the discourse. She argues that 
this “may well inadvertently replicate dominant power relations that continue to tacitly 
disempower victims and thereby undermine transitional justice objectives.” Reviews of these 
wider truth-telling processes in war-affected settings stress important unresolved challenges 
to current research approaches. It is simply not sufficient to affirm the usefulness of voicing 
the suffering of vulnerable people by undertaking and publishing research. Traumatic 
storytelling may be useful in contributing to public accountability, but requires immense effort 
from victims ‒ too often without the promised cathartic effects and expected material 
reparations (for example, Shaw 2015). In other words, TJ practices should not be considered 
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Chapter 2: Unpacking the Transitional Justice Toolkit 
Approach: Scrutiny of its Ideology, Claims and Implementing 
Channels 
Introduction 
While the field of transitional justice (TJ) is still debating its own definition, animated 
discussions also deal with the relevance of specific tools associated with the field and what 
these claim to achieve. Contemporary TJ scholarship addresses this evolution and underlines 
the conceptual crisis that this very young field is going through (e.g., Corradetti, Eisikovits, 
and Rotondi 2015; Buckley-Zistel et al. 2013). Within these debates, several authors use the 
concept of ‘toolkit’ to denounce the ‘one-fits-all’ and ‘tick box’ dimensions of the TJ practices 
today (Hinton et al. 2010; C.L. Sriram and Pillay 2010; Hazan 2007; Shaw, Waldorf, and 
Hazan 2010; Lefranc 2010; Andrieu 2013). 
With different degrees of criticism, these authors underline that a preformatted set of solutions 
has been promoted globally by some key international actors (such as the International Centre 
for Transitional Justice, ICTJ, and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
UN OHCHR) to nations in ‘need’ of dealing with their violent past, and suggest that such a 
toolkit approach gives insufficient attention to local and historical specificities. These authors 
provide, however, a limited description of what the TJ toolkit entails, or how it is implemented. 
This chapter aims to unpack the consolidation of the ‘toolkit approach’ as well as to provide 
the theoretical background for scrutinising the implementation of the resulting aid-dependent 
TJ practices in following chapters. Through such scrutiny, I highlight the ideological and 
pragmatic dimensions of the implementation of such toolkit approach. The chapter addresses 
the following questions: How was the TJ toolkit consolidated? How can the TJ’s entanglement 
in aid structures be analysed? 
Such literature review defines a theoretical framework to scrutinise the implementation of the 
‘TJ toolkit’ within localised contexts – in this case Rwanda and Burundi. Considering TJ as a 
collection of aid-dependent practices, my research draws on critical development studies (e.g., 
Escobar 2011; Ferguson 1990; Mosse 2005; Duffield and Hewitt 2013). This leads me to argue 
that the current implementation of TJ is taking place through patronising practices ‒ focusing 
on technocratic efforts using Western concepts and institutionalised mechanisms, while giving 
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limited attention to the local political and micro-social dynamics inevitable to an 
implementation within contexts affected by conflicts.  
The first section highlights the ideological and pragmatic dimensions of such toolkit approach. 
To do so, I underline how (i) TJ ideology and (ii) the resulting policy framework, were framed 
globally and brought into the Burundian and Rwandan context. I put these theoretical and 
empirical discussions in perspective with critical TJ and development literatures. In the second 
section, I turn my attention to development studies to deepen the understanding of TJ practices 
as absorbed by aid structures and entangled in the global agenda to render international aid 
more efficient, the New Aid Paradigm. I also review the existing critique of the New Aid 
Paradigm and its relevance to study TJ implementation. 
  
Section 2.1
The ‘TJ Toolkit’: Universal Promotion of 
Set Models of Technocratic Practices
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2.1. The ‘TJ Toolkit’: Universal Promotion of Set Models and Technocratic 
Practices 
At the global level, the main organisations supporting TJ internationally consolidated a 
preformatted approach to ‘deal with the past.’ This involves a set of mechanisms, associated 
claims and benefits promoted universally. The academic scrutiny of the toolkit approach is a 
critical review of such instrumentalist and technical approach. Despite limited exploration on 
what the toolkit approach entails, a number of authors have nonetheless highlighted the risks 
associated with this approach. As the most consolidated definition, Shaw and Waldorf (2010, 
3) introduce the TJ toolkit as such: 
Transitional justice has grown over the past twenty years into a normalised and globalised form of 
intervention following civil war and political repression. It embodies a liberal vision of history as 
progress, a redemptive model in which the harms of the past might be repaired in order to produce 
a future characterised by the non-recurrence of violence, the rule of law and a culture of human 
rights. This vision is put into practice through a set of legal and mechanisms and commemorative 
projects – war crimes prosecution, truth commissions, purges of perpetrators, reparations, 
memorials – that is conceived as a “toolkit” for use all over the world. 
Through reviews of TJ implementation in various contexts, their edited volume underlines 
limitations of such a normalised approach due to disconnections from local priorities and 
practices. Describing a ‘cookie-cutter’ approach, Sriram and Pillay (2010, 7) equally consider 
that it “will lead to the creation of certain bodies simply because this is what is done in other 
post-conflict situations, without consideration of any demand for it or its purpose and 
legitimacy.” Hinton (2010, 7) sees the toolkit approach as “metaphors that depict international 
actors and local elite as engineers ... who have the expertise and knowledge to rebuild the 
‘broken society’ or ‘failed state.’” Based on empirical scrutiny of TJ practices, these editors of 
the volumes interrogate ideological assumptions of TJ to understand how mechanisms actually 
work in specific contexts. 
These introductions to the TJ toolkit highlight normalised and globalised perspectives on how 
to deal with the past. Underlined is the global dissemination of a preformatted manner of 
approaching a violent past; the authors highlight the limitations of such an approach to be 
adopted and implemented into various local contexts ‒ despite the discursive claim of TJ 
practice to be adapted to local contexts. They all denounce the liberal ideology that claims that 
‘harms of the past’ and a ‘broken society’ can be repaired with expert knowledge, a process 
through which internationals and local elites are depicted as ‘engineers’ (see also Hazan 2010; 
Andrieu 2010). Simply put, these authors establish the basis of seeing the TJ toolkit approach 
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as a technocratic one insufficiently sensitive to historical, political, social, and cultural 
specificities. 
With the aim of expanding this literature, I consider that the TJ toolkit contains ideological 
and pragmatic dimensions that obscure different normative frameworks, ulterior agendas of 
organisations involved in TJ processes, and the individual positions of their members and 
beneficiaries. I scrutinise the implementation of TJ interventions in order to explain frictions 
between norms, policy and practices, the role of knowledge, bureaucracy and the socio-politics 
in place. Development studies, and particularly anthropology of aid, therefore provide a useful 
lens for the exploration of TJ practices, as a field scrutinising critically the implementation of 
aid programmes for several decades. In turn, I review below the ideological and pragmatic 
dimensions of the institutionalisation of TJ.  
2.1.1. Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Concepts: Consolidation of an Imperial 
Ideology 
I argue that the toolkit approach is an ideological, if not theological, guide for action that 
defines the aims that should be pursued through TJ mechanisms: a broken society seeking 
truth, justice, reconciliation and reparation. These moral commitments are formulated in a 
discourse embodied in various global policy documents, the institutional framework TJ 
mechanisms, as well as sensitisation tools and activities. With some nuances, all these 
elements define the principles, claimed aims and normative framework of TJ practice in line 
with the toolkit approach as described in general below and specifically for Rwanda and 
Burundi in the next chapter. 
2.1.2. An Ideology is Born: TJ as Palliative Measure for Democratising Nations 
Transitional justice first came onto the international agenda through reflection over how Latin 
American and European countries experienced political transition from authoritarian rule to 
democracy. This was achieved through various conferences organised jointly by scholars and 
activists involved in these transitions (Albon 1995; Kritz and Mandela 1995; Siegel 1998). 
The term ‘transitional justice’ was not used at the time of these initiatives; it was created later 
to “summarise these debates over how successor regimes should deal with the human rights 
abuses of their authoritarian predecessors” (Albon 1995, 42). All these conference reflected 
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on practices, and the moral, legal and political dimensions of accountability processes for 
dealing with past repression (Arthur, 2009). 
The book published in 1995, Transitional Justice – How Emerging Democracies Reckon with 
Former Regimes, edited by Neil Kritz, documents these discussions. The three volumes have 
dozens of contributors, including key figures such as Nelson Mandela, key human rights 
INGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and TJ pioneers such as 
Ruti Teitel, Priscilla Hayner, Naomi-Roth Arriaza and Diane Orentlicher. The book 
consolidates the paramount efforts that were undertaken at the time to reflect globally on how 
transitional nations could deal with legacies of wide-scale human rights violations committed 
by previous regimes. 
Out of these debates and as summarised in Kritz’s edited book, a growing consensus emerged 
to consider that “a) the state is obligated to provide compensation to victims of egregious 
human rights abuses perpetrated by the government, and b) if the regime which committed the 
acts in question does not provide compensation, the obligation carries over to the successor 
government” (Kritz and Mandela 1995, xxvii; see also Siegel 1998, 439). TJ was considered 
a necessary step to end the chapter of authoritarianism and build up the foundations for 
democracy.  
By the late 1990s, a limited set of mechanisms had been consolidated to ‘deal with the past’: 
truth and enquiry commissions, judicial prosecutions, institutional reforms and vetting (the 
process through which people responsible for crimes were expelled from public institutions). 
These mechanisms form the basis for the TJ toolkit. However then, both policy-orientated and 
academic debates still questioned which mechanism would be best or what where associated 
benefits (Siegel 1998, 433). It is also important to recognise that TJ processes at the time were 
seen as a result of political bargain in politically fragile contexts; fearing that actors exiting 
the regime would still be a source of risk for democracy and peace. This fragility of the political 
context is a reminder that truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs), as founding 
mechanisms of TJ, were first elaborated as palliative measures when trials were not seen 
feasible (see Lefranc 2008a, 2008b). The perception of TJ as set of bargain, palliative or least-
worst measures gradually faded in favour of being seen as the most optimal solution. 
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2.1.3. Conceptual Consolidation of the field: Institutionalising Claimed Benefits 
As the result of the debates mentioned above, accountability, deterrence, reparation and 
retribution became the four main goals pursued by the TJ. Specifically, Teitel (2000, 7) 
describes the process based on these activities: investigations establishing past wrongdoing; 
reparatory projects vindicating rights abused in the past; and transitional constitutionalism and 
administrative justice reconstructing political order. These goals were believed to contribute 
to larger objectives such as national unity, reconciliation and economic development 
(Zalaquett 1995). By the beginning of 2000s, there is almost-consensual vision supporting the 
set of five mechanisms and associated benefits. Following the experience of the South African 
TRC and the increase in intra-state conflicts, particularly on the African continent, TJ was also 
imported to post-conflict contexts (not only post-authoritarian and not always ‘transitional’ 
towards democracy), and extended to non-legal dimensions. 
I enumerate briefly the benefits attributed to truth-seeking and judicial measures as relevant 
for my empirical analysis (gacaca perceived as a hybrid mechanism that includes truth-seeking 
and judicial dimensions and the TJ policy framework in Burundi including both judicial and 
truth-seeking mechanisms even though no progress had been made in relation to the judicial 
mechanism in the latest case). Truth-seeking mechanisms such as truth commissions, truth and 
reconciliation commissions, and commissions of enquiry became among the most common 
mechanisms devised to establish facts about human rights abuses committed during periods of 
conflict or repression. It is claimed they: promote the acknowledgment of responsibility (e.g., 
Kritz 1995); encourage reconciliation through participative establishment of truth, and demand 
for pardon (Minow 1998); support victims to heal from past suffering as a result of cathartic 
effects (ibid.; Hayner 2010); and alleviate current conflicts relating to the interpretation of the 
past. They also supposedly support victims to manage the material dimensions of loss (Hayner 
2010), and deter the state from future abuses (Zalaquett 1995). 
International criminal tribunals, national trials, military courts and special/hybrid tribunals are 
among the main mechanisms pursuing judicial prosecutions for crimes committed by previous 
authoritarian regimes or former belligerents. In relation to judicial investigations and criminal 
prosecutions, it has been claimed that they: establish juridical truth and individual 
responsibility (Teitel 2000); provide justice for the victims and their survivors, especially those 
directly affected by grave violations of human rights (Siegel 1998); alleviate the pain of 
victims by releasing the truth and punishing the perpetrators (Minow 1998); contribute to the 
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consolidation of democracy by restoring conﬁdence in its mechanisms, strengthening the rule 
of law and providing legitimacy to the new regime (e.g., Orentlicher 1991; Teitel 2000); and 
dissipate calls for revenge (Orentlicher 1991). It has been argued that these processes can 
thereby contribute to reconciliation (e.g., Kritz and Mandela 1995; Albon 1995; Roht-Arriaza 
and Mariezcurrena 2006). 
Authors who make these claims consider some limits associated with these truth-seeking and 
judicial mechanisms. Prosecutions and trials are usually restricted to the most serious crimes 
‒ it is not usually possible to prosecute all suspected individuals because of the high numbers 
of cases and limited capacities. The lack of political will to prosecute ‘big fish’ is also a 
probability, due to the risks these people might present to the political fragility of new regimes 
(Orentlicher 1991; Zalaquett 1995). Further, the criminal responsibility of incumbent political 
and judicial actors, and the lack of independence of judicial institutions, have been listed as 
potential obstacles to impartial justice (Kritz and Mandela 1995; Zalaquett 1995). Still further, 
trials could provoke “revenge, rather than ending the cycle of revenge” (Minow 1998, 122). 
In spite of these risks, proponents of prosecutions continue to encourage their implementation. 
They present these risks as common side effects of trials. 
With regard to truth-seeking mechanisms, authors who support the benefits mentioned above 
also acknowledge that limits of time, human and financial resources do not enable 
investigation of all violations committed (e.g., Hayner 2010; Popkin and Roht‐Arriaza 1995; 
Allan and Allan 2000; Minow 1998; see Mendeloff 2004 for a critical review of this literature). 
They appreciate it is necessary for the scope of truth commissions to be selective in the events 
and themes that would be covered – it being impossible to reach all events and victims. Due 
to security risks and fear, witnesses, victims and perpetrators may not be willing to testify 
openly. Furthermore, the sensitivity of certain topics can revive trauma or create strong 
emotional reactions from people testifying to what they have witnessed or suffered (Minow 
1998; Hayner 2010; Allan and Allan 2000). Hayner (2010, 5-6) notes that initiatives also create 
expectations, from civil society and the population, that are impossible to realise. Nonetheless, 
authors in favour of truth-seeking initiatives consider that these concerns should not be the 
basis for neglecting truth commissions.  
By the beginning of 2000s, an extended literature (see next section), mainly written from a 
legal perspective, has addressed the pro and cons, as well as the moral, political and legal 
dimensions of the five mechanisms. The resulting almost-consensual vision supporting the set 
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of five mechanisms and associated benefits. Such a vision and its claims were consolidated 
and formed what today constitutes the ‘toolkit approach’. Overall these authors played a 
crucial role in the consolidating the field conceptually as a set of mechanisms to achieve a set 
of aims to deal with past. Such vision still has a strong impact on the UN position on TJ and 
its promotion of mechanisms around the world (e.g., United Nations, Security Council 2004, 
6-7). In other words, dealing with past has been promoted as an institutional approach that 
requires putting in place certain types of mechanisms to achieve the above mentioned benefits.  
2.1.4. Increasing Critical Conceptual and Empirical Research 
In parallel of the promotion of such approach to the field of practice, the academic field of TJ 
has increasingly produced critical reviews and created vivid debates about both existing 
academic literature and the field of practice. The critiques question and/or underline the limits 
of its conceptual framework (French 2009; Verdoolaege 2006; Burnet 2009; Clark 2008; 
Fletcher and Weinstein 2002; Ingelaere 2007; Lefranc 2008a; Rosoux 2014), its empirical 
practice (to name a few, Hinton et al. 2010; Shaw, Waldorf, and Hazan 2010; Alcalá et al. 
2012; Shaw 2007; Selimovic 2010; Subotic 2009; Gibson 2005; Ross 2003), the global 
expansion of its field of practice (e.g., Nagy 2008; Subotić 2012; Lefranc 2010; Madlingozi 
2010), and the general theoretical framework, specifically the foundation claims of the field 
from politico-legal and philosophical perspectives (e.g., Leebaw 2008; Bell 2009; Andrieu 
2010; Mutua 2015; Naftali 2013). 
In opposition to the optimistic first group of scholars supporting the idea that ‘justice’ and 
‘truth’ have inherent benefits in transitional processes, the critiques have underlined the 
problematic terminology – and hence the difficult implementation – of concepts such as 
‘justice’, ‘truth’, ‘individual responsibility’, ‘pardon’, ‘forgiveness’ and ‘reconciliation’. 
These form part of a terminology that is widely debated from a conceptual perspective, due to 
the vagueness and malleability of their meaning and the value of concepts constituting TJ 
policy frameworks. 
In relation to judicial mechanisms, the meaning of justice has been reviewed in various 
contexts. With the example of international war crimes tribunals, Clark (2008, 332-333) notes 
that “justice is a contested concept; it has no uniform or universal meaning.” She argues that 
“perceptions of justice are fundamentally shaped by a variety of factors, including personal 
experiences and group membership. It is often impossible, therefore, to establish any broad 
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consensus that justice has been done.” Similarly, in relation to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), Johanna Mannergren Selimovic (2010, 59) argues that this 
international tribunal failed “to convey individual justice” by focusing on “factual truth” – 
because the process could not provide a space for victims to confront their different subjective 
experiences and narratives. These two authors underline that the establishment of judicial 
mechanisms necessarily entails a selecting process; it does not systematically lead to a feeling 
of justice, and it does not hold the capacity to deal with the different dimensions of truth. 
In relations to claims that judicial mechanisms involve the identification of individual 
responsibility, Clark (2009) questions whether this is possible and/or desirable. 
Individualisation of guilt “is limited to punishing only a few select individuals who carried out 
the most egregious acts or ordered their followers to do so” (L. Fletcher and Weinstein 2002, 
605). Fletcher and Weinstein (ibid., 588)  consider that:  
There is no reason to make the assumption in the context of accountability for mass violence that 
the ‘truth’ will produce the intended epiphany. The theory implies that trials will facilitate 
approbation of the perpetrators and rejection of the political agenda that produced the criminal acts. 
Yet, the truth is constituted by multiple facts, each of which is vulnerable to distortion, denial, 
rationalisation, and refutation. 
All these authors underline that judicial initiatives are limited in the case of mass violations. 
These necessitate selecting what crimes should be addressed and who should be held 
responsible. The authors question the feasibility, desirability and credibility of achieving 
‘justice’, as well as underline the falsely positive assumptions that have been associated with 
the concept of justice. 
The capacity of judicial mechanisms to achieve purported aims (namely deterrence, healing 
and reconciliation) has been widely criticised. Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein (ibid., 
592) affirm that “there are no empirical data to suggest that trials deter war crimes or gross 
human rights violations.” As Leebaw (2008) suggests, neither the ICTY nor the ICTR has been 
“effective as a response to vengeful or volatile emotions” since reprisal killings took place in 
both Rwanda and Kosovo following the creation of these international courts.  
Clark (2008, 340) argues that “reconciliation does not begin in the courtroom.” But (if possible 
and desirable) it must arguably begin at the level of the individual. Clark (2009, 31) later 
comments that even if it is claimed that “easing of tensions through the meting out of impartial 
justice can create the conditions for a return to peaceful relations on the ground. Similarly, 
Selimovic (2010) underlines, “the problem is, however, that the ICTY is not perceived on the 
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ground as dispensing impartial injustice”. Applying this observation to judicial measures in 
wider contexts suggests a questionable link between reconciliation and justice.  
Even the most supportive authors of judicial mechanisms consider the risk that TJ can 
reawaken trauma (e.g., Minow 1998). Taking this critique further, Fletcher and Weinstein 
(2002, 593) consider that the hypothesised ‘therapeutic’ nature of criminal trials for victims is 
based on a simplistic view of psychotherapy. An important number of authors also consider 
that trials are not sufficiently victim-orientated (Hazan 2007, 117; Leebaw 2008), and are 
therefore unable to heal the trauma of people affected by the conflict. 
The critical research underlines the conceptual issues with the term ‘truth’. For instance, 
through a perception survey of South Africans, Gibson (2005, 351) observed that most of his 
respondents “accept the truth and reconciliation process as a necessary evil.” He (opcit, 355) 
observed, however, that “the collective memory that the TRC promulgated is not widely 
accepted.” Looking at the Guatemalan case, French (2009, 95, 106) assesses a need for “a 
more self-conscious engagement with the complexities of discursive forms and multiple 
epistemologies” in research narratives told by survivors in a TRC, because of the often 
overlooked political dimensions (see also Henri 2005). In other words, truth-telling entails 
various perceptions of truth while the officially-established ‘truth’ does not acknowledge the 
inherent partiality of the fact-gathering process, nor the political nature of the exercise. 
The limitations of truth-seeking mechanisms to achieving trauma healing, reconciliation and 
reparation have also been highlighted. Several authors have contested the relevance of TRCs 
to deal with trauma caused by crimes under scrutiny at a TRC (Shaw 2005; Hamber and Wilson 
2002). Studies of individuals who have been involved in TRC processes demonstrate the 
limited cathartic effect at the individual level (Shaw 2007; Hamber and Wilson 2002; Wilson 
2000, 2003). 
Specifically, Hamber and Wilson (2002, 36) consider that “Nations do not have collective 
psyches that can be healed, nor do whole nations suffer post-traumatic stress disorder and to 
assert otherwise is to psychologise an abstract entity that exists primarily in the minds of 
nation-building politicians.” From the perspective of victims, Ross (2003, 337-338) notes that 
research on trauma explicitly recognises “that telling may ‘reawaken’ memories of trauma, 
with negative effects for the individual.” 
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Looking at the case of a support group for victims in post-apartheid South Africa, Colvin 
(2008) highlights the commodification of traumatic storytelling. After discussions with 
members of the organisation, he considers that:  
The victims should not have to do so much work for so little gain. Traumatic storytelling has not 
brought them reparations, it has not eased their poverty, it has not forced perpetrators to confess or 
beneficiaries to admit their own liability. Only on occasion has it seemed to ease the psychological 
effects of trauma. More often than not, after the brief ‘intervention’ – at the TRC or monthly 
meeting – they are left to go home alone, with little follow-up support (ibid., 174). 
This underlines the limited overall benefit for victims in testifying if truth-seeking mechanisms 
are based on demanding efforts on the victims’ part. Authors have also argued that truth-telling 
is not especially valued by every culture. Through analysis of Sierra Leone’s TRC, Shaw 
(2007, 206) observes the project was not in line with the local culture but, rather, articulated 
around a ‘global knowledge’ that “naturalised the project of truth-telling as a tool that would 
cut through conspiracies of silence, create accountability, restore voice and dignity, ‘talk out’ 
trauma and rebuild the nation.” Such an example illustrates frictions between the global TJ 
discourse and local practices in terms of claimed and actual benefits of truth-telling.  
Whether truth-seeking mechanisms can support reconciliation has also been examined. 
Through the analysis of how the reconciliation discourse was built in the South African 
hearings, Annelies Verdoolaege (2006, 75) observes that “these hearings were designed to be 
extremely victim-friendly, and also this was contradictory to the manifest constructionism of 
the testifiers’ discourse” – this is because the emphasis on reconciliation dismissed the feeling 
of revenge and hatred expressed in victims’ testimonies. This leads her (ibid., 75) to define the 
South African TRC as an “ideological state apparatus” that functions predominantly “by 
ideology to sustain the power of the ruling class” rather than respond to victims’ suffering. 
Furthermore, the process by which truth is sought, told and established has been heavily 
constrained by the political contexts (e.g., Wilson 2001, 2003; Tomuschat 2001).  
These critical commentaries contradict the claims that truth-seeking and judicial mechanisms 
can contribute to the establishment of justice, truth, national reconciliation, construction of a 
collective memory or healing of trauma from past repression. The meanings of justice and 
truth are inherently different according to the groups of people involved in TJ processes and 
their experiences of human rights abuses and violence. It is the political discourse of ruling 
authorities during transitions that construct this overarching vision of unifying justice and 
truth. Ultimately, these pieces of research nuanced or argued against claimed benefits 
associated to these TJ mechanisms. This critical literature is an important contribution to 
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understanding the limitations of the global TJ approach in specific contexts. It brings attention 
to the wider ideological and conceptual models.  
  
Section 2.2
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2.2. Translating TJ in Policy: Promotion of A Holistic Vision 
Whereas the critical scholarship has highlighted many limits of TJ mechanisms, practice-
orientated institutions ‒ such as ICTJ, IJR, the Swiss Peace Foundation (swisspeace) and 
Impunity Watch (IW) ‒ continue to promote these approaches to various post-conflict 
contexts. Specifically, a group of academics and semi-practitioners have supported a ‘holistic 
vision’ at the global level. These include, for instance, Duthie (2008), Orentlicher (2007), 
Joinet (United Nations Security Council 1997), Mani (2008), Lederach (2001), Hayner (2010), 
Minow (1998), Boraine (2006), de Greiff (2009; 2013), and others. All these authors have a 
foot in academia and a foot in practice through different channels.13 This section underlines 
that such vision gives the impression that the critiques of TJ practices have been taken into 
consideration. They hence provide similar but stronger assumptions, and argue for the 
complementary of aims to lead to set aims through various mechanisms. I review here how 
such vision impacted the field of practices and how critical literature address such 
institutionalisation and technocratisation of TJ.  
Roger Duthie, senior associate in the ICTJ research unit, (2008, 293) summarises the holistic 
vision: 
A strong case can be made that the most effective approach to transitional justice is a holistic or 
coherent one, meaning one that includes not only criminal prosecutions but also truth telling, 
reparations and institutional reform. Even a holistic and coherent transitional justice programme is 
not pursued in a vacuum, however, but within a broader transitional and peace-building context. 
In other words, Duthie argues that TJ should be approached with the set of four mechanisms 
(truth-seeking, judicial measures, reparation, institutional reforms) in order to deal with a 
legacy of repression, for the sake of reconciliation, respect for human rights and strengthening 
of the rule of law.  
                                                 
13 Pablo de Greiff is the first and current UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-recurrence, he was previously head of research at ICTJ, this after an academic career 
(http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/TruthJusticeReparation/Pages/PablodeGreiff.aspx). Roger Duthie is a senior 
associate in the ICTJ research Unit (https://www.ictj.org/about/roger-duthie). Diane Orentlicher has been 
involved in the field since the premise of the field, she worked United Nations Independent Expert on Combating 
Impunity (https://www.wcl.american.edu/faculty/orentlic/). Alex Boraine was the deputy chair of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, he founded ICTJ and acted as its director until 2004 
(https://www.ictj.org/about/alex-boraine). Priscilla Hayner is a co-founder of ICTJ and seen as one of the most 
eminent expert on Truth and Reconciliation Commissions; she worked for the UN and Ford Foundation 
(http://www.cassese-initiative.org/global-education/summer-schools/faculty/9-global-education/89-hayner-
bio.html). Louis Joinet is a French Human Rights Lawyer who wrote the principles Joinet including the four 
pillars of TJ working closely with the UN (see below).  
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In his attempt at ‘theorising TJ’, Pablo De Greiff (2012) also supports a holistic vision. He 
connects the key TJ mechanisms to three general aims (without being limited to them): civic 
trust, reconciliation and democratisation. According to him, TJ practice is an indirect support 
of these aims when applied in parallel, thanks to bidirectional relationships between aims and 
mechanisms. He summarises his vision as such: 
A first exercise in abstraction allows one to argue that the elements of transitional justice share two 
‘mediate’ aims, namely providing a complex type of recognition to victims and promoting civic 
trust. Abstracting yet again allows one to argue that a comprehensive transitional justice policy 
also has two ‘final’ aims, namely promoting reconciliation and strengthening democracy. This 
theoretical construct, then, is supposed to ground the claim that transitional justice is a ‘holistic’ 
concept (ibid., 65). 
For De Greiff, the effort of theorisation has been a conceptual scrutiny that defines more 
clearly the conceptual connection among aims and mechanisms. De Greiff (2013, 6) 
acknowledges the risks that policy makers understand TJ measures “as a range of interventions 
from which they can pick and choose, and to trade off one against another.” He considers such 
perceptions reflect “the still unsettled state of ‘holistic’ or ‘comprehensive’ transitional justice 
policies.” A “selective application of transitional justice measures is misguided and why the 
frequently observed tendency to trade off one measure against others is inappropriate” (ibid., 
32-33). While accepting a number of critiques, De Greiff’s holistic vision of TJ also leads to 
a depoliticisation of TJ practices (arguing that TJ failure results from haphazard 
implementation ‒ ibid., 36), and sees political bargains as detrimental rather than inherent.  
Kora Andrieu (Andrieu 2013) notes that De Greiff’s attempt at complete theorisation of TJ is 
seriously affected by his inability to overcome normative generalisations, which she considers 
to be an obstacle towards a concrete evaluation of TJ’s effects. Reviewing critically the holistic 
approach in the case of Sierra Leone, Rebekka Friedman and Andrew Jillions (2015, 144) 
argue “the idea that a complementarity of means emerged organically in the Sierra Leonean 
context is somewhat odd, given the admission by those involved that there were a series of 
attempts to pre-empt problems and harmonise the relationship between the SCSL and the TRC 
during the initial stages of the postconflict processes.” They (ibid., 147) criticise the assumed 
complementarity of means, as it enabled “global policy makers to be satisfied with asserting 
that different mechanisms of transitional justice are mutually reinforcing as a way to avoid 
triggering legitimate and important political debates over the compromises made in order to 
achieve peace without the rigorous critical interrogation of their computability and functions.” 
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In line with these authors, I consider the holistic approach is insufficient in providing stronger 
conceptual foundations to the field of TJ practice. Indeed, why would truth-seeking would be 
more efficient implemented along with other mechanisms, if it has inherent limitations. The 
holistic re-conceptualisation of the field by policy-orientated scholars seems to respond to a 
search for legitimation of current claims and approaches, rather than an honest scrutiny of its 
foundation or a real attempt to go beyond the tools and associated claims of the TJ toolkit 
approach. 
Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne and Andrew Reiter (2010a; 2010b, 4) acknowledge that many 
claims associated with TJ mechanisms remain unproven, unpacked and untested. Using 
quantitative research methods (based on a database of TJ implementation in relation to human 
rights and democracy indicators), their work provides important nuances in relation to key TJ 
claims. They highlight limitations and even potential harm in implementing just one 
mechanism. Their analysis supports that transitional countries performed better in terms of 
democracy and human rights with specific combinations of TJ mechanisms. Their findings 
(Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010a, 996) “do not concur, for example, that trials and truth 
commissions, or amnesties, and truth commissions produce positive results. Instead, only two 
combinations work: (1) trials and amnesties, and (2) trials, amnesties and truth commissions.”   
 It therefore supports partially the holistic approach as promoted by the ICTJ. On the basis of 
their quantitative research methodology, their research offers a more robust exploration of TJ 
processes and actual benefit of complementarity. On the other hand, their research questions 
are framed under the same assumption of the field: questioning to what extent a set of 
mechanisms have achieved a set of predefined aims. It does not therefore think outside the TJ 
toolkit approach ‒ i.e., critically questioning why specific contexts lead to better democratic 
transitions beyond the implementation of TJ mechanisms, unpacking the nature of 
complementarity, and questioning what TJ actually does if not promoting claimed aims. This 
is as if political transitions and human rights records can be reduced to the implementation of 
TJ mechanisms rather than to other societal and political factors.  
Overall, these authors supporting a holistic vision have integrated some lessons from the 
critiques discussed above by promoting a victim-centred and holistic approach, 
acknowledging the limits of the mechanisms and difficulties of the contexts, and encouraging 
approaches adapted to the specific contexts of implementation. They believe in the 
interconnectedness and complementarity of interventions to achieve the goals. Even though 
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the holistic approach promotes itself as being practice-orientated and not a to-do list, it is 
questionable to what extent this conceptual knowledge is transferable to practice beyond just 
being a new policy discourse. 
Furthermore, such re-conceptualisation of the field seems to respond to a search for 
legitimation of current claims and approaches, rather than an honest scrutiny of its foundation. 
As pioneers of the fields, many of these authors promoting a holistic vision are part of the 
network at the origin of both the field of practice and the academic field. They have strong 
connections with NGOs and UN institutions that were created as a result, such as ICTJ, IJR, 
IW, sections dealing with TJ within the UN and UN OHCHR (see footnote 5). Consequently, 
their holistic vision has had a strong impact on the field of TJ practice today, particularly De 
Greiff. Indeed, as the first and current UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, 
justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, he is a direct promoter of the TJ global 
discourse and a porter of the TJ toolkit to various local contexts. 
2.2.1. The Holistic Vision Framing TJ Practice 
I establish in the previous section how the toolkit approach creates a conceptual framework 
that links together TJ aims and mechanisms. Despite existing nuanced on what such approach 
entails, the holistic vision translates the TJ discourse into practices by promoting the 
implementation of these mechanisms: criminal prosecutions, truth-seeking, reparation, 
institutional reforms and lustration programmes ˗ others would also include memorialisation 
initiatives (e.g., De Greiff 2012). Still they, all promote a set of mechanisms to deal with the 
past and achieve similar set of societal aims.   
A number of policy institutions observed through my fieldwork (particularly in Burundi such 
as Impunity Watch, Swisspeace) elaborated their work around the four TJ pillars (or 
‘principles against impunity’) elaborated by Louis Joinet: the right to know and the right to 
truth, the right to justice, the right to reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence of human 
rights violations (United Nations Security Council 1997). Swisspeace illustrates its approach 
dealing with the past based on Joinet principles with the following chart used in their workshop 
with TJ practitioners (that I received it myself during a workshop with the international 
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Illustration 2: Joinet Principles as illustrated by Swisspeace 
 
 
At a pragmatic level, such vision is consolidated and presented through various policy 
documents. For instance, the OHCHR published a series of booklets that provide guidelines to 
post-conflict countries on their way to implementing TJ measures: national consultations, 
prosecution initiatives, truth commissions, vetting, hybrid courts, reparations, amnesties, and 
mapping the justice sector and monitoring legal systems. Many organisations and local 
sections of OHCHR used them to frame their work, often translated into local languages. The 
documents are used in discussions with policy makers, used to train local TJ practitioners, and 
help to structure sensitising activities with beneficiaries. Many policy reports are structured 
around these aims or pillars. 
From a pragmatic perspective, this holistic vision then frames the discourse, the policy models, 
and the agenda of national political actors. Through meetings, visits, training, technical support 
and distribution of manuals, these organisations had a strong impact on how local policy-
makers would define their own TJ policies. The TJ toolkit is the preformatted approach 
adopted by most local TJ policy makers at every step of the implementation, from policy 
writing, sensitisation, programme management, to interactions with victims and alleged 
perpetrators. It reflects the fact that the consideration of what should be done to deal with past 
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crimes is initiated by preformatted and technical solutions – even though if TJ global actors 
claim that the holistic vision enable them to avoid one-size-fits-all solutions.  
2.2.2. Critique of Global TJ Technocratisation 
In parallel of seeking for a more coherent field, most severe and recent critiques have addressed 
deeper problems related to the current professionalisation, bureaucratisation and 
‘lawyerisation’ ‒ dimensions that I capture as the technocratisation of the field. The critical 
authors have predominantly looked at the global level and global dissemination of TJ (Lefranc 
2010; 2008a; Subotić 2012; Naftali 2013; Rubli 2012). 
Sandrine Lefranc (2008b, 68) writes that TJ was established through the creation of a 
professional network rather than the conceptualisation of good practice. She considers that the 
global network came opportunistically to this new market to offer services such as meetings, 
lobbying towards donors, inquiries, and handbooks for universities and practitioners. Lefranc 
later notes (2012, 5 ‒ author's translation) along the same lines that: 
The expression of TJ is not only a sum of experiences, but also a category constructed voluntarily 
by experts engaged in a professional movement, since often, an experience of political militancy, 
on the edge of academia. TJ does not travel upon the basis of its own virtues, but because it is 
carried, transported internationally, modelled at the same time, by actors and groups... The 
expression hence crystallises an organisational process within an international environment of TJ 
professionals, the constitution of an expertise. …The production of specialised organisations … 
contributes to provide a common language and tools for different actors of the sector of 
international intervention. 
In different pieces of work, Lefranc (2008a; 2008b; 2010; 2012) considers that the 
consolidation of TJ results only from the creation of expertise and a network that supports it 
for professional opportunities. This rather negative portrait of TJ is based on her attempt to 
trace how Latin American experiences have travelled around the world. Even if her discussion 
provides limited empirical support, it is insightful in the way it unpacks TJ expertise, 
knowledge and technocratisation of its practice.  
Similarly, Jelena Subotic (2012, 123) underlines how the professionalisation of TJ impacted 
on NGOs’ interventions, which today tend to favour what is perceived as political success 
rather than “the ‘old’ basis” of the pursuit of justice and truth. She (2012, 118) denounces the 
‘lawyerisation’ of TJ as the “use a legalistic frame to portray their claims as universally 
objective and uncontroversial because they rely on human rights standards.” Beyond just 
promoting TJ discourse as an expert knowledge, I also observed through my fieldwork that 
 
 
Transitional Justice Battlefield: Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice 
 
86 
international organisations tend to base their position on international standards of TJ, 
somehow conferring a legal and universal value (see chapter 5). 
Through research into the TJ process in Burundi and on the wider TJ literature, Sandra Rubli 
(2012, 17) denounces the way in which the current global approach has enabled TJ to be 
achieved by bureaucratic means:  
… Reconciliation, rule of law, democracy and peace can be externally engineered. As a policy, 
transitional justice follows a managerial logic where projects need to be planned, implemented, 
monitored and evaluated. Although promoters of transitional justice are increasingly talking in 
terms of adapting policies to the local context, the normative content of their transitional justice 
policies are rarely actually discussed with local actors. 
Such an observation leads Rubli (2012, 17) to underline the resulting depoliticisation and 
professionalisation of TJ: 
By avoiding the difficult discussion about what justice and reconciliation mean in certain contexts, 
transitional justice is thus depoliticised and appears as an uncontested idea. Following a teleological 
logic, this transitional justice conception promotes a Western inspired model of justice. If local 
mechanisms do not resonate with a liberal tradition of accountability, they are considered to be 
second-best, illegitimate or backward. 
Through a scrutiny of TJ professionalisation and technocratisation, these authors address the 
‘social fabrication’ of the technocratic knowledge produced through interactions of TJ 
professionals working closely in a global network that promote the legal and universal claims 
and hold TJ together as a field of practice. Through such observations, these critical authors 
also underline the unintended effect of such an evolution of TJ.  
In summary, the field of TJ has evolved to acknowledge its limits, to distance itself from solely 
political and institutional approaches, and to integrate social dimensions with an emphasis on 
victims. The development of TJ has enabled a consequent reflection on the necessity and 
priorities for dealing with past crimes. Despite the existence of these numerous pieces of 
critical research, the international organisations that promote practices globally do not seem to 
engage in the debate and do not absorb the critique efficiently. Introducing a special issue on 
global and local approaches to TJ, Kimberly Theidon (2009, 296) underlines that “local 
engagements with international discourses, institutions and actors produce unexpected 
outcomes.” My research aims to draw further attention to the unintended effects and limited 
capacities of the much-praised TJ toolkit (e.g., Fergusson, 1990, 275).  
While seeking to understand the everyday life of these professionals, my empirical analysis in 
following chapters illustrates what is taking place behind the public scene, what side effects 
emerge and how they remained silenced. I also argue that the preformatted approach became 
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so self-evident that obstacles were blamed on the local context with almost no reassessment 
of the mechanisms’ pertinence and benefits. The toolkit approach is not only a set of 
mechanisms and associated benefits. It entails important ideological and pragmatic dimensions 
which predefine the concepts and claims, institutions and types of activities that will be in 
place in order to ‘deal with the past’. As a new endeavour consisting of a set of concepts and 
mechanisms in need of implementation channels, the TJ toolkit has been gradually absorbed 
by aid structures via existing means of aid implementation. 
2.3. The TJ Toolkit Approach and Aid Structures 
By clarifying what the TJ toolkit approach entails, I draw attention to the importance of global 
aid actors. In this section, I extend my theoretical framework to development studies in order 
to analyse empirically how aid structures impact on TJ practice. The TJ discourse perfectly 
fits the evolution of neoliberal practices in development and liberal peacebuilding agenda, 
putting an emphasis on democracy, human rights and the rule of law (see e.g., Uvin 2007). 
Indeed, with its emancipatory discourse, the claims associated with TJ mechanisms embrace 
these objectives. Commenting on the nexus of TJ and development, de Greiff (2009, 34) 
describes them as “sprawling fields characterised by fuzzy conceptual borders and by both 
internal and external dissent.” Although there are ongoing separate debates on the nature and 
pertinence of TJ and development, there has also been increasing academic focus on the nexus 
between these fields. The debates about the TJ-development nexus revolve around two key 
questions: the extent to which TJ mechanisms should incorporate measures to address 
economic crimes, and the extent to which TJ mechanisms can deal with socio-economic 
inequalities and tensions between groups. I do not address these questions and focus instead 
on another perspective of the TJ and development nexus, the implementation of TJ 
mechanisms by aid-dependant practitioners.  
Scrutinising the implementation of TJ interventions, the critical literature on development 
studies therefore represents a useful lens for the exploration of TJ practices. First, I briefly 
review the wave of critics of aid practices that led to the creation of the ‘new aid paradigm’  
and its principles for efficiency. Second, I describe in more detail the components of the new 
aid paradigm and its impact on TJ practices. The third sub-section consolidates the critical 
perspectives of scholars unconvinced by the new aid paradigm, who denounce the side effects 
of accompanying technocratisation and depoliticisation. Understanding this new aid paradigm 
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is crucial to grasping the wider process of the technocratisation of aid structures, in which TJ 
implementation became an integral part. 
2.3.1. The New Aid Paradigm: ‘We Know What Went Wrong and How to 
Fix it’ 
For two decades, development studies have been concerned with questions relating to its 
success and failures. Van de Walle (1999: 341) observed aid agencies’ longstanding “appetite 
for self-examination”, but witnessed a watershed characterised by an “unusually large number 
of attempts to grapple with the problems of aid, particularly in Africa” at the end of the 1990s. 
This led to a broad literature trying to understand the failure of aid. Some authors considered 
that most obstacles lay in the context in which aid operated (e.g., Cassen 1994; Lancaster 1999; 
Alesina and Dollar 2000), whereas for others, the policy models were problematic themselves 
(see below). The first group pointed out the following elements behind aid inefficiency: the 
problem of governance and corruption, insufficient effort from donors for significant changes, 
incapacity of recipients to absorb the amount of money entitled, disastrous policies, and 
incompetence. According to these authors, these problems virtually ensured that aid would 
have limited long-term impacts (see e.g., Van de Walle 1999, 342 – 350). 
The second group, instead of putting the blame on the local context, addressed the limits of 
concepts, models and structures through which aid is delivered. Arturo Escobar (1992), for 
example, condemned the development project because it resulted from Westerners’ 
supremacy, which defined what modernity was, and what underdeveloped meant (see also 
Sylvester 1999; Duffield and Hewitt 2013; Kothari 2005b). Mosse (2004, 4) summarises the 
view of this more critical perspective: “like those of colonial rule, development’s rational 
models achieve cognitive control and social regulation; they enhance state capacity and expand 
bureaucratic power … ; they reproduce hierarchies of knowledge …  and they fragment, 
subjugate, silence or erase the local, all the while ‘[wishing] these political effects out of sight’ 
through technical discourses that naturalise poverty, objectify the poor and depoliticise 
development” (also see Ferguson 1990; Maxwell 2005). In relations to the field of TJ, Tshepo 
Madlingozi (2010, 211) similarly denounces how TJ “entrepreneur reinforces her status as the 
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Despite strong disagreement on the causes, these two paradigms of development, along with 
development practitioners, consensually agreed on aid inefficiency. They could only observe 
that aid efforts had not provided the expanded development progress as, in many cases, the 
situation of ‘developing countries’ worsened over the last four decades. This led to a major aid 
reform being put in place from the 2000s. Such reform is embodied in global aid programmes 
and declarations such as the Millennium Development Goals, Accra, Paris and Busan 
declarations (as described below). Such evolution has been coined by a few critical scholars 
as the ‘new aid paradigm’ (Renard 2007), ‘new aid agenda’ (Killick 2004) or ‘new aid 
approach’ (Molenaers and Renard 2008).  
According to Renard, “the general mood is upbeat: aid didn’t work in the past, but we know 
why and have found ways to do things better” (Renard 2007, 6). This critical turn caused three 
types of conceptual change in aid delivery: 1) Contemporary aid practice is framed by a culture 
of management for results; 2) There has been a ‘technocratisation’ of aid, producing particular 
programme toolkits, lexicons and guidelines for best practice; and 3) It calls for an 
implementation through a participatory approach in which NGOs and civil society 
organisations emerge as new essential actors. In other words, measurable and efficient aid is 
perceived as a technical exercise that should be designed by experts in equal partnership with 
civil society.  
During my fieldwork, only diplomats and representatives of aid agencies frequently referred 
to this new agenda in discussions and interviews. They were in the front line of actors who 
had to deal directly with these new rules on how they would organise their funding agenda and 
implementation. By describing the overall development and peacebuilding agendas in Rwanda 
and Burundi, chapter 3 illustrates how these new policy frameworks have shaped policies in 
the two countries. Chapter 4 shows how they play politically, and have shaped policy discourse 
for various political purposes. Ultimately, as I demonstrate in the empirical chapters, this new 
approach to aid has affected how all aid-dependent TJ practitioners must operate in their daily 
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2.3.2. The New Aid Paradigm and its Principles Impacting on TJ Practice  
Management for Results 
Due to observed inefficiencies in aid delivery, development agencies and forums ‒ such as the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UN agencies, the World 
Bank, IMF and key bilateral donors ‒ have adopted a number of declarations, delivery 
instruments and modalities to improve the delivery of results. The United Nations Millennium 
Declaration was adopted by 189 UN member states in 2000. Through this blueprint, donors 
and recipients committed their nations to a new global partnership to achieve eight particular 
millennium development goals (MDGs): combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, 
environmental degradation, and discrimination against women by 2015.14  
Set up in parallel by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), 
poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) were established at each national level to ensure the 
delivery of these goals. The PRSP, which became a key element of the new aid paradigm, 
“contains an assessment of poverty and describes the macroeconomic, structural, and social 
policies and programmes that a country will pursue over several years to promote growth and 
reduce poverty” (IMF, 2012).15 The implementation of PRSPs involves certain modalities of 
relationships between (and among) donors and recipients that were agreed on in the Paris 
(2005), ACCRA (2008), and Busan (2011) declarations summarised by the OECD:  
It is now the norm for aid recipients to forge their own national development strategies with their 
parliaments and electorates (ownership); for donors to support these strategies (alignment) and 
work to streamline their efforts in-country (harmonisation); for development policies to be directed 
to achieving clear goals and for progress towards these goals to be monitored (results); and for 
donors and recipients alike to be jointly responsible for achieving these goals (mutual 
accountability).16  
As this quote indicates, signatories consider they should strengthen their efforts “to achieve 
concrete and sustainable results” (Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Efficiency, 2011: 3). The 
OECD suggests that “this involves better managing for results, monitoring, evaluating and 
communicating progress; as well as scaling up our support, strengthening national capacities” 
(Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Efficiency, 2011: 3). This is relevant as it frames the policy 
contexts in which transitional justice is negotiated and implemented among national 
                                                 
14 http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm 
15 International Monetary Fund, “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers - Fact sheet”, available at 
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government authorities, donors, international organisations and the civil society. The next 
chapter describes how the PRSP and poverty reduction strategies fully incorporate TJ matters 
in their agenda.  
As a donor representative told me in Burundi, if TJ is part of the poverty-reduction strategy, 
they had an obligation to follow it up. In the case of Rwanda, Hayman addresses extensively 
how this new agenda affected the relations in between Rwandan authorities and donors 
(Hayman 2009; 2008). For instance, while she considers the ‘ownership’ agenda to be an 
overall success, she observes limitations resulting from a different understanding of ownership 
by various actors, and different reactions of donors towards the Rwandan political context 
(Hayman 2009, 595). Furthermore, she underlines how the success of ownership is placed 
between government and donors, as opposed to a “national or country ownership where the 
main locus would be an interaction amongst government and people” (Ibid., 597). Ultimately, 
these key concepts of the new aid paradigm impacted how donors engaged with others and 
reshaped power dynamics between donors and recipients, beyond shaping national priorities. 
Aid technocratisation  
In order to adhere to these modalities, logical frameworks,17 objectively measurable indicators 
and a range of monitoring and evaluation approaches have been promoted as essential tools 
for any organisation that aims to receive financial support from main donor agencies (Holvoet 
and Renard 2007; see also any funding document). Such instruments changed not only aid 
negotiation processes between recipients and donors, but also the types of policies and 
programme, as their objectives and implementation are constrained by short-term 
measurability and monitoring requirements (see e.g., Nijs and Renard 2009; Rombouts 2006; 
Killick 2004). Most of the national institutions, international and local NGOs working on TJ, 
being dependent on international donors, have to comply with these technocratic requirements 
of the new aid-delivery paradigm. 
The new aid paradigm has created a new lexicon to describe its key dimensions; the specific 
terminology (such as harmonisation, alignment, ownership, and so on) is conveyed through 
most policy papers. Along with the capacities needed to comply with bureaucratic modalities, 
increasing attention is given to information and knowledge exchange. The Busan Declaration 
                                                 
17 A logical framework is a table required by most donors to demonstrate the connections between the objectives, 
activities and indicators of an aid project. 
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(Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Efficiency 2011, 6), for example, insists that a focus should 
be put on the country level to “strengthen the capacities of all relevant stakeholders to make 
better use of this information in decision-making and to promote accountability.”  
At the global level, international aid agencies (such as the UN, International Monetary Fund, 
OECD, UK Department for International Development, European Commission, and others) 
are increasingly producing guidelines to share best practices, lessons learnt, and advice to 
implement the new modalities. The importance placed on capacity-building and knowledge 
exchange have had an impact on the type of activities TJ organisations have put in place to 
engage with their constituency and beneficiaries – emphasising training and sensitisation, as 
discussed in chapter 5. Furthermore, the gradual technocratisation for aid efficiency has also 
increased the bureaucratic obligations and modified the reporting system for TJ practitioners. 
While this has required them to place an emphasis on technocratic dimensions, it has also 
drawn them away from core discussions on how to deal with the past (see chapter 4). The 
critique of the toolkit approach and TJ professionalisation can be directly related to this wider 
trend in development practices promoting guidelines for best practices. Social anthropologists 
who have been looking at development practices for decades (Long, Escobar, Mosse, 
Fergusson, Olivier de Sardan) have already provided extensive analysis to underline issues of 
technocratised and bureaucratised aid, as I expand on in following chapters.  
New Partnership: Equal and Inclusive 
The new aid paradigm claims to promote an equal relationship between recipients and donors 
(see e.g., Third High Level Forum on Aid Efficiency 2008, 2). NGOs and civil society 
organisations are also given unprecedented importance in the harmonised framework, even if 
they have been part of the development landscape for several decades. Thanks to their 
purported flexibility and representation of people’s interests and subsequent proximity to the 
population, they are considered to be useful for compliance with the ownership objective 
(Second High Level Forum on Aid Efficiency 2005; for critical analysis of the approach see 
e.g., Rombouts 2006, 7). 
This additional emphasis on civil society organisations was perceptible in my empirical 
research, as I demonstrate in the following chapters. In discussions with government 
institutions, collaboration and support to civil society were often raised as safeguards 
(particularly in the case of gacaca), as well as a way to grasp and comply with population needs 
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(as illustrated in the case of the tripartite committee for the National Consultations in Burundi). 
In everyday practice, however, the policymaking and policy implementation, the hierarchical 
division, and the difficult relationships between national institutions, donors agencies and 
NGO, all remained important obstacles to equal partnership (discussed in chapter 4). The 
empirical chapters further unpack how relationships with civil society organisations were 
actually complex and not necessarily responding to claimed aims. The visions of civil society 
organisations are not homogeneous, nor representative of the ‘population’s perception’, as 
addressed in chapters 5 and 6. 
2.3.3. Unconvinced by the New Aid Paradigm: Technocratisation and Depoliticisation   
Some authors have criticised the new aid paradigm, arguing that it is based on inherent 
contradictions and simplistic perceptions. Summarising critics in line with what I capture as 
three components of the new aid paradigm (management for results, knowledge exchange and 
equal partnership), the following paragraphs argue that this technocratic approach enables 
complexity to be hidden and contextual specificities to be ignored, and attempts to make 
measurable what is, in reality, intangible. 
Among the risks associated with this approach, Phillip Quarles van Ufford, Ananta Giri and 
David Mosse highlight (2003, 9) that “the ambition to manage more and more and have macro 
impacts may have the effect of creating a world in which, in fact, less is manageable; one in 
which there is a palpable growth of ignorance and uncertainty.” Molenaers (2007) considers 
that programmes can be neatly monitored only because the technocratic approach provides 
clear, concrete and controllable schemes. She (ibid.) draws attention to the danger of this: the 
supposed feasibility of reform produces: 
the illusion one can buy change, and the risk of exaggerated donor optimism. It also leads to turning 
a blind eye toward failure, a continuous search for fixable and manageable problems, and a 
disregard for political consequences or pre-conditions for certain reforms.  
In a sense, these authors imply managerial optimism and that the accompanying new 
instruments do not constitute a good guide for actions but are, in reality, interpretative tools to 
render policies manageable and enable flexible interpretation of the outcome. From an 
ethnographic perspective, François Giovalucchi and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2009) 
observe that the use of logical frameworks in practice is disconnected from its theoretical 
model (most projects encountered through my ethnographic research were part of logical 
frameworks due to donors’ requirements). For many aid workers, it serves at best as a 
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controller of coherence. They also, however, underline the risk of depoliticisation and of 
undermining the complex social reality in which aid projects are taking place. Their analysis 
nuances the very critical perceptions of technocratic tools, while also supporting other 
criticisms of the managerial approach to aid (Giovalucchi and Olivier de Sardan, ibid).   
The negative impact of indicators of audit cultures and their instrumental capacities to 
manipulate knowledge have also been denounced (for a general perspective on audit culture, 
Strathern 2000; Shore and Wright 2015; about development practices, see Nijs and Renard 
2009, 17-18; Anders 2015). The results-based approach gives an emphasis on accountability, 
while it neglects “evaluative analysis and, in particular, the broader, more institutional and 
systemic issues.” In line with the use of indicators, knowledge is seen as “the framing and 
reframing of policy that links interventions and outcomes, rather than the practical testing of 
implementation modalities” (Giri, van Ufford, and David Mosse 2003, 9). 
Specifically within the practice of human rights, Sally Engle Merry (2011, 201) considers that 
the results-based approach introduces “a form of knowledge production in which numerical 
measures make visible forms of violation and inequality that are otherwise obscured.” 
However, the way in which indicators are named, selected, measured and evaluated relies on 
decisional processes that are hidden by these numbers. Merry (ibid., 201) ironically compares 
such approaches to witchcraft ‒ as they have “the power to guide the flow of supernatural 
forces for good or harm. … Technology that exercises power but in a variety of ways, 
depending on who is using it for what purposes.”  
Looking into the impacts on practice of such technocratic knowledge, a number of authors 
underline the risk of silencing political dimensions. Holvoet and Rombouts (Holvoet and 
Rombouts 2008, 593) denounce how monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices lead donors 
and recipients to “both adopt a skewed technocratic approach, vigorously neglecting the fact 
that M&E takes place within a socio-political setting that can heavily impinge upon it”, and 
hence resulting in the denial of ‘politics’. Through an analysis of the peace process in Sri 
Lanka, Jonathan Goodhand and Oliver Walton (2009,13) assert: 
Peace processes are moments of change when the new rules of the game and one’s position in the 
game are decided. … External interventions in these so-called ‘charismatic moments’ of politics 
are ineluctably political and cannot be reduced to generalisable technical exercises. 
In other words, the technocratisation of aid enables external actors to pretend that they do not 
intervene on the political level, thereby ignoring the inherent political nature of the transition 
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‒ which is often a requirement donors impose on themselves, as I observed in fieldwork. The 
creation of such a technocratic lexicon and practices has depoliticised practical choices by 
claiming to be universal, rational and technical. The new aid paradigm, as a search for 
efficiency, enables international interventions increasingly to hide behind a technical agenda 
the complexity of the social reality on which they intervene. The unpredictability of their 
intervention remains controlled within the managerial agenda without dealing with the social 
and political side effects of their interventions, which will be discussed in the empirical 
chapters.  
In terms of TJ programmes and policies that support reconciliation, truth-establishment, 
accountability and reparation, they are also implemented in highly bureaucratic environments. 
I observed that most actors pretended to limit themselves to technical support; their results are 
mainly evaluated on the basis of technocratic indicators. TJ interventions, therefore, were 
assessed according to how many people were trained in reconciliation methods, or by so many 
perpetrators being judged by such jurisdictions, but the quality, the real outcome and benefit 
for victims, is too rarely integrated in official policy evaluation processes. 
Looking at the dynamics of negotiation among institutions, the empirical chapters (4, 5 and 6) 
explore how power relationships have impacted on the establishment of TJ in Burundi and 
Rwanda. Exploring the implementation of TJ in two distinct contexts, the research illustrates 
similarities in actors’ working patterns, mandates, procedures and use of buzzwords, but also 
attends to the different power dynamics and policy processes framed by the above-mentioned 
dimensions. In this way, my research contributes to our understanding of how this new aid 
paradigm operates in practice and impacts on the nature or core of aid-dependent projects.  
Concluding Remarks ‒ Setting my Theoretical Framework 
The main aim of this chapter has been to situate my own research within the current debates 
of both TJ and development studies. I have consolidated the critique of the TJ toolkit approach, 
of TJ professionalisation and of how TJ practices have been absorbed by aid structures and the 
parallel development of the New Aid Paradigm. This chapter has demonstrated the relevance 
of critical development research to look into aid-dependant TJ practices. The existing critiques 
of the TJ toolkit approach reject its one-size-fits-all perspective and encourage stronger 
attention to local dynamics, the political nature of TJ, and the inherent contradictions between 
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the overarching aims (namely accountability, reconciliation, trauma healing, reparation, 
strengthening of rule of law, democracy and sustainable peace). 
Ultimately, such a literature review leads me to define the TJ toolkit approach as: an 
ideological and pragmatic guide for actions used by TJ practitioners while looking into options 
to deal with a violent past in a particular context. By presenting the TJ toolkit, international 
practitioners present a set of aims and mechanisms to local authorities, and civil society. Such 
a guide should help TJ practitioners in any specific context to elaborate the plans of action at 
ideological, institutional and pragmatic levels. NGOs and newly established institutions then 
translate them into programmes, projects and animation tools for their constituencies and 
audiences. The toolkit approach is thus the dissemination of a discourse, a set of mechanisms, 
and a set of claims that are implemented through aid-dependent structures.   
I have highlighted how TJ practices around the world promote a positive emancipatory 
discourse to help societies and victims emerging from violence to recover from past sufferings, 
to strengthen the rule of law and to build sustainable peace; while in reality have an 
implementation that takes place in complex social realities, creating major frictions between 
policy and practice. These dimensions obscure the inherent socio-political battles about 
representations of the past, behind technocratic terms. I argue that by trying to fix a society 
affected by irreparable experiences, frictions are inevitable. Such an approach, with its 
inevitable issues and without attention to dealing with them, is morally questionable. 
Madlingozi (2009, 225) addresses the problems of TJ experts:  
A well-travelled international cadre of actors – what I have called transitional justice entrepreneurs 
– theorise the field; set the agenda; legitimise what constitute appropriate transitional justice norms 
and mechanisms; influence the flow of financial resources; assist governments in transition; invite, 
collaborate with and capacitate ‘relevant’ local NGOs and ‘grassroots organisations’; and 
ultimately not only represent and speak for victims but ‘produce’ the victim.  
Ultimately, he (ibid.) argues that “the knowledgeable experts and on the other side black 
victims who need saving – re-enacts and perpetuates the civilising mission of the past 
centuries.” As illustrated throughout this chapter, research on aid practices around the world 
denounces the negative impacts of the professionalisation and technocratisation of the 
international aid sector. It also indicates that this evolution is affecting aid-dependent 
processes, including TJ: by enabling depoliticisation and silencing unexpected outcomes. 
The empirical chapters illustrate in more detail how TJ practitioners implement a set of 
activities that reinterpret, negotiate and disseminate the TJ toolkit approach, by organising 
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training sessions, sensitisation campaigns, lobbying, report production and research, and 
supporting civil society. Prior to such an analysis, the next chapter provides the historical and 
contextual background necessary to understand how gacaca and the TRC came into the 
Rwandan and Burundian contexts, but also how the TJ policy framework had been built around 
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Chapter 3: Dealing with the Past: Responses to and Burdens of 
Violence in Current Socio-Political Affairs 
Introduction 
Alongside other critical scholars of TJ policy and practice, I reject the one-size-fits-all 
perspective of the toolkit approach, and encourage stronger attention to localised contexts and 
the political nature of TJ (as presented in the previous chapter, e.g., Shaw, Waldorf, and Hazan 
2010; Hinton et al. 2010; Alcalá et al. 2012; Rubli 2012). Before I scrutinise empirically the 
impact of the toolkit approach in the following chapters, I explain here how the Burundian and 
Rwandan TJ policy models have been moulded to the global ‘toolkit’ approach yet 
implemented in very specific political and historical contexts. As I also describe how TJ is part 
of wider peacebuilding and development strategies intended to respond to the specific past of 
mass violence – as prescribed by the New Aid Paradigm. While these reconstruction 
programmes claim to be about ‘fixing consequences of the past’, I argue that interpretative 
battles over the past are mainly reflective of current politics. This chapter addresses the 
following questions: How are specific TJ models framed according to the global TJ toolkit 
approach? How does the specific political and historical contexts frame TJ policies in Rwanda 
and Burundi?  
Both the gacaca process and the Burundian TJ process have been influenced by the TJ toolkit 
approach in terms of language, mechanisms, ideological claims and pragmatic 
implementation. Following the prescriptions of the TJ toolkit approach, these two models both 
pursue grand ambitions, such as fighting impunity, consolidating reconciliation and 
establishing truth. The associated processes received strong technical support from 
international donors and NGOs, which has important repercussions on the policy framework 
and implementation process. Furthermore, as presented in the previous chapter, a wide 
literature already illustrates the frictions between the gacaca policy and Burundian TJ 
discourse and practice – implementation of these models have been beset by a range of 
problems (in relation to gacaca, see e.g., Ingelaere 2012; 2010; Waldorf 2010; 2008; Burnet 
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At the same time, the two TJ processes addressed in the thesis are part of wider Rwandan and 
Burundian reconstruction strategies and socio-political contexts. Numerous other policies 
(articulated in key strategy documents such as Vision 2020 in Rwanda and Vision 2025 in 
Burundi) have been produced to deal with the consequences of mass violence and related 
poverty in the two countries. These national strategies promote economic development, 
poverty reduction and peacebuilding while embracing ambitions in the areas of human rights, 
democracy, social development, gender and environment, including TJ dispositions. 
Despite the ambitious, emancipatory policy discourse enshrined in Vision 2020 and Vision 
2025, the long history of human rights violations and mass violence still mark heavily current 
socio-political contexts in the two countries. The implementation of these policies is not 
simply dealing with the past for a better future – as it is often suggested. Implementation is 
entangled in socio-political complexities resulting from a violent past and the consequent 
battles over interpretation in current politics. Whether strengthening the ‘rule of law’, 
rebuilding the judicial systems, defining politics of memory, or conceiving development 
strategies, all these ambitions are affected by the legacies of mass violence. 
Between the past and the future, the present is conventionally perceived as the moment to 
redress injustice inherited from the past, particularly when looking at memories of violence 
(Jewsiewicki 2004). However, in the present, the past also potentially constitutes a burden (see 
e.g., Rosoux 2006), which severely affect current politics; including relations between donors 
and recipients. Given the predominance of aid in political affairs in the two countries, the 
legacies of mass violence have inevitably affected the relations between recipients and donors. 
In a different context, (of French and Algerian relations,) Valérie Rosoux (2001) explores the 
role of the past in international relations. She observes (2001: 452-454): 
To identify the impact of the use of the past in foreign policy, one should focus on the tension 
existing between past choices and the burden of the past. […] Although the recounted elements are 
often distant in time, all official referrals to the past often, in reality, are barely concerned with the 
past: they essentially reflect the present. It is in accord with current political objectives that the 
official memory selects historical events it judges to be relevant. In this regard, the proponents of 
official memory perceive the past as convenient tool to support their views rather than an 
unchanging story. […] By playing with the meaning, protagonists attempt to establish a narrative 
that can promote reconciliation between different parties (author’s translation, Ibid.). 
Dealing with the past is therefore about more than responding to violence of the past through 
TJ and other peacebuilding and development policies. The people involved in the 
reconstruction of the two countries are also constrained and challenged by burdens of the past 
that emerge in everyday life – which then reflect on current politics. Equally, TJ and other 
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reconstruction policies are marked by memories of violence involving loss, mourning, trauma 
and resultant economic disparities. Today’s challenging political dynamics are also affected 
by these burdens of the past, including problems within political parties which are mostly 
divided in Burundi; the repression of civil society and media, extrajudiciary killings, and the 
consequences of mass displacement. In both Burundi and Rwanda today, human rights are still 
widely violated and many past violations remain unresolved issues (e.g., Rubli 2013). 
On the basis of these premises, this chapter, for each country in turn, traces the global 
influences of the TJ toolkit on each TJ model, its integration into local dimensions, the wider 
peacebuilding and development strategies in which TJ fits, and how it has been affected by the 
wider political contexts. 
  
Section 3.1
Introducing the Peacebuilding and 
Development Framework in Rwanda
Legend: Top Vision 2020 
Shop in Ruhengeri - © A 
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3.1. Introducing the Peacebuilding and Development Framework in 
Rwanda 
3.1.1. Gacaca Model, the TJ Toolkit and its Implementation 
Discussions about the gacaca policy and legal framework started in the late 1990s, coinciding 
with the period during which the TJ toolkit approach was being consolidated internationally. 
Rather than being a direct result of the toolkit approach, the gacaca policy framework was 
affected by the same global trends that framed the TJ toolkit approach itself. This includes key 
normative trends: it was considered that impunity was not an option; truth-seeking and judicial 
mechanisms were promoted as complementary to dealing with different levels of retribution 
and reconciliation. The gacaca model was innovative in compiling truth-seeking and judicial 
dimensions within one mechanism that had been implemented in each community in Rwanda.  
The gacaca legal framework also fully embraced the claimed relationship between the 
implementation of these mechanisms with the set aims consolidated in the TJ toolkit approach 
as the aims defined in the preamble illustrate. The preamble of the 2004 gacaca law indicates 
that the process was put into place because of “the necessity to eradicate forever the culture of 
impunity in order to achieve justice and reconciliation in Rwanda, … [to enable] rapid 
prosecutions and trials of perpetrators and accomplices of genocide, not only with the aim of 
providing punishment, but also reconstituting the Rwandan Society” (Official Gazette 2004). 
Some 60 per cent of the gacaca budget came from international donors. The significant 
involvement of external actors influenced the policy model, its aims, the type of actors 
involved in the process and the preparatory activities put in place, following the pattern of the 
new aid paradigm: technical support, sensitisation, training and monitoring, accompanied by 
bureaucratic obligations towards donors (see empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6). For example, 
Ananda Breed (2014, 104) describes how one of the billboards displayed around the country 
prepared (or sensitised) the Rwandan population: 
Gacaca hoardings across the country advertised the slogan ‘Tell what we have seen, admit what 
has been done, and move forward to healing.’ The images on the national hoardings were from The 
Liberating Truth, depicting a wide-eyed (traumatised) woman and collages of a man whose hands 
are collapsed over his head (perpetrator), a schoolroom and a gacaca assembly, in the backdrop of 
a fire.  
This simple slogan embraces the global discourse around the benefits of truth-seeking: the 
victims shall tell their trauma, the repented perpetrator shall confess and beg pardon (as part 
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of gacaca law procedures), and this will lead to healing and reconciliation. Another of the 
sensitisation billboards (picture below) similarly illustrates an image of what was expected of 
gacaca practice: an engaging audience to witness the truth-telling, perpetrators to confess their 
crimes, and Inyangamugayo18 to lead the process with integrity. In a line at the bottom-left, 
gacaca’s mantra is indicated in Kinyarwanda, ‘Ukuri Ubutabera Ubwiyunge’ (Justice, Truth, 
Reconciliation): truth and justice shall bring reconciliation. The influence of international aid 
is also noticeable, with the logos of the Belgian Technical Cooperation, UNDP, and the SNJG 
in the right bottom corner. 
 Illustration 2: Gacaca Sensitisation Billboard 
While the preamble of the gacaca law refers to international and national legislation and 
Rwandan culture, and hence creates the illusion that gacaca practices are embedded in legal 
international standards and Rwandan traditions of conciliation, literature about gacaca has 
extensively debated these dimensions. The gacaca courts have attracted important attention in 
the academic arena, with hundreds of publications referring to it. Research addresses different 
facets of the process, including: legal analysis and due process (Digneffe and Fierens 2003; 
Corey and Joireman 2004; Waldorf 2006; Longman 2006); the political and social influences 
of the RPF, the performative nature of gacaca courts, reconciliation, justice and truth seeking 
                                                 
18 People elected within their communities to act as judges in gacaca courts 
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; (Ingelaere 2009; Reyntjens and Vandeginste 2005; Burnet 2009; Waldorf 2010; Breed 2008; 
Breed 2014) and donor involvement (Jamar 2012; Schotsmans 2011; Oomen 2005; Petersen, 
Samset, and Wang 2009; Hayman 2007; Gready 2010; Meyerstein 2007). 
The few researchers who have studied the actual implementation of gacaca have identified 
various positive and negative dynamics with respect to the timing and dynamics of the 
genocide in specific locations. For example, with the mandate to analyse social and legal 
dimensions, monitoring NGOs have identified the following issues: the difficulties of 
Inyangamugayo to apply gacaca law (collecting data about crimes and alleged perpetrators, 
and organise and rule on trials), specifically failing to respect the principle of presumption of 
innocence, limited verification of evidence, incorrect categorisation of crimes and penalties, 
false accusations and corruption, and involvement of political actors in the process. All these 
elements have been considered to have been aggravated by the acceleration of the process in 
200719 (Avocats Sans Frontières 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2010; Penal Reform International 2003; 
2006; 2007b; 2008; 2010).  
Based on his research in Sovu, Max Retting (2011) observed the presence of lies, half-truths, 
silence and personal revenge. Lars Waldorf  (2010, 189) reminds us that gacaca evolved over 
its lifespan, “as it ran the gauntlet of legal amendments, official pronouncements, shifting 
priorities, donors’ worries, NGO critiques, practical hurdles, and local resistance.” Reviewing 
the evolution and implementation, he considers that “local responses to gacaca have 
challenged those foundational assumptions in critical ways, frustrating claims that gacaca has 
promoted truth, justice and reconciliation” and that donors have been dismissive of these local 
responses (Ibid., 201). 
A number of authors underline how the local practice of gacaca was affected by national 
politics in various forms (Ingelaere 2009; Longman 2009; Thomson and Nagy 2011; Burnet 
2014). The imposition of Hutu guilt, victor justice and political intrusion have also been 
mentioned as key limits of the gacaca process. Leslie Haskell and Lars Waldorf (2011, 51) 
underline that “in the period leading up to the RPF victory and the months that followed, the 
RPF killed approximately thirty thousand civilians, most of whom were Hutu.” However, 
while initially included in the Organic Law No. 40/2000 (Jan. 26, 2001), “the National Service 
                                                 
19 To comply of the many closing dates of the gacaca process (later postponed), the rhythm of judgments had 
been accelerated, one monitored reported to have observe a court ruling over 19 cases in one day during that 
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of gacaca jurisdictions removed jurisdiction after individuals in pilot jurisdictions had called 
for justice for RPF crimes” in 2004 (Ibid. p53-54). The vast majority of these crimes have 
never been examined by the gacaca or another court.  
Furthermore, it had been argued that the wide definition of genocide crimes and the unclear 
definition of the notion of accomplice also contributed to the imposition of ‘Hutu guilt’ (See 
e.g., Retting). For instance, Longman (2009, 310) considers: 
In gacaca, even the most minor offenses by Hutu against Tutsi, such as pillaging, were being 
adjudicated and could result in imprisonment, while Rwanda’s legal system pursued almost no 
cases of Tutsi attacks on Hutu, even cases of major massacres. As a result, gacaca reinforced ethnic 
divisions in Rwanda, even as the government made open discussions of ethnicity taboo.  
In relation to general dynamics driving the gacaca process, Ingelaere observes (2009, 518) 
“the general vectors of the ‘truth’ emanating from this new power constellation”: 
The setting in which the search for the ‘truth’ in the gacaca courts takes place is twofold. On the 
one hand there is a new political regime that came into place after the genocide in 1994. This regime 
is the outcome of military victory and the total defeat of the incumbent regime. It entails that the 
victor usurped power and has thus all political space available to manoeuvre its transitional justice 
policies and vision of the past and the future. 
At the same time, the local dynamics also played a role. Both Burnet and Ingelaere find that 
the micro-dynamics of gacaca varied from one community to another (Burnet 2014; Ingelaere 
2004). On a more general level, Ananda Breed (2014, 198) considers that the actual practice 
of gacaca contributed to the construction of a New Rwanda as promoted by the RPF regime:  
the inoculation and weekly ritual of gacaca staged nationally (beyond the data collection courts to 
actually trying the perpetrators of the genocide) between 2005 and 2012 has been a part of a 
national memory machine to produce rwandanicity, or the unified Rwandan identity devoid of the 
ethnic identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. 
Others have commented positively on gacaca courts, such as Nicola Palmer (2014, 242) 
considering that “gacaca is a legitimate, albeit imperfect, channel through which losses that 
occurred during the war have been publicly resolved” (See also Kanyangara et al. 2014; Pozen, 
Neugebauer, and Ntaganira 2014).  
Several scholars looking into the relation between donors and Rwandan authorities take gacaca 
as a key example (Oomen 2009; Petersen, Samset, and Wang 2009; Hayman 2007; 2010; Da 
Camara 2001‒ see analysis below). Much of the writing about the gacaca process underlines 
the significant involvement of donors and external actors in the policy (Longman, 2006, 226; 
Reyntjens and Vandeginste, 2005, 108; Waldorf, 2010, 189; Schotman, 2011). The role of 
donors and civil society in relation to gacaca has been researched but not addressed 
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comprehensively: each piece of research looks only at a short period of time, with a focus on 
a particular set of actors (Schotsmans 2011; Oomen 2005; Hayman 2008; Meyerstein 2007; 
Da Camara 2001; Jamar 2012). 
All these studies denounce the difficult negotiations between donors, authorities and civil 
society. For instance, through the analysis of LIPRODHOR monitoring of the gacaca process, 
Paul Gready raises the risks of detrimental aid dynamics within a political context that 
constrains civil society (Gready, 2009). Martien Schotsmans analyses the donors ‒ 
international NGOs’ relationships with regard to the gacaca monitoring. She observes a 
contradiction between donors requiring NGO monitoring of gacaca All these pieces of 
research underline the micro-social negotiations in implementation, and the macro level 
through interference of politics. I add to this an intermediary level of analysis with my 
empirical focus on TJ practitioners (including Rwanda authorities, and NGO and donor 
representatives) that played a crucial role in the implementation of gacaca.  
At the international level, a number of judicial initiatives have been put in place to deal with 
the consequences of the Rwandan genocide. In November 1994, the UN Security Council 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to try high-level organisers 
of the genocide. In addition, on the basis of universal jurisdiction, some trials of genocide 
suspects have taken place in front of national justice systems of Switzerland, Belgium, and the 
US. Serious crimes began to be judged by the Rwandan National courts in 1996 (e.g., 
Reyntjens and Vandeginste 2005). Even at this level, political dynamics affected the nature of 
justice pursued: there was no prosecution of RPF crimes at the ICTR (Peskin 2011) and there 
were important diplomatic repercussions after French and Spanish judicial authorities issued 
warrants for high-ranking RPF officers for alleged crimes committed in 1994 (e.g., Vidal 2007; 
Chrétien 2009; Simon 2015). In relation to the French and Spanish attempts at justice for RPF 
crimes, Haskell and Waldorf (2011, 54) observe that “both cases have been labeled ‘politically 
motivated’ by the Rwandan government and largely ignored by the international community” 
and are unlikely to lead to any prosecution. 
This particularly ambitious TJ project in Rwanda had been framed by the same ideological 
and pragmatic dimensions that shaped the toolkit approach. On paper, the policy includes all 
these dimensions of the holistic approach, relying on the complementarity of different 
mechanisms to achieve the variety of TJ aims (reconciliation, accountability, reparation, 
democratisation). As the literature review here underlines, the gacaca process and wider TJ 
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agenda had, however, been heavily impacted by various political agendas (RPF politics, 
community dynamics, donors, NGOs, authorities, global consolidation of international justice 
agenda). By integrating more than just national politics, through an emphasis on everyday 
practices, my research brings more attention to the problems associated with the policy model 
as well as power dynamics among implementing practitioners. 
3.1.2. The Wider Reconstruction Programme 
Even if gacaca remains an exceptional process, it is part of an ambitious policy framework and 
of institutional structures that respond to the wider consequences of the 1994 genocide and the 
historical events leading to it. The wider frameworks of reconstruction, peacebuilding and 
development led to the creation of a number of policies and institutions that characterised and 
affected socio-political dimensions in Rwanda. The key strategic document, Vision 2020, 
defines a set of objectives to be achieved by 2020 for the country to recover from its tragic 
past: 
Since 1994, the Government of Rwanda has stabilised the political situation, whilst putting the 
economy back on track with considerable assistance from development partners. However, the 
challenges remain daunting. … Economic growth, alone, is not sufficient to bring about the 
necessary rise in the standard of living of the population. To vanquish hunger and poverty, growth 
must be Pro-Poor, giving all Rwandan’s the chance to gain from the new economic opportunities. 
Vision 2020 aspires for Rwanda to become a modern, strong and united nation, proud of its 
fundamental values, politically stable and without discrimination amongst its citizens (Republic of 
Rwanda 2000, 6). 
Vision 2020 covers many social, economic and structural dimensions where progress is needed 
to result in a united and developed Rwanda. Specifically, four types of key aims (or pillars) 
are presented: 1) Reconstruction of the nation through good governance; 2) Transformation of 
agriculture and the development of a private sector; 3) human resources development; 4) 
regional economic integration and cooperation. These have been translated into actions plans 
through the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP) for 2005 to 2007, the EDPRS for 2008 
to 2012, and the EDPRS II from 2013 to 2017, which are key instruments of the New Aid 
Paradigm to render aid more efficient and coordinated. These strategies are ambitious policy 
frameworks that are seductive when taken out of the political context, implementation 
problems and unintended side effects. 
At the national level, a number of structures and institutions were established to coordinate 
and implement these strategies, such as the External Finance Unit, the Aid Coordination Unit, 
the Development Assistance Database and the Rwanda Governance Board. To ensure their 
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implementation at other levels, the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) was put in place 
at the district level. Linkages to lower administrative levels were through Imihigo, 
performance contracts, in which heads of district, sectors, cells and households commit to 
implementing specific elements of Vision 2020. Furthermore, donors and international 
organisations (including NGOs) were required to sign a memorandum of understanding with 
each national institution they cooperated with to ensure coordination and efficiency (see 
chapter 4 for an analysis of the ‘political bureaucracy’ associated with these structures). 
Specifically in the area of reconciliation, civil education and rehabilitation, the public sector 
Justice Cluster was created in 2004 and reorganised in 2007 to establish the current Justice, 
Reconciliation, Law & Order Sector (JRLO). As part of the Governance Sector Working 
Group, the JRLO initially brought together 14 institutions, and currently 12 institutions.20 It 
aims to strengthen the rule of law to promote good governance and a culture of peace. It is also 
a base for the harmonisation, prevention of duplication of aid projects and the sharing of 
information (Government of Rwanda and UNDP 2007), as well as for the harmonisation, 
alignment, ownership and management-for-results part of the aid efficiency agenda described 
in the previous chapter.  
Among these institutions the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), created 
in 1999, had to “organise and oversee national public debates aimed at promoting national 
unity and reconciliation of Rwandan people” (Parliamentarian Law no. 03/99 of 12 March 
1999).  
The organisation of Community Work (TIG-Traveaux d’Interet General) was put together to 
contribute to the reintegration of prisoners, as those whose confessions have been accepted by 
gacaca courts would contribute to the reconstruction of the country and their neighbourhood.  
                                                 
20 At his creation it included, the Ministry of Justice (MINIJUST), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MININTER), 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MINAFFET-Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et de la 
cooperation), Ministry of Defence (MINADEF), Supreme court, National Service of the gacaca court (SNJG), 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), National Human Rights Commission (NHRC or CNDP 
for Commission Nationale des Droits de la Personne), Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission 
(RDRC), Ombudsman, Prosecutor, Work for General Interest (TIG -Travaux d’Interet General). At the time of 
the writing, some institutions were closed down (the TIG, SNJG, RDRC); others changed due to the 
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The Ingando Camps, 21  Imihigo, 22  Itorero schools, 23  the umuganda (community work 
undertaken once a month), were also initiatives for the production of ‘ideal’ Rwandan citizens 
working for the sake of the country’s development and supporting “good values”. Andrea 
Purdeková (2012; 2011) and Jenifer Melvin (2012; 2010) note a number of frictions between 
these policies and their practice. In relation to Ingando, Jenifer Melvin (2010, 940) observes: 
The Ingando curriculum’s neglect of target-free discussion about opposition parties, the value of 
divergent viewpoints or any critical assessment of the political system in Rwanda becomes all the 
more pertinent when viewed within the context of the country’s political landscape. Particularly 
troubling are recurrent accusations of repression, intimidation and violence inflicted upon members 
of political parties at the hands of the RPF and its proxies. 
Similar observations lead Purdeková (2011, 44) to describe Ingando as “a state-organised rite 
that is permeated by and reflects wider social dynamics and power constellations, and is 
ultimately meant to serve grand social engineering purposes.” In their analysis, both authors 
draw parallels between the practice and policy models of all these reconstruction initiatives 
(including gacaca). They have in common their foundation in re-created traditions that 
encourage participation, ‘authenticity’ and ‘adaptation to the local’ (see e.g., Purdeková, 2011, 
5-6). They also argue that these policy models have seduced the development community, 
which has provided strong financial support. More importantly, these initiatives are the 
cornerstone of the regime’s legitimacy at the political level, holding together and inculcating 
a specific perception of Rwanda being destroyed by colonialism and the genocide, but then 
saved and renewed by the RPF. 
This long list of reconstruction initiatives illustrates the sophistication of the planning in terms 
of social engineering: umuganda, ingando, iterero, gacaca, etc., are implemented to the lower 
level of authority, the umugududu (village), in order to frame how people should organise 
                                                 
21 The NURC defines Ingando as “A civic education activity that has facilitated the smooth reintegration of 
former returnees, X-FAR, provisionally released prisoners back to their communities.” A place that provided 
“forums to Rwandans to come to terms with their past by facing history, forging a common vision for a united 
future.” http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=81 
 
22 Performance Contract – “Imihigo is the plural Kinyarwanda word of Umuhigo, which means to vow to deliver. 
Imihigo also includes the concept of Guhiganwa, which means to compete among one another. Imihigo describes 
the pre-colonial cultural practice in Rwanda where an individual sets targets or goals to be achieved within a 
specific period of time. The person must complete these objectives by following guiding principles and be 
determined to overcome any possible challenges that arise” http://www.rgb.rw/governance-innovations/imihigo/ 
 
23 The NURC defines Iterero as “homegrown initiative inspired by the Rwandan culture that was formerly a 
traditional Rwandan school to instill moral values of integrity, and capacity to deal with ones problems”. It “has 
today been revived to promote values of unity, truth, culture of hard work and avoiding attitudes and mindsets 
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themselves for the sake of development. A number of scholars have analysed these policies 
and structures put in place to respond to the genocide (e.g., Holvoet and Rombouts 2008; 
Hayman 2008; Hayman 2009; Hayman 2010; Ansoms and Rostagno 2012; Debusscher and 
Ansoms 2013; Debusscher and van der Vleuten 2012). While describing the implementation 
of aid architecture (resulting from the new paradigm) and overzealous development policies 
in Rwanda, they all acknowledge frictions between aims and outcomes, and the risks of 
neglecting political dynamics with a focus on technocratisation. 
Reviewing the Vision 2020 halfway through its implementation, An Ansoms and Donatella 
Rostagno underline two sides of the story in the Rwandan development process. First, the ‘new 
Rwanda’ has “obtained a positive assessment of achievements in the fields of education and 
health”. However, it is unlikely that Rwanda will reach the goal of eradicating extreme poverty 
by 2015. They note “the strong economic growth is concentrated in the hands of a small elite, 
resulting in a highly skewed developmental path. The majority of smallholder farmers appear 
not to fit into the government’s vision of a ‘modern Rwanda’.” At the political level, Ansoms 
and Rostagno also note (Ibid. 433): 
the evolution of political governance indicators is also less promising. … Vision 2020 is 
supposedly based on a strong decentralisation process. Ten years on, the institutions have indeed 
been decentralised, yet overall power lies even more with the central authorities. In reality, then, 
decentralisation has been mainly a top-down process and it has not allowed for a bottom-up 
translation of the local needs to the national level. 
Other analyses of the Rwandan development process have also stressed the role of the donor 
community that supports these policies. Despite a high level of financial and technical support, 
Eugenia Zorbas (2011) notes that donors have expressed unease and even criticism. She 
identifies a number of factors that explain this paradoxical situation in which Rwanda is aid-
dependent, yet retain a high level of policy independence -  heavily influenced by the genocide 
guilt felt by donors (see below), as well as donors’ desire to see an African success. Similarly, 
Rachel Hayman observes (Hayman 2008) that donors expressed clear concerns and 
frustrations about certain policies such as gacaca but continued to support these processes. She 
considers that the divergences within and among donors created negotiating spaces for 
Rwandan authorities. 
Indeed, there were strong inconsistencies within donors’ approaches to Rwandan politics and 
their readjustment of aid programmes. Hayman (2007, 21) reminds us that:  
Belgium hold cold diplomatic relations with Rwanda after 1994, was concerned about negotiating 
a new programme framework while Rwandan troops were deployed in the DRC contrasted with 
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the remarkable continuity in projects on the ground… The Netherlands has been prohibited by its 
parliament from providing budget support because of concerns about governance in Rwanda, and 
which froze aid for the elections, has provided increased support for the justice sector. Norway, 
which emerged as a key new donor after the genocide, reduced its bilateral programme due to 
Rwanda’s regional belligerence and concerns about human rights abuses, but continues to provide 
aid through NGOs and acts as a silent partner in the local government and justice sectors.  
She (ibid.) concludes “this divergence created aid management problems for the government 
but also created space in that the aid continues to flow from multiple sources despite the official 
pressure.” While concerns were expressed, donors have not been able to address them 
effectively. On the contrary, I demonstrate in the following empirical chapters that the 
Rwandan authorities have managed to increasingly silence criticism from donors and 
international and local civil society organisations. Analysing the causes of the genocide, Uvin 
(1998) denounces how “political and ethnical amnesia” in aid distribution fuelled the genocide 
by giving no attention to dynamics related to politics and ethnicity. In the post-genocide 
period, donors continue to ignore and/or not address appropriately the politics involved in the 
policies they support. Despite donors’ concerns being expressed, Zorbas (2011, 114) notes: 
the Government of Rwanda can largely continue to define and pursue its own preferred 
development strategy, which does not fundamentally improve the lot of the poor and vulnerable 
nor does it alter the conditions of structural violence. This represents a failure of development in 
its mandates for both welfare and peace. 
Overall, this research about aid-dependant reconstruction and development in Rwanda 
demonstrates the limited capacities of an emancipative policy discourse and technocratic 
efforts to fix a ‘broken society’. Indeed, such research demonstrates how the development 
community has contributed in the projection of initiatives that promote reconciliation, unity 
and development by ignoring or not addressing appropriately the politics involved. Purdeková 
(2012, 205) argues that “Development is perceived as a common bounty to be achieved, not 
as an uncertain process producing new inequalities and divisions, accompanied by the 
emergence of struggles and resistances, empowerments and exploitations.” Inadvertently, 
these policies may have created new inequalities and divisions that are not addressed. At the 
same time, all these analyses of current development and aid strategies make references to the 
past, and the challenges caused by the past. They all brought  
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3.1.3. Legacies of Past Violence in Current Socio-Political Affairs 
The analysis above gives insights into how the very ambitious Rwandan structure established 
to deal with the past inevitably has to deal with the burdens of the past as well. Based on this 
literature that addresses frictions between the policy models and their implementation, I clarify 
in this section how the projects responding to the consequences of decades of conflict and the 
genocide are affected by the very same past. I reiterate the crucial causal relationships (even 
if often discontinuous) between the current political scene, legacies and instrumentalisation of 
the past that the frame political dynamics in play through these reconstruction, peacebuilding 
and development efforts. I first review the past is being instrumentalised in current political 
affairs; I then describe how international donors are constrained by their mistakes of the past.  
Politics and Instrumentalisation of the Past 
In Rwanda today, the Tutsi-dominated RPF controls economic, political and security power, 
with the only real opposition coming from political actors in exile. The legitimacy of the RPF 
power is consolidated around their successful reconstruction, securitisation and development 
of Rwanda. The regime has been frequently praised for its successes and criticised for its 
pitfalls. The subject of Rwanda’s political evolution is highly controversial among both 
scholars and the international community. Donors, even sometimes internally, are divided on 
whether to consider Rwanda as a success story or not (Hayman 2008; Pottier 2002; Mamdani 
2002). 
On the positive side, the RPF regime has been praised for successful infrastructure 
development, the stabilisation of security within Rwanda’s borders since the late 1990s 
(despite Rwanda military involvement in DRC – see below), promising economic 
development in terms of gross domestic product, providing access to education and health care 
to the population, and limiting corruption. At the same time, severe critique underlines the 
authoritarian nature of the regime (e.g., Reyntjens 2004; Reyntjens and Vandeginste 2005), 
the impartiality of judicial authorities (e.g., Human Rights Watch 2008; Amnesty International 
2010b), the RPF military intervention in the DRC that prolonged the Rwandan conflict outside 
national borders (Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009), attacks and extra-judiciary killings of 
opponents in exile (Human Rights Watch 2014b), and the difficult context for civil society 
organisations and the political opposition – constituting very weak or inexistent, independent 
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media, human rights, freedom of speech and associations (e.g., UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association 2014).  
During my fieldwork in 2013, the alleged support of the RPF to the rebel group M23 active in 
eastern Congo was mentioned as a serious concern by many international actors and led several 
donors to cut funding in Rwanda. As a group of Rwandophone rebels in DRC, the M23 was 
then one of the most active rebel group in Eastern Congo (e.g., BBC 2014b). These apparent 
contradictions make sense by unpacking how the RPF gained legitimacy and imposed a strict 
interpretation of the past. 
The political legitimacy of the RPF is articulated around a specific interpretation of the 1994 
genocide: one in which the colonial power divided Rwandan people, the génocidaire regime 
destroyed the country, the RPF came to save it, and enabled unity, reconciliation and 
development along with the return of Rwandans in exile (see e.g., Kagame speech at 20th 
commemoration of the genocide). 24  In line with the legitimacy-building detected in 
reconciliation policies, Melvin considers (2010, 939): 
By connecting these social factors to the previous genocidal regime, the current government is able 
to strengthen its attempts to eradicate them and make progress towards building a nation that is 
unified with a singular identity sans division or ethnicity. Moreover, bad governance in the colonial 
and post-colonial era and the violence it espoused justifies the criminalisation of genocide ideology, 
revisionism, divisionism and trivialisation of the genocide; accusations of which have been made 
against suspected génocidaires as well as political opponents, journalists and members of 
international non-governmental organisations. 
Similarly, Barbara Oomen (2005, 901) argues that the Rwandan government captured history 
and instrumentalised it for domestic and international political purposes. At the national level, 
this discourse or political vision held by the RPF led to the creation of a legal framework that 
criminalised ethnicity and divisionism through the adoption of laws forbidding ‘sectarian and 
genocide ideologies’. Many have argued that these laws are an efficient political tool to 
manipulate the legacies of the past and to neutralise government critics, especially as their 
definition of what genocide ideology and divisionism means is vague (Amnesty International 
2010a; Reyntjens 2011). It has been argued that this legal framework has been used politically 
and has severely affected democratisation and the development of an independent civil society. 
Those who do not support the discourse and attempt to challenge it have been repressed and/or 
arrested (Amnesty International 2010a). An illustrative example is the case of Victoire 
Ingabire, the president of opposition party FDU-Inkingi. She is a Hutu who returned to 
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Rwanda after 16 years in the Netherlands. She was arrested after she mentioned problems with 
Hutu victims while preparing her candidacy to the presidency campaign in 2010. She was 
condemned to eight years of imprisonment for charges that subsequently changed in her trials 
(Amnesty International 2010b).  
Reyntjens underlines how the RPF regime eliminated all critical voices at the national level 
through military control, political use of the legal framework, the infiltration of civil society 
and intimidation. He concludes (2011):  
Externally, the RPF has successfully cordoned off the arenas of massive human rights abuse in 
Rwanda and the DRC and imposed a monopoly on the reading of history. In combination with the 
moral high ground achieved through the genocide credit, this has made the regime nearly 
unchallengeable for the international community.  
The politics of knowledge production by the RPF has been addressed extensively (see also 
Pottier 2002; Lemarchand 2007), describing these processes and their implications. While the 
legitimacy of the regime relies on its military victory and socio-economic success, opening up 
to different interpretations of the past is seen as a risk which could undermine their power, but 
also put them under judicial enquiry for the war crimes committed in Rwanda and later in the 
DRC. At the same time, this projection of ‘success story’ has been facilitated by the failures 
of international donors prior to, during and after the genocide.  
International Aid and Past Failures 
The instrumentalisation of guilt towards international actors was accompanied by an aversion 
to criticism (e.g., Hayman 2008; Pottier 2002; Reyntjens 2011). In a speech to donors, 
President Kagame affirmed: “[i]t is therefore sometimes uncalled for, that we become subjects 
of endless lectures of how we should manage ourselves. We know what is best for us. No one 
should pretend that they know better than us what we need for ourselves.”25 Interviews with 
representatives of the SNJG demonstrated that this anti-interventionism discourse was also 
adopted by officials within gacaca negotiations: “the international community is responsible 
for what happened and is expected it to pay, it has no right to criticise” (Author’s Interview 
with SNJG representative, July 2008). 
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Extensive research has looked into the causes of the Rwandan genocide and has addressed the 
roles of the international community, pointing out multiple aspects such as: the responsibility 
of Belgian colonial rule for institutionalising ethnic difference; the provision of financial and 
military support to the Habyarimana regime; a general disregard for the socio-political realities 
of the country; the UN mission’s failure to stop the massacres; the withdrawal of Belgian blue 
helmets (e.g., Barnett, 2003; the problematic and political role of Opération Turquoise of the 
French military beyond its claimed humanitarian mission (e.g., Dallaire); and the passivity of 
the international community in general (Uvin, 1998). These legacies define the current context 
in which donors’ representatives and diplomats must work when discussing and negotiating 
aid policy with Rwandan authorities. It has created various sentiments of guilt and obligation 
and led to support for peacebuilding and reconstruction on the donors’ side, and blame 
narratives on the side of the Rwandan authorities. 
Through an examination of Belgian official representations of history in former colonies, 
Rousoux also addresses the representation of the Rwandan genocide (Rosoux, 2006). She lists 
actions undertaken and motivated by the desire of Belgium to admit the unfairness of the past 
(Ibid., 168–169). Interviews with donor representatives confirmed that the strong financial 
support of the justice sector in Rwanda, and particularly of the gacaca process, are related to 
the official willingness to address past mistakes. However, the Rwandan authorities used to 
their advantage the guilt expressed by international partners to justify aid without 
interventionism. Thus, donors have been caught in a catch-22, being discouraged to voice 
concerns in regard to political authoritarianism and human rights abuses because of their 
mistakes of the past - and hence repeating the same mistakes. All these elements of the past 
and current politics sets in the context in which the discussions over the gacaca process took 
place. 
3.1.4. Ten Years Later, at the Closure of the Gacaca Courts 
As I illustrate throughout the following empirical chapters, a number of donors and aid-
dependent actors have been involved throughout the decade of gacaca implementation. Their 
positions have changed, and their approach and support towards gacaca have been adapted 
accordingly. Even though the Rwandan government continually postponed the closure of 
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gacaca courts,26 the long-expected closure did finally take place in May 2012, a few months 
before I started my doctoral fieldwork. During the first phase of fieldwork (November 2012), 
I quickly identified crucial contradictions between the public discourse, with the praise of good 
numerical and technical success, versus the discovery of a number of unresolved problems. 
On the one hand, the closing ceremony organised by Rwandan authorities in June 2012 and 
the adoption of the terminating law drew a line under the process. It appeared that the TJ toolkit 
had been successfully applied – through the implementation of set mechanisms for a set of 
aims. Therefore, the problem of transition and the consequences of the genocide have been 
dealt with. On the other hand, I gathered scattered pieces of evidence suggesting the gacaca 
process was not as closed as this discourse suggested. In this section, I present the public 
discourse about the closure of gacaca courts, and the provisions of the Law ‘No25/2012 of 15 
June 2012 terminating the National Service in charge of follow-up, supervision and 
coordination of the activities of gacaca jurisdictions’ (terminating law). I also expose the 
remaining problems I identified, the limited attention of donors towards the closing process, 
and provide an overall conclusion in regards to the gacaca process. The following sub-sections 
address in turn the closing of gacaca courts, the problems created by gacaca and supporters’ 
reactions towards the gacaca closure.  
The Official Closing Ceremony and Legal Framework  
From on official perspective, the organisation of a closing ceremony and the adoption of the 
gacaca termination law imply that the litigation of genocide crimes was a problem that had 
been dealt with – at least for perpetrators within the country (as ongoing efforts are made to 
extradite alleged perpetrators from outside of Rwanda). To symbolically mark the closure of 
gacaca courts, Rwandan authorities organised a closing ceremony on June 18, 2012. At the 
closing ceremony, President Kagame stated: “the value and effectiveness of gacaca will be 
measured against the record of other courts, principally the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda [the ICTR]. The ICTR has tried about sixty cases, cost 1.7 billion dollars and left 
justice wanting. Yet, at significantly less cost, the gacaca process has had the highest impact 
in terms of cases handled, and has delivered justice and reconciliation at a much higher scale 
[dealing with at least two million cases]” (Kagame 2012). He further stated that the gacaca 
                                                 
26 From the beginning of the process, Rwandan authorities constantly announced new closing dates of the gacaca 
process; this had negative impacts on Inyangamugayo capacities, forced to speed up their trial pace in 2007, and 
the perspectives of monitoring NGOS (See Jamar 2012, 84-85 for more details).  
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process “has been a period when we sought to reunite our nation, inspire confidence in the 
administration of justice and hold each other accountable for our actions (Ibid.).” In other 
words, he justified the success of gacaca by reiterating its aims and comparing it with the costly 
and limited ICTR. 
When I met a Dutch diplomat in January 2013, who explained her support to gacaca had 
finished following their funding of a qualitative evaluation research in 2012 (the report 
discussed in chapter 6 – section VI.3.3.), I was given a copy of the speech by Jan Pronk, a 
former Dutch politician invited by Rwandan authorities to attend the gacaca closing ceremony. 
In line with Kagame’s speech, it reads: 
The judicial procedures have been implemented with dignity and honour. Gacaca has proven itself 
as an honest way to achieve justice, including acquittal when justified, and reconciliation. The 
system was not perfect. It couldn’t be, if only because of the countless numbers of victims and 
perpetrators. Moreover, some questions will remain, for instance those concerning the relation 
between personal reconciliation and national reconciliation, and – more difficult – between 
forgiveness and reconciliation. However, there is no doubt in my mind: the gacaca proceedings 
have made an essential contribution to the rebuilding of the nation, based on justice, peace and 
non-discrimination (Pronk 2012). 
The two speeches affirm gacaca’s success in terms of judicial process and associated aims, 
namely justice and reconciliation – equally in technical and ideological terms. Even if the 
Dutch politician acknowledged some limits of gacaca, these were due to the nature of the 
genocide and the high numbers of victims, and the complexity of the reconciliation processes. 
Other socio-political dynamics entangled in the implementation of gacaca, and the Dutch 
government’s responsibility as donors, are not questioned. No other donors agreed to give a 
speech at the closing ceremony – because besides the sensitiveness of the gacaca process, 
relations between Western donors and Rwandan authorities were difficult due to the M23 
crisis27 at that time (author’s interviews with donors’ representatives, 2012 and 2013). 
While academic literature debates the nature of success (see e.g., Kanyangara et al. 2014; 
Pozen, Neugebauer, and Ntaganira 2014; e.g., Thomson and Nagy 2011; Burnet 2014), most 
practitioners that I met during my fieldwork agreed with Kagame and Pronk that gacaca was 
over, and that the ‘transition’ of TJ complete. The gacaca courts were closed, and the wider 
political agenda had moved towards rebuilding the nation economically and socially. Such a 
                                                 
27 In 2012, the UN accused Rwanda to support the operation of the M23, rebel mouvement in DRC. In response, 
a number of international donors suspended their funding and overall the relationships between Western 
diplomats and Rwandan authorities were tense (e.g., US cuts military funding: 
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position and the wider political context left limited space to carry on advocacy for the follow 
up of the closure of gacaca courts.28 The closure process had been widely mediatised. While 
this suggests the end of the process, the provisions of the terminating law suggest otherwise. 
The title of the terminating law (see above) strengthened the illusion that outstanding problems 
were being dealt with. However, the law provides for transferring gacaca’s competence to 
prosecute, hear and judge crimes of genocide perpetrated against Tutsi and other crimes 
against humanity to classic courts and Abunzi (institution of local mediators dependent on the 
Ministry of Justice and created in 2006) (Official Gazette 2012, Art 4-7). The law further 
indicates that these institutions can open new cases and undertake a review of gacaca cases 
when: an accused was found guilty of killing someone later found alive; when more than one 
person has been condemned for the same crime without complicity between the accused; when 
new incriminating information for a person acquitted is found; for decisions ruled by a gacaca 
bench found to have been corrupted (Art 10); re-rule on cases for an extradited person 
sentenced by gacaca courts (Art 8), and organise auctions of belongings of perpetrators found 
guilty for crimes against property that have not yet paid the victims (Art 14, 15, 17). This law 
provides an official acknowledgement that the gacaca process entails judicial mistakes that 
need to be dealt with, that some matters related to gacaca court decisions have not yet been 
implemented and need some follow up.  
Direct Legacies of Gacaca  
During my first phase of fieldwork (October 2012), it was still unclear for the people I 
interviewed how the judicial authorities would interpret the gacaca termination law and how 
it would unfold. Some informants, particularly NGO staff, were concerned with regard to the 
consequences of the gacaca process, the lack of support for people still struggling with the 
process,29 and the transfer of gacaca competences to other institutions on the basis of the gacaca 
terminating law. In later period of fieldwork (February 2013 and June to October 2013), it 
appeared that donors were not involved in the implementation of the closing law and that no 
additional measure (other than passing the law) had been undertaken by Rwandan authorities. 
                                                 
28 Some efforts have been put in place to file all the gacaca archives under the supervision of the National Service 
for the Fight Against Genocide (SNGL – Service National de Lutte contre le Génocide). 
29 For instance, one interviewee mentioned one family tried to obtain without success a copy of the gacaca court 
decision that acquitted their relative so he could be released. One organisation counted more than 500 people in 
detention for genocide crimes whose cases had never been ruled still open after the gacaca closure (Interview, 
Rwanda, November 2012).   
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These approaches to gacaca closure and moving support to other matters showed that no efforts 
were being put into following up on social and legal issues identified in their monitoring 
reports of gacaca (false accusation, false testimony, judicial mistakes, corrupted acquittals, 
unfair decisions and imperfect justice – see Avocats Sans Frontières 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 
2010; Penal Reform International 2003; 2006; 2007b; 2008; 2010).  
Local NGOs could not publish their last reports on the population’s perceptions because of all 
the other problems they were facing with Rwandan authorities (see chapter 4). At the same 
time, other human rights issues (freedom of speech, freedom of association, support to M23 
during my fieldwork, muzzling of civil society and political opposition, political use of the 
law against genocide ideology), were taking over the agenda of the organisations that had 
previously formulated concerns about the gacaca process.  
With regard to the transfer of competences, one person involved in Abunzi training expressed 
concerns to me about partial transfers of Inyangamugayo competencies to Abunzi. He 
considered that 1: the population was already confused about the roles of Abunzi and 
Inyangamugayo; 2: Abunzi already had too much to deal with, and 3: being involving in 
auctions for the implementation of gacaca decisions for crimes against property seemed to be 
contradictory to their conciliating role (Interview, Kigali, Rwanda, November 2012). 
Furthermore, two Rwandan lawyers I interviewed explained that they had tried to bring gacaca 
cases for review to classic courts without success. Further research will need to evaluate the 
repercussions of the termination law over the longer term. 
Donors Turning their Backs on Gacaca 
My research brings the role of international donors and aid-dependent practitioners under 
critical scrutiny. Researching the initial phases of the gacaca process, I gathered extensive 
material illustrating the high mobilisation of international and national actors to put together 
the gacaca courts, to write the best legal framework, with the best safeguards to address and 
balance most concerns from both social and legal perspectives (see chapter 6). During all 
stages of my fieldwork (in 2012 and 2013), I observed, however, a strong disinterest in the 
aftermath from donors who had supported gacaca, who were mostly unaware of the 
terminating law and considered the gacaca process to have finished (I should note that 
individual reactions to my research were various – including positive ones and a couple of 
donor representatives expressing concerns about gacaca aftermath).  
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Gradually, donors had reduced their political and financial support to organisations critical of 
gacaca. This led to a gradual disengagement and deterioration of relations between the various 
initial supporters of the process (see e.g., Jamar 2012). Today, donors I interviewed do not 
think they have a responsibility; nor that anything should be done about the legacy of gacaca. 
But without donors and international aid, the gacaca process would never have reached its 
proportions – ruling on over 2 million cases in less than a decade.  
The discrete way in which the Rwandan authorities passed the closing law meant that these 
changes passed almost unnoticed. According to diplomats I interviewed, the law was not 
mentioned in the closing ceremony, nor discussed with donors before being adopted. Given 
the ubiquity of aid in the Rwandan public sphere, and the previously strong involvement of 
the international community in gacaca, the absence of donors during and following gacaca’s 
closure is important to underline. All donor representatives I met during fieldwork had no 
intention of monitoring or investigating further the outcome of gacaca. 
  
Section 3.2
Introducing the Peacebuilding and 
Development Framework in Burundi
Speech for CSLP II Workshop -  Jean-Marc Ferré Creative Commons, Pierre Buyaya 
signing peace agreeements - Pierre Buyoya Creative Commons 
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3.2. Introducing Burundi Peacebuilding and Development Framework 
While Burundi has not received as much attention as Rwanda in the media and academic 
scholarship, the ‘faux-jumeau’ (non-identical twin) followed a different but related path of 
mass violence and later reconstruction efforts. I review here how the global TJ toolkit approach 
influenced the Burundian TJ model. I then describe the wider reconstruction strategy of which 
TJ is part and challenges in its implementation. The final part of the section underlines how 
challenges in implementing these reconstruction strategies are due to the legacies of the past 
in current socio-political affairs. In contrast with Rwanda scholarship, there is an overall 
consensus that Burundian regime has had limited success in terms of development, 
infrastructure, public service and TJ. 
3.2.1. Burundian TJ Policy Model and the Toolkit Approach 
In Burundi, discussions over TJ mechanisms started through the peace negotiation process in 
the late 1990s, based on the premises of the TJ toolkit approach, as well as its ideological and 
pragmatic components. The global influences are easily palpable in terms of discourse, 
mechanisms, claims and implementation channels. As prescribed in the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreements for Burundi (APRA, 2000) and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) law (République du Burundi 2014), the TJ policy framework includes a 
truth-seeking mechanism, judicial prosecutions, institutional reforms and reparations. Fifteen 
years later, however, the TRC had not yet been put in place, and the future of the judicial 
mechanisms is even more unclear. The 2014 TRC law indicates that it will be guided by the 
following aims: “establish truth, national reconciliation and re-establish victims’ dignity” 
(Article 5).  
The Arusha agreements included three mechanisms: an international inquiry, a National Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (NTRC – later renamed Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, TRC) and a judicial mechanism (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
2000, Protocol I, Chapter II, Art. 6 and 8).30 These mechanisms aim to establish truth, promote 
                                                 
30 In the APRA, an International Criminal Tribunal for Burundi (such as the ones established for Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia) was considered to undertake judicial prosecutions against the main perpetrators. Through 
discussions with the UN, the International Judicial Commission of Inquiry was dropped as perceived as a 
duplication of the TRC for truth-seeking purposes, and due to great critique towards the ICTR and ICTY, it was 
alternatively considered that a special chamber could be established for dealing with judicial dimensions at a 
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reconciliation and pardon, and order indemnification or restoration of disputed property, “to 
rewrite Burundi’s history so that all Burundians can interpret it in the same way”, and to 
establish responsibilities and judge and punish perpetrators of the most serious crimes (Arusha 
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi 2000, Protocole I, Chapter II, Articles 6 and 
8). 
In 2004, a first TRC law was adopted but never implemented. A look into the drafting process 
partially explains why. A practitioner involved in the process explained to me that discussions 
about the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (NTRC) law started through the 
normal institutional process in early 2003. Several civil society associations started to 
collaborate on a joint analysis of legislative texts and institutional lobbying to promote stronger 
neutrality of the commission and protection for victims. Later in 2003, when the senate 
intensively questioned the government of Burundi on the bill during the first Q&A session in 
commission, the latter closed the discussions and pledged to produce a further revised version. 
In reality, nobody was appointed to revise the law and the legislative process was frozen for 
several months until the UN Security Council responded to Burundi’s request for an 
International Judicial Commission of Inquiry (IJCI). One of my informants explained that the 
government of Burundi misunderstood the UN correspondence and considered that the 
adoption of the NTRC law was a condition for the IJCI. It then resumed the legislative process 
and the law was finally adopted in December 2004 with limited revisions (Interviews with 
local practitioner, Bujumbura ‒ 2011 and 2012). The UN mission then came to evaluate 
conditions for the IJCI. Its report, known as the Kalomoh report, recognised a duplication of 
the role of the IJCI and the NTRC and suggested concentrating on a NTRC and judicial 
mechanisms (UN Security Council 2005).   
This anecdote shows that the Burundian TJ agenda was driven by the willingness to comply 
with international requirements during the initial phases, and not necessarily by domestic 
concerns. Once the law was adopted, the TJ process proceeded uneasily, with difficult 
negotiations among the authorities, UN representatives and civil society organisations (Stef 
Vandeginste 2011a; Stef Vandeginste 2012; Taylor 2013b). The process was also marked by 
many periods of inaction. As a way to move forward, national consultations were organised 
from 2007 to 2010 to gather views of the population with regard to TJ mechanisms (see chapter 
6). The negotiations resumed in 2011 when a technical committee was appointed by 
presidential order. Strong critiques from opposition parties and civil society slowed down the 
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legislative process. An updated TRC law was finally adopted in May 2014. Its mandate is 
defined: “the Commission is guided by the aim of establishing the truth, national reconciliation 
and recovery of victims’ dignity” (République du Burundi 2014 Author’s Translation). This 
legal and policy framework clearly refers to the set of mechanisms and claims promoted by 
the TJ toolkit approach. 
Traces of this understanding of TJ following the toolkit approach goes beyond simply the 
policy framework. Many of the activities and analysis organised and produced by local and 
international NGOs were also fully supporting the claims associated with this set of 
mechanisms. Through my fieldwork in Burundi, I observed many times how the toolkit 
approach had been used in practice – as illustrated by this calendar page, used a sensitisation 
tool, see chapter 2 for further examples.  
Illustration 3: TJ sensitisation material produced by an INGO for Burundi: 
 
 
The calendar was produced by an international NGO with funding from two European donors 
to distribute to local partners. The first page, January, defines TJ in French and Kirundi with 
an illustration on the right-hand side. The main text translates as follows:  
In the aftermath of conflicts and mass violation of human rights, demanding justice is important 
and requires the implementation of exceptional mechanisms. Transitional justice is a step towards 
democracy. It is a process that aims for the establishment of truth and national reconciliation. 
Judicial and extraordinary mechanisms enable us to better know and write history, to recognise 
victim’s rights, and to confront the perpetrators to their crimes. Finally, institutions must be 
reformed to prevent the repetition of abuse (Author’s translation). 
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The text in the speech bubble (only in Kirundi) translates as follow: “We need truth, justice, 
reparation, institutional reforms and reconciliation so we can live in a country of milk and 
honey”. The calendar is a typical example of the toolkit approach. The structure and text 
contains the set of mechanisms and aims of the toolkit approach with an adaptation to the local 
culture (using the local language, the drawings and the reference to milk and honey). It 
conflates the automatic relationship in between TJ mechanism and its claimed benefits: 
democracy, reconciliation, accountability and non-repetition. The content of the calendar is 
based on a UN OHCHR leaflet on TJ for Burundi produced in French and Kirundi.  
These examples also underline, though less explicitly, that the implementation channels are 
typical of the toolkit approach: INGOs work in collaboration with local partners through the 
organisation of sensitisation and training for the local partners and population. I argue that 
such an approach has limited capacity to deal with the past, and creates false expectations of 
the capacity of these mechanisms, by promising an ideal transition without adequately 
addressing key socio-political issues reflected in the difficult and slow institutional process.  
I establish in the previous section how the toolkit approach creates a conceptual framework 
that links together TJ aims and mechanisms. Despite existing nuanced on what such approach 
entails, the holistic vision translates the TJ discourse into practices by promoting the 
implementation a set of mechanisms to deal with the past and achieve similar set of societal 
aims (criminal prosecutions, truth-seeking, reparation, institutional reforms and lustration 
programmes ˗ others would also include memorialisation initiatives.  
At the pragmatic level, these examples also underline, though less explicitly, that the 
implementation channels are typical of the toolkit approach: INGOs work in collaboration with 
local partners through the organisation of sensitisation and training for the local partners and 
population. I argue (in chapter 5) that such an approach has limited capacity to deal with the 
past, and creates false expectations of the capacity of these mechanisms, by promising an ideal 
transition without adequately addressing key socio-political issues reflected in the difficult and 
slow institutional process. Even in the summer school that I put place with Burundian TJ 
practitioners, the toolkit approach had a strong impact on participants’ expectations. My own 
agenda for the course was to challenge such an approach by analysing truth-seeking 
mechanisms in depth over several months, but participants insisted that they wanted one 
session to be devoted to each of the five mechanisms. Even a four-hour long session was 
insufficient to tackle one mechanism (more details in chapter 5). 
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In contrast with the limited general scholarship on Burundi, the Burundian TJ process has 
received increasing attention. Within this body of literature, there is a consensus that the TJ 
process has failed to date due to political obstacles. Vandeginste (2012; 2011a; 2010) has 
written extensively about the political use and abuse of legal instruments in the process. 
Similarly, Emilie Matignon (2012) evaluates the TJ international normative and legal 
framework by the scrutinising difficult TJ process in Burundi. She describes an ambivalent 
and complex process marked by political instrumentalisation, but also a potential contribution 
for the long road of reconciliation, and particularly with regard to the refusal to forget past 
crimes expressed by the population (Ibid., 571). 
Acting as the research coordinator for Impunity Watch, David Taylor (2013a; 2013b; 2014) 
has written about the paradoxical role of the international community among local 
expectations for truth in Burundi. He highlights the weak role of the international community 
and the risk of the TRC being disconnected from local communities ‒ while also considering 
there is a local desire for truth. From a socio-political perspective, Sandra Rubli (2011; 2012; 
2013) demonstrates the denial of politics in political TJ negotiations and the bureaucratisation 
of the TJ process. All these authors draw attention to the political manipulation of the TJ 
agenda by political elites and the inefficiency of international actors such as the UN and 
Western donors to push forward the TJ process. 
This research describes the structural, political and legal contexts in which TJ negotiations are 
taking place. With an emphasis on the local contexts, the studies acknowledge the presence of 
aid actors and the impact of external interference (see also HRW, 2007; Ingelaere, 2010; 
Vandeginste, 2009(a); 2009(b); 2009(c)). Vandeginste (2012) underlines how domestic elites, 
for example, had the capacity to hijack the way TJ unfolded in spite of the albeit not-so-
efficient pressure from the international community and civil society (see also Jamar 2012; 
Dupont, n.d.; Nee and Uvin, 2010). However, these studies give limited attention to the actual 
role and impacts of international aid on the difficult process. 
In contrast, I argue the Burundian TJ policy framework includes all different mechanisms and 
aims as promoted by the holistic vision. It provides for the complementarity of different 
mechanisms: truth-seeking, judicial prosecutions, institutional reforms and reparations. The 
TRC law claims to seek these aims and address other TJ mechanisms of (e.g., beyond truth 
seeking and pardon dimensions, its mission includes to qualify crimes, suggest reparation, 
commemoration and institutional reform programmes - République du Burundi 2014, Article 
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6). In appearance, Burundian authorities are complying with UN guidelines and its holistic 
vision. Even with gaining a stronger political understanding of the political context, the holistic 
vision continues to promote an institutional response and is blaming the local government for 
not doing it.  
The report of De Greiff official field visit to Burundi as Special Rapporteur illustrates such a 
holistic vision (United Nations General Assembly 2015). The report acknowledges the TJ 
difficulties caused by a long history and ongoing impunity in Burundi, and the current unstable 
political context. It brings attention to risks of the TRC in giving emphasis to pardon rather 
than reconciliation, to the re-traumatisation of victims, and to the lack trust from civil society 
and parts of the population. Within such a pessimistic context, the UN Special rapporteur 
(Ibid., 21) states: 
Serious efforts to redress past massive violations would signal to the population that the authorities 
are sincere in breaking with the tradition of impunity. That, in turn, would contribute to the 
protection of fundamental rights in the present. Transitional justice initiatives must be grounded in 
and intended to foster human rights. They must not be instruments of “turn-taking” that only benefit 
one side. 
Still, the report and recommendations are structured around TJ pillars and other mechanisms: 
judicial mechanisms, reparation, reforms of institutions, and commemorations. Such an 
analysis provides a strong understanding of political dynamics at the national level, and clearly 
states their fears that the TRC will not succeed in achieving set aims. However, it also 
maintains a view of international and civil society as benefactors. More importantly, it 
continues to promote an institutionalised fix to deal with past crimes – by implementing other 
TJ mechanisms and not only a TRC.  
I contribute to this research on the basis of an aidnographic scrutiny of TJ practitioners 
involved in these dynamics. From the perspective of the critical ethnography of development, 
my research adds to the literature by questioning the aid-dependant structures, their everyday 
practices and role in the limited progress of TJ in Burundi. I demonstrate in empirical chapters 
how the TJ efforts based on the aid-dependent TJ toolkit approach tend to depoliticise the 
process by adopting technocratic and bureaucratic approaches and hence silence (and/or not 
address) political dynamics in play. The next sub-section underlines how the TJ process is only 
a small part of reconstruction, peacebuilding and development strategies in Burundi. 
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3.2.2. The Wider Reconstruction Picture: Arusha Agreements and  
Vision 2025 
Burundi has not been as zealous as Rwanda with regard to its development policies. The 
development strategies do nonetheless emanate from similar global dynamics and are partly 
inspired by Rwandan experiences, as suggested by the naming of its strategy plan: Vision 2025 
(Vision 2020 in Rwanda). The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreements signed in 2000 
already contained a number of features for Burundian rebuilding and development plans. 
These agreements are structured around three set of aims: (1) Democracy and good governance 
(constitutional principles for the transition), (2) Peace and security (security and defence 
services, ceasefire), (3) reconstruction and development (rehabilitation of refugees and 
victims, socio-economic development). A comprehensive vision puts together peace, security, 
justice and development. Commentators on the peace negotiations indicated that there were 
limited expectations in terms of the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, even at the time 
of its signature (Dupont 2007; Vandeginste 2015). 
Vision 2025 and poverty reduction strategies (Cadre Stratégique de Croissance et de Lutte 
contre la Pauvreté I - CSLP I for 2007 to 2011 and CLSPII 2012 to 2015) provide further 
objectives and implementing strategies for peacebuilding and development. Vision 2025 
(Ministry of Planning and Communal Development and UNDP 2011, 7) is defined as a 
planning instrument to “build a Burundi that is New, Democratic, Reconciled and Unified, a 
land flowing with milk and honey, as our grandparents wished.” It establishes eights pillars to 
achieve that vision, including good governance, economic growth, fight against poverty and 
social cohesion. Structures have been put in place to ensure its implementation: the National 
Committee for Aid Coordination, Partner Coordination Groups and sectoral groups. In the 
strategy, the government of Burundi treats as a priority the re-establishment and the 
consolidation of the rule of law and justice, and the protection of human rights, “which will 
play a major part in conflict prevention and national reconciliation” (Ibid., 54). 
Such documents create the impression of a well-established development strategy; yet 
literature on contemporary Burundi demonstrates the limited success of these policies. Some 
progress had been achieved initially: the security improved, infrastructure and public services 
were developed, trust towards public authorities gradually improved. Yet the political, security 
and economical context has been degrading, particularly in the lead up to the widely contested 
presidential election in 2015. 
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The implementation of these national development strategies has not been specifically 
researched; but existing research reflects the limited capacity of external aid to consolidate 
democracy, security and development. In terms of aid effectiveness, Peter Uvin (2010; 2008) 
underlines contradictions within the international community’s efforts towards governance 
and the fight against corruption in Burundi. For example, Uvin (2008, 116) notes the 
international community takes for granted when the “governments say they want to improve 
governance”. Such assumptions ignore the fact “that the government is a political player”; 
“that many power-holders in the government are the beneficiaries and creators of ill 
governance”; “that they must relate to other power centres in society who do not want to lose 
their privileges”; and finally “that ill governance has evolved over decades and is hardly likely 
to be solved by some technical assistance (Ibid.).” 
Similarly, assessing the limited effectiveness of aid in Burundi, Desrosiers and Muringa (2012: 
511) observe the limitations of technical indicators: with “the effect of primarily limiting the 
understanding of challenges to the realm of organisational relations among Burundian 
institutions and between national and international actors.” While underlying the lack of 
capacities to embrace the local context (that is, insecurity, legacy of violence, ‘mentalité du 
maquis’, limited human resources and a network of preference – Ibid.), the article gives limited 
insight into reasons why the international framework does not address efficiently the ‘fragility’ 
that it is supposed to respond to. 
In relation to security and democracy, Devon Curtis (2012, 74 – 75) underlines: 
International donors and diplomats have tended to prioritise regional stability and the crafting of 
ethnic power-sharing governance institutions. Pleased by the apparent peace and controlled 
violence, international peacebuilders largely turned a blind eye to governance abuses, human rights 
violations, and militarism, when confronted with the messy and contested politics of transition, as 
long as Burundi remained generally stable. 
Such observations underline the issues lying behind the apparent improvements of security 
and democracy in Burundi. Overall, all the authors writing about the Burundian reconstruction 
programme address the continuity between the past and the present by highlighting the 
background of the current ruling regime, the legacies of violence and governance marked by 
a patronage. In other words, these policies are also affected by the burden of the past ‒ that is, 
heavy consequences of mass violence in social and political relations. Modalities of aid 
delivery and technocratisation emanating from the new aid paradigm are unable to address 
these dimensions. The following sub-section based on the review of contemporary research 
underlines how these past burdens influence current politics. 
 
 
Transitional Justice Battlefield: Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice 
 
131 
3.2.3. Legacies of Past Violence in Current Socio-political Affairs 
A closer review of the current socio-political context in Burundi demonstrates more clearly 
the limited success of the implementation of the development strategy, as well as how the 
burdens of past violence remain important challenges. In Burundi, the limited success with 
achieving security and democracy indirectly underlines the limited success of the 
reconstruction and development agenda. The continuity with the past is more obvious in the 
Burundian case, constantly mentioned in the literature.  
In terms of democracy, the Arusha peace agreements included power-sharing provisions. Since 
2010, the political evolution led to the ‘establishment’ of a single-state party de facto ruled by 
the CNDD-FDD (Vandeginste 2015). Historically, an armed group that resisted to power, the 
CNDD-FDD put down its weapons only in 2003 and won the election in 2005. Over the years, 
it consolidated its power with the prominence of high-level political actors with strong military 
backgrounds. CNDD-FDD governance practices are referred to as the “système DD” marked 
by corruption, misappropriation, arbitrary, oppression, but overall, brutality, torture, or even 
murder (Hirschy and Lafont 2015). Despite wide critiques inside and outside of the country, 
the CNDD-FDD populist politics attracted strong support from rural communities. 
The democratisation process took a negative turn after the election in 2010. Local, legislative 
and presidential elections were held from May to September 2010. During the electoral 
process, most opposition parties withdrew from elections. They thought that elections were 
rigged and assumed the international community would support them to reorganise elections. 
Consequently, the CNDD-FDD maintained the presidency and most ministerial seats. This 
resulted in a failure to establish a consociative democratic system (a form of power sharing 
designed for devided socities - see Stef Vandeginste 2011b; International Crisis Group 2011) 
and the consolidation of the CNDD-FDD power. Reviewing Arusha 15 years after its 
signature, Vandeginste (2015, 19) considers: 
Underneath the surface of constitutional and other reforms of state structures, politics in Burundi 
are highly determined by a lack of separation between public and private spheres and by informal 
networks and relationships in which state resources serve the interests of competing ‘patron’ elite 
groups and their ‘client’ support groups…. That was the case before Arusha and remains valid 
today.  
Vandeginste (Ibid.) further notes “there is a historical continuity between the post-conflict 
polity and the traditional patronage system which structured societal relations from the king 
down to the peasant”.  
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Since 2014, opposition to the third mandate of the current President Pierre Nkurunziza has 
been causing important political problems. In March 2014, the Movement for Solidarity and 
Development (Mouvement pour la solidarité et le développement – MSD) organised a walk 
demonstrating against the third mandate of the current president. Having failed to request prior 
authorisation from the local authorities, they claimed they were jogging. Some 70 
demonstrators were arrested; the leader of the party escaped and left the country. In reaction, 
the Burundian authorities forbade sports in groups – which had been so far a frequent social 
activity in Burundi. Later in the Court, 21 demonstrators were sentenced to life imprisonment, 
26 received lighter sentences and the rest got acquitted (BBC 2014a). 
In relation to security, despite improvements in the previous decades, acts of violence 
committed by the Imbonerakure (Kinyarwanda for ‘those who see far’ ‒ youth members of the 
ruling party) are reported weekly (Centre d’actualité de l’ONU 2015). These crimes include 
killings, beatings, rape, threats and extortion against their perceived opponents and other 
Burundians. Human Rights Watch (2014a) reported that “despite a public outcry and promises 
by government and party officials to punish such actions, abuses continued throughout the 
year (in 2014)”. In 2014, there were allegations that the Imbonerakure were receiving weapons 
and military training from parts of the defence authorities. 
Actors who tried to bring attention to these insecurity issues encountered serious problems. 
For instance, the UN head of security (an expatriate based in Burundi) was announced a 
persona non grata by Burundian authorities and had to leave the country when one of his 
correspondences to New York on this matter was leaked. The human rights activist, Pierre-
Claver Mbonimpa, was imprisoned after making a public statement on the military training of 
civilians (allegedly Imbonerakure) in DRC. He was arrested and asked to provide evidence. 
He transmitted pictures of dead bodies, allegedly Imbonerakure who had died during military 
training in DRC. Mbonimpa was charged with “endangering internal and external state 
security for remarks made on the radio … and using false documents”. In September 2014, he 
was finally released for medical reasons, without the charge being dropped (Human Rights 
Watch 2014c). 
Between 30th December 2014 and 3rd January 2015, clashes occurred in Cibitoke (the 
northern province neighbouring DRC) between an armed group (whose political affiliation has 
not been officially identified) and Burundian armed forces. The police and the military with 
support from Imbonerakure and some local civilians tracked down the armed rebels who 
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entered from Congo. HRW reports that at least 47 rebels were extra-judicially killed (with no 
effort having been made by the security forces to arrest them alive) and only a few dozen were 
arrested alive (Human Rights Watch 2015a). 
At a societal level, there are many other issues exacerbated by the conflict and the current 
deteriorating context. The justice system is considered partial (More 2010); and corruption is 
a common occurrence (International Crisis Group 2012). Land issues are considered to be a 
societal bomb, particularly due to economic crisis, land grabbing, and return of at least 200,000 
refugees since 2000 (International Crisis Group 2014). Burundi is considered the country with 
the highest hunger indicator in Africa (Ibid.) 
In Burundi, all these episodes illustrate the severe deterioration of the security and political 
situation since 2014 in the lead up to the organisation of the elections. Political affairs are 
volatile and operate in continuity with past logics of intimidation, fear, arrest and, in the worst 
cases, murders. In this context, it is likely that the TJ agenda will be furthered postponed. This 
is particularly so since the major crisis in April 2015 sparked by the official announcement 
that Nkurunziza would run a third mandate (which I address briefly in the general conclusion, 
since it happened in the final stage of my writing process). The organisation of elections had 
been frequently mentioned during my fieldwork as an obstacle to the implementation of TJ. 
Many of my informants considered that the TRC would not start any enquiry before the 
elections, and would until then only work on institutional preparations without predicting that 
the political and security situation would take such a negative turn. 
3.2.4. Going Forwards and Backwards: Politics and TJ progress 
For more than a decade, promoters of TJ in Burundi (the UN and local and international NGOs 
as well as some Western donors) have been waiting for the political context to be more 
favourable to the implementation of TJ mechanisms – which has not come yet. The Burundian 
TJ process keeps taking steps forwards and backwards. At the beginning of my doctoral 
research in late 2011, I was convinced (as others – see e.g., Vandeginste 2012) that the TRC 
was finally going to take place. I thought I would be able to observe the preliminary phase of 
the TRC work by the time of my fieldwork. The Burundian TJ agenda in 2011 was marked by 
enthusiasm and strong dynamism. During that year, the government nominated a technical 
committee to produce a draft law. When their draft was released as part of the committee 
report, some civil society actors requested more guarantees of independence than those 
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provided in the draft (author’s interview – see more in chapter 5). The subsequent 
disagreements between and within Burundian officials and civil society organisations then 
made the process slower than expected. Later in 2012, another draft, with fewer guarantees 
than the first, was leaked. 
Throughout my fieldwork (from August 2012), the National Assembly kept postponing the 
discussions about the TRC law in the parliamentary agenda – leaving the TJ agenda without 
any progress at the institutional level. The TJ unit of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), and 
several local and international NGOs opted to use this lull to prepare the population and their 
local networks through sensitisation and capacity-building activities about TJ mechanisms (as 
discussed in chapter 5) – and to push for truth-seeking/telling and commemoration activities 
that could begin even if the official process had not commenced.  
In 2014, some progress was made in the official TJ implementation by the adoption of a TRC 
law and the appointment of the TRC commissioners. Again, political disagreements between 
the media, civil society and Burundian authorities emerged. Once I returned from fieldwork, 
a TRC law was finally adopted in May 2014 (République du Burundi 2014) and its 
commissioners were appointed in December 2014. Even then, local media and civil society 
organisations were expressing doubts about the future work of the TRC, given the identity of 
newly appointed commissioners and the appointing process. In a press article presenting these 
commissioners, Iwacu journalists listed them, describing their trajectory, background and 
explaining why they would not be credible (Ngendakumana and Bigirimana 2014). In the 
conclusion of the news article, the view of the representative of the Forum of Civil Society 
(Forum des Organisations de la Société Civile ‒ FORSC) is explained: most of the 
commissioners were political personalities in the regimes under which these crimes were 
committed. “Therefore, it is difficult to believe in their impartiality, neutrality and integrity, 
qualities that each member of the commission should have” (Ibid., Author’s translation). 
Civil society and private media presented themselves as apolitical and neutral. They 
denounced others for having been affected by past violence that would make them partial – 
but continue to see themselves as impartial, as if their own position was not affected by their 
political position and their own suffering of the conflicts. So while the institutional process 
was moving forward, there was political opposition (e.g., UPRONA did not participate in the 
parliamentary session appointing the commissioners as they did not find it credible) and civil 
society organisations boycotted and heavily criticised the process. More importantly, the 
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current political crisis will inevitably slow down the progress. At the same time, sequences of 
the crisis clearly underline the political positioning of all local actors, including TJ 
practitioners. 
As I address throughout the empirical chapters, sensitisation and capacity-building activities 
were promoted a positive, technical and apolitical vision of TJ in line with the global discourse 
promoted by the TJ toolkit approach. In all these preparation activities, I argue that actors are 
competing the framework and components of TJ. Reading in between the lines of these debates 
that claimed to be technocratic, there are subtle indications of micro politics at play as they are 
fighting for different truths and justice; and the debates are inevitably affected by current and 
past politics and power dynamics. Their work somehow becomes more than the ‘simple’ 
implementation of an emancipatory and repairing framework. 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to highlight how TJ and wider development and peacebuilding policies are 
affected by the burdens of the past, providing contextual analysis of Rwanda and Burundi. For 
each country, I presented how the global TJ approach influenced the specific TJ model, but 
was implemented in very different socio-political and historical contexts. I also reviewed 
scholarship that observed frictions in between the TJ, reconstruction, development and 
peacebuilding policy models and their implementation in both Rwanda and Burundi. 
Through a review of mass violence and its legacies in current politics, the chapter also set the 
contextual framework of my research. It illustrated that dealing with the past goes beyond TJ 
policies in contemporary affairs. In both Rwanda and Burundi, the effects of decades of mass 
violence have irreversibly affected the social, political and security situations. Even though TJ 
attempts to redress the wrongs of the past, the same history of violence also negatively impact 
TJ processes. I argue that mainstream TJ practices do not hold the capacities to address 
adequately these complex social and political dimensions, being restrained by their 
technocratic nature.  
My critical scrutiny of aid and TJ practices questions further the political role of donors and 
aid-dependent actors, as well as the impacts of aid structures in relations to these processes. 
Even though frictions in between policy and practice have been researched and widely 
acknowledged in the two contexts, existing research focuses on local politics acting as 
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obstacles, but tends to treat the roles of international actors as external rather than putting them 
at the centre of the critical scrutiny. 
The inevitable continuities between the past and the present imply that there is a blurry line in 
between ‘fixing the past’ and being challenged by the burden of the past when dealing with 
the past. Building on ethnographic research, the following chapters address how TJ 
practitioners implement technocratic TJ activities in the specific socio-political contexts of 
Rwanda and Burundi, yet are affected by the burdens of the past and the contemporary socio-
political context.  
In conclusion, it is important to reiterate that every TJ practitioner will be influenced in his or 
her work by his or her own experiences of the violence. All the individuals involved in 
decision-making and implementation of TJ (whether they are political, institutional, non-
governmental) have been involved and/or affected themselves by the conflicts, which they are 
supposed to respond to. Their own interpretations and experiences of violence orient their 
perceptions of policy, other practitioners and beneficiaries. Even if most expatriate aid workers 
not have been directly involved in violence, the general structures of aid and foreign 
interventions are also embedded in the violent past. Their interpretation and experiences of the 
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Chapter 4: A Typical Day in Aidland: Everyday Relations and 
Structural Contradictions 
Introduction 
The everyday in ‘Aidland’ frames how aid-dependent professionals work and live in a 
structure marked by legacies of colonialism and conflicts. Their everyday relations and 
working patterns are taking place in these environments that affect how TJ practitioners 
interact with each other and how their intervention is structured. As addressed in chapter 1, 
literature on Aidland has scrutinised the “discourse, lore and custom” of aid workers (Apthorpe 
2011, 199). This literature already underlines legacies of colonialism, frictions between policy 
discourse and practices, as well as everyday contradictions faced by aid workers. Through the 
recollection of a typical day of various TJ practitioners, I further scrutinise everyday 
contradictions beyond the conventional divide between the international and the local, and ask 
how international and local dimensions have embraced each other in the reproduction of 
unequal relations and structure. 
In contrast with most studies of Aidland that focus on international aid workers, my research 
looks into individuals who are involved at a professional level with the gacaca process and the 
TRC negotiations, and hence includes both local and international professionals. Working for 
distinct institutions (embassies, donor agencies, government authorities and NGOs), they all 
operate under different mandates and agendas but all ‘collaborate’ and/or negotiate around 
these TJ processes. The unfolding of a typical day and their day-to-day obligations in Burundi 
and Rwanda demonstrate how professional concerns of most practitioners go beyond TJ 
matters. More importantly, the everyday highlights the ways in which routines and day-to-day 
obligations are framed within an unequal structure and political bureaucracy that impact 
further on TJ practices. 
As illustrated in chapter 2, TJ practice is premised on a positive emancipatory discourse to 
help societies and victims emerging from violence to recover from past suffering, to strengthen 
the rule of law, and to build sustainable peace and democracy. This chapter describes how 
actors disseminating the TJ emancipatory discourse, along with human rights, are actually 
embedded in highly hierarchical structures. Within a comprehensive approach to development 
and peacebuilding, current policies promoting TJ and human rights aim to fix dysfunctional 
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and abusive systems. It has been argued that a belief that technical work can fix dysfunctional 
states31 leads to Western paternalistic behaviour from donors towards recipients (see e.g., 
Duffield and Hewitt 2013; Escobar 2011; Paris 2002). 
Bringing such an analysis to TJ practice, I argue that these efforts and working patterns, 
focusing on performative (understood here as utterances and acts in which formality and public 
nature are important, such as giving official speeches, cutting ribbons, signing agreements and 
having handshakes) and technocratic work, fail to appreciate the hierarchical social structures 
in which they operate. The chapter addresses the following two questions. How is the everyday 
of TJ practitioners organised? How are everyday relations affected by social and hierarchical 
dimensions? 
Throughout the chapter, I explore three levels ‒ the personal, professional and the structural 
environment ‒ and describe how these are entangled in each other. In other words, I scrutinise 
the everyday for TJ practitioners against the following preliminary observations. 1) The 
personal lifestyle of aid workers is important in an understanding of professional interventions. 
2) Technocratic dimensions can take different forms in practice, they can be a pretence of 
action at the institutional level, can become a burden for the practitioners, or can be deployed 
as an obstacle to dealing with issues by authorities, but rarely as a way to achieve set aims. 3) 
Aidland is not a bubble disconnected from local contexts; it is taking place in, and reproduces, 
complex layers of inequalities that affect local contexts. Every TJ practitioner sits within a 
structural hierarchy and operates within a context marked by colonialism and violence. 
Post-colonial research applied to development (Sylvester 1999; Duffield and Hewitt 2013; 
Kothari 2005) turns out to have been useful in going beyond the image of Aidland inhabited 
by mobile people on the edge of society. Even though they constantly go from one country to 
another, expatriate aid workers are part of an historical continuity; they work in collaboration 
with local practitioners and they enjoy the services provided by local elites. As result, a social 
environment, around elitist sections of ‘beneficiary societies’, is created for these people 
travelling around. Exploring relations between colonialism and development, Mark Duffield 
and Vernon Hewitt underline (2013, 14) that “there is little or no direct continuity between the 
past and the present. The connection is more in terms of resonances and echoes, unresolved 
antagonisms and, especially, recurrent designs of power and urges to govern.” Similarly, I 
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consider that everyday practices of TJ practitioners are embedded in these post-colonial 
contexts, where behaviours of paternalism and an emancipatory discourse are based on 
Western ideas that are omnipresent and on an unequal power hierarchy that is silenced by a 
discourse of progress.  
The discourse relating TJ practice and human rights promotion to democratic transition and 
sustainable peace becomes absorbed by these unequal structures in which routines become 
invisible and unquestioned. As Lisa Smirl’s work with humanitarian workers demonstrated, 
the everyday structure provides a formulated, rational and readymade bureaucratic approach 
to deal with the contradictions faced. This leaves the issues of power and the hermetic nature 
of aid unquestioned and marginalised (Smirl 2008; Smirl 2011). 
This chapter describes very basic activities for expatriate aid workers that constitute the 
everyday in Aidland at the personal level, such as having breakfast, doing house chores and 
heading back home. Looking into professional obligations in the second section, I zoom in on 
bureaucratic requirements for two polar entities of the TJ network hierarchy: the diplomat and 
the local human rights activist. At the one end, diplomats give speeches and undertake political 
dialogue for the sake of human rights promotion. At the other, local activists are increasingly 
constrained by bureaucratic obligations that are put in place under the name of the new aid 
paradigm. The two sections look separately at personal and professional spheres to highlight 
structural contractions overlapping both sides and impacting back on TJ practices.  
  
Section 4.1
TJ Practitioners’ Everyday in 
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4.1. TJ Practitioners’ Everyday in Post-colonial and Post-Conflict Settings 
‒ the Personal Sphere 
4.1.1. Everyday Inequality: Starting from Breakfast and House Chores 
As soon as an expatriate aid worker leaves their bedroom, they walk to a table garnished with 
exotic fruits, freshly pressed juice, bread and coffee or tea ‒ depending on what they asked of 
the cook. They enjoy this while looking at a beautiful garden with palm trees, colourful flowers 
and green grass nicely trimmed by the gardener. When finished, they either jump into their 
SUV or wait for the toot of a driver’s horn at the gate ‒ which the guards will open. During 
breakfast, the mind of the aid worker might be occupied by worries about the tasks of the day 
ahead such as to finish a report, host a visit from the head office, run from one meeting to 
another, or meet partners in the field. They might need to discuss money matters and duties 
with home workers; or more generally be concerned about the work mission (improving 
security, strengthening peace and democracy or helping economic development). 
Of course, not every expatriate sits daily at the table to enjoy a nice breakfast. The vast majority 
of expatriate aid workers, like the local upper- and middle-classes in Burundi and Rwanda, do, 
however, have house staff. This generally includes a cook, guards, a gardener and, for families 
with children, a nanny. In line with existing scholarship on aid and post-colonialism (Sylvester 
1999; Kothari 2005a; Duffield 2005; Eyben 2012), this vignette brings attention to the 
complexity in contexts marked by major disparities between (and among) expatriates and 
locals (Roth 2012; Fechter 2012), paternalist behaviour (Baaz 2005), and the resulting clash 
between mission and lifestyle, and expatriate and national staff status.32  
Once the aid worker gets to work, the house remains active, with the cook washing the dishes, 
going for the grocery shopping, and washing and ironing the clothes. The cook will set the 
table again for lunch and eventually for dinner. A body of knowledge and skills is required to 
be seen as a good cook: to be well organised, accomplish chores with limited supervision, to 
know Western and exotic recipes, be trustful, not to steal, and to be fluent in French or English. 
Guards are there to watch over the house 24 hours a day, seven days a week. They are supposed 
to protect aid workers from post-conflict insecurity and potential burglars. The main 
                                                 
32 During most of my working and fieldwork experiences in the two countries, I lived in such environments, being 
hosted by friends, housing being organised by employers or houses being shared with other expatriates. 
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manifestation of their work, however, is to open and close the gate, go on errands to the corner 
shop, and so on.  
Some aid organisations hire, and are in charge of, the house workers for their expatriate staff. 
The expatriate workers otherwise handle the workers themselves. For ‘junior’ expatriates, 
house-sharing is the most common living scenario, enabling the possibility of a decent house 
in a pleasant neighbourhood (with access to electricity, hot water and the Internet) and the 
service of house workers. The wage of a house staff member varies greatly. Expatriates are 
known to pay more than local employers, even rich locals. Compared with expatriates’ own 
salaries, pay is low (see also Roth 2012; Fechter 2012) ‒ but up to six times higher than offered 
by local standards in Burundi. 
Wage discrepancies create inequality between expatriates and domestic workers, but also 
among the domestic workers themselves and the local population. The cook generally receives 
a salary higher than the guards, who in turn get more than the gardeners. The best-paid cooks 
might have a low-paid cook at home, and so on. In informal discussions with aid workers, I 
observed various ethical concerns in the setting of wages: expatriates who paid lower salaries 
considered that a house-worker should not receive a salary higher than a national university 
professor; while others setting the highest wages believed that paying someone less than what 
was needed for a decent life was slavery. 
Such discussions about wages are relevant for an aid environment also heavily marked by 
wage discrepancy. Similar wage inequalities are reflected within aid work among and between 
expatriates and national staff, depending on place of origin, nationality, educational 
background and experience. Several pieces of research mention tensions in aid work created 
by the wide wage disparity within one team and by the fact that wages are not determined by 
skills and capacities (Roth 2012; Fechter 2012; Baaz 2005). 
Every expatriate household needs to define the role, wage and working hours of their workers 
and negotiate their relationship on a daily basis. The pragmatic rationale is that unemployment 
is high and labour is cheap, there is no washing machine, and grocery shopping is done, not in 
the supermarket, but in small shops here and there, in which prices need to be negotiated. 
Expatriates would not have the time to achieve these daily tasks by themselves. Hiring local 
house workers is the norm in support of international staff for their daily life in an ‘unknown’ 
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I gathered numerous anecdotes about such a rationale among expatriates that indicate ethical 
difficulties and consequent struggles. Every TJ practitioner would respond differently, but 
there are ethical tensions associated with this uneasy luxury. By expanding on these ethical 
tensions, the next sub-sections illustrate how these relationships are marked by paternalism, 
and then reproduced by TJ practitioners within their professional settings. 
4.1.2. Uneasy Luxury, Unspoken Contradictions and Paternalistic Behaviours 
In the personal sphere, the house setting is marred by contradictions in which people share an 
intimacy while having very different lifestyles. While the presence of servants at home is 
normalised, it still involves relational, socio-economic and often unspoken ethical 
complications. Ethnographic research on expatriate aid workers addresses the dilemmas 
associated with these lifestyle privileges (e.g., Roth 2012; Eyben 2012; Fechter 2012). For 
instance, Silke Roth (2012, 1468) describes how professionalisation of aid work is also 
resulting in inequality. She demonstrates that people are aware of their privileged position in 
terms of salaries and living standards, even in comparison with most people in developed 
countries, but also compared, more importantly, with national staff and beneficiaries. The aid 
workers participating in her research consider this problematic and they set up strategies at 
personal and professional levels to deal with it (by supporting staff financially, mentoring 
them, paying for professional training, and so on – ibid.). 
Analysing aid workers’ perspectives ‘on living well while doing good’, Ann-Meike Fechter 
(2012) underlines more directly the contradictions between their lifestyle and professional 
duties. Her article indicates the unease about the situation, and the consequent yet silenced 
problems ‒ one of them being the tendency of workers to put their own wellbeing second. It 
encourages many expatriate employers to support domestic workers beyond their salary. I also 
observed through my fieldwork that their wage does not enable them to cover extra expenses, 
so workers would frequently ask for money for schooling, medications or an emergency, such 
as the need to cover the costs of a funeral, to travel to a sick relative, or to fix parts of the 
house. Some expatriates will spontaneously offer to pay (in addition to their wages) the school 
and medical fees for the worker or his children.  
I consider that this engenders on a daily basis a particular way of interaction between expatriate 
staff and local house workers in which hierarchy and patronising behaviours are important. 
But this is also reflected in their relations with local colleagues and other people outside of the 
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house. Within the private sphere, it is normalised that house workers will not eat the same food 
as is prepared for expatriates ‒ they do not eat at the table and use basic outside sanitation. 
Guards are not allowed to walk into the house. 
Other matters are widely discussed among expatriates, such as the setting of salaries, 
experiences of theft, and humorous anecdotes that depict misunderstanding, whereas these 
separations are silently integrated. Anecdotes about expatriates newly arrived in Burundian 
and Rwandan Aidland are frequently circulated. For instance, the new manager of an informant 
had been cheated by his cook during his first experience of working in Africa. The manager 
first explained that he spent more money on food than in Europe and was warned that this was 
abnormal in Burundi. He found out that the cook was shopping at the Bon Prix (a shop selling 
imported products for around four times the European price, or for local products, twice). 
When he found out the cook was also buying food for his personal use, he fired him. In the 
same way, other informants explained that when they first hired a cook they paid her a salary 
higher than established by local standards. They later found out that she hired another person 
to do her job while she watched television in the house. 
I heart many more anecdotes involve issues of more or less seriousness related to the 
misunderstanding of given guidelines or a ‘misdeed’ of the domestic staff: stealing all sorts of 
things from food, expensive goods, to significant amounts of money; getting drunk during 
official receptions; damaging clothes while doing the laundry.33 I heard that some expatriates 
drew lines on food jars and bottles to monitor the cook’s use; others lock up cupboards 
containing food. Many others relied only on trust. 
Among TJ professionals, this is translated structurally into significant differences in terms of 
salaries, housing packages and travel expenses based on technical and expert knowledge, often 
falling along existing national and social divides rather than actual capacities. This creates a 
similar sense of unease and unfairness that can create tensions in a professional team. While 
these privileges are associated with higher expertise and capacities, they also give more 
decisional power to the most privileged and hence less to those at lower levels of privilege. In 
the worst cases, this might result in ‘I know better’ behaviours, or stereotypical presumptions 
                                                 
33 These anecdotes are based on informal discussions and interviews as well as my house-sharing experiences 
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of projects failing because of local issues rather than as a result of adopting the wrong 
approach. 
These relationships between the expatriate aid worker and local servants are tangible instances 
of the everyday in which behaviours of paternalism combine aspects of support and 
surveillance. Such normalised unequal relationships highlight the hierarchical structures 
within which expatriate aid workers work. All these anecdotes are not insignificant. They 
portray a local worker who tends to be inefficient, slow, or scams new arrivals. This reproduces 
the stereotype of the dishonest, lazy and stupid local worker, with the good worker portrayed 
as the exception. Arriving with a willingness to ‘help Africa’, the aid worker’s first encounters 
tend to create disappointment, over-cautiousness, and simultaneously paternalistic behaviours. 
While this picture is far from that of the extreme racial segregation under colonial authority, it 
is not insignificant in representing the emancipative and imperial approach to work by many 
aid workers. Even if many reject neo-colonial moralising views, expatriate and high-level local 
aid workers are operating in hierarchical and unequal structures that place them as privileged 
deciding who will receive their support and how. Inevitably, professional practices are taking 
place within these structures and affect how practitioners interact with each other, and how 
they implement and negotiate aid-dependent policies, including TJ. 
4.1.3. Home Location and Security: Factors of Geographic and Social Segregation 
At the end of a working day, most local aid workers will take one or two buses from the office 
to their homes in popular neighbourhoods. Other locals with better situations will drive their 
second-hand Japanese car towards middle-class neighbourhoods. Diplomats and mid- to high-
level expatriate workers will drive their brand-new SUVs to villas in rich hills. Simply put, 
every member of staff will leave the workplace with different means of transport to head 
towards different realities. Again, the location of the house and the means of transport indicate 
one’s position in the aid network hierarchy. 
In both the Burundian and Rwandan capitals, the neighbourhoods in which you live affect the 
convenience (access to electricity, water, transport and security) and social dimensions of your 
life. Expatriate aid workers and diplomats are likely to be located in the most luxurious 
neighbourhoods, where big villas are lined up with panoramic views.34 These neighbourhoods 
                                                 
34 Such as Kyovu, Nyarutarama in Kigali or Kiriri in Bujumbura. Other high-level staff find good housing in less 
elitist neighbourhoods (i.e., Kimihurura, Kacyiru, in Kigali, Kinindo, Rohero or Gatoke in Bujumbura). 
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are predominantly inhabited by expatriate workers and the local elite as neighbours. Some 
expatriates prefer to be in more democratic neighbourhoods surrounded by the local upper and 
middle classes.35 It is rare to find expatriates living in a common neighbourhood. In any case, 
your house location and your transportation habits are key indicators of your socio-economic 
position in Aidland. 
In parallel with housing, security measures are another example of institutionalised inequality: 
paradoxically, security protections in Aidland entail overprotection for the (untargeted) 
privileged. Each employing organisation has its own security guidelines. In Burundi, UN staff 
must hire guards from a particular security company, and they need to be escorted by the 
military if going to the airport after midnight. UN and Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) 
international members of staff have a security radio with weekly radio checks. One of the 
NGOs I worked for prepared a security trunk at our home. It contained candles, matches, water 
and food for three days, for potential use in the case of severe insecurity and a need to stay 
home. More generally, advice was given not to walk after dark, not to enter some parts of 
Bujumbura by night and not to travel between cities after dark.  
The guards and the security guidance give the impression of a bubble secured from potential 
risks. At a pragmatic level, it requires important logistical and financial efforts. These 
guidelines protect only certain types of individual, who are not the most vulnerable, and they 
do not provide any protection to people under risk of imprisonment or killing (see below). 
From an ethical perspective, this also draws an institutional and structural line on the question 
of who deserves to be protected in case of extreme violence. All these measures create 
routinised practices in everyday life. Even though they are repeated daily with limited thought, 
they inevitably affect how one encounters the local context, as well as reinforcing the feeling 
of living in an extraordinary place. Several authors similarly describe the social and geographic 
segregation of aid workers (e.g., Autesserre 2014; Smirl 2008).  
Even though there is only a handful of compounds in Burundi and Rwanda, Mark Duffield’s 
(2010) argument that the housing of expatriates creates segregation is still valid. He considers 
that the security measures increase inequality and distance between aid workers and their local 
                                                 
 
35 Such as some parts of Nyamirambo and Kacukiro in Kigali, Mutanga and Kinanira in Bujumbura. 
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beneficiaries on an everyday basis. Through the analysis of UN security training for staff to 
be dispatched to post-conflict areas, he (Ibid., 461) states that: 
While in certain locations this might be necessary, when institutionalised and universalised, even 
in areas where threats are more imagined than real, this subjectivity reshapes the perceptions, 
interactions and exchanges that link aid workers and host societies. Not least, it normalises the 
segregation and bunkering of the aid industry within fortified aid compounds. 
In other words, Duffield highlights the social consequences of institutionalised security in 
terms of the perceptions, interactions and exchanges between expatriate and host societies.  
Such settings encourage social routines ‒ to hang out with people with similar status and 
background. Dinah Rajak and Jock Stirrat (2011, 169) examine the “social cocoon” in which 
development workers tend to exist by “socialising with each other and reproducing not only 
differences between the expatriates and the host community but also national differences 
amongst the expatriates.” 
Their chapter claims the specificity of the development environment relies on institutionalised 
and codified ways to approach local contexts. They state this cocoon is marked by “parochial 
Cosmopolitanism and the power of nostalgia”, and that “views of the local are generated not 
through some openness to local cultural complexities, but rather from ready-made templates 
there to be used by newcomers” (ibid., 168). The fact that these segregated environments are 
difficult to burst suggests an almost inoffensive bubble. My research supports most of these 
academic descriptions of ‘Aidland’, emphasising the social particularity of the aid-working 
environment due to the high mobility and short-term posting of its practitioners.  
I challenge, however, the projection of Aidland as a hermetic bubble, which involves the risk 
of losing sight of important dimensions of this special environment: the history and layers of 
segregation are frequently silenced, and the possibilities to surpass segregation by ‘changing 
group affiliation’ are ignored (even if limited). In Burundi and Rwanda, spheres created by 
international aid are more than floating bubbles of expatriate workers. These privileged 
environments have long impacted, and strongly, on the whole ‘recipient society’ by 
empowering particular actors and making others vulnerable. Such differences result in 
structural inequality in which the already privileged receive protection whereas the people 
most exposed to risks do not receive adequate protection. Through daily normalisation, these 
contradictions are not challenged but perpetuated by the lifestyles of aid workers. 
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4.1.4. Everyday Relationship in Post-Colonial and Post-Conflict Setting: Relevance 
for TJ Practice 
The image of a paradisiac breakfast and homes operating with servants underlines many 
contradictions within aid work and aid in post-conflict settings. It does not represent only a 
post-colonial setting in which the local ‘black workers’ are serving food to the ‘white saviours’ 
that they cannot afford themselves. While the presence of servants facilitates daily housework, 
it also creates a difficult environment in which super-privileged people and house workers 
must define relational barriers. These encounters reproduce various levels of social and 
economic divide based on professional occupations in aid-dependant projects that affect the 
recipient society as a whole. 
The structure of interactions between the expatriate and home staff very clearly highlights 
clashes between mission and lifestyle: the privileged, who are supposed to strive for equality, 
are instead reproducing complex hierarchies and structures of inequality. Further, this is a 
pattern of relationship that is reproduced by the aid worker outside of his house (see in the 
following sections of the chapter). 
Today, in contrast with extreme racial segregation under colonial authority, these settings 
include inequality among expatriates themselves ‒ there is greater flexibility in the divisions; 
the colour of the skin, race and other dimensions related identity are not so much the focus. 
With a foreign passport and/or a Western education, ‘locals’, too, can acquire an expatriate 
status. Still, education, country of origin and background are crucial determinants of 
hierarchical position in Burundian and Rwandan Aidland. Privileges based on opportunities 
and background also affect how one interacts with another. 
For the case of TJ practitioners, it is their technical knowledge of Western managerial and TJ 
standards that gives them access to a privileged position to ‘fix’ the post-conflict situation in 
Burundi or Rwanda. Structurally, this implies institutionalised assumptions that expatriates are 
more efficient, more knowledgeable and more trustworthy than local professionals. This 
hierarchical superiority, held mostly by expatriate staff, gives them more decisional power 
within the organisation. In an environment in which time is often insufficient, this leaves little 
place for consensual and negotiated positions, and thus limited value is given to local 
perceptions within everyday implementations. This results in everyday relations involving 
surveillance, support, and paternalistic or even arrogant conduct, while a discourse of equal 
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partnering and empowerment is preached. Such internalised and institutionalised inequality is 
embedded in everyday routines, in both personal and professional spheres. Routines leave 
these everyday relations unquestioned and unchallenged but reproduced.   
Last, beyond the indirect legacies of colonialism, the legacies of violence also affect everyday 
relationships marked by distrust within the professional sphere. An expatriate with long 
experience in the region explains: “There is always a need to read in between lines, there is a 
very clever way to deal with it. The conflicts have created a particular way in which they 
communicate, it involves denial, silence, and deviation” (interview, January 2013, Burundi). 
As explored in the following sections, these legacies of colonialism and mass violence remain 
crucial points in grasping the everyday of TJ practitioners. 
  
Section 4.2
Defending Human Rights Day to Day: 
Spectrum of Professional Obligations
Top: World Bank Meeting for Rwanda - Creative Commons, Middle: Jean-Marc Ferré - Creative 
Commons, Bottom, Article 25 Flickr -  Creative Commons.
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4.2. Defending Human Rights Day to Day: A Spectrum of Professional 
Obligations 
For most TJ practitioners, their work obligations go beyond TJ and are often associated with 
wider human rights matters. The political officer of an embassy, the representatives of national 
authorities, the head of mission in NGOs or of international organisations, the consultant and 
the logistician are all part of the networks that promote human rights and democracy, including 
TJ matters. All these different TJ practitioners would have their own specific duties within 
their organisation depending on its mandate and structure. The usual sets of responsibilities 
include many tasks to fulfil in short periods of time, with an important emphasis on 
accountability and the bureaucratic obligations tied to funding sources.36 
This second section will unpack the daily obligations of two specific types of actor in such a 
network: the diplomat and the local activist. By exploring the settings of diplomatic speeches 
and political dialogue, I illustrate how paternalistic behaviours are reproduced. Second, 
looking at the registration process and political bureaucracy imposed on local activists, I reveal 
the political use of the discourse of the new aid paradigm. These two positions each have a 
crucial role in human rights and the promotion of TJ. Being part of the same structure, they sit 
at different positions, exposing them to distinct lifestyles, tasks and risks.  
4.2.1. The Diplomat – Everyday Obligations and Human Rights Promotion 
Within embassies of key donor countries, a number of diplomats hold important public roles 
within the aid environment by finalising agreements with local officials. Behind the public 
scene, they also undertake political dialogue with institutional partners in order to address 
matters related to sovereign socio-political dimensions, including the promotion and 
monitoring of human rights and democracy. A closer look at how their work is organised 
reveals a more nuanced picture, somehow paternalistic and post-colonial, that promotes good 
collaboration but with many reservations on both sides.  
This review of the diplomat’s everyday work illustrates: 1) How the diplomatic performative 
function projects a comprehensive approach to development, democracy and human rights, 
and 2) How political dialogue is both a central but limited instrument to impact on human 
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rights and justice matters. In other words, whereas attention to human rights and democracy is 
repeatedly mentioned in policy documents and public speeches, recurrent human rights abuses 
continue to be significant issues in both Burundi and Rwanda. 
Given slight variations, human rights and political matters are addressed by a similar set of 
actors within embassies: the ambassador, the political officer, and possibly the head of 
cooperation. These complement the staff of the aid agency from their own country in charge 
of the implementation of aid policies.37 The political officer is the person carrying the most 
responsibility related to matters of human rights and justice within the embassy. One of them 
based in Kigali explains: “Human rights is around 40% of my work, if you add the DRC 
[Democratic Republic of Congo] issues, it goes up to 60%. On the top of this, you can add 
economic matters, bilateral relations and visits” (interview, Kigali, April 2014). Another 
diplomat based in Bujumbura explains with more detail: “I am in charge of the political 
dialogue, the monitoring of political, human rights and transitional justice matters. I need to 
follow and report about all these issues to my head office. In addition, I supervise the funding 
of 15 NGO projects” (interview, Bujumbura, April 2014). 
In both countries, current political affairs include a number of serious issues. Diplomats have 
to follow up and/or deal with internal frictions within political parties; repression of opposition 
by the ruling party; extrajudicial killings; debates over the third term of the current president; 
land issues; transitional justice; internally displaced people and returning refugees; security 
and justice reforms; acts of violence committed by Imbonerakure (youth members of the 
militia of the ruling party, CNDD-FDD) in Burundi; support for M23 and genocide ideology 
in Rwanda (see chapter 3). These ongoing issues affect diplomatic dynamics related to 
democracy and human rights in discussions with civil society and government authorities. 
Failing under the holistic approach as promoted by the peacebuilding and development agenda 
(as consolidation of development and security while putting an emphasis on democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law) as well as the claimed aims of TJ toolkit approach 
(accountability, non-recurrence, reparation, democratisation), indeed, all these different 
matters become part of the diplomats’ everyday obligations. 
At the same time, there is only a small group of embassies that regularly address these political 
and human rights issues from an aid-incentive perspective (there are not that many 
                                                 
37 Such as Belgian Technical Cooperation for Belgium, Department For International Development for the UK, 
GIZ for Germany, EuropeAid for the European Commission, USAID for US, etc. 
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international donors, and some diplomatic representations are not willing to be involved in 
human rights or TJ discussions – as suggested in several interviews, it is mainly Western 
donors, hence around a dozen diplomats in each country). For instance, in relation to TJ 
discussions, a European diplomatic representative explained to me that a number of diplomats 
from other African countries are not supporting this project:  
“I talked with other African Embassies. They all feel that the process is not run by Burundians. 
They blame the UN for pushing it too hard. … They don't speak about TJ at BNUB meetings. They 
never address this in public and they don't like European ambassadors pushing for it so much” 
(Interview, Bujumbura, 2013). 
Furthermore, the amount of time consequently dedicated to TJ matters will be very limited in 
general and will vary widely from one actor to another. In Rwanda, donors put a lot of effort 
into supporting the gacaca project at the institutional, logistical and financial levels, 
particularly during the preparation phase and the early implementation (1998 to 2006). At the 
time of my fieldwork (several months after the official closure of the process in June 2012), I 
was repeatedly told that “gacaca is not fashionable anymore” ‒ no single diplomat was giving 
attention to it. In contrast in Burundi, only a couple of political officers were giving continual 
attention to the TJ process, having TJ as a key component of their institutional agenda. Other 
representatives of donor states reacted solely to the official process and to civil society’s 
lobbying efforts. I now scrutinise in turn the public and backstage dimensions of diplomatic 
interventions with regard to human rights promotion: public speeches and political dialogue. 
4.2.1.1. The Public Face: Representation Duties and Public Speeches  
As part of representation duties, diplomats are required to attend all sorts of cultural and 
political events. These events follow a certain performative pattern, which includes spatial and 
protocol settings, and ideological dimensions. They take place at the most expensive hotels or 
the luxurious gardens of diplomatic residences. They gather specific sets of actors from the 
same hierarchical levels, from both national and foreign spheres. Speeches, often written in 
advance, are usually read by one national and one foreigner of similar rank. Speeches include 
similar buzzwords: praising their good collaboration; reiterating their common interest for the 
respect of human rights and democracy; and seeking sustainable peace and development. I 
participated through my fieldwork in such events on numerous occasions that reproduced these 
patterns, such as commemorations, conferences, policy report launches, cocktail parties 
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organised for special (or not so special) visiting guests, national holidays of donor countries 
and film screenings. 
The local media will frequently publish images of diplomats and national counterparts signing 
contracts, cutting inauguration ribbons, shaking hands with rural beneficiaries, and will 
summarise the opening or closing speeches at these events.38 As a perfect example of this, a 
Burundian newspaper, Iwacu, covered the signing of a new cooperation contract worth five 
million euros for the strengthening of national police professionalisation between Belgium, 
the Netherlands and the Burundian Government (Kaburahe 2014b). The article includes a 
picture of the two ambassadors and the Burundian ministry of foreign affairs, and comments 
on their speeches. The news article reports the Belgian ambassador’s words as follows: 
The Belgian parliament is following and observing these programmes with a lot of interest, so these 
reforms can lead to the establishment of a real rule of law. … There will be the implementation of 
a police of police that will include an internal investigation service in charge of investigating 
blunders and non-respect of laws and human rights (ibid., author’s translation). 
Considering his country “a reliable and loyal partner of Burundi”, the Dutch ambassador stated 
that “if good governance principles [further mentioned as respect for laws, democratic values 
and human rights] are not respected, there will be an impact on the funding of the project” 
(ibid.). Furthermore, these utterances represent the complex relationship between recipient and 
donor countries marked by a combination of cooperation, caution and mistrust ‒ paternalistic 
behaviours, in other words, as described in the first section of this chapter. 
Earlier in May 2014, Iwacu (Kaburahe 2014a) covered a similar event in which the Dutch 
ambassador was signing an agreement in support of 1.7 million euros for independent media. 
A softer tone was used because funding was for a less sensitive type of aid (aside from the fact 
that the media covering the event was one of the recipients). The Dutch ambassador stated: 
“During the electoral campaign, mistrust and tensions among political actors will increase. We 
hope that training adapted to current contexts will help you (the independent media) to play a 
regulating role” (ibid.). The news article further underlines that, “however, the media will not 
receive a blank cheque. Ethics and good management will be require. Aid will be granted in 
steps” (ibid.). These last words again underline the sensitive context in which support will 
always be accompanied by explicit cautiousness.  
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These examples demonstrate that Western diplomats hold a prominent position in domestic 
public affairs ‒ which becomes tangible through these performative events.  
Looking at the content of these speeches, there is implicit acknowledgement of political risks 
associated with supporting the police and overall elections process. These risks will be 
counterbalanced by paying attention to the rule of law, human rights and democratic values, 
including independent media. There are references to concepts encapsulated in the New Aid 
Paradigm such as the pressure to provide efficient aid through ownership, accountability and 
management for results. Furthermore, there is an acknowledgment of mistrust and tension. 
These instances reproduce a similar paternalistic relationship to that described in the first 
section, combining support and surveillance behaviours. In the first case, the ambassadors refer 
to a police of police, parliamentary monitoring from the home office, ‘good governance 
principles’ and financial penalties if needed. These safeguards are seen as essential when 
supporting sensitive sectors such as the security forces, who are widely recognised as authors 
of crimes.  
Both the speakers and the audience are aware that these phrases and institutional surveillance 
measures are not as restraining as they sound. Threats of cuts to funding are recurrent tropes 
that are rarely, if ever, fully implemented. Yet the discourse entails a strong symbolism: the 
prominence of aid actors, diplomats engaging in paternalistic behaviour, and the reproduction 
of a hierarchical divide. The power imbalance enacted is inherent to their missions and the 
structure of policy implementation despite a new discourse claiming equal partnership (see the 
description of the new aid paradigm in chapter 2). 
In the case of Burundi, these diplomats and working patterns reproduce the inequality 
accompanying their emancipatory and liberal missions. These speeches produce the image of 
their great, generous nations supporting training and professionalisation of public services, and 
democracy tools for the respect of human rights. A post-colonial image is present in which the 
emancipatory and imperial international community is omnipresent in providing aid money to 
public services. Donors’ representatives can threaten, criticise or encourage positions with 
regard to sovereign matters in a manner that would not be conceivable for a southern official 
to adopt towards recipient countries. It would be unthinkable indeed to have Burundian or 
Rwandan diplomats based in donors’ capitals making public statements about problems with 
regard to human rights or immigration. 
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A great deal of politics goes into speech production: who gives the speech, what is said, and 
what is implied ‒ whether by hidden, implicit or clear messages that are perhaps contradicted 
by the settings and the wider context. Encouraging policy analysis through diplomatic 
speeches, Robert Oliver (1950, 26) brings attention to the depersonalisation process and the 
performativity of the speech production: “the speaker is uttering sentiments that are not 
specifically his own.” The formulation of a speech needs: 
to ensure that they represent the policies of government for which he speaks. And similarly, the 
auditors may not react to his speech as, in their own proper persons, … they must maintain whatever 
pattern of response is dictated by their own home governments. Because of this fact, diplomatic 
speech has some of the characteristics of a puppet show before a shadow audience, in which 
analysis must proceed far behind the scenes, both the speakers and for auditors, to discover what 
is really happening and why. 
Similarly, an analysis of the performative stage in which speeches are read is useful to go 
beyond analysis of policy documents and discursive promotion of human rights in Rwanda 
and Burundi. In all these different speeches, human rights are mentioned but in a variety of 
interpretations and tones. Whereas aid for the professionalisation of the police and media have 
a dubious (at least, not systematic) causal relationship with human rights and democracy, the 
speeches connect them to each other.  
With limited impacts on intended effects, these public representations and speech duties are 
still framed by specific social processes that Iver Neumann (2007, 194-195) comments on from 
speech writing experiences as the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs. Because of the 
objective to create a discourse behind which the “whole ministry can stand by”, he considers 
speeches do not aim to provide analytical value and are not politically effective. Drawing again 
from Lefebvre’s (1971) argument, that discourse has the capacity to link incoherent practices, 
the performative pattern of speeches creates the impression of rational actions to policy papers. 
In other words, speeches ‒ as day-to-day activities of diplomats ‒ create coherence and give 
life to policy documents beyond the bureaucratic space, without effective improvement of 
human rights and political contexts. 
4.2.1.2. The Diplomatic Backstage: Political Dialogue in Sensitive Contexts   
Behind the public scene described above, the diplomats I interviewed reported that ‘political 
dialogue’ is an important activity for the promotion of human rights. Framing the partnership 
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between EU donors and their recipient countries, the Cotonou Agreement (2000, Art 8)39 
promotes political dialogue as an instrument “to exchange information” and “to facilitate the 
establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas.” More specifically: 
Through dialogue, the parties shall contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable 
and democratic political environment. It shall encompass cooperation strategies, including the aid 
effectiveness agenda, as well as global and sectoral policies, including environment, climate 
change, gender, migration and questions related to the cultural heritage (Ibid.). 
With the aim of encouraging cooperation beyond economic dimensions, the political dialogue 
refers to discussions about social, political and environmental affairs taking place among 
diplomats, government and civil society representatives.  
The role of political dialogue in relation to human rights in Burundi and Rwanda has received 
limited attention in academic literature. The existing scholarship refers to the lack of a rule of 
law, the political insecurity, and impunity (Longman 2011; Reyntjens 2011; Vandeginste 
2011a, 2011b; Reyntjens 1996), without giving much attention to the limits and flaws of 
approaches to promote and defend human rights, including a tripartite partnership in between 
government, donors and NGO and involving activities such as political dialogue, lobbying, 
monitoring and reporting. Some pieces of research already underline the limits of aid 
compliance either in relation to TJ (Subotić 2012) or the specific countries under study 
(Gready 2010; Schotsmans 2011; Hayman 2008; Taylor 2013b - see more details in chapter 
6).  
In this section, I aim to clarify what political dialogue implies concretely, to locate how TJ is 
integrated in the wider structure of human rights promotion. As a backstage activity, I have 
been refused access to most ‘political dialogue’ meetings among diplomats and institutional 
actors. The analysis is thus based on interviews, informal discussions and participative 
observation of meetings gathering diplomats and civil society. 
In Burundi and Rwanda, where human rights violations are frequent under the authoritarian 
regimes (see chapter 3), donors promote political dialogue as a key tool for discussing these 
human rights issues with government authorities. They often operate on the basis of 
information received from NGOs. These are the various discussions promoting democratic 
values and human rights through ‘tripartite’ channels: international and local civil society, 
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through European diplomats representing donor countries, and putting pressure on decisions-
makers ‒ representatives, that is, of government and public authorities.  
One diplomat based in Kigali gave a positive description of political dialogue with partners in 
Rwanda as follows:  
This is a dialogue that works out well. We meet with the government two or three times a year to 
discuss sensitive matters such as civil society, political party, Eastern Congo and arbitrary arrests. 
We talk very frankly. Among European colleagues, we contact each other regularly; we exchange 
emails. We have a consensual and common approach. We are very few, so we organise ourselves 
to divide the work among ourselves (interview with diplomat, author’s translation, Kigali, April 
2014.) 
In the same interview, he later gave a completely contradictory statement:  
The government works very autonomously here, our influencing capacities are very low. Rwanda 
is very proud, she is not willing to be given lessons by foreign partners. Concretely this implies 
that when we ask questions about an arbitrary arrest, they give a part answer and the dialogue is 
over. We are limited with means (ibid.).  
This contrary statement underlines the public and private views about political dialogue. From 
an official perspective, discussions and meetings are taking place to address human rights and 
political affairs with local authorities and civil society organisations. However, when I asked 
this diplomat to elaborate on the content of the political dialogue, he later considered that even 
if discussions were happening, they did not necessarily lead to an improved human rights 
situation. On the contrary, the Rwandan authorities refuse to engage in substantive discussions 
about issues brought to them, as the diplomat’s example about arbitrary arrest illustrates.    
Another diplomat, also based in Kigali, acknowledged directly that political dialogue with 
Rwandan authorities was not very successful: 
We can say in public it is wonderful and obtain something though dialogue off the public scene. 
There are a lot of sensitive issues. … The partners (donors) are weaker strategically than local 
actors due to the sensitiveness. There are many complex matters that always go in the same 
direction … such as the impartial justice system. But us, diplomats or technical advisers, we cannot 
say that, otherwise our visa risk to not be renewed. 
In this negative evaluation of the dialogue, the interviewee brings attention to the repercussions 
on visas, and wider professional risks represented for them in undertaking lobbying on 
sensitive issues. There are both personal and professional threats for critical diplomats if they 
voice a negative analysis of the situation. Particularly for political officers, who are often in 
the early stages of their careers after a long recruitment process, being ejected from the 
assigned country due to bad relations is a risk that few would dare to take. Overall, I observed 
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diplomats having to navigate the political dimensions of technocratic obligations with limited 
opportunities to impact positively on human rights.   
This said, all diplomats interviewed in Kigali affirmed that gacaca was not a concern and that 
no discussion was taking place with the authorities on the follow-up of its closure. A 
representative of a human rights INGO affirmed that he did not undertake any lobbying about 
gacaca despite his concern about it. He explained that he did not have sufficient time with 
diplomats; he would bring to discussions with them only the issues that were considered the 
most serious: 
You have a limited amount of time with important players through which real advocacy is 
permitted. We have not dropped it [concern about gacaca] with senior representatives … Other 
events are taking over, all the embassies only want to hear about M23.  …. When gacaca closed in 
June, issues around M23 were getting crazy. Conversations with high-level diplomats in Kigali 
were focused on M23 (interview with NGO representative, Kigali, Rwanda, January 2013). 
Aside from defiant government authorities, this interviewee underlines other limits of political 
dialogue. Given the limited time diplomats dedicate to human rights and political matters, only 
a number of issues considered the most serious could be dealt with. So even if some NGOs 
held concerns about the gacaca process, these would not be brought to the political dialogue. 
Simply put, my scrutiny of political dialogue in Rwanda demonstrates its clearly limited 
impact for the promotion of human rights: political dialogue can address only a limited number 
of issues and have limited success – and hence leaving no space for discussions about issues 
related to the closure of gacaca.  
In Burundi, the political dialogue between donors and the government of Burundi gives an 
appearance of better collaboration. Unlike Rwanda, Burundi does not use international guilt 
or post-colonial accusation to influence discussions. However, government officials still 
ignore most recommendations. In terms of TJ discussions, the authorities ignored some of the 
correspondence sent from the TJ unit of the UN mission from December 2011 to December 
2012. This meant there was then no institutional framework to undertake any negotiation. 40 
From a general perspective, an European diplomat based in Bujumbura explained the 
weakness of their role in political dialogue: “The international community here is small and 
                                                 
40 Every diplomat interviewed in Bujumbura explained they were engaging in political dialogue. I thus decided 
to dedicate one of the sessions of the summer school to reading critical scholarship with diplomats (see chapter 
6) on political dialogue and risks with international pressure in relation to TJ matters. Through the session, it 
became clear, however, that none of them was really undertaking consistent discussion on that matter (at least at 
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fragile. It is not as strong as one can believe. Only a certain group of countries deal with human 
rights issues. Others do not pay attention to issues related to human rights.” 
Finally, these quotes from interviews all underline that the political dialogue undertaken by 
diplomats with government and civil society representatives is limited. They have limited 
capacities in terms of political leverage and human resources. In both Rwanda and Burundi, 
around ten diplomats are supposed to influence better human rights performance with 
uncountable cases of human rights abuses raised by the wider network defending human rights. 
While political dialogue can address only a limited number of matters, diplomats do not 
necessarily have capacity to induce change or improvement within these authoritarian regimes, 
particularly in Rwanda, where the authorities generally reject any type of foreign critique. 
4.2.1.3. Diplomacy and Human Rights: Everyday Efforts and Impacts for TJ 
In conclusion, the exploration of the role of diplomats underlines the range of their obligations 
along with their limited capacity and opportunity for addressing human rights promotion, of 
which TJ is a component, in an effective manner. Given the fact that human rights and 
democracy issues in these post-conflict contexts cover an important number of serious 
problems, resulting from past violence, ongoing human rights violations and the risk of future 
violence, a heavy agenda is put on their shoulders ‒ even when simply monitoring the issues 
without improving the situation.     
Behind the public discourse supporting human rights and democracy, the everyday work of 
diplomats signals paternalism (telling recipients how they should behave) and Western 
supremacy (only Western countries participate in these activities promoting human rights 
democracy in the two countries – other diplomats from African and Asian countries do not get 
involved), which relies on a problematic historical and cultural supremacy. This contradicts 
the discourse of equality and emancipation. 
Speeches and political dialogue do not have sufficient capacity to improve democracy or 
human rights situations, including TJ matters. The professional obligations of diplomats, with 
both bureaucratic and protocol dimensions, can be perceived as pretences to action. The time-
consuming nature of the obligations, however, becomes a burden. Rarely are the established 
aims achieved. Most practitioners are aware that this does not lead to solution of the human 
rights and governance issues at stake. Reviewing typical professional obligations for diplomats 
who operate as key aid brokers in recipient countries, this section underlines that the trend of 
 
 
Transitional Justice Battlefield: Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice 
 
162 
an institutionalised holistic approach is affecting their work beyond TJ. The global agenda for 
aid efficiency, the new aid paradigm, is also giving them guidelines on how to approach human 
rights and security and a wide range of issues.  
However, technocratisation is serving a very specific purpose. From an institutional 
perspective, these professional obligations are a waiver for the potential risk of blaming 
donors. Economic and political support to authoritarian regimes involves the future risk of 
being blamed for having blindly supported regimes that committed mass atrocities and serious 
violations of human rights (as happened with regard to Habyarimana’s regime in Rwanda). 
At an institutional level, the presence of diplomats on both private and public stages is 
omnipresent. As aid-dependent countries, Burundi and Rwanda have politicians who meet to 
negotiate and agree on budgets and strategies with diplomats on a daily basis. While the 
comprehensive aid approach (resulting from the new aid paradigm) increased attention to 
human rights from Western donors, available tools proved to be limited in making a real 
difference. Everyday obligations undertaken within protocol rules demonstrate an 
institutionalised approach to human rights promotion that goes unchallenged and 
unquestioned. Looking at human rights from the perspective of local activists, the following 
sub-section describes how bureaucracy is used politically by government authorities to 
obstruct organisations from denouncing human rights violations.  
4.2.2. Human Rights Activists: Political Bureaucracy in Everyday Work 
This sub-section describes professional and bureaucratic obligations for staff of local civil 
society dealing with sensitive human rights issues. Whereas all human rights and TJ 
practitioners are dedicated to the same mission and operating under interdependent structures 
to implement aid policies, this section demonstrates how stakes are different for actors at the 
front line of the defence of human rights, particularly for the most critical ones. On the one 
hand, political institutions in both Rwanda and Burundi impose heavy procedural obligations 
on NGOs and civil society to undertake their work through a long and demanding registration 
of the organisation and its staff. Furthermore, intimidation of critical voices and local human 
rights activists has been reported as common practice (e.g., Human Rights Watch 2013; 
Human Rights Watch 2007; Human Rights Watch 2014c; Amnesty International 2012; 
Amnesty International 2015). Registration is motivated under the claims of sovereignty, but 
mainly aid efficiency and coordination. In the example below, the Rwanda Governance Board, 
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an institution fully embracing the good governance agenda and various components of the new 
aid paradigm, extensively abuse politically technocratic procedures to silence critical voices 
through registration processes.  
Challenges faced by human rights NGOs, particularly local ones, have been reported by 
several scholars working on Rwanda (e.g., Straus and Waldorf 2011; Longman 2011; Gready 
2010). These pieces of research refer to the following practices as common in the intimidation 
of organisations monitoring human rights: infiltration by people close to the RPF regime, a 
difficult and long registration process, and intimidation and imprisonment. My interviews with 
NGO staff also indicate that bureaucratic assessments imposed by both donors and local 
institutions have heavily increased and diversified to become a burden in everyday work. In 
Rwanda, the most critical organisations are continually under the threat of new bureaucratic 
burdens from all sorts of Rwandan public institutions, which impedes on their monitoring and 
lobbying about gacaca matters.  
In Burundi, human rights and civil society organisations have been described as weak and 
disorganised. Most of these organisations are also considered to be affiliated to the political 
opposition (More 2010; Palmans 2005). Both local and international NGOs face difficulties in 
the registration process (though not as severe as those in Rwanda) for political and cronyism 
reasons. By unpacking obligations imposed on local organisations, I aim to underline the 
political use of bureaucracy and the discourse of new aid paradigm to constrain critical voices 
and the impact this has for human rights promotion of which TJ is an element.  
4.2.2.1. The Registration Process: Political Bureaucracy 
As an extreme example, I describe here how the registration process became a strong political 
tool in the Rwandan aid context. New obligations and legislation were introduced in 2012 for 
the registration of NGOs, claimed to be for the sake of aid efficiency, harmonisation and good 
local governance. All NGOs, even the most collaborative ones, must comply with a heavy 
bureaucratic process. Every year, local organisations need to bring to the Rwanda Governance 
Board (RGB) the following documents for registration:41  
1. Application letter addressed to the CEO of the Rwanda Governance Board;  
2. Authenticated statutes in conformity with the law no. 04/2012 of 17 February 2012;  
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3. Document showing the organisation’s head office and its full address;  
4. The name of the legal representative of the organisation, the name of their deputy, 
their duties, full address CV and their judicial records; 
5. The minutes of the general assembly that appointed the legal representative of the 
organisation and the signatures of all the members who attended such a general 
assembly meeting;  
6. The action plan for the fiscal year   
7. Original district collaboration letter. 
Among these documents, the authenticated statutes from RGB (2) and the original district 
collaboration letter (7) require long negotiations with different levels of authorities to be 
obtained. The action plan for the fiscal year (6) entails many details about planning, strategies 
and finances, and is not easily predictable one year in advance, due to the long difficult parallel 
process to obtain funding. In terms of the content of activities and strategies, every NGO has 
to negotiate its actions according to the agendas of the ministry in charge of the field in which 
it aims to intervene, of the authorities in each district it aims to work in, and of the RGB. 
Besides, requirements 4 and 5 could be seen as highly intrusive by organisations that distrust 
government authorities. Even with documents gathered, the RGB has refused individuals from 
representing organisations, as illustrated below.  
The authorities do not have to approve just the agenda of the organisation; the organisation 
must also comply with the targets of the ministry and the district strategies they wish to 
collaborate on under the name of harmonisation and alignment (as promoted by the New Aid 
Paradigm; see chapter 2). In practice, however, this legal framework becomes a political tool 
to restrain and block NGOs trying to do critical work. Registration is one of the many examples 
recounted by research participants during my fieldwork in Rwanda spread over 2012 and 2014. 
In all cases, Rwandan authorities use the discourse of good governance and elements of the 
new aid paradigm (defined in chapter 2) for political ends through bureaucratic means.  
Authorities should not, however, been seen as a homogeneous machine ‒ indeed, micro-
politics affect these different steps of negotiation, as illustrated by visa applications for 
expatriate aid workers. For instance, there were rumours that IDEA had to leave Burundi after 
refusing to hire a relative of a member of staff from the registration office; the head of mission 
of another INGO was expelled from Burundi after not renewing the contract of an employee 
who had a family connection in the registration office; ASF was refused its research 
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authorisation after Belgium refused visas to family members of a high-level member of staff 
at the SNJG. There is no direct evidence that these decisions are solely caused by these 
personal matters ‒ however, rumours are frequent enough to affirm a belief that they influence 
these institutional decisions. 
Even if in the end NGOs manage to comply with this overzealous bureaucracy, the authorities 
would have succeeded in obstructing their work with a time-consuming annual process. Some 
interviewees explained that once one accreditation had been obtained, preparation for the next 
already needed to be started. They explained that it did not leave any space to critique the 
government, or to undertake activities that national and district authorities disagreed with. 
They would face constant difficulties negotiating every level of requirement. Compliant 
associations would experience an easier registration process. An association that did not fully 
follow the political agenda and discourse was likely to have problems at every step, as 
demonstrated in the following example of the Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defence 
of Human Rights (Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l’Homme 
– LIPRODHOR). As the following explains, donors couldn't do anything about it even when 
they finally thought it was necessary 
4.2.2.2. LIPRODHOR’s Bureaucratic Ordeal: ‘We are Fighting Against 
Something Beyond our Power’ 
LIPRODHOR monitors, researches and denounces human rights abuses, as well as provides 
support to victims of these abuses. The organisation holds a critical view on the current 
political and judicial situation in Rwanda. Such position indirectly rejects and comprises the 
RPF’s discourse on the successful “new and united Rwanda”. This perspective led the 
parliament to request the dissolution of LIPRODHOR in 2004 after a parliamentary 
commission report accused the organisation of having a genocide ideology (Human Rights 
Watch 2004 ‒ see also chapter 3 about the legal framework that forbids genocide idealogy). A 
number of LIPRODHOR members left the country after this assault and the consequent threats 
(Longman 2011). Academic work already underlines some of these challenges in the Rwandan 
context, in which the government is averse to criticism (Straus and Waldorf 2011; Gready 
2010; Reyntjens 2011). 
LIPRODHOR’s struggles continued through further political use of bureaucratic obstacles and 
intimidation beyond the registration process. During my first set of fieldwork in January 2013, 
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the organisation had already reported a number of serious administrative problems. It could 
not get authorisations to visit prisons for several months while having long been a key actor in 
the monitoring of prison conditions. Significantly, the organisation was expelled from its 
offices by local authorities. A staff member explains: 
We had to close our office from 3rd November 2011 to 4th January 2012. The reason given is that 
we worked in a house for residential purposes in the district of Nyaregenge. We were ordered to 
leave by the urbanism administration and the police at the district level. …  In order to be able to 
use the building again, we needed to refurbish it. This is a house with two floors; this implies 
enormous costs. … Because of the moving, we now have to pay a rent. We had our house. Moving 
out was very expensive. The filing of documents is difficult here [in the new office]. All our files 
are in containers. I do not have a private office anymore. Now I have to go out with any claimant 
who comes and sees me. … There, it was our home. We had an easy access. It was calm and secure 
in addition to rent issues (interview with an NGO staff member, author’s translation, Kigali, 
January 2013).  
This interdiction to use their own building was presented as national urban policy. It affected 
the organisation at logistical, financial and morale levels. In the same week, I asked diplomats 
for their view of the LIPRODHOR situation. I was given paradoxical answers, such as the 
following: 
To say that the civil society situation is worrying, is overstating it. Yes it is difficult. Some NGOs 
held a dubious role during the genocide. This enables us to understand fears, even though it is 
exaggerated. More room should be given to human rights NGOs. The government does not take 
any risk. Human rights NGOs do not have real capacities to play their role. It is a difficult 
environment. ... We financed LIPRODHOR for years. The budget line supporting local ONGs does 
not exist anymore, the one that supported CLADHO and LIPRODHOR (interview with a diplomat, 
author’s translation, Kigali, January 2013). 
This interviewee used the legacy of the conflict to justify the authorities’ (ab)use of 
bureaucracy and restraints on local civil society organisations. He acknowledged that the 
situation was difficult for human rights NGOs, but did not express intention to support them 
more actively. More generally, there were signs that independent human rights NGOs became 
increasingly muzzled, but diplomats did not give them much support at these stages. 
During the next stage of my fieldwork, in September 2013, most informants talked about the 
‘LIPRODHOR’s Putsch’, referring to the removal of some members of the board, including 
its own director. A new board of directors was elected during an extraordinary meeting 
organised by people considered to be close to the regime. The members who were ejected 
contacted RGB, the National Commission for Human Rights and several ministries. They 
wrote to ambassadors and FIDH and started to make noise. LIPRODHOR’s removed director 
explains the causes of his removal: 
Everything went worse when we decided to leave CLADHO [the Collectif des Ligues et 
Association de Défense des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda – a network of Human Rights 
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organisations in which LIPRODHOR was playing a major role]. We were founding members, but 
we had no more room for manoeuvre. … This was after the vice-president of LIPRODHOR was 
appointed as the vice-president of CLADHO. But the RGB refused to approve the CLADHO 
committee.... I was threatened personally (by RBG staff). We informed FIDH, HRW, LDGL, the 
East and Horn African Association for Human Rights Defenders, Amnesty International, Front 
Line, KIOS, 11.11.11. …  Finally RGB accepted the committee in January. Later the RGB 
nominated an intermediary committee with members who were not even members of CLADHO 
and then we decided to leave jointly with two organisations. …  I was threatened and pressured to 
go back on that decision. I refused, and I was told, you will have to deal with the consequences, 
and now I am on trial as we brought to court this decision [of having been removed as the 
representative of LIPRODHOR].  
… We are fighting against something that is beyond our power. We are threatened, we must be 
very careful. … We are risking our lives through prison or violence. They can invent anything 
against us to weaken us. …  We risk our houses, our jobs, our life. An accident can easily happen, 
you are dead and they say it was an accident. They can invent anything to put you into jail... My 
friends and family are telling me to stop; I am starting to be scared (interview with an NGO staff 
member, author’s translation, Kigali, September 2013). 
Further and repeated attempts to destabilise LIPRODHOR and its partners indicate the abusive 
political use of bureaucracy. This event was reported by INGOs, which themselves have faced 
similar issues when operating in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch 2013; Fédération 
internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme 2014). In April 2014, diplomats told me of 
their serious concerns for the situation faced by LIPRODHOR. They explained that they were 
following the situation closely, by regularly meeting the removed director and attending the 
court hearing of his case to overturn the change of board of directors. One interviewed 
diplomat considered this could at least help ‘to avoid most flagrant procedural abuses’ by the 
judicial system. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office writes in its 2014 report on 
human rights and democracy:  
We are concerned by the role that the Rwandan authorities played in the change in leadership of 
LIPRODHOR, one of the last remaining independent human rights advocacy organisations in the 
country. A court case has been initiated, which the British High Commission is following closely, 
including by attending hearings (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014). 
In August 2014, more than a year after the case was brought to court, the judge decided that 
he could not hear the case since the removed director should bring his case against 
LIPRODHOR, the association itself, rather than the new leading members (RFI 2014). These 
successive obstacles and threats were put in place partly by the RBG, which is in theory a 
public institution to improve good governance in development projects. It has become, though, 
a tool for the regime to control and weaken critical organisations. This example of 
LIPRODHOR illustrates how critical activists are encouraged to leave the battle by an 
increasing bureaucratic burden and personal threats. 
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I raised these everyday difficulties with LIPRODHOR staff while addressing their follow-up 
of gacaca. At the first interview in December 2012, they had finished a research report about 
population satisfaction with gacaca. Aside from the problems mentioned above (such as delay 
in obtaining monitoring authorisation, eviction from their office, difficult registration process), 
their research partner had been intimidated by authorities and had withdrawn from the project. 
The publication of the research was then put on hold. Even after the official closure of the 
gacaca process, people came to seek help to deal with issues related to gacaca (such as finding 
trial documents to free a prisoner found innocent or to appeal a decision). Towards the end of 
gacaca, the SNJG stopped reacting to LIPRODHOR’s claims. In turn, LIPRODHOR could not 
provide any support to requests.  
LIPRODHOR’s bureaucratic ordeal demonstrates how these obligations to comply with the 
legal framework forced it to give less attention to its core work of denouncing human rights 
abuses and providing support to victims of violations. As an example of everyday complexities 
that TJ practitioners must go through, this case of local activists underlines how threats 
associated with work carry risks not only at a professional but also at a personal level. 
The Burundian context presents similar cases, with security threats against human rights 
activists. Ernest Manirumva, who was the vice-president of l’Observatoire de Lutte contre la 
Corruption et les Malversations Economiques (the Observatory of the Fight against Corruption 
and Economic Misappropriation ‒ OLUCOME), a Burundian NGO denouncing corruption, 
was found dead in 2009. Prior to this, he had been investigating embezzlement and arms 
trafficking among the national police force. Pierre-Clavaire Mbonimpa, the president of 
APRODH, one of most respected human rights associations in the country, was imprisoned 
for several months in 2014 after publicly denouncing military training of Imbonerakure in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. For local activists who resist the system, there are a lot of 
risks beyond the professional sphere. A lot of pressure is placed on activists in their personal 
environment. There are continual risks of imprisonment for minor crimes, of being subjected 
to false allegations, of political exclusion, and even of being killed – without sufficient support 
from Western donors in spite of a commitment to human rights. This represents very serious 
unintended effects of the new aid paradigm and its technocratic practices: with authorities 
using the global agenda and donors’ financial support to silence critical voices and 
consequently restrain the freedom of speech and association under the name of aid 
coordination and efficiency. Ultimately, the new aid paradigm defines not only an ideological 
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agenda of what aid practices should achieve, it also pragmatically frames the everyday work 
of aid-dependent organisations. Political motivations behind registration for coordination have 
led to very different results. In the case of Rwanda, the RGB destroyed critical civil society 
and encouraged other organisations of civil society to not be critical. 
4.2.2.3. Impact on TJ practice of Everyday Political Bureaucracy   
Not every person is ready to endure such pressure to undertake critical promotion and defence 
of human rights. Indeed, a number of practitioners and organisations tend to comply with these 
bureaucratic obligations with a strong political connotation imposed by Rwandan authorities. 
The bureaucratisation induced by the ‘new aid paradigm’ for more efficient aid indirectly led 
to a paradoxical situation: independent NGOs are constrained in undertaking sensitive work 
by the same structures and institutions that promote the respect of human rights and good 
governance (such as RBG for instance). These critical organisations received limited support 
from the international community, particularly in Rwanda. In turn, compliant NGOs 
consequently receive more support from the international community by acting as 
implementers of official agendas, complying more efficiently with managerial obligations and 
hence running their funded activities more smoothly. 
Donors are aware of the challenges related to human rights. For instance, report of the UK’s 
aid agency, DFID, describes its human rights approach as the following: “Rwanda, where the 
human rights environment is challenging, is still at an early stage. Understanding the situation 
better and looking for entry points in existing programmes is the strategy that has been 
adopted” (Piron and Watkins 2014, 35). In reality, DFID supports those current human rights 
projects that are not the most politically sensitive, such as women’s access to land, violence 
against women and eradication of poverty (interview, Kigali, February 2013). In this case, 
among those of others, the expansion of a human rights discourse to economic, social and 
cultural issues, turned out to be a useful vitrine for human rights promotion and a legitimatising 
waiver for leaving political emergencies untackled. 
More generally, the overzealous use of political bureaucracy in Rwanda and the personal 
threats led human rights organisations to undertake gradually less-sensitive work on gender 
issues, access to land for women, training in mediation skills for local authorities, legal aid 
support to victims of non-international crimes. There is an increasing number of local NGOs 
acting as implementers of governmental or international aid agency agendas. These issues are 
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of course important and would face similar political challenges on a lower scale. But it remains 
important to question whether turning to less sensitive issues with a technocratic approach 
really serves the search for entry points or closes the space for critical organisations. 
For the case of Burundi, a Burundian political actor described to me how he views the 
emergence of these associations without clear agenda or mandate, while also acknowledging 
the important work of some human rights NGOs: 
Civil society is good, they denounce governmental abuses ...  this restrains the government to do 
whatever he wants.... These who set up civil society are putting in place structures to receive aid. 
When they stop receiving aid it shuts down automatically, this is not normal. …  There is no 
national organisation of civil society that can sustain without international aid. We can thus say 
that they are structures through which international aid flows to finance cars, staff and consultancy. 
There is only one NGO that tries to write reports; it is APRODH. The others circulate job adverts; 
consultants will look for stories to fill in the pages. … There are very few engaged people in 
Burundi. Many are looking for wages. This is what makes civil society grow like a mushroom 
(interview with a political actor, author’s translation, Bujumbura, October 2013).  
This sarcastic description of the proliferation of civil society organisations shines light on the 
creation of opportunistic organisations drawn to the professional market created by 
international aid. Both the politically constraining environment and the bureaucratisation of 
aid have indeed encouraged organisations that comply with heavy bureaucratic process (which 
in the extreme cases do not have specific agendas and are opportunistic). At the same time, 
organisations that decided to be more critical in fighting for political changes can be 
disadvantaged financially and receive less political support since they cannot cope with legal 
and accountability obligations.  
Conclusion 
By recollecting the everyday activities of TJ practitioners, the chapter demonstrates the way 
in which the everyday projects the illusion of rational action beneath ubiquitous contradictions 
that have gained coherence through discursive and routinised acts, to a point at which their 
inefficiency has become almost invisible. The everyday lifestyle and working patterns give 
more insight on how routines and discourse maintain the counter-effective technocratic work, 
expert language and contradictory aid missions within these ultra-sensitive and unequal 
contexts. While everyday practices reproduce inequality, practitioners also tend to blame the 
localised context rather than the inappropriate approach or structure. 
From breakfast to returning home at the end of the day, from a meeting to a speech, from one 
bureaucratic obligation to another, every moment in Aidland is marked by ubiquitous 
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contradictions. There is a rational explanation, at least an institutional one, behind each 
contradiction, and preformatted approaches to respond to it. Expatriates need servants because 
of time and pragmatic constraints; expatriates need higher salaries because they have different 
living standards and better qualifications. Speeches and political dialogues are performative 
acts that enable bureaucratic obligations and are important for the purposes of accountability 
and efficiency. This chapter demonstrates that very few people in the field fully agree with 
these rational explanations ‒ routines, however, keep being repeated. Within both social and 
professional spheres, routines and readymade approaches have then been institutionalised. 
Such observations have two main implications for understanding the structural context. First, 
the multi-layered segregation and inequality are reproduced through the everyday practices 
and the definition of different treatments: wage scales and benefits among different aid 
workers, secondary staff and beneficiaries. Through their institutionalisation, aid practices 
reinforce the structure of inequality against which they are supposed to fight. Second, 
observations highlight that the social environment in aid-recipient countries goes beyond a 
divide of international and local dimensions. More specifically, the idea that international 
interventions need to deepen their understanding of the local context in order to improve their 
efficiency (Autesserre 2014) is challenged by my observations.  
No clear-cut divide therefore exists between the international and the local in Aidland. 
Hierarchical structures go beyond race and country of origin. There are people from all sorts 
of backgrounds in all sorts of positions (but with a majority of white expatriates in the higher 
positions). Through various opportunities ‒ extended stays in Western countries, marriage 
with an international, a mixed background ‒ Rwandan and Burundian nationals have reached 
expatriate positions with expatriate package benefits. Some white junior expatriates are 
frequently entitled to fewer benefits. The hierarchies within the peculiar aid context are 
affected by wider social dimensions as well as by local contexts. Daily interactions are marked 
by paternalism, otherness and normalised segregation. 
Further, making a parallel analysis of the everyday of diplomats and local activists underlines 
the structural inequality and limits of human rights promotion in general. On the one hand, the 
international donors repeat the importance of democracy and human rights despite limited 
efficiency. The analysis above highlights the consequences of everyday actions and routinised 
professional practices in Aidland: creating an environment in which assumptions and practices 
are not challenged; silencing failures and the hypocrisy of human rights promotion. This in 
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turn normalises the discrepancies between the everyday efforts of different cohorts at the two 
ends of the spectrum: the burden of trivial bureaucracy and security threats. It also creates 
tolerance for and justifies ubiquitous contradictions. 
On the other hand, at a personal level, risks are different depending on one’s background. 
National activists who are considered fundamental actors for human rights promotion 
continually put their personal lives in danger. With few exceptions, international activists are 
exposed to lower risks ‒ they might lose their jobs, be expelled from a country or be relocated 
somewhere else in Aidland.    
Finally, the chapter underlines three key aspects of bureaucracy. In everyday work, 
bureaucracy can be perceived variously as a combination of pretence to action, become a 
burden or be deployed as an obstacle. Bureaucratic obligations are time-consuming, with 
limited impact on addressed issues. For TJ practitioners, bureaucratic requirements become a 
burden, as having to deal with serious and sensitive issues in a systematic manner does not 
offer redress. From an institutional perspective, it is the pretension of attending to human rights 
and democracy that complies with policy discourse. Finally, bureaucracy becomes an obstacle 
when it is deliberately used by governmental authorities to discourage critical voices. Through 
disproportionate requirements for registration and authorisation of activities, the structure of 
the new aid paradigm can become a tool of political bureaucracy.  
As a result, everyday practice paradoxically turns into a distraction from core work for TJ 
practitioners and other actors in human rights networks. For the practice of transitional justice, 
the implication is that practitioners do not have TJ implementation as their only, or even their 
main, concern for their time in the field. The social structure and pragmatic working 
framework require them to deal with restrained time, knowledge and a contradictory structure 
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Chapter 5: Training and Sensitisation: TJ Practitioners Engaging 
with Beneficiaries 
Introduction 
For most of TJ practitioners, their daily work consists of implementing a set of activities that 
reinterpret and disseminate the TJ international discourse to their beneficiaries. Working 
mainly for local and international NGOs, they organise training, sensitisation campaigns, 
lobbying and monitoring projects, and conduct research. This chapter describes the 
institutional context of these efforts to train and sensitise various actors on TJ concepts by 
showing ethnographically how international aid operates very similarly in very different 
contexts. Specifically, it demonstrates how the ‘TJ toolkit’ approach is put in place with 
respect to the TJ processes in Rwanda and Burundi, but promoting a predetermined ideology 
and implementing a set of activities. 
As a key part of its TJ policy, the Rwandan government mandated the participation of its 
population in the gacaca courts. From 2002 to 2012, 15,300 courts ruled on nearly two million 
cases (see e.g., The New Times 2012; Avocats Sans Frontières 2010). Despite extensive 
literature about gacaca, limited research has looked into the preparation of gacaca. First, the 
local population had to elect Inyangamugayo, within their community. Selected as ‘persons of 
integrity’, Inyangamugayo then served as judges and ruled on genocide crimes and crimes 
against humanity that took place in their own community. I scrutinise in this chapter how 
donors, NGOs and national institutions organised training for Inyangamugayo and sensitised 
the population to encourage their participation in the gacaca process. 
In 2000, Burundian political actors and belligerents engaged officially in the implementation 
of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA), which included accountability, 
reconciliation and judicial TJ measures. After passing a law on the National Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in 2004, ongoing discussions made little progress for a decade 
(Stef Vandeginste 2012; Rubli 2013). Throughout this period, dozens of aid-dependent 
organisations provided training on TJ concepts in order to encourage the population’s 
participation in this stagnant TJ process. 
As mentioned in chapters 1 and 2, research on aid practices around the world reveals the 
negative impacts of the professionalisation and technocratisation of the international aid 
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sector. This literature underlines how technocratisation is affecting aid work with unexpected 
outcomes. For example, research has shown that these approaches enable depoliticisation 
(Uvin 1998; Holvoet and Rombouts 2008), reproduce inequality (e.g., Roth 2012), and silence 
social dynamics and contradictions within the aid environment (e.g., Baaz 2005). While the 
TJ literature does demonstrate frictions between aims, policy and practice, this chapter 
scrutinises in detail the effect of the TJ toolkit approach by looking at the organisation of 
training and sensitisation. In these activities, TJ practitioners meet directly, and communicate 
with, their ‘beneficiaries’ ‒ the population. Looking at these interactions allows us to 
understand frictions between intentions, actual practices and outcomes. 
The training and sensitisation activities I analyse in this chapter frequently promote unclear 
concepts such as ‘truth’, ‘pardon’, ‘justice’, ‘reconciliation’ and ‘reparation’. These are good 
examples of Andrea Cornwall’s (2007, 473) definition of aid buzzwords, given that “they 
combine performative qualities with an absence of real definition and a strong belief in what 
the notion is supposed to bring about.” These buzzwords are disseminated through different 
channels, and often via training and sensitisation tools. 
In development practices, training is supposed to contribute to capacity-building and 
sensitisation, to enhance social change. What they really bring to the people targeted and to 
the whole community, however, is questionable. Looking at the repetitive use of undefined 
concepts, silenced reinterpretation and adaption of simplistic discourses through activities, this 
chapter also highlights how TJ practice has institutionalised the idea that ‘justice’, ‘truth’ and 
‘reconciliation’ can be achieved through training and sensitisation initiatives. I address the 
following three questions in this chapter: 1) What does the ‘TJ toolkit’ concretely entail in 
terms of discourse and activities? 2) What are the frictions between policy discourse and 
practice? 3) What are the power dynamics in play?  
Such technical approaches are present not only in organisations working for TJ processes, but 
in many other development sectors, too, such as health, education, gender and human rights. 
In line with existing literature in relations to these other sectors, my empirical analysis 
underlines the processes of ‘technocratisation’ and ‘depoliticisation’ of TJ practice, as a result 
of which the aid provided does not necessarily empower the population to overcome the 
challenges identified. I argue that complex social dimensions hidden behind a technocratic 
facade partly result from legacies of the conflict, but is also due to aid practices. I also show 
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5.1. Dissemination of the Toolkit Approach: Forms of Training and 
Sensitisation 
The extensive use of training and sensitisation results from contemporary aid strategies to 
promote aid efficiency through ‘empowerment’, ‘ownership’, and the ‘strengthening’ of civil 
society. Efforts towards capacity-building and the development of ‘good practices’ have been 
widely undertaken around the world by international organisations (Clarke and Oswald 2010). 
The training and sensitisation projects I observed during my fieldwork claimed to inform 
people about TJ concepts or specific procedures, to encourage them to take part in the official 
processes, to seek truth and reconciliation, and to heal their trauma while contributing to 
justice. I observed that such activities also aimed to seek funding, lobby for particular issues, 
set up organisational or thematic strategy, and/or present research outputs. 
Among the few thousand documents gathered, I collated workshop and sensitisation tools 
relating to the Burundian TJ process (2004 to 2014) and the gacaca process (1998 to 2012). 
Burundian and Rwandan TJ matters have been debated for more than 20 years, in all sorts of 
places, from Geneva, New York, Cambodia and Dakar to the remote Rwandan and Burundian 
hills ‒ but in the latter countries mainly in hotel conference rooms in the capitals of Bujumbura 
and Kigali and the cultural cities of Gitega and Butare. My empirical data cannot therefore be 
exhaustively representative of activities undertaken in relation to the two processes under 
consideration, but are rather illustrative. 
In Rwanda, I identified three sets of training of the trainers, 14 sets of material for training of 
Inyangamugayo42 and three training tools related to the gacaca law from 2000 to 2008.43 To 
these can be added 18 international workshops discussing the gacaca policy model.44 Gacaca 
                                                 
42 For example, training of judges of the pilot phase (2002); training of cell judges on data gathering (2004); 
training of sector judges before the launch of the judgment phase (2005), training of cell judges on prosecution 
of third category crimes and mediation procedure (2006), training of sector and appeal judges on the 2007 New 
Organic Law (2007), training of sector and appeal judges on first category crimes (2008) (source: NGO Reports 
and correspondences with NGO staff).  
 
43 First, the Supreme Court issued a gacaca manual for judges. In 2002, PAPG set up a training module for 
Inyangamugayo. In 2005, the SNJG circulated simplified instruction booklets.  
 
44 For example, Round Table Conference on Justice and Security of Persons and Goods (Kigali, 1996); workshop 
on role of international community in justice rebuilding (Butare, 1998), seminars on reparations for victims of 
genocide and Crimes against humanity, on community service, on gacaca courts (Kigali, 2000); genocide victims 
compensation (Kigali, 2000), round table meeting on gacaca courts (Copenhagen, 2000), informal seminar on 
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government officials also established 20 different tools used to sensitise the population during 
the gacaca process (Babalola et al. 2003). This does not include all the sensitisation tools 
produced by INGOs for the same purpose.  
In Burundi, while the official TJ process has not been launched, many activities have been 
undertaken to sensitise and train the population. Around 15 different series of workshops have 
been organised,45 and I identified four different types of sensitisation tool. I have personally 
attended dozens of training sessions and workshops. Events that I did not attend were studied 
through the analysis of gathered textual and multimedia materials as well as through interviews 
with informants (participants, donors and organisers). 
The following sections describe five different projects delivered by international aid 
organisations to enhance capacity-building and empowerment. These examples were selected 
to represent different delivery formats and targeted audiences. The case studies present, in 
turn, an event sensitising high-level political and institutional actors, a training programme for 
local implementers, two sensitisation activities for small groups of people, and, finally, 
materials used for mass sensitisation. The following areas are addressed within each vignette: 
background information highlighting frictions between policy engagement and practice, the 
reinterpretation of buzzwords through dissemination, the power dynamics in play, and the 
technocratic obligations that silence legacies of conflicts. I also discuss a four-month workshop 
that a colleague and I put together in order to encourage critical thinking among TJ 
practitioners in Burundi. Such experimental research was interesting in the exploration of the 
challenges and limits of training, especially since I attempted to transfer knowledge and 
enhance changes beyond the mainstream technocratic approach. 
                                                 
45 For example, “Colloque sur la Justice en période de Post-Conflit” (Bujumbura, 2005); “Atelier sur la gestion 
des dépouilles mortelles et la question des personnes disparues” (Bujumbura, 2011); “Colloque international 
Repenser le Changement Post-Conflit – Quels modèles de coopération en Afrique des Grands Lacs ?” (Bruxelles, 
2011), “Atelier international sur les Mécanismes de la justice de transition: leçons apprises des commissions de 
vérité et réconciliation” (Bujumbura 2011); “Atelier de réflexion sur les Droits de la Femme et ses Priorités en 
termes de réparations dans les mécanismes de justice transitionnelle” (Bujumbura, 2011); “Dialogue and 
Exchange Program – Study tour of Burundian Parliamentarians for understanding the different stages of the TRC 
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5.1.1. Sensitisation of High-Level Stakeholders and the Creation of Standards 
(Burundi) 
In July 2011, the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) and the 
Burundian Parliament jointly organised a workshop on TJ and on the functioning of the TRC. 
Gathering important policy makers, this workshop aimed to encourage Burundian members of 
parliament (MPs) to take part in the TJ debate prior to the preparation of the TRC law. The 
373 participants included a diversity of high-level staff from political, judicial and diplomatic 
spheres. The event was a typical example of a high-level gathering in which well-known 
experts and policy actors jointly discussed a model under development. 
In his opening speech, Pie Ntavyohanyuma, the president of the National Assembly, defined 
the aims of the workshop: 
This journey towards peace and reconciliation ... is only possible if we seek first to establish truth 
on what happened in our country. It is this truth that will free us and enable us to move towards 
pardon and reconciliation, as well as towards a sustainable peace among daughters and sons of this 
country. ... All these actions have been and are guided by Burundians determination to get over the 
cyclical violence that hit our country, to build a society that is just, prosperous and respectful of 
human rights. Today it is the momentum to undertake a deep reflection on the implementation of 
transitional justice mechanisms and the vital quest for truth” (Pie Ntavyohanyuma’s speech at 
AWEPA TJ Workshop, July 2011, author’s translation). 
Presentations during the one-day workshop covered the national consultations, an assessment 
of the challenges of TRC implementation, and lessons learnt from foreign experience ‒ that is, 
the Togolese and Moroccan TJ processes. Logistical organisation of the workshop was through 
the Belgian Embassy and funded by AWEPA. Every participant received travel expenses and 
per diems at the end of the workshop. 
The opening speech and the entire event gave a strong symbolic and performative message. 
First, it directed towards donors a reiteration of the message that Burundian authorities cared 
about human rights and sustainable peace and were willing to implement TJ mechanisms. 
Second, European nations demonstrated that they were supporting Burundi to undertake a TJ 
process. Ambassadors and EU diplomats sitting in the front row of the large conference room 
acted as witnesses of these ‘formal’ promises and their own engagement towards TJ was 
embodied by their presence and their financial support for the event. At the time, most actors 
(and myself) believed that the Burundian TJ process would move forward shortly after that 
event. Yet until May 2015 the process remains on hold, as the discussions over the TRC law 
have been repeatedly postponed in the parliamentary agenda. 
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A number of details underlined the political dimensions behind the technical surface of the 
workshop. For instance, the selection of the Togolese and Moroccan cases was not politically 
neutral. These are two cases in which truth-seeking mechanisms were put in place without 
judicial prosecutions. This reflects a preference by key political parties to encourage truth and 
pardon but to leave aside judicial questions (e.g., Rubli 2013). Such preferences have been 
indirectly expressed (and have been refused by the UN) since early TJ negotiations in Burundi, 
due to the implication of some current political actors in past crimes. Addressing the role of 
leading former opponents in blocking the TJ process, Vandeginste (2011a, 14) affirms, 
“Keeping up appearances as if they are genuinely interested in transitional justice has so far 
proved to be a successful strategy. [The contrary] ... might force the UN to change its position, 
possibly to the detriment of its Burundian counterparts.”  
Similarly, this workshop demonstrated, in gathering high-level policy makers, goodwill and 
cooperation between the engaged international community and Burundian authorities. In 
practice, the technical façade ‒ in which donors support capacity-building by enabling 
Burundians to learn from foreign experiences ‒ hides the political sensitivity at the heart of 
the blocked process: the judicial consequences of truth-seeking and the power dependence of 
policy makers towards certain authors of crimes. 
Further, a strict interpretation of technical recommendations given by one international 
consultant during the workshop provoked unexpected outcomes in the unfolding process. In 
his presentation, he addressed pending questions about dispositions to be decided for the then-
forthcoming TRC law: 1) The composition of the TRC: would it include international 
commissioners or not? 2) The mandate of the TRC: would it have the capacity to name 
individual perpetrators and victims or would it remain at the collective level of responsibility 
and victimhood? 3) The legal mandate and implications of the TRC: how would TRC inquiries 
relate to judicial bodies? What are the implications for temporary immunities? Would the TRC 
have the capacity to qualify crimes? 
The presentation was a rare example of a speaker not simply linking together TJ buzzwords 
that assessed truth-seeking as necessarily leading to reconciliation (in contrast to the opening 
speech above and the following vignettes) but highlighting the real key dilemmas. The 
consultant’s analysis clearly raised the high political stakes on which legal decisions had to be 
taken in order to move the TJ process forward. 
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In interviews I undertook over the following years, several informants from the donor 
community stated that they would not support the TRC if it did not respect ‘TJ standards.’ 
When I asked them to clarified what they menant, they referred mainly to the three elements 
mentioned by the consultant: a mixed composition of the commission, the capacity to qualify 
crimes, and a restriction in granting amnesty for the most serious crimes (judicial 
responsibility). In December 2012, the technical committee46 produced a draft law, which did 
not include, among other things, international commissioners and did not decide on judicial 
prosecutions. This version of the draft law included a provision that “Its [the TRC’s] work 
cannot jeopardise competences of the Special Tribunal” (République du Burundi 2011, Art. 5; 
§2, author’s translation). Both local and international NGOs strongly rejected the draft and 
undertook heavy lobbying against it to potential donors, as it did not respect ‘international 
standards’. Whereas there are no clearly defined international or legal ‘standards’ in relation 
to TJ (a factor that will be elaborated on in the final section), the lobbying efforts set in stone 
the three criteria. As a result, the law project was put on hold. 
Another draft law was leaked from the National Assembly in 2013. A number of provisions 
were deleted, reducing further the guarantees provided in the first draft. By the end, some 
interviewees from the civil society regretted not having supported the first draft law and having 
requested further guarantees (interviews with NGO representatives, Bujumbura, 2013). 
Framing recommendations from experts as international standards, and hence demanding 
more from the authorities, did not turn out successfully – as authorities provided fewer 
guarantees in the adopted law than initially proposed in the first draft law.  
The AWEPA workshop underlined an important limit of TJ negotiations. Guided by 
diplomatic relations, potential donors often failed to address openly their concerns relating to 
potential political manipulations. Within such contexts, it becomes useful to frame experts’ 
recommendations or moral standards as ‘international standards’. Ultimately, the workshop 
was undertaken within a context in favour of TRC implementation, at least from an official 
position. It provided food for thought for lobbyists but limited reflection on recommendations 
and opportunities. It was supposed to put the process back in motion by providing technical 
advice; but civil society rejected the draft law proposed by the technical committee after a 
                                                 
46 Established by a presidential decree in 2011, the Technical Committee was mandated to study the legal and 
technical questions about the TRC. Civil society organisations had reacted differently to the committee; some 
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strict interpretation of these recommendations. The process consequently remained on hold for 
the subsequent year and a half.  
On 15th May 2014, the president promulgated an updated version of the TRC law but it did 
not take into consideration the ‘technical’ concerns raised by local and international NGOs. 
The judicial dimensions were again left on hold until the submission of the report produced by 
the Technical Committee to the government, parliament and the UN. The high-level workshop 
illustrates a recurrent limit of international aid: much effort put into technical support of the 
TJ Burundian process with limited impact so far for victims and theoretical beneficiaries. 
5.1.2. Mass Training for Mass Justice: Becoming a Judge in Six Days (Rwanda) 
The training of gacaca judges is an extraordinary example of mass training of local 
implementers for transitional justice purposes. As a mass justice process for mass crimes, 
gacaca also required mass training for the roughly 260,000 elected Inyangamugayo, 
cornerstone actors in its implementation in every Rwandan cell. In the context of with Lars 
Waldorf’s (2006, 84) statement about gacaca ‒ that “no legal system is equipped to prosecute 
mass complicity in mass atrocity” ‒ I consider that training for Inyangamugayo adopted a weak 
methodology to deal with matters as serious as the judgment of genocide crimes. In previous 
research (Jamar 2012, 83), I  underline a lack of training to be one of the main causes of judicial 
mistakes committed by these non-professional judges.47 The following description of the 
training of Inyangamugayo explores weaknesses in training models, and has wider lessons for 
such interventions. 
Inyangamugayo were elected by and from within their local community on the basis of their 
integrity. The legal conditions for being elected include general characteristics (such as being 
a Rwandan citizen and at least 21 years of age) but also ethical dimensions such as: 
to be recognised as having a good behaviour and morals; to be characterised by honesty and a spirit 
of sharing speech; ... not having participated in perpetrating offences of the genocide crime or 
crimes against humanity; to be free from the spirit of sectarianism and discrimination (Republic of 
Rwanda 2001). 
The majority of elected judges at the cell level were farmers, whereas a large number at the 
district level were teachers or civil servants (15.4 per cent were illiterate, Human Rights Watch 
                                                 
47 Working closely with INGOs I wrote previously that training was limited because Rwandan authorities did not 
approve INGOs’ robust methodology. Through further research, I gathered evidence that first training sessions 
were already showing methodological issues, as demonstrated within this section. 
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2011, 66). A number of Inyangamugayo were removed during the process for alleged 
participation in the genocide or corruption. Human Rights Watch reported that 92,000 judges 
were removed in total (ibid. 2011, 68). SNJG states that 443 judges were dismissed for 
corruption and “45,396 Inyangamugayo judges were replaced [in 2006] due to suspicion of 
participation in genocide crimes” (National Service of Gacaca Courts 2012, 171). Considering 
that the lack of monetary remuneration could be a source for corruption, many discussions 
among Rwandan authorities and donors addressed how Inyangamugayo could be compensated 
for their role (ibid.).48 
The Rwandan authorities and INGOs initially collaborated in putting these training 
programmes together. They were funded by several international donors such as USAID, the 
Netherlands and Belgium. Some 15 sets of training (lasting from three to ten days) were given 
to Inyangamugayo from 2002 to 2008.49 The training process started by training the trainers. 
The main training programme was organised jointly by an INGO and the National Service of 
Gacaca Courts (SNJG in the French acronym) and financially supported by USAID. It was 
delivered in two sessions of six days in November 2004. In total, 572 trainers were trained in 
two weeks. The training was given by six experts from INGOs and different Rwandese 
institutions. Lectures were organised for groups of around 150 people. The programme 
consisted of 16 sessions (1.5 or 2 hours each) addressing topics such as the philosophy of the 
gacaca courts, legal concepts, gacaca procedures, logistical aspects and skills to handle trauma 
and conflict management. 
According to the NGO activity report, short-term results included 551 trained trainers and 
capacity-building for SNJG staff (Avocats Sans Frontières 2004b). It was considered that this 
would lead to the training of 42,260 judges fit to provide impartial justice. The main predicted 
long-term result was that gacaca “judicial decisions are [would be] well received by all parties 
and the whole community” (ibid., p30). As a typical part of activity reports, a list of statistics 
summarised evaluation sheets filled in by participants. These numbers led organisers to 
conclude that it was a great success in spite of some limits. Overall, only two aspects received 
                                                 
48 They received free health insurance for all their family. Radios were distributed to all judges and bicycles to 
each jurisdiction. They received a one-time payment of about £4. 
49  Different sources, including Amnesty International Reports, HRW reports, ASF Reports and email 
correspondences with NGO staff. 
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a negative numerical evaluation: time allocated and practical exercises.50 From a quantitative 
and technocratic perspective, this represented only two negative results out of 16 evaluated 
criteria. From a qualitative point of view, the fact that trainers (being trained) considered that 
there was not enough time or exercises for the absorption of the new knowledge suggests rather 
a limited outcome. 
It can also be argued that the intellectual benefits were questionable, due to the size of groups 
and the numbers of topics covered in a short amount of time. Even if limits were 
acknowledged, this form of numeric evaluation provided a positive assessment of the training. 
Such bureaucratic practice validates a positive appreciation of the project and lead to further 
continuation of the process, silencing rather than addressing the limits and consequences. 
According to the SNJG (2012, 47), it was sufficient ‒ since trainers being trained “were 
individuals already familiar with the law, notably those practising as judges, students of law 
and human rights activists.”  
The training of Inyangamugayo was then organised on a similar basis. The first set of sessions 
were monitored by NGOs as part of the monitoring programme. Their internal reports on the 
training illustrate the different capacity levels of trainers. Some trainers made mistakes in 
explaining the important nuances of gacaca law such as crime categorisation and consequent 
sentence calculation, guilty-plea procedures, and the notion of complicity.51 In practice, this 
would have contributed to Inyangamugayos’ misinterpretation of the law, with serious social 
implications given that they had the power to decide on innocence or culpability in relation to 
genocide crimes, and to issue sentences of up to life imprisonment.  
Moreover, a number of issues related to the political interpretation of crimes under scope were 
also reported. For example, trainers and trainees have argued about RPF and vengeance 
crimes, ‘genocide ideology’, whether a double genocide took place, and other sensitive matters 
(Avocats Sans Frontières 2004b). These socio-political issues can be illustrated by the example 
of one monitored training session that received particular attention from NGO observers 
                                                 
50 For example, “96.5% of participants found that the received teaching was of high quality ... 98% of participants 
found the choice of subject to be appropriate ... 43.3% of participants assessed that the granted time of training 
was not enough ... 54.6% of participants found that the number of exercises was not enough ...” (ibid., 49).  
51 The gacaca law defines crimes in three categories and provides sentence calculation against the category, 
confessions and times of confessions. For further details, see Articles 9, 10, 11 of Gacaca Organic Law No 
13/2008 of 19/05/2008. 
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because it radically challenged gacaca’s philosophy (Avocats Sans Frontières 2004a).52 The 
specific training session was supposed to address the legal definition of the crime of genocide 
and its application in the gacaca law through crime categorisation. The NGO observers 
reported that “Inyangamugayos’ remarks were heavily marked by the ‘genocide ideology’.” 
The observers personally affected by the conflict had to leave the lecture “because we were 
scared by the participants’ remarks, we felt insecure” (ibid.). The reporter further writes: 
It is really regrettable to notice people who were elected as Inyangamugayo denied the genocide 
while they were selected to deal with the genocide litigation and to contribute to the process of 
national reconciliation. We can thus have doubt about their impartiality due to the fact most of 
them shared a feeling of hate regarding the Tutsi. 
This example illustrates that technical training has the capacity to silence arguments about the 
conflict, or at least to fail to address concurrent and/or critical narratives that naturally emerge 
in transitional justice processes. It indeed reminds us that justice and truth-seeking are not 
simply technical exercises in which people tell their versions of the story to reach 
reconciliation; also involved is the negotiation over whose truth is more relevant and 
acceptable. In this training, participants and trainers were negotiating a political definition of 
what kind of fact would be able to be discussed and with which perspectives in the then-
forthcoming gacaca trials. This also shows that every individual participating in the process 
had been affected by the genocide in a different way, and that their experiences of the violence 
would have important impacts on how each perceived the legal model, interpretation and 
implementation. 
Later, the SNJG stopped organising training jointly with INGOs and refused to allow them to 
undertake further monitoring of training sessions (Interview with NGO representatives, 2012, 
2013). Wide-scale monitoring of other phases of the process (data-gathering and judgments) 
was still organised. These organisations continually reported the Inyangamugayos’ difficulties 
in implementing the gacaca law, particularly at the cell level. Mistakes and infringements were 
partly assigned to the lack of training. From a wider perspective, policy-orientated and 
academic research show that the law was interpreted and implemented according to the context 
and power dynamics of local communities (Ingelaere 2004; Burnet 2014). Bert Ingelaere 
(2004) demonstrated how the local dynamics of the conflict had an important impact on how 
gacaca courts dealt with genocide crimes locally. Monitoring agencies considered that most 
                                                 
52 The report provides a few examples such as this intervention from one of the Inyangamugayo being trained: 
“Why are we talking about the genocide of the Tutsi while there are also Hutu who were killed by Tutsi? This is 
unfair because the Tutsi military committed as well the genocide against Hutu”. 
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trials at the beginning were undertaken in good spirit, the population was enthusiastic, and it 
was assumed that Inyangamugayo would improve their work throughout the process and 
follow-up training (Avocats Sans Frontières 2006, 39; Interviews, Kigali, 2010, 2012, 2013). 
NGOs did not envisage that the Rwandan authorities would cease collaborating with them and 
ignore the observed issues. It was predictable, however, that a model relying on one week of 
training would encounter problems. An important number of complex topics from different 
disciplines were taught in short periods of time to big groups of trainers, there was a high level 
of absence, and the trainees interpreted the law differently while training Inyangamugayo. 
Furthermore, legal and technical dimensions were strongly entangled in very sensitive social 
and political matters. It is ultimately not surprising that it did not systematically lead to “fit 
Inyangamugayo providing impartial justice well received by all parties and the whole 
community” (as stated in training material Avocats Sans Frontières 2004b, 30). 
In addition, international actors who financially supported the gacaca process insisted on 
providing supposedly purely ‘technical’ aid, including through such training. This case also 
illustrates how technocratic exercises can silence or fail to address socio-political issues; in 
turn, this challenges back the process by undermining the complexity of post-genocide legacies 
and the consequent damaged social fabric. This analysis of gacaca training again questions 
how training and state-imposed reconciliatory institutions have the capacity, from a technical 
approach, to repair social fabric after mass violence. 
5.1.3 Silencing Worst Practice: Flirting for the Sake of Women’s Voices 
Many sensitisation workshops have been organised to discuss TJ processes within the 
‘population’ in both the Rwandan and Burundian hills. Gathering people for a half or full day, 
discussions were organised as focus groups or using different tools (theatre performances, 
‘expert presentations’, audio and video projections). In addition to an (almost) systematic 
inclusion of local officials and activists, ethnic and gender balance were included as criteria 
for participants from the community. In practice, all the workshops I observed gathered the 
local educated elite, covered too many topics in a short time, and pretended to adopt a 
‘technical’ and ‘politically neutral’ position. The primary message conveyed could be reduced 
to this: ‘truth’, ‘justice’ and ‘commemoration’ will ‘heal’, ‘pardon’ and ‘reconcile’. 
Nonetheless, the personal position of organisers was often perceptible, even if not stated 
openly. This section discusses one session that gathered women to hear their voices regarding 
 
 
Transitional Justice Battlefield: Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice 
 
188 
TJ and their needs in the post-conflict setting. Having observed a number of similar events, 
this one is an extreme example of how things can go wrong and how the worst practice is 
silenced.53 
This specific project model put together a number of aims: training on TJ concepts to prepare 
the population for taking part in the official TJ process; listening to the population’s needs to 
convey recommendations to institutional actors; and encouraging healing and reconciliation 
by giving people the opportunity to talk about their suffering related to past violence. It was 
supposed to include 15 to 20 people. When we arrived at the venue, there were just three ‒ all 
women. One of them asked why the workshop gathered only women. The organiser answered, 
“It is because it is a fashionable topic and donors like it.” During the presentation of material 
giving various perceptions on the conflict, one of the women left to pick up two friends, and 
by the end there were five participants. 
The observed activity barely achieved the goals set. Debates were undertaken to discuss the 
perceptions of women on key TJ mechanisms. The methodological material used did not 
address TJ mechanisms and no further information had been provided. As a result, the 
discussions were abstract. At one point, a participant said that her country should have laws to 
forbid war crimes. The organiser, a local NGO worker, did not think it would be relevant to 
inform her that these laws already existed. No specific need was identified. The intellectual 
benefit was limited because supporting pedagogic material and discussions were not related to 
each other.  
At the end of the activity, the NGO thanked participants by offering drinks and food. The 
organiser asked the restaurant to provide drinks and food for the planned rather than the actual 
number of participants (20 instead of 5). After a few beers, sexually-referenced jokes were 
being shared among the organiser and participants, and the workshop organiser kept putting 
his hands on the thighs of the women sitting next to him. When the husband of one of the 
participants joined, the organiser moved away from this woman but continued to flirt with the 
others. I felt most uncomfortable, and remained sitting at the same table while I observed. 
The organiser used a professional opportunity to flirt with women, proudly styling himself as 
the ‘expert’ as well as the person who could provide drinks and food for everyone. This was 
not only an unethical way to listen to women’s voices, but an extreme example in which the 
                                                 
53 No further indication will be provided in order to maintain confidentiality. 
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trainer did not embody the message he was promoting. He put fashionable keywords together 
that responded to donors’ expectations and looked good on project documents. In theory, he 
adopted a gender approach to give sensitisation on TJ concepts and hence to empower women. 
He was supposed to create a space for expression of women’s voices in relation to a violent 
past. In reality, his own view with regard to women took over and his behaviour was sexist 
and inappropriate. The fact that such behaviour took place in front of me as a foreign observer 
suggests that he did not consider it to be ethically questionable. 
This reminds us that the bureaucratic reporting procedures are insufficient to probe what is 
really happening in the field despite increasing interests and funding obligations for efficiency 
and accountability. While technocratic reporting could turn the event into a success, this event 
was undoubtedly a failure: there were too few participants, limited capacities were transferred, 
and, most importantly, it reproduced male domination of women. Finally, it showed that 
overambitious models could be manipulated for all sort of purposes without this being noticed 
by supervisors or donors. 
5.1.4. Arguing about the Truth while Commemorating Victims (Burundi) 
In contrast with the previous extreme example, this vignette aims to highlight that even in the 
best organised workshops with good planning and ethical commitments, tensions can arise 
between trainers and among participants. Logistically and financially support by international 
funding, this workshop was organised by two recently created networks of victims, gathering 
around 50 of their members from all the Burundian provinces. Spread over three days, it 
focused on commemoration. Throughout my fieldwork (from August 2012), the National 
Assembly kept postponing the discussions about the TRC law in the parliamentary agenda – 
leaving the TJ agenda without any progress at the institutional level. The TJ unit of the UN 
Office in Burundi (BNUB), and several local and international NGOs opted to use this lull to 
prepare the population and their local networks through sensitisation and capacity-building 
activities and to push for truth-seeking/-telling and commemoration activities that could take 
place even if the official process had not commenced.  
Four national consultants provided presentations about commemoration and memory, memory 
and history for reconciliation, memory as a therapeutic tool and the role of memory in dealing 
with the past. All these consultants were members of staff working for TJ NGOs based in 
Bujumbura. Participants all emanated from local elites ‒ fluent French speakers working as 
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teachers, local human rights representatives and local journalists. They received 90.000 BIF 
(around €45) and transportation allowances for their attendance (representing around a fifth of 
the average annual income in Burundi).54 As one of the best training I attended, the description 
below contributes to underlying limits of training and sensitisation practices. More 
importantly, the workshop again silenced social complexities within commemoration efforts. 
Typical of such expert presentations, the programme included the viewing of two 
documentaries about TJ, group work sessions to define provincial strategies, and visits to 
commemoration sites. The structure of the workshop was based on an interactive approach to 
encourage people to undertake commemorative activities in their own communities. This 
‘bottom-up’ approach aimed to integrate rural populations in the TJ process ‒ the focus on 
commemoration was a strategy to make progress even though the official process was blocked. 
This effort to address problematic issues in depth and pragmatically made this workshop stand 
out from others I attended. It focused only on commemoration and dedicated sufficient time 
for reflection on strategies. 
 ‘Commemoration’ was introduced to participants in this workshop as the new alternative to 
deal with the past. Nonetheless, the themes of the presentations drew on the key claims and 
objectives of the TJ toolkit approach. While the governmental authorities were failing to 
implement the TRC or judicial mechanisms, memorialisation activities were presented as 
another way to achieve truth-seeking, accountability, trauma-healing and reconciliation. This 
new emphasis on memorialisation was not only a local initiative; the workshop and networks 
involved were supported and funded by international organisations.  
‘Commemoration’ was introduced to participants in this workshop as the new alternative to 
deal with the past. Nonetheless, the themes of the presentations drew on some of the claims 
and objectives of the TJ toolkit approach. Only one of the presentations discussed the risk of 
political manipulation of memory and memorialising events; there were brief discussions 
about disrespectful damage on existing commemoration monuments in various parts of 
Burundi. Other presentations did not mention concurrency between different objectives of TJ 
mechanisms. For instance, when a participant asked if the construction of a memorial was 
dangerous, the consultant answered: 
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No, everyone has this right. We undertook research on commemoration, we observed there was a 
mass grave on the road to Karuzi. We need to gather the other ones from all provinces, periods and 
victims from all ethnical groups. Evidence should be protected; it is the state’s obligation. Anyone 
can press charges if a mass grave is destroyed. In Burundian law, judicial police officers (OPJ) 
must draw up a report if human remains are found. What is done today is not legal; we can press 
charges (author’s translation of field notes). 
This answer avoids acknowledging the risks associated with commemoration, such as 
repression, insecurity, revival of political or ethnic tensions, stigmatisation of victims or 
excluding other types of victim. This workshop was held a few weeks after the Kivyuka mass 
grave had received attention in local media (see the general introduction). It was reported that 
several corpses had been removed from the mass grave without judicial accountability or 
ethical precautions in the presence of policemen and the province governor. It is certain that 
participants, being members of TJ or victim associations, would have heard about the incident 
in the press and were aware of the security risks involved in efforts for accountability. 
Similarly, I observed in other workshops that consultants tended to avoid critical questions 
rather than to give tools or to open up discussions to identify and overcome challenges. 
As part of the workshop, we later had a field visit to the Kibimba commemoration. The site 
commemorates around 60 Tutsi high school students who were burnt alive in a petrol station 
shortly after president Ndadaye was assassinated in 1993. The burnt out building is maintained 
and protected by a concrete structure built over it. A mass grave gathering the remains of 
victims was built 50 meters beyond, with a circular pillar over it inscribed with ‘plus jamais 
ça’ (‘never again’). We first walked around the site, then stood in a circle on the collective 
tomb. Following one of the messages of the training, that commemoration will help to seek 
the truth, one of the organisers asked, “So what is the truth about this event?” One participant 
explained that children ran away in different directions from the school, and that those who 
fled in this particular direction were brought to the petrol station and burned to death. The 
discussion turned quickly into an animated argument about the school director’s responsibility. 
Among the participants, some argued that other teachers were also responsible for giving 
victims to killers, while others supported the claim that it was the director’s responsibility. The 
organiser mediating the debate, a male from the capital with a high position within its victim 
organisation, did not accept the ‘truth’ provided by a woman who originated from that area 
and was a local member of the TJ network. 
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It was a tense atmosphere in which all were shocked by the horror of the killing of these 
innocent children. Discussions over the ‘truth’ about the school director’s responsibility took 
attention from giving respect to victims while standing on their tombs. Heading back to the 
bus, participants asked a passing older woman, seeing her as representing a wiser image. Her 
version of the story satisfied them; they agreed with what she said was the ‘truth’. The fact 
that none of the participants was a direct relative of any victims eased negotiations over which 
‘truth’ could be accepted and who had the legitimacy to define which it was. The alternative 
picture is easy to imagine: if such discussions had taken place between direct relatives of 
victims, perpetrators and alleged perpetrators, tensions would have been created and 
intensified, which in turn would have challenged more seriously the purposes of 
commemoration and reconciliation. 
This was another example in which consultants and organisers did not fully embody the 
preached values (commemorating by listening to people’s experiences and giving respect to 
victims). It underlines how establishing truth implies negotiating events according to the social 
and gender dynamics in place. Where this could be perceived as a good example of capacity-
building related to truth-seeking mechanisms, the power dynamics in play also hold an 
important role in debates.  
These difficult discussions about what is the ‘truth’ bring attention to existing risks in the 
association of concurrent TJ concepts such as truth-seeking, justice, trauma-healing, 
commemorations and reconciliation. Overall, the workshop presented commemoration as an 
initiative that would enable the pursuance of all these objectives simultaneously (as formulated 
in the TJ toolkit approach – see chapter 2). But the implementation of the TJ toolkit approach 
through training is marred by social and political complexities, as the short argument over 
‘truth’ illustrates. Some of the participants, who were members of the national TJ network, 
might refrain from establishing commemorative initiatives in their communities to avoid 
similar arguments around concurrent perceptions in relation to experienced violence. Others 
participants might create tensions in their community by discussing violence and 
commemorations without sufficient preparation to channel and mediate unexpected outcomes 
(such as the confrontation of different views). 
Reading between the lines of these debates that claimed to be technocratic (in this case building 
the capacity of provincial practitioners), there are subtle indications that they are fighting for 
different truths and justice; and the debates are inevitably affected by current and past politics 
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and power dynamics. Their work somehow becomes more than the ‘simple’ implementation 
of an emancipatory and repairing framework. 
On return from the field visit to the hotel where the workshop was held, more discussions were 
held in groups in order to define the province’s strategies. Out of this, the following initiatives 
were planned: to implement the TRC, rewrite Burundian history, adopt legislation in relation 
to memorial sites, sensitise victims about their commemoration sites, build an inclusive 
memorial site, organise collective commemorations, and sensitise around the past. Except for 
the last three, participants did not have the capacities to undertake action towards the strategies 
set. The workshop was followed by several others to pursue sensitisation and reflection, with 
more local members of the two victim networks. It is probable that this approach would lead 
to concrete activities in certain areas. I consider, however, that more reflection on unexpected 
outcomes and existing risks could limit the re-instigation of tensions. It should be discussed 
openly that different visions of the past would arise in gatherings from different parts of society 
and ethnic backgrounds. 
5.1.5. Sensitising the Whole Population through Radio Broadcasts 
In both Rwanda and Burundi, NGOs working on TJ developed all sorts of instruments for mass 
sensitisation: broadcast of documentaries, radio and TV debates, theatre shows and radio 
soaps, newspaper articles, street boards, calendars, card games, graphic novels and flyers. 
These channels were used to inform the population about adopted policies and the progress of 
the TJ process, to teach them about TJ concepts and encourage ‘mutual understanding’. In 
contrast with the previous examples, these activities addressed a wider audience and entailed 
limited interaction between message conveyer and receiver. In Rwanda and Burundi, most 
private media are dependent on international funding and received important support for 
programmes related to peacebuilding and TJ matters; in order to transform the role of media 
from channels of hate messages to channels “in the service of peace” (Frère 2009). 
In Burundi, radio programmes addressing matters related to TJ were broadcast weekly by a 
consortium of the main radio channels and printed press under the umbrella of one INGO and 
financially supported by international donors. They defined a new storyline every week, which 
focused on one particular TJ concept (buzzword) or linked several of them together.55 Each 
                                                 
55 For instance, programmes have debated the following topics in the past months (end of 2013 to early 2014): 
should the TJ process be depoliticised?; economic crimes committed during conflicts; the TRC draft law; debates 
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programme praised the discourse of the TJ toolkit approach through an evaluation of the pros 
and cons of mechanisms, interviews with the population about their views, or debates between 
local authorities and their populations. These media activities projected an image of TJ 
concepts and mechanisms supporting each other, rather than being competitive or concurrent 
(e.g., Leebaw 2008; Clark 2008 ‒ see also chapter 2 and next section). As a result, there was 
limited attention to identifying forthcoming political and social challenges of the 
implementation of the TRC, and hence no reflection on how to approach and mitigate these 
challenges. 
The situation was different in Rwanda, where the media was held officially responsible for 
encouraging killings during the 1994 genocide. The government therefore restricted the 
creation of local radio outlets. Nonetheless, the media campaign on gacaca was an important 
step to get the population involved. Many different materials were developed and circulated 
for this purpose. An evaluation of the gacaca media campaign affirms that the best assimilated 
materials were jingles (Babalola et al. 2003). This meant that people’s understanding and 
participation in the process was based on a message of a few seconds that encouraged them to 
go to gacaca courts and tell the truth. This also indicates that difficult messages are more 
challenging to disseminate en masse. 
There has undeniably been important improvement to the level of professionalism in the media 
in Rwanda and Burundi (Frère 2009). For example, newly constituted media in Burundi have 
paid important attention to ethnic balance within their staff. There have also been noticeable 
attempts to integrate various political views. In the long run, a key question remains neglected: 
to what extent can the media contribute to the TJ process? Rules of journalism are limited in 
relation to the goals of TJ. First, short and simple messages are used to address complex 
legacies of conflict. Second, the media has the capacity only to disseminate messages. Even 
though the process to put sensitisation programme varies from one organisation to another, I 
observed that there is too often limited attention paid to what messages shall be transmitted or 
what should follow their dissemination. Most materials promote a neutral and ambitious 
speech by referring to automatic relationships between truth telling, reconciliation and trauma-
                                                 
with population and MPs about the TRC; ‘vetting’; the disappearance of evidence; resort to international 
jurisdictions; women’s roles in the TRC process; TRC discourses and promises; impacts of lies in the process of 
dealing with the past; why don’t we teach about the past?; crimes of sexual violence in the past; testify or flee, 
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healing ‒ the same discourse, that is, as is held by the TJ toolkit approach. Ultimately, media 
releases and distribution of vulgarisation tools are not followed up by any other activity ‒ there 
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5.2. Analysing the Professionalised Dissemination of TJ Buzzwords 
This scrutiny of TJ practice illustrates that, despite implementing agencies describing their 
activities in a very similar way, the impacts of each project depend on each individual involved 
and the local contexts. On the one hand, TJ practices follow a bureaucratic pattern responding 
to funding requirements. In policy documents, a description of both training and sensitisation 
refers to technical activities for capacity-building, empowering the population and enhancing 
social change to deal with a violent past. The professionalisation of TJ practice further 
advocates a universal lexicon against which each activity is justified, as embodied in the TJ 
toolkit approach. On the other hand, empirical analysis identifies a number of unexpected 
outcomes that are left untackled. I argue that TJ practice is anything but universal and 
apolitical. Consequently, this technical facade silences, or fails to address, the effects of 
institutionalised practices and a universal lexicon full of buzzwords. This is a result of 
bureaucratic funding requirements and a quest for political legitimacy, each of which will be 
analysed in turn. 
5.2.1. TJ Activity Toolkit Following Bureaucratic Requirements 
As discussed in chapter 2, a number of contemporary authors have tackled the TJ toolkit 
approach and the risks associated with it. This literature discusses the production of a 
normalised and globalised approach to TJ in which international experts operate as engineers 
“to rebuild the ‘broken society’” by employing the TJ toolkit composed of a set of mechanisms 
and associated claims (e.g., Shaw, Waldorf, and Hazan 2010; Hinton et al. 2010). This chapter 
furthers such an analysis by describing the way in which TJ practitioners implement 
ideologically and pragmatically the toolkit approach. There is indeed a number of TJ service 
providers that prepare and support the official implementation of ‘official’ TJ mechanisms. 
All observed implementing agencies trained practitioners to build their capacities and 
sensitised the population to encourage their empowerment. These two types of activity fulfil 
with ease the basic bureaucratic requirements for funding, such as organising the programme 
in a logical framework (Giovalucchi and Olivier de Sardan 2009) and claiming to provide 
technical, apolitical support. 
A logical framework involved aligning a set of logical relations between hierarchical 
objectives, means to achieve them, external essential conditions, indicators and expected 
results. At the end of a project, NGO management staff can evaluate efforts thanks to mainly 
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numerical indicators of the project’s results (broadcast rating of radio programme, percentage 
of people who better understood TJ concepts after sensitisation, number of people trained, and 
so on). For training and sensitisation, staff need to report the number of participants, the 
number of programmes broadcasted, and statistics about participants’ ratings of satisfaction. 
For this reason, all workshops are concluded by the distribution of evaluation sheets, with 
multiple choice and open sections for comments. These comments often involve requests for 
more training, or even complaints about per diems. 
In one observed workshop, a few participants complained on the evaluation sheets that there 
was not enough meat in the lunch buffet; others wanted the per diem to be given on the first 
day of the training (rather than at the end). These examples show how some participants 
perceived these activities as a commodity and source of additional income. More importantly, 
they underline frictions between the trainers’ practices and the claims of workshops and 
sensitisation campaigns. We are reminded that aid practice does not sufficiently question the 
quality of the contributions nor the effects of the activities on the social fabric in the long run.  
Looking into the vices and virtues of INGO capacity-building, Rick James (2010, 15) 
considers “the content of capacity development reflects donor priorities, particularly in their 
changing context of ‘results-based management’ and ‘risk assessment’.” James considers that 
aid actors “appear caught in a relentless spiral of activity, forever too busy to stop and think 
about their own future capacity needs and to plan accordingly” (ibid., 20). Indeed, NGOs are 
constrained by aid dependency ‒ donors are in demand to pay out budgets while dealing with 
issues that involve slow and complex transformation processes. At the same time, concerns 
for credibility perpetuate aid-dependent organisations to maintain a status quo rather than to 
publicly acknowledge the limit of their work. Underlining the limits of capacity-building 
initiatives, Deborah Eade (2010, 205) notes: 
After all, no NGO could admit to funding one-off training workshops whose impact may be short-
lived, or that risk serving mainly as social events for the same old bunch of tired aid junkies. ... 
adopting a narrow view of capacity-building as in-service or vocational training is just as unhelpful 
as using it as a catch-all to mean everything and nothing. 
This literature on aid practice indicates that bureaucratic approaches to capacity-building are 
not only specific in TJ projects. Due to accountability towards donors and to concerns of 
credibility, the limited impacts of activities centred around training and sensitisation are not 
given sufficient attention. Further, aid actors do not acknowledge the distortion of conveyed 
‘universal messages’, as analysed in the following section. 
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5.2.2. Universal TJ Lexicon: Who Cares about the Message as it is Universal? 
‘Right to truth’, ‘reconciliation’, ‘justice’, ‘reparation’, ‘pardon’, ‘trauma-healing’, 
‘commemoration’ and ‘gender-sensitive’ are all terms that were repeated like buzzwords in 
the TJ activities observed. These buzzwords were articulated through the activities described 
in the chapter, in variations such as the following: ‘Truth and justice will enhance 
reconciliation among the population as it will contribute to victims’ feeling of reparation and 
heal their trauma; perpetrators will confess, beg pardon, and eventually be punished and then 
reintegrated.’ This is embedded in the TJ toolkit discourse, promoted by the UN and INGO.  
In a workshop, an NGO staff member stated, “Whereas the UN had principles on which it 
cannot compromise, we will have a flawed solution in Burundi.” Similar remarks were 
frequently circulated despite every person having his or her own understanding of ‘truth’ and 
‘justice’, as well as preferences according to experiences of violence. The above-mentioned 
quote gives the illusion of universal principles while ignoring complex and varied facets of TJ. 
Even some of the key promoters of these principles, such as Louis Joinet, acknowledge that 
there are no international legal standards relating to transitional justice stricto sensu: 
“Standards and principles that TJ should respect do not exist stricto sensu, or at least, not yet. 
The concept of TJ is too recent for to be part of a normative approach. It must maintain its full 
potential creativity” (Joinet 2007, author's translation).  
The United Nations (2010, 3) itself considers that  
The normative foundation for the work of the UN in advancing transitional justice is the Charter 
of the United Nations, along with four of the pillars of the modern international legal system: 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and 
international refugee law.  
This should be translated into practice with the United Nations promoting standards and best 
practices in “assisting in the design and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms, 
providing technical, material and financial support, and promoting the inclusion of human 
rights and transitional justice considerations in peace agreements” (Opcit). 
Similarly, Subotic (2009b, 262) observes  
over the past 20 years, a global norm of international justice has emerged prescribing the 
appropriate way for states to deal with crimes of the past. This international norm presents a set of 
expectations for transitional governments to fulfill when facing a state’s criminal history. Crudely, 
it can be reduced to the statement that gross human rights abuses, such as war crimes, crimes against 
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Yet, she (Ibid., 263) considers not enough attention “has been given to the question of how 
exactly states go about complying with international justice requirements, and to what 
domestic political effect.” Through such exploration, she “challenges optimistic accounts that 
predict increasing social support for human rights norms – such as those of international justice 
– as international actors make lasting coalitions with domestic allies and pressure governments 
to change their policies.” She argues that such compliance instead produces “unexpected and 
contradictory political effects.”  
On the one hand, these different authors illustrate that there are ongoing efforts to consolidate 
international standards and legal norms specifically in relations to TJ; that existing norms in 
relation to other but related matters, i.e., human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, are 
already applicable. However, they leave many areas uncovered as they do not fully embracing 
the various aims and mechanisms promoted by the TJ global agenda. On the other hand, Cryer 
et. al. (2014, 531) argue that “While international priorities are shifting in favour of justice 
and accountability, it would be an oversimplification to assume that international criminal law 
has simply superseded immunities law.” Similar argumentation can be expended for TJ norms 
beyond immunity and amnesties. Depending on normative framework from other fields, TJ 
policy frameworks still need to be crafted for each different context of implementation.   
Coming back to Cornwall’s (2007, 473-474) concepts of aid buzzwords in which ambiguity is 
essential for the buzzwords to be endorsed by a diverse audience, all TJ concepts “can float 
free of concrete referents, to be filled with meaning by their users”. My empirical data 
describes how TJ buzzwords in line with the TJ toolkit approach are circulated through 
different channels to various audiences. The description of the initiatives above indicates 
constant reinterpretation of the message’s content. This phenomenon follows Levitt and 
Merry’s (2009, 446) process of ‘vernacularisation’, which they describe as varying according 
to a number of factors such as:  
where its communicators are located in the social and power hierarchy and their institutional 
positions, the characteristics of the channels through which ideas and practices flow, the nature of 
the ideas and the idea packages in which they are embedded. 
Tracing the ‘vernacularisation process’ of the TJ universal lexicon has also underlined various 
appropriations by both message conveyers and recipients. Through the activities I observed, 
institutions and individuals that implement these training and sensitisation projects have 
introduced (consciously or not) social and political dimensions to the promoted technical 
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speech on several occasions. These political and social positions become tangible through, for 
example, the selection of examples to illustrate concepts, references to the political context, 
and suggested interpretation of concepts. The example of gacaca training showed how 
technical discussions on the definition of genocide crimes involved disputes about political 
interpretation of the conflict. At a training session in Burundi, one trainer suggested that a 
specific political actor should be brought to justice while she was introducing the 
complementarity between memory and history for reconciliation – which reveals her political 
position against that political actor rather than illustrates her argumentation about memory and 
reconciliation. Other trainers declared their positions in the conflict by explaining their own 
suffering in relation to a particular crisis. These interpretations will inevitably influence the 
process of assimilation by the audience. 
Indeed, targeted audiences accept and interpret the messages in their own way. Research on 
gacaca has demonstrated how the population implemented procedures in their own ways 
(Rettig 2011; Ingelaere 2004; Burnet 2014) despite strictly-defined legal models and 
sensitisation campaigns. In Burundi, various positions emanated in workshop discussions on 
TJ initiatives. Some participants fully absorbed the TJ universal message, as this participant’s 
comment illustrates: “Truth heals, I believe so ... If there is no reconciliation, there will be no 
truth, victims will not have the feeling of reparation, they will not feel acknowledged” 
(author’s translation of field notes, 2014). Others were more critical and sceptical. 
On several occasions, I observed participants asking critical questions about the theme 
presented. For instance, one participant asked the trainer why this reconciliation initiative 
would be different if every previous attempt proved it did not work (violence occurred again). 
Instead of addressing difficulties and offering strategies to overcome them, the trainer 
explained that some NGOs have great results in terms of reconciliation, and “all parties should 
now be able to get along, as they suffered the same way” (author’s translation of field notes, 
2013). In all events observed, there was no exploration of the real risks at stake. Trainers 
systematically found arguments to deny the complexity and encouraged people to believe in 
truth, justice and reconciliation. 
As discussed in chapter 2, extensive research on TJ demonstrates that discussing truth and 
justice implies accepting the existence of competing views (e.g. Laplante 2007; Leebaw 2008; 
L. Fletcher and Weinstein 2002; Hamber and Wilson 2002). These authors underline that 
several aims promoted by the toolkit approach are irreconcilable rather than complementary 
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(for example, arguing about different representations of the past does not lead to reconciliation, 
commemoration does not necessarily lead to accountability, and truth-telling does not 
systematically result in healing – see chapter 2). By extension, this implies that individuals 
perceive and remember events according to their own experience and their kinship with the 
people involved. Power relationships and local contexts have an important influence on who 
defines what truth will ‘shine out’,56 who will be commemorated, and who will face justice. 
Failing to acknowledge these power dynamics can trigger conflicts and create all sorts of 
negative feelings (non-recognition, vengeance, repression, insecurity, revival of political and 
ethnic tensions, and stigmatisation of victims). The appropriation of circulated messages 
depends on the way individuals and communities react to messengers and their speech, as well 
as their own experiences and environment. 
Concerns related to the universalisation of the TJ lexicon are not new (Naftali 2010; Lefranc 
and Mouralis 2014; Subotić 2012). Framing TJ as a set of clearly defined international 
standards is a useful claim for TJ practitioners to legitimise their interventions, but it entails 
several risks. First, it deals only with a certain past dependent on the buzzwords used and 
interpretations given within each context. This leaves other relevant issues outside of the 
discussions (for example, return of refugees and internally displaced people or land issues). 
False expectations are created for beneficiaries, particularly due to the massive media 
campaigns undertaken in Burundi and Rwanda. 
More importantly, these training and sensitisation efforts create the illusion of apolitical and 
technical activities while potentially instigating tensions by silencing or ignoring different 
views – held by the message-conveyer – or openly rejecting the claims of the TJ toolkit 
approach. Current training and sensitisation practices are indeed taking place within contexts 
of power inequalities and suffering; however, no attention is given to socio-political 
dimensions of vernacularisation, nor to the definition of local expertise. From a technocratic 
approach supporting universal rights to truth and justice, there is no reason to do so. I argue 
that initiatives tackling these complexities should integrate these dynamics into their 
approaches for more plausible contributions towards beneficiaries. Without giving this 
                                                 
56 A translation of the phrase “faire éclater la vérité” in French that is frequently used in Burundi by TJ 
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sufficient attention, efforts are concentrated around virtual and performative technical 
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5.3. Experimenting with ‘Critical Training’: Bujumbura Transitional 
Justice Summer School 
In line with the difficulties of civil society organisations in pushing the TJ process forward in 
Burundi, another scholar57 and I set up a summer course using academic methodologies to 
exchange with TJ practitioners based in Bujumbura. Through frequent encounters in the small 
TJ sphere in Burundi, we observed a similar understanding of the TJ stagnation in Burundi. 58 
In line with the analysis described in the previous sections, I considered that practitioners 
should be encouraged to think outside of the box, to look at their contributions with a critical 
distance to better grasp the underlying stakes behind their technocratic contributions. 
During the last part of my doctoral fieldwork (July to October 2014), we organised joint 
sessions to strengthen the practitioners’ analytical capacity and knowledge about the TJ 
literature in the hope of encouraging practitioners based in Burundi to be more critical and 
creative. It enabled us to challenge traditional training patterns, and also to identify a number 
of limits related to academia’s contribution to practice and the concept of capacity-
development. The project was created spontaneously with available means (versus a project 
with heavy management constraints), focusing on long-term and qualitative training (versus 
mass and quick training), putting the emphasis on capacity incentives (versus material 
incentives through per diem), self-reflection through reading and discussions (versus long 
expert presentations). We put together a 52-hour course split into 13 sessions. Over a period 
of four months, these workshops addressed topics defined jointly with participants.  
We used an academic and participative approach, offering reading from a week in advance for 
later discussions in half-day sessions. In each session, we addressed from three to four texts 
from different authors. We sent a list of questions in advance to encourage critical reading. In 
order to favour conceptual discussions, the four hour session were structured, first on 
theoretical discussions on the text; second on comparison and relevance for the Burundian 
                                                 
57 Salif Nimaga (who undertook doctoral research on international criminal courts at the Free University of Berlin 
and who worked in Burundi as an adviser to local civil society on TJ matters in the GIZ programme Civil Service 
for Peace) provided technical and logistical support. Human Security Division Swiss Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs provided financial support. 
 
58  Discussions around TJ process were vague and going around in circles, referring to the Arusha Peace 
Agreements and the National Consultations; most NGOs and civil society representatives have a limited and 
vague understanding of TJ concepts, even if used in their everyday work, which leaves the TJ process abstract. 
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contexts; and lastly we reflected jointly on the message to remember and convey into their 
work. 
The key audience included local staff from INGOs, members of civil society networks working 
on TJ and one Burundian scholar. A similar exercise was also undertaken through two sessions 
with only diplomats who have interest in TJ matters. Through this experience, participants 
received an introduction to debates on TJ definitions, the multiple meanings behind truth-
seeking, justice, reparation and victims, as well as to the political and technical stakes hiding 
behind these neutral concepts. We opted for long-term, participative training in order to 
encourage participants to create their own perspectives. 
Putting the summer school together, I hoped, (1) it wold encourage the participants to move 
away from their understanding of the toolkit approach, (2) provide with a deeper understanding 
of only truth seeking mechanisms looking into several contexts around the world, as well as, 
(3) make them conscious of their role in the process by reading jointly the literature on the 
professionalisation on TJ. However, participants had a preference to have one session 
dedicated to each pillar of TJ. The first part of sessions looked into the history of TJ 
consolidation, to underline how the TJ toolkit approach came about and how truth-seeking 
mechanisms gradually gained importance in these debates. The second part of the sessions 
were dedicated the other pillars: judicial mechanisms, reparation, vetting and institutional 
reforms. 
We observed that their understanding of contemporary debates in relation to TJ were more 
limited than expected. Despite several years of working experiences in relation to TJ, their 
understanding was limited to the list of the four TJ pillars and the associated claims. One of 
the participants, a trainer on TJ, had never heard about the limitations of the South African 
TRC, nor about dissatisfaction in other contexts, despite having following several training 
sessions on TJ. We consequently consider it was important to unpack these concepts with 
them. We aim to present critically the diversity of underlying objectives in relations to each of 
these mechanisms, the variety of sub-instruments, as well as their strengths and limitations. In 
contrast to training sessions observed during my fieldwork (focussing on the complementarity 
of mechanisms), we put a strong emphasis into underlying the contradictory and concurrent 
dimensions of different components of the toolkit approach.  
Through these sessions, we observed that TJ local practitioners had integrated idealistic views 
on the TJ discourse promoted by the UN and INGOs. As a result, they looked for a technical 
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fix to these socio-political matters, and they demonised institutional actors who considered the 
lack of political will as the key obstacle. A number of participants explained the government 
and ruling authorities are responsible for TJ lack of progress in Burundi. There was no 
reflection in relation to other possible obstacles, nor on their role or impact of their intervention 
on the process. They mentioned at numerous occasions information about TJ processes in other 
part of the world with idealistic and decontextualised vision. During the first sessions, they 
seemed to envy the experiences of Rwanda, South Africa, Latin America and Sierra Leone. 
They were not aware that these contexts also faced social and political limitations. They 
believe that TJ aims would all be systematically achieved with the truth coming out. When we 
analysed tensions in between truth and trauma healing, a participant said: “truth will bring 
social reconciliation, this public acknowledgment is a recognised right for victims.”  
Overall, this experience represents much more than an experimental research method. It 
contributed to both participants understanding, an ongoing exchange in between their and my 
perspectives. Leading to the conclusion of this chapter on training and sensitisation sections, 
this four-month training experiences was beneficial for all of us involved, even if not 
necessarily for the reason expected. We encountered difficulties with our critical approach to 
training, in meeting their expectations (for example, by not giving clear guidance on what 
should be done), and in encouraging them to get detached from their idealised information 
about foreign processes from previous training and sensitisation campaigns.  
Another key obstacle was to find appropriate texts in French, as TJ literature is more advance 
and rich in English in terms of critical, conceptual and empirical levels. At the beginning, we 
had prepared both texts in English with list of vocabulary and in French for each session, but 
it was not understood sufficiently. These sessions required long hours of preparations for a 
small group of people (from 5 to 12 participants a week) and decreasing preparation from their 
part. It was not just about selecting texts and sharing them. For some sessions, the preparation 
required reading around ten authors to find the most pertinent and most adequate texts for 
participants, select text extracts in English, re-read selected texts to formulate questions that 
they should raise throughout their reading, and read again texts the day before the sessions to 
chair the discussions. 
While I engaged with my research participants in the hope of encouraging a more critical 
approach to the global TJ discourse, I not only faced resistance among participants to 
criticising TJ, I also observed in more depth that most TJ practitioners had a limited vision of 
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the challenges in the implementation of TJ. Local TJ practitioners held very high expectations 
of the official process, and demonised authorities, as the only factor blocking TJ progress. On 
the basis of what they learnt from the toolkit approach, they granted prodigious benefits to 
truth-seeking, accountability and justice, and ignored the complexity of these concepts and 
associated mechanisms. At the same time, they avoided battles over the past, when 
confrontations over different perceptions of the previous conflicts occurred, ignoring how 
these battles over the past were affected by their experience of violence and political positions. 
Our main success was to see a widening-up of their understanding of TJ in terms of competing 
dimensions behind its key concepts, and the chronological sequences of any TJ process (longer 
than suggested by the technocratic approach). By the end, participants integrated the view that 
there was no easy solution, that the UN did not have any magic mechanism, and in other words 
that the potential implementation of the TRC would not solve all the issues related to the 
consequences of violence. 
While discussing learning points in the final session, participants considered more sensitisation 
and training should be undertaken to share their ‘new knowledge’ and moderate expectations 
of the population. Participants, accustomed to institutionalised patterns widely promoted by 
aid actors, considered training and sensitisation as empowering actions. This concrete 
interaction with the research participants raises important questions with regard to a bridge 
between academia and practice: is it a necessary link, how can it be better achieved, and do 
local actors have to be familiar with the intricacies of the TJ literature? The only certainty is 
that knowledge transfer is a long process that depends on the nature of the interaction between 
conveyers and participants; and it will inevitably have unexpected effects. 
Conclusion 
The bureaucratic TJ toolkit approach has resulted in the widespread delivery of conferences at 
high policy levels, short-term training, and media sensitisation by aid actors in many contexts. 
In addition to describing the production of TJ tools, this chapter has addressed how 
‘empowerment’ and ‘capacity-building’ were implemented. Within a technocratic aid 
environment, buzzwords are useful concepts in the same as way training and sensitisation are 
easily delivered projects. This chapter has described different consequences within each 
context. A short training programme that transfers judicial power is a cause for more serious 
concern than a radio jingle encouraging people to reconcile. In this sense, the lack of follow-
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up of the closure of the gacaca courts by most previous donors and supporters raises serious 
concerns about the process. On a different scale, pretensions to technical and universal support 
in Burundi have created an idealised vision of TJ mechanisms that will need to be dealt with 
in the unfolding of the process. 
This chapter has focused on the implementation of TJ preparation and intermediary phases of 
official processes. It has illustrated how practice can be disconnected from its policy promises. 
It is not ground-breaking to discover that one-off short training and mass sensitisation have 
little capacity to empower the population to overcome the dilemmas and concurrent wills of 
revenge versus reconciliation, justice versus impunity, silencing versus truth-seeking, and 
status-quo versus reparation. In addition to these well-established limits, the description of 
micro-social negotiations over how to deal with the past brings attention to the important, and 
often unbalanced, power relationship between message-conveyers and recipients. 
In every context, technical approaches tend to silence these micro-dynamics in play. As an 
instigator of the ethnographic analysis of expertise in development practices, Norman Long 
(1992, 275) points out the paradoxical aspect between empowerment and knowledge transfer 
projects:  
it capsize(s) the simple notion that social processes follow straightforward systematic patterns and 
can thus be manipulated with an injection of power from outside. The issues of conflicting loyalties, 
of negotiation over ‘truth’ claims, of battles over ... contesting interests ... bring us back to our ... 
concern for the analysis of the interweaving and interlocking of life-worlds and actor projects. 
These power-relations should be addressed even more seriously when dealing with the 
sensitiveness of post-conflict contexts. According to Tshepo Madlingozi (2010, 213), the 
relationship between TJ experts and victims “reproduces relations of inferiority and 
superiority. In this encounter, the one is the victim and the other is the saviour. Politics of 
disempowerment and trusteeship ... are reproduced.” It is then even more relevant to question 
for whose sake all these efforts are being undertaken. 
In both countries, the international community has been encouraging TJ processes to answer 
moral obligations with respect to the most serious crimes. In the case of Rwanda, the 
international community has expressed guilt for not reacting to the 1994 genocide ‒ this has 
often resulted in support for the gacaca process despite the gacaca model offering limited legal 
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guarantees (Jamar 2012).59 Today, previous supporters are reluctant to take into account and 
act on problems raised by monitoring agencies. Several of the interviewed donor 
representatives considered that the Rwandan genocide was so morally reprehensible that any 
attempt to deal with its consequences should be praised (interviews with donor representatives, 
2012, 2013 and 2014). 
In Burundi, a similar group of actors from the international community set a preference for 
international standards. At first sight, this seems contradictory. However, these policies and 
speeches are developed according to political, diplomatic and moral dimensions between the 
international community and domestic authorities. The international community has limited 
effect once the policy is being implemented. In practice, international aid gave technical 
support to these NGOs to deliver similar activities to engage with the population, with limited 
attention given to the dynamics and the concrete implementation taking place. TJ policy 
documents have increasingly made claims for victim- and people-centred efforts. The structure 
of TJ implementation outlined in this chapter, however, demonstrates that the practice on the 
ground still adopts a top-down technical approach in spite of the described intention, and it is 
far from a genuinely locally-driven process. 
 
  
                                                 
59 To answer to these initial concerns, the preamble of 2004 gacaca organic law refers to international and national 
legislation, giving the illusion of providing safeguards for a fair trial as indicated in the Rwandan constitution, 
penal code, penal procedural code, and international conventions with regard to human rights. 
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Chapter 6: Mass Production of Reports: Experts’ Input or 
Backstage Battlefield over Representation?  
Introduction 
Starting a career as a junior researcher in INGOs, my roles were all related to research projects 
and report production on TJ matters in Burundi and Rwanda. Three of the projects I worked 
on entailed of the physical piling-up (or electronic filing-up) of observation and activity reports 
for several months or years. My role was to summarise thousands of pages of these field reports 
to produce an internal report or publication for public consumption. These experiences of 
writing reports were my incentive to look further into policy-orientated research processes and 
methods. Despite the small number of organisations involved, I gathered more than 100 policy-
orientated reports related to the two policies ‒ the implementation of the gacaca process and 
the negotiations over TJ in Burundi (all written from 1998 to 2014).  
The analyses I became involved in always took place within very short periods, with the most 
extreme example being a request to analyse over 200 qualitative interviews in two weeks. 
These dense sets of data often presented contradictory information. I had insufficient time 
either to undertake in-depth analysis to identify the roots of problems, or to look into existing 
literature beyond the empirical data made available, and I was certainly not expected to do so. 
Also, through the revision of report drafts, I had to negotiate with NGO staff on what was 
appropriate to write or not. As explained in the methodological chapter, these experiences were 
difficult. There were many pragmatic and methodological constraints tied to the project time-
frame, political contexts and team dynamics. But challenges were also related to the fact that 
I was not fully aware of the lore and customs of ‘policy-orientated research’, and that my 
legitimacy was limited as a young woman embarking on her career. 
Further reports were frequently mentioned during my fieldwork, including monitoring reports 
about gacaca from Human Rights Watch and the national consultations report in Burundi. 
Building on from my experiences and observation, the current chapter pursues the 
anthropological analysis of TJ practices and applies it to the texts; that is, the reports produced 
about the two TJ policies. Reviewing his participation as a social anthropologist in an 
agricultural project in India, Mosse (2005, 156-7) writes:   
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We consultants were actors like others, but we used our power and networks (into donor or 
academic communities) to authorise our unifying meta-narratives and make them the stories that 
[other] actors must tell themselves about strategy (cf . Latour 1996: 164). The project then 
systematised these models into training manuals and brochures, providing official representations 
of practices that were in fact generated by a hidden operational logic. These were necessary in order 
to put back together the worldview of project staff that was constantly fragmented by the everyday 
contradictions of practice. 
Along the same lines, this chapter addresses this operational logic behind texts and report 
production on the gacaca and TRC negotiations. Presented as scientific tools, reports promote 
approaches and recommendations to deal with these complex post-conflict contexts. But away 
from the public sphere, there are intense negotiation processes over their content and the 
limited (if any) follow-up activities. This chapter scrutinises the processes and institutional 
conflicts underlying the apparent technical work of report production. Whereas reporting 
practices are widespread in ‘Aidland’, limited academic research has questioned their role and 
rationale. The chapter is guided by three main research questions. 1) How is a report’s 
production organised? 2) What are the socio-political dynamics in play that impact on the 
content and dissemination of a report? 3) How is report production relevant for TJ 
implementation?  
From an academic perspective, this chapter aims to highlight the epistemic implications of the 
social processes behind a technical report. At a pragmatic level, the chapter aims to encourage 
reflexivity over report production practices and the role of reports in aid governance. Within 
academic scholarship, some academics forget to take into account the normative framing in 
place in policy-orientated reports. Some researchers have used gacaca monitoring reports as 
their main source of data, without taking into consideration the normative framework of the 
authoring organisation and the politics in play. For example, Ariel Meyerstein (2007) and Phil 
Clark (2010) compare the content of reports produced by human rights watchdog NGOs and 
monitoring NGOs without taking into account their mandates and politics involved in the 
process of producing reports. Nevertheless, the aim of the chapter is not to promote academic 
writing over practice-orientated research. Indeed, academic writing also has many limits and 
inconsistencies. It also involves specific rituals and conventions to gain legitimacy that are 
disconnected from the purpose and the quality of the research. On the other hand, policy-
orientated reports include vast valuable data useful for undertaking the contexts of 
implementation and hence improve policy intervention. 
This chapter describes the social processes taking place through the routines of report 
production. The first section explains how texts and reports can be researched as social objects. 
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The second section provides a general overview of the reports gathered by describing their 
spectrum and general similitudes and differences. The last two sections look closely at two 
prominent research programmes: the gacaca monitoring in Rwanda and the national 
consultations in Burundi. These two projects resulted from collaboration between the national 
government, international community and civil society. The analysis of these two prominent 
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6.1. Texts and Reports as Social Objects  
Throughout my fieldwork, I gathered a number of anecdotes that encouraged me to look 
further into reports as social objects, as they have a social life through both their production 
and dissemination. I remember when a diplomat in Kigali had gone to the archives of his 
embassy to bring me some of the dozen monitoring reports funded by his government, but 
could find only one, and could not get hold of any others. Similarly, a representative of the 
National Commission for Human Rights in Rwanda could not find any of the Gacaca 
monitoring reports his institution had produced. The implication is that these reports can have 
limited long-term use and value, gradually fading with time to a point at which they cannot be 
found in archives. 
Other political dynamics were also often in play. For example, I was informed that the 
technical committee formed in 2011 and in charge of writing the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) draft law in Burundi had received a significant number of reports 
providing recommendations from various local and international organisations. I was told 
informally that the committee did not read the recommendations sent from the organisations 
whose called for the dissolution of the same committee. Indeed a number of NGOs considered 
that the creation of such a committee did not respect ‘the spirit of the national consultations’ 
as it did not integrate any member of civil society, and asked in a press release for the 
immediate dissolution of the committee only a few days after it was appointed. In return, the 
committee members did not find it relevant to read recommendations written by these 
organisations, which had tried to jeopardise them. This brings attention to the political barriers 
to contributing ‘technical recommendations’ and the underlying political positions of 
authoring and target organisations. 
Karin Barber (2007, 1) describes all texts as the “universal human work of weaving or 
fabricating with word.” Upon such a consideration of texts as social facts, she adds (ibid., 4): 
Texts are commentaries upon, and interpretations of, social facts. They are part of social reality but 
they also take up an attitude to social reality. They may criticise social forms or confirm and 
consolidate them: in both cases, they are reflexive. They are part of the apparatus by which human 
communities take stock of their own creations.  
At the early stage of the field of development studies, Apthorpe (1996) called for more 
discourse analysis of development policies. He encouraged giving more attention to social 
processes in framing, naming, numbering and coding the intervening context and intervention, 
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as they constitute important practices in development work. Since then, there has been 
extensive research looking into the production of policy papers, including in Rwanda and 
Burundi (Marriage 2006; Debusscher and Ansoms 2013; Debusscher and van der Vleuten 
2012; Holvoet and Rombouts 2008; Rubli 2013; Vervisch 2011). 
These pieces of research clearly identify the challenges in attempting to write the best technical 
recipes for complex social problems without taking into account problems related to the long-
term and structural dimensions of social transformation. For example, Petra Debusshcre and 
An Ansoms (2013) analyse the implementation of gender-equality policies in Rwanda. Their 
research concludes that in spite of strong political will, target-driven policies offer limited 
transformative potential by neglecting local economic realities (the ‘invisible labour’ of 
women, that is) and the lack of grassroots participation. 
From the perspective of the ethnography of aid, my analysis of policy-orientated reports looks 
at a working practice that is prior to (and entangled in) policy formulation. Policy reports 
resulting from the writing and reporting exercises are undertaken to find a technical solution, 
whether being commissioned or to be used in lobbying activities (in contrast with policy 
documents that are prescribing directly the implementation of a policy). These reports are 
addressed to those who will create the policy, in order to influence them. This intermediary 
stage has received limited attention.  
Among the few exceptions, Harper (2000) undertook an ethnographic analysis of IMF 
reporting processes, establishing the social processes through which technical and numerical 
data are gathered. He observes (ibid., 24) the crucial role of social rituals in the data-gathering 
process that concede the technical value of reports (such as getting numbers and associated 
interpretations ‘signed off’ by the right person or the agreeing process between the mission 
and the authorities through ritualised orations). Anthony Good (2012) also looks into policy-
orientated reports by comparing the different genres of reports, such as those for 
anthropological academic journals, natural science journals, NGO reports and country reports 
for asylum seekers. Through his exploration of these genres, he observes that structures, 
argumentation rules, as well as concerns and proof of credibility are particular for each 
professional sphere.  
Through a comparison of policy-orientated and academic research, Olivier de Sardan (2011) 
denounces how the development industry has mobilised most academic bodies in Africa 
through their extensive involvement in consultancies. He underpins the weaknesses of these 
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policy-orientated research projects, arguing that consultancies are operating under managerial 
constraints, with terms of references often incompatible with research principles, limited 
qualitative rigour and ‘venalisation’ effects (referring to financial incentives that academia 
cannot beat). All these anthropological reviews of reports have informed my analytical 
framework and the spectrum of reports presented in the following section. 
Further, the analyses of human rights reporting and consequent lobbying activities were useful 
when looking into the reports I collected (Dudai 2006; Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005; 
Meernik et al. 2012 ‒ discussed in more detail below). For example, developed by Amnesty 
International, ‘naming and shaming’ strategies involve research and documentation of human 
rights violations. On such monitoring, reports are disseminated around the world to shame the 
regime under which these violations are taking place and consequently prompt a reaction from 
the abusive regime. Today, such lobbying strategies are adopted (and adapted) by many 
watchdog and human rights organisations, including the organisations involved in my 
research. Reports produced within this normative framework are addressed to high-level 
political actors who are believed to have power to put pressure on nations or organisations 
violating human rights.  
Engaging with Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) work on ‘information politics’, several authors have 
looked into the reporting work of international human rights NGOs. Specifically, these pieces 
of research focused on the information-gathering process as well as the symbolism and politics 
in leverage practices: global and local dynamics resulting from human rights NGOs’ reporting 
and lobbying work (e.g., Gready 2004); politics in agenda definition and selection of countries 
and matters to be addressed (e.g., Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005); stylistic and content 
analysis – argumentations based on international human rights instruments rather than moral 
judgments and use of footnotes (Dudai 2006). Building on this literature analysing reports and 
reporting practices, I pursue two objectives throughout the chapter: 1) By unpacking the 
pretended scientific nature of reports, to reveal their production and dissemination rituals; 2) 
To argue that reports are not just end-products but objects with rich social lives through their 
production, use and dissemination. 
  
Section 6.2
The Spectrum of Policy-Orientated
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6.2. The Spectrum of Policy-Orientated Reports: A Hundred Reports 
Covering Two Policies 
Through my previous working experiences and fieldwork, I gathered more than 100 reports 
related to the two policies researched in the thesis. I gathered them by going to launch events 
and conferences, visiting authoring institutions and searching on the Internet. A number of 
other researchers shared the reports they had collected. During fieldwork interviews, I 
systematically asked for copies of documents mentioned in the discussion. I first considered 
addressing the production of only published reports, but realised this would leave out many 
internal reports and working papers used for lobbying and presented in conferences for 
practitioners.60  
The list of reports (see appendix) that I collected is not considered to be exhaustive. Many of 
these reports are not meant for wider dissemination, and produced by institutions without good 
websites (local NGOs and national public institutions in particular), their reports are difficult 
to identify and locate. For instance, I visited the donor and authoring organisation several times 
in order to receive the last official evaluation report on gacaca without success. I finally 
received it several months later when another expatriate scholar forwarded it to me. In this 
first section, rather than review the content of reports, I describe patterns of reports in terms 
of their format and objectives. I address in turn the different spectrum of reports, the people 
involved in the process, the research methods and dissemination. 
6.2.1. Wide Spectrum of Policy-Orientated Reports 
All policy-orientated reports share one main characteristic: they present data and analysis in 
order to present a specific view and offer a strategy to deal with the identified issues. Such 
reports strive to promote a specific normative framework. They achieve this by stating an 
issue, identifying its causes and finding potential solutions through recommendations. The 
reports are shared with other stakeholders to influence their decisions in policy-making. 
However, the political agendas of authoring organisations encourage them to silence their 
                                                 
60 I excluded short briefs, press releases, minutes of meetings, documents with only empirical data (that is, 
transcriptions of interviews or gacaca sessions used for their reports), activity and funding reports, annual reports, 
policy and legal documents. As mentioned in the chapter introduction, the reason was to focus on research and 
reporting practices for lobbying purposes. 
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normative framework behind ‘scientifically’ researched positions conveyed through a report, 
as I demonstrate below in more detail with regard to the national consultation and gacaca 
monitoring.  
The table below illustrates the wide spectrum of reports gathered. The key differences that 
characterise each report actually overlap, rather than define fixed categories. Through a review 
of the 140 reports collected, I identified the following criteria varying from one report to 
another: authoring organisation, format, writers, method, scope and timing. The spectrum 
shows the combination characterising each report. Each report is elaborated differently 
according to its role assigned by the authoring organisation and financial capacities; it also 
receives different levels of attention internally and externally. The table should be read to 
include possible combinations of multiples characteristics, as some reports are co-authored by 
several institutions, resulting from mixed research methods, and so on.  
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From a material point of view, the presentation of reports also includes several similarities. 
The cover page gives the title, the year of publication, the name of the authoring 
organisation(s) and its logo(s), sometimes with a picture as background, but rarely with the 
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authors’ name (see below). The donor(s) is (are) often thanked in the next pages with their 
logos and a disclaimer of responsibility over the content (even if in reality the donors impact 
on the content, as I elaborate in the analysis of gacaca monitoring reports and the national 
consultation in Burundi). Even though they all aim to influence policy implementation, policy-
orientated reports have various secondary goals that define their scope. These secondary goals 
can be associated with situation analysis, identification of needs, programme evaluations, 
analysis of political contexts and legal frameworks, surveys about perceptions and 
expectations, and, rarely, literature reviews.  
6.2.2. Authorship, Audience and Readership: Who Writes for Whom? 
Different sets of actors are involved at each stage of the report production: the NGO or donor 
member of staff usually deals with logistics, the authors and the audience. A typical case could 
be summarised as follows. Putting together a funding application, a desk officer (the person in 
charge of a regional or thematic set of projects at the head office) decides in discussions with 
his or her team and partners that a report shall be written. She/he later writes the terms of 
reference, hires the consultant and supervises that person. The programme coordinator (the 
person in charge of project implementation in the field, often an expatriate) hires local field 
researcher(s), and she/he collaborates with the expatriate consultant on her/his arrival. The 
field researcher(s) gather(s) the data, supervised either by the programme coordinator or the 
consultant. The consultant analyses the data and produces the first draft. The NGO key 
members of staff (project manager, head of mission, director and desk officer) comment on 
the draft, and they then negotiate the content with the consultant.  
Both the position and the tone of the report are up for negotiation. Decisions over what can be 
written arise from these questions: what analysis can be conducted from the data gathered, 
what political and technical positions can be adopted, and how can they be formulated? Each 
of these steps involves negotiations and decisions among different internal actors (and 
eventually project partners), with decisions not only being technical or scientific but also 
political, and having a strong impact on the report’s content and use ‒ as I elaborate through 
two case studies below.  
It is frequently the institution that is named as the author. Only rarely do policy-orientated 
reports give the names of the specific authoring individuals. Naming the organisation as the 
author creates a sense of objectivity, as the data and analysis are produced in accordance with 
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the mandate of the institutions (versus the personal views of a set of individuals). From a social 
perspective, this brings attention to the process of negotiation among the different actors 
gathering and analysing data. An institutional authorship paradoxically results in the 
appearance of objectivity while obscuring a process of negotiated analysis within a given 
political and social context, entangled in political and economic dependencies. 
The main audience is made up of policy makers on whom the authors want to influence (i.e. 
staff from ministerial offices, directors of local institutions, representatives from donor 
agencies, political officers and ambassadors of embassies, and NGOs’ heads of mission and 
programme coordinators). All these individuals have limited time to read the reports, and are 
continually bombarded by them. They will thus scan reports and rarely read them in depth. 
The general public and academia are also potential secondary audiences. 
6.2.3. Research Methods: How is the Data Gathered? 
Most of these reports are brief or silent about their methodology. When stated, it includes a 
description of the research process such as sites where the research was undertaken, and the 
number and type of people consulted, the general aim of the project, and/or the approach they 
adopted. There is rarely reference to the challenges faced through the process, consequent 
methodological adaptation, the relevance of gathered data, and possible sources of bias. How 
informants were selected, how and where they were consulted and who did the interviews or 
surveys are also elements not systematically addressed. Due to the complexity and sensitivity 
of the Burundian and Rwanda contexts, particularly in relation to TJ matters, it is inevitable 
that challenges appear. Silencing the presence of such challenges raise a number of questions 
of credibility and legitimacy. It is obvious that conventions in policy-orientated research 
designed to gain legitimacy and credibility are different from those in the academic 
environment (which are also limited). However, none of the reports actually addresses 
epistemological questions such as, ‘Why should you believe this?’ 
Through a review of methods employed in refugee research projects, Karen Jacobsen and 
Loren Landau (2003, 186) question to what extent “analysis and conclusions [are] based on 
sound principles of descriptive and causal inference and robust data-collection practices.” As 
Fairlie Chappuis observed alongside myself (Jamar and Chappuis 2016), a declared normative 
mandate can be a disadvantage for organisations openly engaged in advocacy research: 
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The normative prescriptions driving their advocacy, and ultimately their research, also undermine 
their perceived credibility by allowing their work to be criticised, and often marginalised, as 
unscientific and politically motivated. For this reason many such organisations seek to disavow the 
normative motivations underpinning their missions, research and programmes, and instead attempt 
to cling to claims of scientific methodology as a way to bolster their credibility in a chosen area. 
More grave, the declaration of an overarching normative mandate is sometime used as a shield 
behind which weak research is hidden: as if a normative commitment to certain ideals 
predetermined the outcome of the research process to an extent that made the actual research 
process a mere accessory to the argument itself. 
In other words, policy-orientated reports tend to silence key stages of the research and their 
own normative framework using a ‘scientific etiquette’. Indeed, the methodology section also 
often directly claims to be scientific despite many silences about key elements. For instance, 
a gacaca report affirms, “we will try to answer to the question addressed de facto at the end of 
every scientific work: did gacaca [achieve] initially defined aims?” (National University of 
Rwanda/Center for Conflict Management (CMM) 2012, 182). Another report informs “the 
first chapter, presenting adopted methodology to gather Burundian population perceptions on 
the post-conflict, enables [readers] to appreciate the rigorous character of the process.” 
However, both of these examples do not clarify in the methodology section what lies beneath 
claims for scientific rigour. 
Generally, the scientific facade includes other legitimising practices. By hiring a consultant, 
the authoring organisation expects the mess of reality reflected in contradictory data to be 
tidied up. Through my research, it appeared several times that the word ‘scientific’ was used 
to hide problems with credibility. In an interview, a donor representative explained that they 
supported a particular project because it relied on scientific methodology, even though their 
activities based on Western ideas of trauma and reconciliation were not culturally appropriate 
for Burundi (Interview with donor representative, Bujumbura, Burundi, October 2013). The 
interviewee expressed private doubts about how appropriate the programme under discussion 
was, even though it was receiving good comments on the reports from well-known foreign 
researchers. This example shows that putting together pleasing reports gives the opportunity 
to the funded organisation to hide a problematic practice, and consequently limits critical 
evaluation by the audience, since the produced analysis is deemed ‘scientific’. 
Jacobson and Landau’s analysis is a reminder that methodological flaws are not peculiar to 
NGO research by also looking into limited methodologies of academic projects. Weaker 
methodologies are more common, however, and conventionally accepted in policy-orientated 
research. Both academic and policy research can lack rigour, because of the “strong tendency 
towards what Myron Weiner used to call ‘advocacy research’, where researchers or 
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organisations already know what they want to see and say, and come away from the research 
having ‘proved’ it” (Jacobsen and Landau 2003). The target audience ‒ that is, policy makers, 
practitioners or diplomats ‒ need documents that get straight to the point, and they are not 
necessarily cautious about methods. Further, authoring organisations do not aim to engage in 
debates, their core objective being rather to have their recommendations taken into account. 
6.2.4. The Report’s Life: How is Research Disseminated? 
Once edited and/or printed, reports are used as public relations instruments to represent and 
promote the view of the authoring organisation. At a pragmatic level, they are key instruments 
for lobbying and political dialogue, as addressed in previous chapters. After production, 
dissemination is another key step that starts the (short) life of a report and that gives it 
legitimacy and credibility. The main end result is therefore the dissemination at formal and 
informal levels. Formally, published reports are given out at launch conferences, and then 
distributed in emails and made available online. The workshops and conferences provide a 
social environment for the first step of the ‘social life’ of a report. Report launches often take 
place in ceremonial settings inviting all the partners and potential audience.  
The organisations with the best financial capacities will be able to give a better life to their 
reports by hiring the best hotel, organising a workshop to present and discuss the content with 
the targeted audience and offering attractive per diems and food to participants. Some will 
organise events in Burundi, in Rwanda, as well as in northern countries for the donor 
community. That said, I attended a number of low-key events of NGOs launching their gacaca 
reports quietly, in a bid to avoid strong reaction from authorities. 
At an informal level, some members of staff will be in charge of repeating the reports’ contents 
in both domestic and international political spheres through political dialogue (see chapter 4). 
Nonetheless, financial capacities are not the only criteria; sensitive data will also be purposely 
disseminated more discretely in difficult contexts. 
Looking into peacebuilding practices, Denskus (2014) addresses the performativity in peace-
building workshops and conferences. He (ibid., 25) states that peacebuilding workshops:  
often display intangible products, for example, ideas, knowledge and ultimately the vision of a 
better, peaceful society that will be embedded in the liberal market model of Western societies. 
Professionals may offer their services, knowledge, gossip and information in hotels and workshops 
and engage in an ongoing ritual negotiation of expert status, acceptable knowledge or unthreatening 
policy recommendations. … The rituals of travel, physical attendance of events, expectations of 
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results (e.g., a conference report) or conduct (experts staying in certain hotels for only a couple of 
days) often create economic activities, status and legitimacy as well as a new form of pilgrimage.  
His analysis reflects similarities with the dissemination of TJ reports: important efforts are put 
into formal presentation, organisation of the launch, into attracting the best and most 
appropriate policy makers, and conveying clear and simple messages with ‘unthreatening 
policy recommendations’. All these performative acts of professionalism and scientific 
etiquette are designed to gain legitimacy and thus promote a political agenda. 
High-level political actors (such as representatives of authorities, diplomats, heads of mission 
in NGOs and aid agencies) continually receive lobbying reports from all sorts of institutions. 
Most of them do not have sufficient time to read them in detail. At best, their introduction, 
conclusion and recommendations are read in more depth. At worst, they are piled up with other 
reports in shelves or drawers. What is therefore important is the social interaction that is taking 
place around the report, the networking through which quick and easy messages for very 
complex issues are conveyed. Professional and well-designed reports remain important 
commodities to produce credibility and enact lobbying. 
Both donors and authoring organisations have limited opportunities (if any) to follow-up on 
bureaucratically finished projects and reports. There is too rarely a strategy beyond formal 
presentation of research outcome, material dissemination and lobbying activities. Among the 
100 reports listed in the appendix, two sets of initiatives were prominent in the two contexts 
of analysis. The large-scale monitoring of gacaca courts in Rwanda involved several 
institutions over a decade, and the Burundian national consultation was supported by the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission and implemented by a tripartite steering committee. The two 
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6.3. Gacaca Monitoring: A Decade of Reporting 
The reports listed in the appendix indicate clearly that the gacaca process has been widely 
discussed by potential donors, human rights organisations and legal experts from around the 
world. These dozens of reports represent the long journey of experiences, analysis and 
negotiations that stakeholders went through to come to agree to the gacaca model as stipulated 
in the first law in 2004 and updated versions. The collection of reports indicates that since 
1996 numerous international actors have been concerned with the question of impunity, the 
situation of prisons and condition of the destroyed judicial system, compliance with 
international law, and psychological needs in post-genocide Rwanda.  
It is interesting to note that most of the reports were written before the national launch of the 
process (see list and dates of publication of reports in the appendix), when authoring 
organisations (Danish Center for Human rights (DCHR), Newick Park Initiative, Penal 
Reform International, UN OHCHR, Collective of Leagues and Associations for Promotion 
and Defence of Human Rights in Rwanda (CLADHO), and the Rwandan League for the 
Promotion and the Defence of Human Rights (LIPRODHOR)) were hoping to influence the 
policy model. From 2006, however, NGO monitoring reports were written most frequently; 
and reports from other sources became rare. The list also illustrates the decreasing role of 
involved organisations; this results from a diminishment of interest and/or belief that their 
work can bring any change. All these reports demonstrate that there is no unanimity ‒ many 
concerns, preferences and positions are deployed in all these reports.  
 
While negotiating the law that entitled non-professional ‘judges’ with the judicial power to 
rule on genocide crimes, an important monitoring system was also set up as the main 
safeguard. All these technical negotiations were defining the legal framework that entitled 
non-professional ‘judges’ with the judicial power to rule on genocide crimes that took place 
in their own community. Given that gacaca court decisions would range from acquittal or 
material reparations to life imprisonment, the indirect and long-term social consequences of 
these technical negotiations are undeniable, but also unpredictable. More importantly, these 
reports clearly illustrate the fear expressed by authoring organisations over the lack of judicial 
guarantees that the gacaca system offered.  
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This section focuses on reports produced within the context of the monitoring, as a policy set 
up with the main intermediary output being the production of reports. Even though the 
monitoring was initially designed to act on observed issues and violations of the gacaca law, 
it progressively became impossible for monitoring agencies to do more than just report them 
as explained below. 
6.3.1. Monitoring Reports as Appropriate Safeguard?  
In response to these concerns, donors’ support for the gacaca process was made dependant on 
safeguards, of which monitoring was the most important. As an international consultant, Peter 
Uvin (non-dated) recommended that the international community provide critical support to 
the gacaca process. Among outlined propositions, he (Uvin, non-dated, 12) suggested:  
These monitors assist at the audiences and, using a standard, uniform monitoring system, they write 
short reports about the unfolding of the dynamics. If necessary, they take note of major violations 
of the spirit of the gacaca process .... They send these reports to a central mechanism...  
He envisioned that the monitors, upon observation, would support Inyangamugayo at the 
community level, and analytical reports would rectify policy guidelines at the national level. 
It was indeed believed that “reliable and rapid monitoring of instances where the spirit of 
gacaca is being violated” would enable the abuses to be rectified (Ibid, 12).  
A number of organisations were commissioned for the gacaca monitoring: local NGOs 
(Collective of Leagues and Associations for Promotion and Defence of Human Rights in 
Rwanda (CLADHO), the Rwandan League for the Promotion and the Defence of Human 
Rights (LIPRODHOR), and Support Project from the Civil Society to the gacaca Process – 
PAPG, Ibuka); and international NGOs (Avocats Sans Frontieres (ASF), Penal Reform 
Intnernational (PRI), Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW)), and the 
Rwanda National Commission of Human Rights (CNDP)). PAPG had 152 agents, 
LIPRODHOR had 126 human rights voluntary agents undertaking monitoring for them, 
however, throughout the process, their number decreased drastically; in some regions, nobody 
was willing to volunteer due to the sensitiveness of cases. PRI and ASF both had research 
teams with around eight people dedicated full-time to their monitoring programmes until 2010.  
In the late 1990s, when the monitoring model was decided, NGOs and judicial institutions 
were working hand-in-hand (e.g. Digneffe and Fierens, 2003). Monitoring NGOs were then 
optimistic about the project. Over one decade, this monitoring extensively documented the 
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sequences of the gacaca process. However, the Rwandan authorities reacted very negatively 
to criticism, particularly following the creation of the SNJG in 2004, and gradually closed the 
discussion space. The relationship between these actors turned sour and the input from NGOs 
became less and less integrated. At the end of the monitoring in 2010, authorities gave little, 
if any, attention to recommendations formulated by monitoring organisations. Gradually, 
donors and NGOs disengaged from the process. The analysis in the next section illustrates the 
discursive battles between stakeholders over gacaca, fought through reports, and demonstrates 
the failure of lobbying and influencing strategies set up by donors and implemented by NGOs.  
Overall analysis of monitoring reported that there were difficulties for Inyangamugayo to 
apply the gacaca law, i.e., collecting data about crimes and alleged perpetrators, organising 
and ruling on trials, failing to respect the principle of presumption of innocence, limited 
verification of evidence, incorrect categorisation of crimes and penalties, false accusations and 
corruption, and involvement of political actors in the process. All these elements are 
considered to have been caused by the limited training of Inynagamugayo. It was also 
aggravated by the acceleration of the process in 2007.61  
All NGOs involved had serious challenges with their gacaca monitoring programmes. Several 
scholars address issues of dynamics between monitoring agencies, donors and the Rwandan 
authorities (Waldorf 2010; Schotsmans 2011; Oomen 2005; Hayman 2008, 170–171; Da 
Camara 2001; Jamar 2012). For example, through the analysis of PRI gacaca monitoring, 
Gready (2010, 656) describes a “difficult operational context for civil society organisations” 
in which “the micro-political processes and arrangements through which civil society-state 
relationships can be negotiated remain ad hoc and state-determined.” Focusing on donors’ and 
INGOs’ relationships through gacaca monitoring, Martien Schotsmans (2011, 392) observed 
apparent contradiction between what donors required from INGO monitoring, without 
supporting the resulting recommendations. While looking at different sets of dynamics, these 
authors underline the challenging position in which monitoring organisations are put, given 
their roles and means. 
Both Gready and Schotsmans do not, however, give sufficient attention to the constantly 
evolving dynamics among the complex set of stakeholders. They do not assess whether the 
                                                 
61 To comply with the many closing dates of the gacaca process (later postponed), the rhythm of judgments had 
been accelerated, and one monitor reported to have observed a court making rulings in over 19 cases in one day 
during that period. Even though the rhythm slowed down when the closing was postponed, it has irreversible 
impacts on the quality of judgments. 
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monitoring approach was an appropriate safeguard to manage such complex dynamics (of 
communities themselves having to rule on judicial decisions for genocide crimes). They 
discuss monitoring dynamics as though each organisation is one heterogeneous entity, and 
hence ignore the difficulties within organisations. I nuance their arguments by also looking 
into socio-political tensions within monitoring organisations, and question their impact on the 
production of reports, as well as on the gacaca process overall.  
6.3.2. Monitoring Reports as a Socio-Political Battleground 
In addition to these above-mentioned and well-established constraints, my research brings 
attention to challenges caused by concurrent views within monitoring organisations, and 
related micro-social politics. Various levels of politics, including national and international 
pressure, have affected the monitoring process by ultimately defining what was observed, what 
type of analysis was undertaken, what was written in reports, how they were disseminated and 
received, and finally, how they impacted on the gacaca process.  
 Various Levels of Politics at Play 
As explained in chapter 3, number of authors underline how the local practice of gacaca was 
affected by national politics in various forms (Ingelaere 2009; Longman 2009; Thomson and 
Nagy 2011; Burnet 2014). The imposition of Hutu guilt, victor justice, and political intrusion 
have also been mentioned as key limits of the gacaca process jurisdictions (see e.g., Rettig 
2008; Longman 2009, 310). At the same time, local dynamics also played a role. Both Burnet 
and Ingelaere find that the micro-social dynamics of gacaca varied from one community to 
another (Burnet 2014; Ingelaere 2004). Coming to the monitoring, another factor was at play. 
Rwandan authorities used the immorality of the genocide and international guilt for their lack 
of interventions to prevent the genocide to counteract criticism and put pressure on donors 
(e.g., Gready 2010; Reyntjens 2011; Straus and Waldorf 2011). My focus on the production 
of reports underlines how similar dynamics driven by national politics and social relations 
among professionals have influenced aid-dependent efforts towards gacaca. 
As previously established, diachronic analysis of the monitoring evolution demonstrates a 
deterioration of coordination (Jamar 2012). Initially, monitoring reports were discussed in 
several forums involving NGOs, donors and Rwandan government officials (discussed below). 
It was through this process that the main output became the production of reports to be 
 
 
Transitional Justice Battlefield: Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice 
 
232 
distributed to Rwandan institutions, aid agencies and embassies in Rwanda. Discussion 
channels disappeared gradually, bureaucratic obligations to monitor were made more difficult, 
and both led to increasing internal tensions within monitoring agencies and a progressive 
disengagement from all stakeholders. From 2008 to 2010, NGOs pursued with difficulty their 
monitoring and reporting activities, thinking the gacaca process would come to end (given that 
the SNJG announced the postponement of the closure of gacaca courts almost every year).  
Among initial coordination channels, the National Human Rights Commission (CNDP) 
organised monitoring meetings with other international and local NGOs. In theory, this was 
supposed to provide a forum for dialogue between NGOs and Rwandan authorities. From 
minutes of meetings, it can be observed that each NGO presented its observations in turn. 
However, minutes do not record discussions between monitoring institutions, CNDP and the 
SNJG aiming to find solutions to the problems encountered. A donor representative who 
frequently attended these meetings noted that the most sensitive issues raised did not appear 
in the CNDP published reports (Interview with donor representative, July 2008).  
The work as a monitor also became more challenging through the process, as this interviewee 
explains:  
At the beginning, the lobbying work was easy [from 2002, counting the preparation and pilot 
phase]. We could say what we found pertinent. ... We could go and talk to a president of cell court 
[the leading judge of the lowest level of courts in the gacaca system]. It became gradually a difficult 
lobbying process through different levels, we could not anymore go and talk to the president of the 
court, we had to go through the sector coordinator, the district coordinator, and the lawyer (from 
the SNJG legal unit in which each province is supervised by one lawyer), it was a long and very 
difficult process (Group Interview with NGO staff and former monitors, author’s translation from 
French, December 2012).  
From an initially collaborative relationship, the synergy between monitoring NGOs and the 
Rwandan authorities deteriorated. Through fieldwork, I collected extensive data illustrating 
how Rwandan authorities imposed bureaucratic obligations on NGOS, in order to constrain 
their work (see also chapter 4). For instance, a local NGO worker explains, “Initially we were 
easily given collective research authorisation. The researcher took a copy and he could go and 
observe gacaca courts. The research authorisation was then individualised and the number of 
observers consequently diminished” (Group Interview with local former monitors, author’s 
translation from French, December 2012). ASF, one of the most active INGO in gacaca 
monitoring, was not granted monitoring authorisation for two months in early 2008, without 
any explanation.  
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My research indicates that monitoring difficulties were related to increasing bureaucratic 
obligations underpinned by strong political dynamics. A researcher for a local NGO affirms, 
“Initially we were delivered easily collective accreditation. The researcher took a copy and he 
could go and observe. It was then individualised and the number of observers diminished” 
(Group Interview with NGO staff and former monitors, author’s translation from French, 
December 2012). ASF remained without monitoring authorisation for two months in early 
2008. The then ASF head of mission was never given a clear justification. He considered “it 
could be a reprisal from Domitilia [the Executive Secretary of the SNJG – the Rwandan office 
for gacaca courts] because some of her family members were refused a visa to go Belgium. Or 
because of a newspaper article published in 2007 that misquoted what I had said potential 
negative consequences. Yet Rwandan people will have to deal with the consequences of the 
false accusation, false testimony, judicial mistakes, and unfair decisions widely cited in all 
these monitoring reports.  
At the global level, donors’ embassies also were also pressured from their own national 
governments. For instance, the Belgian Cooperation office in Kigali was called on several 
occasions to answer parliamentary questions concerning its support to the gacaca process. The 
office answered that it financed monitoring safeguards implemented by ASF and PRI 
(Parlement Fédéral Belge 2008). Referring back to support of and collaboration with 
monitoring NGOs turned out to be useful in dealing with increasing concerns and criticisms 
about the process. At the same time, increasing pressure was put on NGOs not to produce 
overly critical reports. In 2006, DFID cut its funding to PRI, considering its reports to too 
negative (Waldorf 2010). With the arrival of a new donor representative who was pro-regime, 
PRI was encouraged to not publish a report written about RPF crimes (Interview with a 
previous NGO staff, December 2014). 
What Can Be Said in the Last Monitoring Report?  
One local NGO faced problems in the publication of their last gacaca research project. The 
research consisted of a quantitative survey of the population with regard to their appreciation 
for the gacaca process. The draft report concluded that gacaca had received limited 
appreciation and had had limited impact towards reconciliation. The research project had been 
jointly undertaken with a Rwandan academic institute. Through the editing process, the 
academic researchers disengaged, apparently after being intimidated by the police. Due to a 
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number of other problems, the NGO never published this final report. These are clear 
obstructions put in place by Rwandan institutions in order to discourage analysis, which is not 
in line with the official narrative about the genocide and the gacaca process. Bureaucratic 
obstacles turned out to be useful to silence critical voices, as in this instance their last 
monitoring report could not even be published.   
Looking into the internal tensions among staff at INGOs further reveals how social and 
political dynamics framed how gacaca was being monitored, analysed, and reported about. A 
former expatriate head of mission explains how the local researcher team was heavily affected 
by the post-genocide and ethnic context:  
The lead researcher suffered a lot of pressure because he was Hutu. The genocide survivors of the 
team played with ‘genocide ideology’62 and upon the fact he was incompetent. He had limited 
authority on his own team, and his ethnic identity had a lot to do with it. When we were the two of 
us, he would talk to me with full confidence about his analysis of gacaca. With just one other person 
in the room, he would talk differently. Actually, only the researchers who were Tutsi survivors 
would talk in the same way in all circumstances. The others, they suffered from war crimes, but 
they would always have changed their voice and language with others around. They would not 
comment negatively on their observation of gacaca. Through moral pressure, the survivors could 
frame what type of issues we would work on, or not, and how we would talk about them. As a 
result, we stopped having team meetings. At the end, the researchers would only collect the data 
and the analysis was dealt separately.  
In this discussion, it became apparent that the everyday work of a monitoring team was heavily 
affected by personal experiences of the genocide, ethnic identity, and positions towards the 
regime. In parallel, there were also other complex interactions in between the expatriate staff 
based in Kigali and the head office about the content of monitoring report, particularly the last 
monitoring report. 
ASF and PRI stopped their monitoring programmes in 2010, while the gacaca courts officially 
closed in 2012. Interviewees explained that the main reasons were insufficient funding and the 
limited contribution of their work. Given the lack of impact of previous reports, both INGOs 
considered that the last reports should not contain any recommendation, nor be followed by 
any lobbying work. Working at PRI in 2009 and at ASF in 2010, I experienced directly and 
observed difficult discussions internally about the closure of their monitoring programmes, the 
                                                 
62 The Rwandan legal framework criminalise ethnicity and divisionism through the adoption of laws forbidding 
‘sectarian and genocide ideologies.’ Many have argued that these laws are an efficient political tool to manipulate 
the legacies of the past and to neutralise government critics, especially as their definition of what genocide 
ideology and divisionism means is vague (Amnesty International 2010a; Reyntjens 2011). It has been argued that 
this legal framework has been used politically and has severely affected democratisation and the development of 
an independent civil society (Amnesty International 2010a). 
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content of their last reports and public disseminations. The then ASF head of mission 
describes: 
It was planned that we would say it all in the last report. It was supposed to have strong political 
analysis. But as you were submitting different drafts [me being the consultant at the time], the head 
office realised that ASF was too involved in the process and decided to not say anything. They 
were worried that they would be challenged on why they did not communicate these problems 
earlier. I was asked me to stepped out from discussions about the last report. The Director and other 
people from the head office took over me and decided what could be included and how the political 
analysis should be tuned down. 
ASF decided to launch their last report discretely. The head office dismissed the critical head 
of mission, partly to demonstrate that they took actions over their mistakes. In contrast, PRI 
organised an important event to launch their summary report, which was overly positive – 
particularly in comparison with the original analysis being summarised - in London. PRI head 
office had asked Klaas de Jonge to write a piece for its final summary report. He played an 
important role in the involvement of PRI in gacaca as the former head of mission and 
coordinator of the PRI gacaca research programme in Kigali, but left the organisation in 2007 
when he started to disagree with PRI’s approach and position on the monitoring (Skype 
interview, December 2014). In his concluding notes, he (2010, 2) wrote: 
… naively, we hoped that our analysis of the key issues and proposed solutions […] would have 
some impact. […] it could be expected that the RPF would instrumentalise the gacaca as it has 
done with the ICTR […] inside as well as outside Rwanda. … In my view, [PRI monitoring] reports 
show that the gacaca process was a failure if we relate the outcome to its explicit objectives…  
His text was considered too critical for the position that the head office wanted to promote in 
the last report. It was not included, and it was not distributed at the launch event. Both PRI and 
ASF decided to adopt a diplomatic approach to the closure of their monitoring programmes 
even though they would no longer need support for their offices that were to close. The head 
offices had serious concerns about their apparent credibility if the problems of a policy, which 
they had ‘supported’ for so long, were to be discussed publicly. Receiving funding for their 
other projects from the same donors is certainly an important element to take into account.  
This scrutiny of reports production shows the increasing challenges in undertaking monitoring. 
The monitoring failed to constitute research as a safeguard of judicial and procedural 
guarantees in gacaca hearings. Despite all actors involved being aware that monitoring did not 
work, important efforts continued to be mobilised to produce the reports and project the image 
of an appropriate safeguard. Simply by reading the depoliticised published reports it is not 
possible to understand the battles over their content and publication. However, the above 
description makes obvious the extent to which national politics and bilateral relations (in 
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between donor countries and Rwandan authorities) were at stake throughout the monitoring of 
the gacaca process. 
The internal tensions are important to underline the interplay of national and international 
factors impacting on reports production. First, it brings attention to the important role of the 
individual; personal experiences of violence, political positions towards the regime, and ethnic 
identity cannot just be solved by having a mixed team with diverse ethnical backgrounds, 
national, and international members (as often put forward by NGOs as a way to overcome 
cleavages). These are important lessons for organisations and donors supporting societies 
recovering from past violence. Particularly, as I elaborate below, on how it shapes the TJ 
process in itself, and in this case failed to address problems created by the gacaca process.
  
6.3.3. Battles over Representation of Gacaca 
Building on the previous section, I present here how overall different organisations openly 
engaged in representation battles. Beyond these internal debates, there were stronger 
disagreements in between organisations. These were more obvious in the media coverage of 
the reporting of watchdog organisations, namely HRW and AI. These organisations are not 
financially dependent on bilateral donors. As a consequence, their criticism of gacaca and the 
judicial institutions in Rwanda was more direct. Their critical stances are obvious in the titles 
of their reports: “A question of justice” (Amnesty International 2002); “Rwanda: Genocide 
suspects must not be transferred until fair trial conditions met” (Amnesty International 2007); 
“Rwanda: Gacaca Trial Condemns Activist to Prison” (Human Rights Watch 2007); and “The 
Power of Horror in Rwanda” (Human Rights Watch 2009).  
The release of the HRW report, “Law and Reality” (2008) commenting critically on the 
Rwandan justice system, including the gacaca process, created the main conflict. The 
government reacted negatively to all these reports (see for example The New Times 2006 ‒ a 
state-sponsored newspaper). Allison Des Forges, an HRW senior expert, was described as a 
spokesman of the génocidaires. A few months later, she was refused entry to Rwandan territory 
(Hirondelle News Agency 2008) after having worked on Rwanda since the mid-1960s. These 
media clashes with Rwandan authorities represent the battles over what gacaca is, how 
successful it was, and how it should be represented. 
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Throughout the years of the gacaca process, the authorities followed a certain pattern in 
refuting NGOs’ critiques in relation to gacaca: they maintained that INGOs did not sufficiently 
understand the Rwandan context, that their analysis was biased as it was embedded in Western 
legalism, that they did not appreciate the traditional dimensions of gacaca, and that they did 
not propose alternatives (e.g., interviews with authorities representatives, Kigali, 2008, 2012, 
2013). The final SNJG report illustrates these patterns (National University of Rwanda ‒ 
Center for Conflict Management (CMM) 2012). Financed by the Dutch Government, the 256-
page document explains the judicial challenges faced in the aftermath of genocide, the 
functioning of gacaca, its achievements, challenges, and adopted strategies. One section 
dismisses criticisms made about gacaca courts. It writes “having noticed that some individuals 
and organisations have been providing in their reports … [analysis] which is the contrary of 
what has been done during the gacaca courts process” (ibid., 162). This 26-page section 
invalidates NGOs’ criticism and claim to reveal ‘gacaca’s true nature.’ The section specifically 
addresses 14 criticisms. For example, in relation to the issue of the poor training of 
Inyangamugayo, the report states that some human rights organisations: 
… expressed doubt regarding whether the Inyangamugayo judges of gacaca courts who have no 
legal training and experience would be able to try genocide cases. … As it is, gacaca has always 
been part of Rwandan culture. When one committed a crime they were brought before gacaca and 
chastised by the elders and the two families (the family of the offender and the family of the 
offended) were reconciled and the conflict was resolved. … Even though there were no written 
laws at the time, conflicts were settled basing on cultural values. With regard to gacaca courts, the 
historic goal of reconciliation was maintained however, the courts applied the codified laws and 
regulations. .... The only next step involved was to consult the provisions relating to the crime in 
Organic Law no 16/2004 governing gacaca courts. Therefore this does not require graduate 
education in law.  
... It should also be noted that the Inyangamugayo judges were given training on the laws and 
regulations governing hearings of gacaca courts and most of them even memorised them because 
the Organic Law mentioned above had become like the Inyangamugayo bible. …  
The section does not discuss NGOs’ specific criticism, particularly the social implications of 
Inyangamugayo capacities to implement the gacaca law. It only refutes this by stating that the 
Inyangamugayo did not need professional legal training because gacaca is a Rwandan 
tradition. Therefore, the report implies that Inyangamugayos’ insufficient training, as reported 
by NGOs monitoring, was false. Such inference is, however, weak; it only underlines that the 
authoring organisations, CCM and National University of Rwanda, reject the position of 
monitoring NGOs report without empirical evidence to refute it. This last report is a typical 
example of the battles over representation about what the gacaca process was about, what it 
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achieved or failed to achieve. More importantly, it implies that any social consequences of 
infringement of the gacaca law will not be dealt with. 
6.3.4. Social Relevance of the Representation Battlefield for TJ  
Throughout all stages of the monitoring, NGOs were working under Rwandan sovereignty and 
financial dependence on donors. They had insufficient power to legitimise their analysis. Even 
with evidence of sound and robust methodologies in the production of their reports, this did 
not enable them to influence most of the policy changes that they recommended. Given the 
moral burden of the genocide and on-going complex relations with Rwandan authorities, most 
diplomats I spoke to acknowledged the complexity and the need to focus on new priorities ‒ 
that is to strengthen the judicial system and to attend to more general human rights issues. By 
the end, even critical organisations gave up on the battles over what gacaca was supposed to 
be about and what could be done to ‘rectify’ its implementation.  
I collected numerous pieces of information indicating that the legacies of the gacaca process 
were bigger than what the public discourse suggested. While donors and representatives of 
authorities kept repeating to me during my fieldwork that the gacaca process was over, I 
observed signs at the same time that it was not finished. During my first phase of fieldwork 
(October 2012), it was still unclear for the people I interviewed as to how the judicial 
authorities would interpret the gacaca termination law. Some informants, particularly NGO 
staff, were concerned with regard to the consequences of the gacaca process, the lack of 
support for people still struggling with the process,63 and the transfer of gacaca competences 
to other institutions on the basis of the gacaca terminating law. In later periods of fieldwork 
(February 2013 and June to October 2013), it appeared that donors were not involved in the 
implementation of the closing law, and that no additional measure (other than passing the law) 
had been undertaken by Rwandan authorities. Even on the side of NGOs, no efforts were being 
put into following up on social and legal issues identified in their monitoring reports of gacaca 
(false accusation, false testimony, judicial mistakes, corrupted acquittals, unfair decisions and 
imperfect justice). 
                                                 
63 For instance, one interviewee mentioned that a family tried to obtain, without success, a copy of the gacaca 
court decision that acquitted their relative so he could be released. One organisation counted more than 500 people 
in detention for genocide crimes whose cases had never been ruled on and were still open after the gacaca closure 
(Interview, Rwanda, November 2012).   
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In conclusion, the review of gacaca monitoring also underlines the murkiness of politics when 
dealing in TJ. It highlights that all organisations involved, Rwandan authorities, donors and 
NGOs, hold their own agendas. As demonstrated, these agendas were changing over time, 
reacting to different dimensions from various pressures and political positions. Overall, it 
shows how aid-dependant actors were inconsistent and unequipped to deal with politics. As a 
result, the immense efforts put into establishing safeguards for the risks represented by gacaca 
were not able to limit or fix the problems encountered. Turning to Burundi, the following 
section now looks into the production of the national consultation report. In contrast, the 
national consultations report presents methodological limits, but served the purpose of 
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6.4. The National Consultations in Burundi: Pushing Forward a Deadlock 
Process 
The TJ process in Burundi presents a different case study in which not much has happened 
yet. While the first TRC law was adopted in 2004, no progress had been achieved by 2007. 
The negotiations were then suspended due to a disagreement between the UN and the 
government of Burundi. During this impasse, the Burundian authorities and the UN decided 
to organise national consultations. From a policy perspective, the national consultations aimed 
to create an environment in favour of TJ mechanisms and ensure the population’s participation 
in the reconciliation process, by consulting a sample of the whole Burundian population 
(Gouvernement du Burundi 2010, 14).  
The 187 page-long report on the national consultations results from a quantitative research 
project undertaken jointly by the UN, the government of Burundi and Civil Society. Consulting 
more than 4,800 people across the provinces of Burundi and the biggest diaspora communities 
overseas, it provides statistics about the Burundian population’s preferences regarding the TJ 
process. The project was launched in 2007 and the report was published in 2010. Its results 
have been repeatedly mentioned in discussions about TJ in meetings, training and sensitisation 
tools, and in interviews I undertook.  
The UN granted great importance to the consultation exercise, as illustrated by the UN 
OHCHR’s booklet entitled ‘National Consultations on Transitional Justice’, part of the series 
on ‘Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict Countries’.64 It considers that national consultations 
are a matter of human rights to include the affected population and victims in the TJ processes; 
as well as a crucial element to tailor the most appropriate policy according to the local context:  
International human rights law requires national consultations to be undertaken. Such consultations 
are also a matter of common sense. The people who have been affected by oppression or conflict 
need to be listened to, so that the transitional justice programmes best reflect their actual 
experiences, as well as their needs and entitlements. ... each programme must be precisely crafted 
to take account of the particular needs of the national situation. A careful process of consultations 
will also ensure that there is a strong sense of local ownership of the transitional justice approaches 
and should serve to promote stakeholder participation throughout the transitional justice 
programme.  
                                                 
64 As mentioned in chapter 2, the UN OHCHR has published a series of booklets providing guidelines to post- 
conflict countries on their way to implementing TJ measures. It addresses eight different matters: the national 
consultations, prosecution initiatives, truth commissions, vetting, maximising the legacy of hybrid courts, 
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This reference indicates the importance of the UN in encouraging such an exercise in Burundi. 
It also depicts its technocratic ‘toolkit approach’ to dealing with the past, as described in 
chapter 2.  
The consultations are considered one of the key achievements of a long and a tenuous process. 
Its results have been repeatedly mentioned in discussions about TJ in meetings, training and 
sensitisation tools during my working experience in Burundi (2010) and my fieldwork (2012, 
2013). The report is widely considered to be one of the best tools used in political discussions 
about TJ matters.  It is no longer a key document. It remains a crucial example of a TJ process 
in which the global agenda is taking over national priorities. The few critical voices support 
this view given to the blocked process, but they also stress the project’s limits. In this section, 
I argue that the report constitutes a significant case of depoliticised TJ efforts, involving 
important financial and human resources, but which was not able to address political matters. 
Rather than providing information about the local context, the national consultations report 
reflects the TJ Global Agenda. 
6.4.1. Politics at Play – Intersections between the Local and the Global 
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Peace Agreement signed in 2000 provided for truth-
seeking and prosecution mechanisms. Providing for a ceasefire and a consociational 
democracy, it marked an important step forward for the negotiated peace in Burundi. At the 
same time, it also implied that the key political parties were close to and included members 
involved in past crimes. Key political parties encouraged truth and pardon with the aim to 
leave aside judicial questions (e.g., Rubli 2013). In the early phase of the official process, the 
UN and Burundian authorities disagreed about the relationship between a Special Tribunal, 
the TRC and amnesty dispositions. Specifically, the UN representatives could not accept that 
the TRC decisions would bind the prosecutor of the Special Tribunal to prosecute specific 
cases and leave other cases outside of its jurisdiction. They also could not agree with an overly 
lenient granting of amnesty, which was considered as a risk to potential violate the Burundian 
penal code and international norms. 
Commenting the overall TJ process in Burundi, Vandeginste (2012; 2011a; 2010) comments 
extensively about the political use and abuse of legal instruments. He (2011a, 14) specifically 
addresses the role of leading former opponents in blocking the TJ process. He comments 
“Keeping up appearances as if they are genuinely interested in transitional justice has so far 
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proved to be a successful strategy. [The contrary] ... might force the UN to change its position, 
possibly to the detriment of its Burundian counterparts.” Such preferences have been indirectly 
expressed (and have been refused by the UN) since early TJ negotiations in Burundi. Within 
such a political context, the actual implementation of TJ mechanisms was not possible. 
Constrained by these dimensions, the national consultations are negotiated within this very 
limited space in between the positions of Burundian authorities, civil society and the UN – 
without the limited common ground. 
Of the few scholars who have written about TJ in Burundi, most mention the national 
consultation report as a key step in the process (Stef Vandeginste 2012; Taylor 2013b; 
Matignon 2012). For instance, Taylor notes: “Methodological flaws notwithstanding, the 
consultations organised jointly by the government and UN demonstrate that the current options 
for TJ have sizeable local grounding” (Taylor 2013b, 5). Rubli (2011) describes the national 
consultations as an arena of negotiations between the government, the UN and civil society 
through which civil society gained legitimacy as an essential stakeholder. I add to this existing 
literature demonstrating how the technocratic accomplishment and the scientific facade of 
producing a report, have resulted in strong support for what is in reality a limited document. 
By further depoliticising TJ discussions, the National Consultations also pursued the 
consolidation of the global TJ agenda, but inadvertently left out of the enquiry ‘what is best 
for Burundi.’  
6.4.2. Tripartite Committee Looking into Fuzzy Concepts: An International Agenda 
in the Driving Seat 
Launched in 2007, the national consultation project was undertaken jointly by the UN, the 
government of Burundi and civil society organisations. It published a 187-page report in 2010, 
presenting the results from a quantitative research project, which provides statistics about the 
Burundian population’s preferences regarding the TJ process. The then newly established UN 
Peacebuilding Commission funded most of the project, with a budget of 1.38 million US 
dollars (Stef Vandeginste 2009, 187). The UNDP and International Organisation of 4cophony 
also contributed 200,000 and 30,000 US dollars respectively.  
One of most praised dimensions of the national consultation is its tripartite committee. The 
committee, comprising the Burundian authorities, the UN and civil society representatives, 
was in charge of the consultation’s conception and implementation, as well as guaranteeing its 
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independence, integrity and credibility (Gouvernement du Burundi 2010). There were several 
technical committees. For instance, the technical monitoring committee was co-chaired by the 
president’s private secretary of civil affairs, the representative in Burundi of UN OHCHR, and 
the director of the BINUB human rights division. A South African consultancy firm was hired 
to analyse the data gathered. Such a large and expert team, along with important financial 
resources, were put at the disposal of the project with the aim of producing the best 
consultations. I argue, however, that the conceptual framework applied to the project adopted 
a narrow understanding of TJ, which was strongly embedded in the TJ toolkit approach. This 
adherence to the toolkit approach had a strong impact on the overall normative framework of 
the consultations, the types of questions included in the questionnaire (Gouvernement du 
Burundi 2010 see appendix), and the content and structure of the final report.  
The first chapter of the national consultation report defines transitional justice, truth-seeking 
mechanisms, judicial prosecution mechanisms, reparations and institutional reforms. This set 
of mechanisms and the provided definition match exactly the assumptions of the TJ toolkit 
approach. Specifically, the chapters respectively report on the following dimensions:  
• Truth-seeking mechanisms (facts to be investigated, mandate of the TRC, members of the 
TRC, male and female representation, members of the selecting committee, disclosure of 
alleged perpetrators, hearings in public or in camera, persons to be heard by the TRC);   
• Judiciary prosecutions (members of the special tribunal, male and female representation, 
mandate of the special tribunal);   
• Reparations (collective, symbolic, material individual, crimes for which reparations 
should be accorded);   
• Institutional reforms (role of institutions in the Burundian crises i.e. the judiciary, 
administration, police, army and the media);   
• Burundi’s future (path to reconciliation, how break the cycle of violence).  
 
From chapter 3 onwards, the technical preferences for the mandate, and the composition and 
background (gender and nationality) of members for each mechanism are indicated. The report 
presents numbers and charts to reflect the statistical overview of participants’ preferences (see 
the example in the next section). 
The consultations referred to fuzzy concepts such as truth, justice, reparation and 
reconciliation that do not have clear meaning – but all can agree on them. An INGO 
representative explains: 
It is a very numeric analysis, there is a need to clarify what is beneath these numbers and attach 
more attention to narrative elements. … For instance, the consultations ask, ‘Do you want truth?’ 
But what truth are we talking about? The truth about perpetrators? The truth about factual events? 
 
 
Transitional Justice Battlefield: Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice 
 
245 
The report left many points unclear (Interview with NGO staff, Author’s translation from French, 
February 2013). 
At the same time, the report did not raise the issues at the crux of disagreement between the 
UN and authorities: modalities about impunity, judicial mandate and binding nature between 
the TRC and Special Tribunal. Given that no sensitive questions were introduced in the 
questionnaire, the process mainly reflects the toolkit approach: full support of claims 
associated with these mechanisms and their benefits for reconciliation, accountability, rule of 
law and democratisation.  
On the one hand, the report clearly reflects technical and depoliticised views – even if 
negotiations were taking place in a heavily political context, as discussed in the previous 
section. On the other hand, the report also holds the capacity to support any political claim. 
Another INGO representative explains: “The questions were vague; this created a document 
that can give legitimacy to any argument” (Author’s interview, 2013). Further battles about 
the TJ legal framework frequently referred to the spirit of the national consultations, but this 
was mobilised by different actors for different reasons (e.g., the involvement of civil society 
in the TRC brought up by international donors and NGOs; or the preference for reconciliation 
and pardon by Burundian authorities). The depoliticised consultation process enabled a 
pretence that the TJ process was moving forward, enabled the TJ agenda as envisioned by the 
UN to be pushed ahead, and left Burundian actors at their initial positions. Finally, it 
encompassed all the different political agendas.  
6.4.3. Methodological and Scientific Rigour Building the Report’s Legitimacy  
Despite these limitations, the report presents a strong ‘scientific etiquette’ – a pretence to 
scientifically established work. The second chapter of the consultation report provides a 
detailed description of the adopted methodology. It includes a series of numbers and tables in 
relation to the selection of samples, the research calendar, and precautions for data security. 
The following chapters further project a ‘scientific etiquette’ by including numerous numbers 
and charts. Through my fieldwork, I also witnessed many references to the ‘scientific methods’ 
of the national consultations. A UN representative affirms “it is a scientific work that was 
undertaken. We hired a house of independent experts that produced the research document” 
(Interview, Author’s translation from the French, February 2013). It leads to this question: was 
the best methodology deployed for the most efficient consultations, or just to legitimate the 
process?   
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Shortly after the report was released, Dushirehamwe (a Burundian women’s association 
working on peacebuilding) and Impunity Watch wrote briefly about the national consultation 
reports, underlining how the methodology restricted the type of responses received by the 
consultations (Association Dushirehamwe 2010; Moriceau 2010). They considered that the 
adopted methodology and types of questions were not fully satisfactory because no open or 
sensitive questions were included, and some of the results were incoherent or unworkable. 
Indeed, many of the questions were formulated in a way that did not encourage a strong 
opinion. The questionnaire left out the possibility to respond positively (or negatively) to every 
question. For instance, a participant could reply yes to both preferring a majority of men and 
a majority of women in the TRC committee. The result ended up being 70.89% in favour of 
female majority and 81.51% in favour of male majority (national consultations report, 2011, 
77), which in turn had little relevance for practice. Another relevant example is the question 
and its answers about the mandate of the TRC, as illustrated in the table below (author’s 
translation from national consultations report, 2011, 76). 
Table 1: Example of National Consultations Results 
 
The question does not reassess whether a TRC should be implemented, and the suggested 
answers implicitly reaffirm the association of a TRC with its claimed aims (truth-telling, truth-
seeking, pardon, reparation and reconciliation). The question does not leave space for 
interpretations beyond the political agenda of what TJ needs to be. As the resulting statistical 
numbers illustrate, it does not establish much of a hierarchy of preference. Further, questions 
also refer to technicalities on which the population would not have a clear position without 
context, and even less without an understanding of Western legalism (such as the mandate of 
the prosecutor, whether the sessions should be held in camera or in public). By the end, such 
What power should be conferred on the TRC?  
  No (%)  Yes (%)  No opinion (%) 
Receive victim’s grievance  3.75  93.68  2.57 
Investigate violence  0.91  97.96  1.13 
Hear perpetrators of violence  8.37  88.86  4.77 
Confront perpetrators to victims and witnesses  13.66  80.98  5.37 
Establish responsibilities  4.83  91.41  3.76 
Allocate reparation  7.64  84.50  7.86 
Mediate conflicts and reconcile parties  3.95  92.00  4.06 
Encourage victims and perpetrators to pardon  4.57  91.89  3.54 
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an approach gives limited information about the local context and local needs for significant 
added value to the policy framework. 
On this point, an INGO representative explains:  
I do not know much about the methodology of the national consultations. ... It is a very numeric 
analysis, there is a need to clarify what is beneath these numbers and attach more attention to 
narrative elements. ... It is easy to ask questions. For instance, the consultations ask, ‘Do you want 
truth?’ But what truth are we talking about? The truth about perpetrators? The truth about factual 
events? The report left many points unclear (Interview with NGO staff, Author’s translation from 
French, February 2013).  
The research process demonstrates extensive concern for representation, inclusion and 
professionalism, as reflected in the report ‘scientific etiquette’. Simultaneously, the 
consultations contained serious pitfalls related to the normative framework and the lack of 
consideration of participants’ perspectives. The scientific claim of the report is the reason for 
its success; it has been repeated at high-level workshops, sensitisation activities and further 
negotiation meetings. The performance of professionally achieved work enabled praise for the 
illusion of progress in the TJ process, using statistics to promote one’s position. Rather than 
contributing to a strong foundation for TJ, analysis suggests that the consultation process was, 
rather, looking for mobilisation and support for the limited issues that different stakeholders 
agreed upon. The tripartite committee and the ‘scientific facade’ of the research process and 
results create strong legitimacy for the document. It is thus one of the few documents that 
diplomats and NGO representatives used frequently to support their claims in further 
negotiations with the government. This also suggests that in the end, because of its utility and 
the credibility of the various organisations involved, no one had an interest in being critical 
about the document. 
6.4.4. Implications of the ‘Scientific Etiquette’ 
The national consultation identified several trends in the Burundian population: a desire for 
truth-seeking and justice, a preference for collective and symbolic reparations over individual 
ones, mistrust of the population towards political parties, and the subsequent preference for 
religious and civil society representatives to be key actors in the process. It created a precedent 
for an inclusive approach in policy implementation. According to most interviewees, if there 
was any problem identified, it was in the way the report was used rather than in the way it was 
written. One UN representative told me “the government did not make most of the report. They 
put it on the side, we spent a lot and now it is in a drawer.” In a context in which the BNUB 
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and the government were not working closely, 65  the government had later undertaken 
additional consultations about TJ perceptions by sending ministers themselves to each 
province. Burundian political actors asserted that the number of people consulted through the 
national consultations was too low to represent the population’s views and thus not sufficient 
to drive policy (GRJT Meeting Minutes, 2012 ‒ on file with author). They then decided to 
undertake further consultations. 
All these anecdotes question the validity of the national consultation and the capacity of its 
report to push the TJ process forward. Despite the high budget invested, the few 
straightforward results of the consultations (already limited by the adopted methodology) were 
not integrated into the most recent TRC law – for example, recommendations to include civil 
society foreign commissioners as part of the TRC commissioners was neglected. More 
importantly, recent progress highlights that these financial and bureaucratic efforts did not 
enable political constraints to be overcome. A technocratic and apolitical approach did not 
enable the question of alternatives beyond the implementation of mechanisms as prescribed 
by the TJ toolkit approach, nor the development of an approach to deal with a violent past 
‘fitted to the national context’. On the contrary, by addressing technical dimensions of truth-
seeking and judicial mechanisms, reparations and institutional reforms, the national 
consultations consolidated the TJ global agenda and depoliticised further TJ negotiations. Such 
approach inevitably calls for an aid-dependent process, and promotes further a unrealistic way 
to deal with consequences of mass violence and stop. This again underlines the need for more 
critical scrutiny of the role of international aid, its political agenda and its operational 
structures.   
Conclusion  
In this chapter, the discussion of report production demonstrates the widespread use of 
research and reporting for TJ lobbying purposes. My two case studies question the rationale 
and benefits of reporting strategies. They demonstrate that TJ professional practices create an 
apolitical and technical façade that obscures the political and normative frameworks of 
different actors in the process. Even with very different national and international driving 
                                                 
65  Prior to and during my fieldwork, a number of elements illustrated difficult communication between the TJ 
unit at the BNUB and Burundian authorities. For instance, the draft law produced by the technical committee was 
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forces, both the reporting practices over the gacaca process in Rwanda and the national 
consultations in Burundi served to promote political and normative preferences hidden behind 
technical recommendations.  
When dealing with the past, such a depoliticisation process is not without risks. It leaves 
politics to operate without being addressed, and without attempts to redress the balance of 
power. Ultimately, it leaves unintended and unattended consequences out of the official 
process. These observations are more obvious for the Rwandan context in which the political 
sphere is clearly dominated by the RPF and its elaborate representation of the genocide and 
the gacaca process. In the case of Burundi, particularly at the time of my fieldwork (spread 
over 2012 and 2013), the political scene was occupied by various political dynamics and 
paralysed the actual progress of TJ while consolidating the TJ global agenda. In conclusion, I 
restate, first, how normative battles are depoliticised in reports production and, second, how 
reporting practices have become a legitimising tool in the TJ battlefield.   
Reports Production: Depoliticisation of Normative Battles 
With a few exceptions, the research projects did not take into account their normative filters 
inherent in report production. On the contrary, normative and political agendas were promoted 
by referring to cultural values, population views and international standards. The empirical 
analysis brought attention to political reasons encouraging authoring organisations to leave 
data out of their reports. Restrictions on content imposed by the mandate and functioning of 
authoring institutions are not obvious for most audiences reading their reports. Looking into 
the methodology and the normative commitments of authoring institutions elucidates the wide 
range of positions with regard to both gacaca and the national consultations. The analysis here 
of both gacaca monitoring and the Burundian consultations reveals the political and social 
processes lying behind reporting and representation production. 
The production of TJ reports creates the image of more efficient processes unaffected by 
murky politics over the past. Under the surface, however, it appears that these processes are 
driven by various levels of political negotiation. The technocratisation of aid, and consequent 
depoliticisation, are not exclusive to TJ practices (see e.g., Holvoet and Rombouts 2008; 
Debusscher and van der Vleuten 2012; Debusscher and Ansoms 2013). Depoliticisation does 
not render processes apolitical; instead, it simply silences or hides the political matters in play. 
The case studies suggest that claims to apolitical aid also constitute a waiver of responsibility 
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for the long-term outcomes of short-term funding cycles. The claims silence politics that could 
negatively affect credibility and legitimacy of the authoring organisations.  
Such silences over normative frameworks limit debates about disseminated analysis, and can 
lead to the dismissal of sound analysis by the projection of an ideal vision in a highly sensitive 
post-genocide or post-conflict context. Both practitioners and academics should pay more 
attention to normative and political filters in the production of such documents, to enable more 
transparent debates about the political nature of technical modalities. 
Reporting as a Legitimating Tool for the Transitional Justice Battlefield 
All these reports have been produced with the aim of disseminating a particular approach, 
eventually in order to enhance social changes in relation to the crimes of the past. The analysis 
of reports produced in Burundian and Rwandan TJ contexts demonstrates that reports have 
insufficient capacity to change a reality. The ‘scientific’ and ‘technical’ reports, the 
conferences for their launch and the dissemination strategies all follow a number of 
conventions to promote credibility. Looking into peacebuilding workshops, Denskus (2014, 
25) notes that these events: 
often display intangible products, for example, ideas, knowledge and ultimately the vision of a 
better, peaceful society that will be embedded in the liberal market model of Western societies. 
Professionals may offer their services, knowledge, gossip and information in hotels and workshops 
and engage in an ongoing ritual negotiation of expert status, acceptable knowledge or unthreatening 
policy recommendations. ... The rituals of travel, physical attendance of events, expectations of 
results (e.g., a conference report) or conduct (experts staying in certain hotels for only a couple of 
days) often create economic activities, status and legitimacy as well as a new form of pilgrimage.  
His analysis reflects similarities with the dissemination of TJ reports: important efforts are put 
into glossy professional reports and ceremonial launches to attract policymakers, and into 
conveying clear and simple messages with ‘unthreatening policy recommendations’. All these 
performative acts of professionalism and scientific etiquette are designed to gain legitimacy 
and thus promote a political agenda. 
By close observation of the process, policy reports gathered valuable information on the TJ 
process in Burundi and Rwanda. In the case of gacaca, it became gradually obvious that 
monitoring safeguards were not used in the way they were designed, but rather became a tool 
to legitimise aid support for a controversial policy. The analysis of these monitoring reports 
will become useful only if any policy is ever established to deal with the side effects of the 
gacaca process on Rwanda’s social fabric. The case of Burundi is more flagrant in the 
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production and dissemination of results with limited policy relevance. However, most TJ 
practitioners in Burundi consider that the lack of success is related to the national political 
context rather than any limitation in the international TJ framework. 
These observations have major implications for the possible contribution of policy-orientated 
research, and by extension for writing about truth-seeking initiatives and dissemination of TJ 
successes. Taking into account the murkiness of politics when dealing with TJ, my research 
underlines the need to walk away from the frequent assumptions framing international efforts. 
Aid is not apolitical and technical by nature. Adding and stirring NGOs and civil society is no 
counterbalance to power dynamics. TJ mechanisms do not hold magical capacities to move 
away from past personal experiences of violence. Political positions are inevitable constraints 
and should be directly addressed rather than silenced. Finally, the social life of reports 
illustrates how international donors and NGOs enter the TJ battlefield. By supporting one 
technical modality over another, by projecting a particular representation of the TJ progress, 
international actors become part of the political negotiations. In the end, reports are convenient 
tools, since they are able to embrace concurrent political views, or to render merely tacit the 
representation battles over TJ. 
The two case studies provide more detail about the rationale, the required efforts and the 
limited benefits of reporting strategies. Regardless of the strength of the methodology, reports 
and research projects have little capacity to promote changes, even given the financial and 
human efforts involved. In conclusion, I restate the key arguments developed in the chapter. 
1) Social processes are taking place in the production of reports, but social dimensions are 
silenced by the ‘scientific etiquette’, which silences in turn the epistemic and normative 
frameworks. 2) Reports are given a social life once produced, but this may hold little capacity 
to encourage more than merely bureaucratic change towards to the recommendations made. 
Based on Arjun Appadurai’s (1988) argument that the meaning given to things derives from 
human transactions and motivations, particularly from how those things are used and 
circulated, I detailed the ‘social lives in’ and the ‘social lives of’ policy-oriented reports 
through the review of their production and dissemination processes.   
All these reports have been produced with the aim of disseminating a particular approach, in 
order eventually to enhance social changes in relation to the crimes of the past. The analysis 
of reports produced in Burundian and Rwandan TJ contexts demonstrates that ‘naming and 
shaming’, ‘analysing and reporting’ have insufficient capacity to change a reality. The 
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‘scientific reports’, launch conferences and dissemination strategies follow a number of 
conventions to promote credibility. The important differences in the power distribution among 
stakeholders is key to how these reports are used among practitioners. Nonetheless, theoretical 
beneficiaries are left with nothing much more than receiving direct or indirect ‘sensitisation’ 
about the research outcome.  
Perhaps this is inevitable. Speaking of leading transnational NGOs in general, James Ron, 
Howard Ramos and Kathleen Rodgers (2005, 575) reveal a more complex picture:  
Global activists have made considerable achievements, but they also operate with limited resources 
against enormous odds, forcing them to pursue pragmatic and politically savvy strategies ... we 
should also acknowledge that pragmatic strategizing can have both positive and negative effects. 
Information politics may be necessary, but by failing to systematically probe their benefits and 
their costs, we miss a valuable opportunity to stimulate useful debate within the transnational 
sector.  
By close observation of the process, monitoring reports gathered valuable information on the 
TJ process in Burundi and Rwanda. In the case of gacaca, it became gradually obvious that 
monitoring safeguards were not used in the way they were designed. The limited impacts of 
the monitoring and its accompanying recommendations contained in reports led to the failure 
to achieve objectives established by coordination between donors, NGOs and Rwandan 
authorities. These documents will become useful only if any policy is ever established to deal 
with the side-effects of the gacaca process on Rwanda’s social fabric. The case of Burundi is 
more flagrant in the production and dissemination of results with limited policy relevance. 
Most actors in Burundi consider that the lack of success is related to the lack of sensitisation 
and dissemination of results, which would require even more effort. These observations have 
major implications for the possible contribution of policy-oriented research, and by extension 
for writing about truth-seeking initiatives and dissemination of TJ successes. 
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Everyday Battles Behind Technocratic Practices 
Looking into the everyday of transitional justice (TJ) practitioners in Rwanda and Burundi, 
my thesis gives a detailed account of the professionalisation and depoliticisation of TJ in the 
two contexts of these countries. Throughout it, I demonstrate how international aid towards 
the gacaca process in Rwanda and the TRC preparations in Burundi mostly presented these in 
technocratic and apolitical terms (in policy documents particularly), while numerous, often 
unspoken, political compromises and negotiations were taking place among practitioners. 
Bringing TJ practitioners and their everyday practices to the centre of a scrutiny of TJ, my 
thesis contributes to the research about frictions between TJ policy and its ‘localised’ practice. 
It clarifies why and how these frictions are taking place. 
My research illustrates the way in which these professionalised practices actually constitute a 
battlefield, with “ongoing struggles in the battle for the nature and direction of the transition” 
being a metaconflict ‒ a “conflict about what the conflict is about”, in which TJ victors tilt all 
transitional mechanisms “towards an end point for transition that approximates” to their 
“battlefield goals” (Bell 2009). Within these everyday battles, TJ practitioners are playing a 
crucial role in the implementation of TJ. Through the dissemination of their expertise, they act 
as ‘brokers’ and ‘translators’ of the TJ toolkit approach. They, particularly the most powerful 
practitioners, produce interpretations and offer “scripts into which others can be recruited for 
a period” (Lewis and Mosse 2006, 13). As Norman Long (1992, 275) points out in looking at 
development actors, their professional practices constitute a “knowledge battlefield” in 
relation to “the issues of conflicting loyalties, of negotiation over ‘truth’ claims, of battles over 
images and contesting interests.”  
I have, in other words, scrutinised the everyday battlefield of TJ practitioners in Rwanda and 
Burundi. I have unpacked what they actually do on an everyday basis. In the two cases under 
scrutiny in this research, it became clear that the gacaca law and the Burundian TRC law, and 
their policy frameworks and implementing activities, have all been created around the same 
global discourse. But the actual negotiations of specific prescriptions and implementation have 
led to very different practices being moulded around different dynamics of power by actors 
and organisations involved in these processes. Whereas these dynamics are but natural, 
silencing them behind technocratic knowledge, however, has severe implications.  
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This general conclusion consolidates my understanding of TJ professionalisation and 
depoliticisation and thus clarifies my contribution to the field of the TJ. In contrast to most of 
the TJ literature making reference to civil society and international donors, my research 
underlines the role and consequences of their everyday politics, through which the directions 
of the TJ agenda are decided and implemented. Building on social anthropology and 
development studies, I underline the entanglement formed between TJ and aid, and bring 
attention to unattended effects of TJ practices, including how power has a play in policy 
implementation and how unequal relations are reproduced. Doing so, I expand the critical TJ 
scholarship and the calls for ‘localising transitional justice’, as well as developing the 
understanding of the limitations of TJ processes in Rwanda and Burundi.   
Professionalisation of TJ: A Network of Practitioners 
Implementing the TJ Toolkit Approach 
Through a scrutiny of TJ professionalisation and technocratisation, Lefranc, Subotic and 
Rubli, and Madlingozi address the ‘social fabrication’ of the technocratic knowledge produced 
through the interactions of TJ professionals working closely in a global network that promotes 
the legal and universal claims. In line with these authors, my research adds to existing literature 
by providing empirical material from Rwandan and Burundian experiences. My discussions 
with TJ practitioners and the practices I have observed refer to the programme and funding 
requirements, capacity-building, universal standards, victims’ needs, and political constraints 
– all involving skills that these practitioners master and navigate to implement their TJ agenda. 
I explain below how the professionalised TJ practitioners further advocate a universal lexicon 
against which each activity is justified, as encapsulated in the TJ toolkit approach. 
Following wider tendencies in the aid-dependent work environment (see Roth 2015), TJ 
professionalisation implies a preformatted approach to deal with the past, and new guidelines, 
degrees and qualifications. Silke Roth observes a number of paradoxes in relation to aid work, 
including the increasing professionalisation along with a mismatch of qualifications, 
experiences and positions of many staff members. More specifically, she observes (ibib., 81) 
“the introduction of codes of practice, standards and new humanitarian degrees”, the arrival of 
newcomers to the field without experience of the region and/or of the subject of assignment, 
high turnover, and project-based work. She explains that this paradox of increasing 
professionalisation with mismatching profiles is partially due to the “need to hire replace or 
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personnel quickly and therefore” to “make comprises as far as the job experience and training 
are concerned”. Similarly, one of my Western informants explained that she came to work to 
Burundi after working for the same INGO in another context. According to her, it was more 
important to her organisation that the post holder knew how to manage an aid programme 
rather than that they understood TJ, since: “Transitional justice is something you can learn 
quickly” (Interview with international NGO staff, Burundi, 2012). In the end, more guidance, 
plus technical and policy materials in relation to TJ, did not necessarily lead to better practices.  
I consider that a high turnover of staff and pragmatic constraints of the aid environment are 
not all that have led to such a paradoxical situation. In line with the theoretical discussions in 
chapter 2 and the empirical material in the chapters following it, I understand the 
professionalisation of TJ as a process through which a global network promotes a preformatted 
approach that entails ideological and pragmatic dimensions: perceptible in all the TJ activities 
observed throughout my fieldwork in Rwanda and Burundi. By unpacking what the TJ toolkit 
consists of, I also underline the unintended effects of such an evolution of TJ practices. Behind 
the pretence to operate to ‘international standards’, ‘population needs’ and ‘best practices’, TJ 
professionalisation is also guided by the search for utility, legitimacy and institutional survival. 
It is through the formulation of the technocratic approach that TJ has gained coherence to all 
these concurrent elements as I summarise below. 
What is the TJ Toolkit Approach? 
I built my definition of the TJ toolkit approach on the existing literature that refers to the global 
dissemination of a preformatted manner of approaching a violent past that takes insufficient 
account of historical, social and cultural specificities (Shaw, Waldorf, and Hazan 2010a; 
Hinton et al. 2010; C.L. Sriram and Pillay 2010; Hazan 2010; Andrieu 2013). According to 
the global promoters of such an approach (such as ICTJ, IJR and UN OHCHR), truth-seeking, 
the judicial, vetting and reparative mechanisms, and the reform of institutions should all be 
implemented in order to consolidate sustainable peace, democracy and accountability, and 
reconciliation. The relationships that are claimed between these mechanisms and the different 
aims have been examined, refuted and criticised by various disciplines (ibid. ‒ see also chapter 
2).  
On this basis and against my ethnographic research, I define the TJ toolkit approach as a 
technocratic template of actions containing ideological, conceptual and pragmatic dimensions. 
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I have argued that the TJ toolkit is more than just a set of mechanisms and associated claims: 
it entails the combination of an ideological adherence (around mechanisms and claims, as 
described in chapter 2), with a pragmatic template for gaining access to funding for projects 
that deal with the past, a combination that also predefines the types of institution and activity 
that will be put in place to ‘deal with the past’.  
Ideologically, the toolkit approach defines the aims that should be pursued with TJ 
mechanisms: a broken society seeking truth, justice, reconciliation and reparation. These moral 
commitments are formulated in a discourse embodied in various global policy documents and 
in the institutional framework providing for TJ mechanisms, as well as in sensitisation tools, 
training and reporting activities. With some nuances, all these elements define the principles, 
claimed aims and normative framework of TJ practice in line with the toolkit approach. 
Furthermore, I consider that TJ practices are marked by traces of post-colonialism. 
Professionalised practices produce the implication that aid-dependent TJ practitioners ‘know 
better’, thanks to their technocratic knowledge of how to fix ‘dysfunctional states’. This has 
encouraged them to adopt paternalistic behaviours towards recipients and thereby reproduce 
unequal hierarchical social structures. At the same time, the illusion has been created that aid 
institutions and aid actors are neutral benefactors, along with their partners in civil society 
organisations – which are also independent from the “unscrupulous” authoritarian 
government.  
On a pragmatic level, the toolkit approach has strongly shaped TJ activities. As a new 
endeavour consisting of a set of concepts and mechanisms in need of channels of 
implementation, the TJ toolkit has been absorbed gradually by aid structures via the existing 
means of aid implementation. As a typical aid-dependent project, the implementation of 
official TJ mechanisms requires practitioners to be involved in numerous activities that are left 
out by most of the TJ literature, such as writing TJ policy frameworks, lobbying donors and 
governmental institutions, organising training and sensitisation programmes, reporting, 
monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the official process, and complying with 
procedures and institutional requirements for aid efficiency. 
Through participant observation of these professionalised TJ activities, I perceived on many 
occasions emotional responses and political positions behind the technocratic façade. These 
interactions shaped the negotiations about interpretations of the past yet had limited capacities 
to achieve the claimed objectives. These elements are crucial to understanding a post-conflict 
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context and its politics in which TJ is being implemented, but the technical approach gives no 
attention, or only limited attention, to these dimensions.  
Technocracy Bringing Coherence to the Messy Everyday 
With a focus on a particular set of policies, my research aims to underline more clearly the 
policy relevance of aidnographic materials, and particularly how these messy components of 
the everyday gain coherence through technocracy. Recent aidnographic literature has provided 
me with valuable analytical tools for looking into TJ practitioners as aid-dependent 
professionals. It has brought my attention to the complexity of daily routines, to everyday 
relations in the private and professional spheres, and to how power, ideology, structure and 
agency are articulated in everyday personal and professional lives (Fechter and Hindman 2010; 
Mosse 2011; Mosse 2005; Lewis and Mosse 2006 ‒ including many chapters of these edited 
volumes).  
From a critical scrutiny, Lefebvre (1971, 50) rejects the concept of technocracy because it 
“tends to eliminate all the mediations that gave social experience its complexity and connected 
material production to ideologies, principles and the often contending groups of signs and 
significances that enlivened social existence.” This has led me to consider that it is indeed the 
mediation process through social experiences that grants value to the technocratic knowledge. 
These social processes are, in the case under my scrutiny, battles over the past; their 
technocratic façade suggests they emanate from rational behaviour – implementation of the 
toolkit approach – and simultaneously they legitimise the social dynamics in these processes. 
In other words, the technocratisation and professionalisation of TJ practices both create the 
image of more efficient processes not being affected by murky politics over the past. Under 
the surface, however, it appears that TJ practices, as micro- and macro-social activities, are 
dealing with the past in contexts that are heavily marked by its burdens.  
The working patterns I observed focused on performative work (understood as utterances and 
acts in which formality and the public nature were important, such as giving official speeches, 
cutting ribbons, signing agreements and having handshakes) and bureaucratic work (i.e. such 
as complying with donors’ accountability requirements, complying with authorities’ 
registration processes, managing a team, programme and projects, accounting for deliverables 
– as dictated by the new aid paradigm and its management for results agenda). Through 
everyday structures, the race for financial sustainability and legitimacy, along with the search 
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for impacts and success stories, leaves very little space to think about how the past is affecting 
the present, and even when discussing it, uses a discourse full of buzzwords that create a 
technocratic rational façade. Lisa Smirl’s work with humanitarian workers demonstrates that 
their everyday structure provides a formulated, rational and readymade bureaucratic approach 
to deal with the contradictions faced through their profession. This leaves the issues of power 
and the hermetic nature of aid unquestioned and marginalised (Smirl 2008; Smirl 2011).  
In Peaceland, Séverine Autesserre details daily routines in international peacebuilding 
interventions, as well as its negative outcomes. My research complies with many of her 
observations regarding the side effects of daily personal and professional routines, and I bring 
a stronger emphasis on structural consequences. Focusing on the global dimensions, 
Autesserre gives secondary attention to localised contexts and hence romanticises the ‘local’. 
For example, she values the understanding of local contexts by expatriates married to local 
people, without acknowledging the structural legacies of colonisation in such unions. With a 
stronger focus on localised contexts (Rwanda and Burundi), my research highlights how 
looking at the personal and professional everyday, encourages a view beyond the local versus 
international divides towards a grasp of how both national and international practitioners are 
taking part in reproducing these unequal structures. 
Everyday routines maintain aid, and in my case study of TJ, make it coherent. Unpacking the 
everyday of TJ practitioners reveals equally how the field coherence has been created in 
practice, and how such coherence can be unpacked. Looking beyond obligations related to TJ, 
chapter 4 argues that personal lifestyle renders more tangible the paternalistic and unequal 
dimensions of Aidland. Aidland is not a bubble disconnected from ‘localised’ contexts:66 it is 
taking place and reproduces complex layers of inequalities that affect ‘localised’ contexts. 
Every actor involved in aid work sits within a socio-economic and racial hierarchy and behaves 
in relation to a given history marked by colonisation and violence. These same structures 
through which TJ is being implemented are marked by institutionalised assumptions that 
expatriates are more efficient, more knowledgeable and more trustworthy than local 
professionals. This hierarchical superiority, held mostly by expatriate staff, gives them more 
decisional power within the organisation. In an environment in which time is often insufficient, 
this leaves little place for consensual and negotiated positions, and limited value is thus given 
to local perceptions within everyday implementations. This results in everyday relations 
                                                 
66 As suggested by Harrison: “Beyond the Looking Glass? ‘Aidland’ reconsidered.” 
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involving surveillance, support and paternalistic or even arrogant conduct, whereas a discourse 
of equal partnering and empowerment is preached.  
Looking into the messy everyday, the power dynamics and the patterns of paternalism takes 
us away from the local versus global divide, and underlines the entanglement of micro and 
macro politics, challenging the romanticisation of the local. Technocratisation is affecting aid 
work with unexpected outcomes. Research has shown, for example, that the approach enables 
depoliticisation (Uvin 1998; Holvoet and Rombouts 2008), reproduces inequality (e.g., Roth 
2012), and silences social dynamics and contradictions within the aid environment (e.g., Baaz 
2005). 
Depoliticisation: Addressing the ‘Aid and Politics Debate’ in relation to TJ  
As I have argued throughout the empirical chapters, national and international TJ practitioners 
are involved in many political battles to navigate and negotiate various competing and 
concurrent agendas. Most aid-dependent actors pretend, however, to operate only on technical 
and apolitical levels – in policy documents and official statements in particular. The key 
obstacles to TJ implementation are often relegated to the national politics, meaning a blaming 
of ruling elites as the main obstacles to democratisation and other TJ aims. I argue that 
considering national politics as a key obstacle to the implementation of TJ is a perspective that 
silences other levels of politics. Blaming national politics also projects a linear vision of 
transition: it contemplates an ideal transition from an authoritarian regime to a more 
democratic one. In spite of strong TJ efforts, both Rwanda and Burundi are, rather, on a 
transition towards other authoritarian regimes. Overall, the adoption of such positions has 
depoliticised the role of international and aid-dependent actors supporting TJ processes and 
given claim to an apolitical nature.  
Reviewing the Nuremburg trials and the South African TRC, Leebaw is one of the few TJ 
scholars bringing strong attention to depoliticisation. She (2011, 4) argues that depoliticisation 
is “useful to establish legitimacy of TJ institutions… However, depoliticization has also 
undermined the critical role of TJ as a challenge to denial, as a basis for exposing the systemic 
dimension of past wrongs, and as a basis for advancing an ongoing process of change.” She 
also demonstrates a number of side effects such as TJ institutions have “obfuscated the 
systemic dimension of past wrongs” while investigating systematic injustice; “rationalised and 
legitimated selective forgetting and denial” while challenging denial; “functioned as strategies 
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for avoiding competing claims regarding the meaning of past wrongs” while encourage efforts 
to overcome (Ibid., 175). In line with her observations and building on development studies, I 
consolidate in this conclusion how depolitisation played out and impacted TJ processes in 
Burundi and Rwanda.  
Development studies have more extensively addressed the side effects of depoliticisation and 
the role of aid (e.g., Ferguson 1990; Ansoms and Rostagno 2012; Debusscher and Ansoms 
2013; Holvoet and Rombouts 2008; Molenaers and Renard 2009; Kothari 2005). Pieces of 
research about aid technocratisation in Rwanda demonstrate that rather than improving aid 
efficiency, aid practices resulting from the new aid paradigm tend to depoliticise processes 
(Holvoet and Rombouts 2008; Debusscher and Ansoms 2013; Ansoms and Rostagno 2012). 
As the most famous example, James Fergusson (1990, 256) notes: 
By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical 
solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people, the hegemonic of ‘development’ is 
the principal means through which the question of poverty is depoliticised in the world today. At 
the same time, by making international blueprints for ‘development’ so highly visible, a 
‘development project’ can end up performing extremely sensitive political operations involving the 
entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, 
technical mission to which no one can object.  
I argue similarly in the previous sections that claiming to embrace international standards and 
victims’ needs in TJ enables its practitioners to receive support for their “technical mission to 
which no can object” (see also chapter 5). Ferguson further explains that depoliticisation 
enables even failed projects to serve political aims: 
If unintended effects of a project end up having political uses, even seeming to be ‘instruments’ of 
some larger political deployment, this is not any kind of conspiracy; it really does just happen to 
be way things work out. But and because things do work out this way, ‘failed’ development projects 
can so successfully help to accomplish important strategic tasks behind the backs of the most 
sincere participants, it does became less mysterious why ‘failed’ development projects should end 
up being replicated again and again. It is perhaps reasonable to suggest that it may even be because 
development projects turnout to have such uses, even if they are in some sense unforeseen, that 
they continue to attract so much interest and support. 
Building on this stream of research, this conclusion clarifies my contributions to the field of 
TJ by unpacking the various levels of politics taking place through the negotiations and 
implementation of TJ, and by highlighting the unintended side effects. This analysis aims to 
encourage future TJ literature and practice to move beyond blaming national politics and to 
reflect on the limitations of their interventions and the resulting political consequences.  
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Going Beyond Blaming National Politics 
The technocratic approach and this blaming of local actors is perceptible in global policy 
documents such as the UN Security Council report on the rule of law and TJ in conflict and 
post-conflict societies, and in particular in this excerpt on truth commissions:  
Experience reveals that truth commissions can quickly lose credibility when not properly 
resourced, planned and managed, thereby undermining the very confidence they are intended to 
build. Truth commissions will likely falter where they are introduced too early in the political 
process, are manipulated for political gain or involve insufficient efforts to solicit stakeholder input, 
including such hard-to-reach populations such as displaced persons and refugees. Strong national 
ownership is essential. Unfortunately, governments have a mixed record of compliance with truth 
commission recommendations, evidencing the need for follow-up mechanisms and active and long-
term political engagement from the international community and civil society. 
This paragraph illustrates the following technical position: truth commissions have a high risk 
of failure. The main causes are associated with poor resources, inadequate planning and 
management, wrong timing, or political manipulation. Indirectly, this results in the blaming of 
national politicians for their vested interests and reluctance to comply with a set of agendas 
for accountability and democracy. The assumption is that if the civil society and the 
international community are engaged adequately, the risks will be limited. Such a perception 
persists in promoting truth commissions as an ideal mechanism, with failure being attributed 
only to the local political context. This is as opposed to being critical of Western models and 
looking at these dynamics as inherent parts of any TJ process; and this overlooks the negotiated 
nature of transition and the interpretation of, and approaches to, a difficult past. Silencing 
politics simply renders them invisible in public text and narratives while public battles and 
negotiations take place behind technocratic terms.  
Silencing Other Levels of Politics  
The form of TJ that is promoted globally requires important financial support from external 
actors and the involvement of various organisations, including international and local NGOs 
and civil society. Yet, aid is coming with a set of structural issues and ideological constraints 
that make TJ even more difficult. The ideas of the role of civil society as representative of the 
population and of the population-centred approach have been questioned by several authors, 
even before the emergence of the new aid paradigm (see e.g., Mamdani 1996; de Sardan 1995; 
Lewis and Mosse 2006; Long and Long 1992). The more recent integrative approach in which 
all stakeholders are now considered to be equal partners has been highlighted and denounced 
as hypocritical, given that aid implementation always results from a negotiation between 
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parties with different agendas and priorities (Hyden 2008, 273; Renard 2007). Mosse (2005, 
204) notes that “power inequalities are reproduced in the making and execution of policy”.  
Empirical research on TJ has also highlighted how donors and NGOs hold an important role 
in shaping “attitudes towards justice and reconciliation” by bringing their own agenda into the 
negotiation process (Weinstein et al. 2006; see also Shaw 2007; Subotić 2012).  
Leebaw’s (2011, 15-16) review of depoliticisation underlines crucial sides effects for TJ 
projects: 
One problem is that depoliticisation does not transcend the politics of transitional justice, but rather 
functions to obfuscate and naturalise the way that politics operate in the process of judging the past. 
Depoliticisation masks the particular political and social values that frame the investigation and its 
judgments. It also naturalises the political compromises and asymmetries that define the scope of 
transitional justice mandates … Depoliticisation has also obfuscated the ways in which 
international justice norms are gendered. … By naturalising the compromises, distortions, and 
asymmetries that frame their investigations, these institutions foreclose or limit ongoing debate 
regarding the terms of official memory in the process of political change. 
On the basis of these observations, it is clear that depoliticisation does not render processes 
apolitical. On the contrary, it simply silences or hides the political matters in play. Throughout 
the scrutiny of the consolidation and implementation of the TJ toolkit approach I have 
unpacked many layers of concurrent agendas. These include the international criminal justice 
agenda (i.e., the fight against impunity, the set of international legal standards); the agenda of 
bilateral and multilateral donors (i.e., demonstrating their aspiration to democratisation, 
accountability and the rule of law while maintaining good relationships with the ruling regime 
– meaning, even when it is authoritarian, respecting the priorities of the national government); 
the agenda of national authorities (i.e., to show a desire for democracy, maintain political 
supremacy or the status quo, distance political opponents and critical voices, and gain political 
legitimacy); and the agendas of local and international NGOs (i.e., to promote their normative 
position, maintain financial capacity and legitimacy, and prioritise their own constituencies). 
Moreover, all practitioners have their own personal agendas (to maintain their jobs and 
relationships, and promote their understanding of TJ and their vision of the conflict).  
In the implementation of TJ, all these different micro and mezzo agendas are coming together, 
and need to be navigated, compromised on, and negotiated according to existing and evolving 
power dynamics. While the professionalisation of TJ results in the production of ideological 
and pragmatic patterns to frame its activities, it renders out of the public sphere, and almost 
intangible, the negotiations among TJ practitioners across these different agendas.  
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The empirical chapters have illustrated that behind technocratic practices (whether 
registration, training, sensitisation, capacity-building, monitoring, lobbying or reporting), 
various levels of political negotiations are crucial driving elements. Despite the apparent 
discourse and practices associated with both the TJ toolkit and aid’s best practices, my doctoral 
research aims to bring to the fore the subtle political battles. Through participant observation 
of these activities, I have continually witnessed the reinterpretation of the TJ toolkit by both 
message conveyers and recipients, as well as arguments about TJ concepts that have been 
affected by the power hierarchy in play.  
Various  examples have been presented in empirical chapters: a perspective on a massacre 
from a woman who was not being taken seriously by older male members at a gathering of 
victims’ associations aimed at promoting commemoration for truth and reconciliation; a trainer 
who was not giving training on anything, but using his position for personal gratification; an 
expert’s technical advice used for international standards (chapter 5); the political negotiations 
on the national consultation framework and outcomes (chapter 6); the almost ineffective 
political dialogue and political bureaucratic ordeal for critical actors (chapter 4). I argue that 
in all these preparation activities, TJ practitioners are defining the TJ policy framework while 
competing for components. Reading between the lines of the debates that took to claims of 
being technocratic, there are indeed subtle indications that they were fighting for different 
truths and justice; and the debates were inevitably affected by current and past politics and 
power dynamics. Their work somehow becomes more than the ‘simple’ implementation of an 
emancipatory and repairing framework. 
It is not groundbreaking to discover that short, one-off training and mass sensitisation have 
little capacity to empower the population to overcome the dilemmas and concurrent wills of 
revenge versus reconciliation, justice versus impunity, silencing versus truth-seeking, and 
status-quo versus reparation. In addition to these well-established limits, the description of 
micro-social negotiations in between practitioners over how to deal with the past brings 
attention to the important, and often unbalanced, power relationship between message 
conveyers and recipients. In every context, technical approaches tend to silence these micro-
dynamics in play; and such processes entail serious consequences, including in the case of 
Rwanda and Burundi the consolidation of authoritarian regimes.  
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Politics and Aid: Depoliticisation of TJ Battles and Transition Towards  
Authoritarian Regimes  
My two cases studies have looked into the side effects of current TJ and aid practices that have 
otherwise been left mostly un-tackled. Through such a scrutiny, it turns out that it might be 
convenient for donors and external actors to present their interventions as apolitical and 
technocratic in the short term. Interventions are inherently political (e.g., support to 
Inyangamugayo’s training, NGO monitoring in Rwanda, and national consultations and 
sensitisation programmes in Burundi). In both Rwanda and Burundi, the pretence to being 
apolitical and technocratic has contributed to opening the door to political distortion from both 
national and international actors. Each vignette underlines the consequences. And at a general 
level, Rwandan and Burundian transitions have led to authoritarianism rather than the 
democratisation that TJ claimed to support. 
Within mitigated and various degrees, donors have maintained support for regimes that have, 
while the TJ agenda has been unfolded, increasingly become authoritarian. Indirectly, 
international aid has contributed to the consolidation of authoritarian regimes. It has enabled 
donors to demonstrate their commitments to addressing the need for democratisation, to the 
rule of law, and to the fight for impunity – while at the same time financially supporting 
authoritarian rule, and thus indirectly consolidating its power. This has ultimately consolidated 
the authoritarian nature of the Burundian and Rwandan regimes.  
In the case of gacaca, donors have buried their heads in the sand with regard to its still-unclear 
legacy. It is certain that the Rwandan people will have to deal with the consequences of false 
accusation, false testimony, judicial mistakes, corrupted acquittals, unfair decisions and 
imperfect justice. These are all widely addressed by the existing literature. In the case of 
Burundi, the failure of the TJ process has been associated mainly with the lack of political will 
‒ certainly a key factor, but not the only one. I argue that the preformatted approach gained 
such a self-evidence that obstacles were blamed on the local context with almost no 
reassessment of the mechanisms’ pertinence and benefits. 
While it might not have figured in the cases I studied, some international donor agencies, such 
as USAID, do now attempt to embrace the political nature of aid (e.g., Carothers and De 
Gramont 2013; Levy 2014). My research calls for more critical attention to this political nature 
of aid in relation to TJ processes in particular. International organisations, donors and NGOs 
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must recognise more clearly their political roles in intervening in TJ and wider transitional 
processes. These interventions and their donors’ political agendas inevitably affect or produce 
national politics, policy outcomes and unintended effects.  
Localised Contexts in a Global World 
Through a scrutiny of the gacaca process in Rwanda and the TRC negotiations in Burundi, my 
thesis demonstrates how these two processes have been framed by the similar global 
dimensions of the TJ toolkit approach and the new aid paradigm. However, local social and 
political dynamics have factored heavily in these global influences and shaped the actual 
implementation of TJ. My empirical research expands the critical TJ scholarship and calls for 
a ‘localising’ of international interventions. Understanding how local and global dimensions 
of TJ became entangled in the Rwandan and Burundian processes has challenged the 
romanticised vision of the ‘local’. I review here the ontological implications for understanding 
the ‘local’ and, finally, consolidate my contributions to the research of these two specific TJ 
processes.  
Challenging the Romanticisation of the Local   
By looking at individuals involved professionally in TJ processes, the global versus local 
divide has become analytically blurry. In prolongation of the edited book, Localizing 
Transitional Justice (Shaw, Waldorf, and Hazan 2010), the current critical literature has 
encouraged a scrutiny of local contexts. By arguing that the toolkit approach has failed to 
understand the local context and culture, the implicit suggestion is that TJ efforts would lead 
to a better result if the local context were better understood. Furthermore, this literature accepts 
that the implementation of one or all of the mechanisms suggested by the toolkit approach 
would not be feasible in many post-conflict and aid-dependent contexts without the support of 
international aid. Overall, TJ literature tends to romanticise the relationship between the 
international and the local. It is with such a perspective that I have ventured into this research 
with the aim of better understanding the local, and ultimately contributing to recommendations 
for international interventions towards TJ. Paradoxically, my attempt to understand the local 
has unearthed confusion. My research ultimately challenges assumptions, and demonstrates 
how the involvement of international aid adds layers of complexity ‒ complex negotiations 
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towards policy frameworks and implementation, and accompanying complex processes of 
professionalisation and depoliticisation.  
The result is a critical review of the intervention of international aid and the actors dependent 
on it. This analysis does not aim to demonise the global and romanticise the local. Quite the 
opposite: it aims to demonstrate how these two levels are so entangled that any differentiation 
becomes futile. Even when looking for localised practices in local initiatives, traces of the 
global discourses are omnipresent (see Tsing 2005). The Burundian population has been 
exposed to mass programmes of sensitization based on the global discourse, and Burundian 
practitioners have followed training and participated in TJ workshops from around the world. 
Aid dependency has also framed the way these programmes have been implemented with a 
need to navigate donors’ agendas and operating rules. Yet the reinterpretation and reenactment 
of the global discourse remains moulded by local dynamics and local forms of power. In the 
instance of the practitioners gathering in Kibimba, highly educated men from the capital 
claimed to know better about what had happened than the local female activist (see chapter 4).  
Scholarship in peacebuilding and international relations has granted more critical attention to 
debates about the local. Peacebuilding scholars have criticised the liberal peace agenda for 
neglecting the ‘local’ context. Meera Sabaratnam undertook an ontological critique of this 
liberal or international versus local divide. She considers (2013, 267) that: 
There is a clear emphasis here on the need to engage with the ‘indigenous’ or ‘authentic’ traditions 
of non-Western life, which seems to reflect an underlying assumption of cultural difference as the 
primary division between these two parties. This reproduces the division between the liberal, 
rational, modern West and a culturally distinct space of the ‘local’.  
My concluding observations are closely connected to these debates. I also encourage a 
challenge of the romanticisation of the local by acknowledging the complex entanglement 
between ‘global’ influences in ‘localised contexts’. The global level ultimately frames what is 
happening in the localised context, in which it is almost impossible to think outside of the box 
‒ instead having to do whatever is wanted from inside the box. Any localised context is 
complex, messy and in fact highly globalised. Universal concepts are used and reinterpreted. 
Practices and ideology are shaped by global trends but reframed around local dynamics. Even 
knowing the local and addressing its complexities would not make the toolkit a better approach 
for dealing with the past. The aims may be laudable, but the implementation of these 
institutions does not lead to the claimed aims being achieved, even in better contexts.  
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Critical Review of Aid towards the Gacaca Process 
In conclusion, my research contributes to the literature about gacaca by looking at social and 
political dynamics around policy making and levels of implementation. A number of scholars 
have already demonstrated that gacaca has been a vehicle of many other social and political 
dynamics at both national political and micro-social levels (e.g., with various degrees of 
critique and analytical emphasis: Burnet 2014; Waldorf 2010; Rettig 2008; Ingelaere 2008; 
Thomson and Nagy 2011; Palmer 2014). Bert Ingelaere considers, for instance, “[v]iolence in 
Rwanda took numerous forms, thousands of forms, from hill to hill, as there are numerous 
ways to deal with these tragic events of the past. Violence and reconciliation are guided by 
forces and constraints imposed from above, but with sufficient margins for local dynamics to 
take place” (Ingelaere, 2009: 41). Similarly, Burnet considers that “Gacaca courts became 
arenas where local power relations worked themselves out under the guise of national policy” 
(Burnet, 2010: 114). 
To this I add the role played by international aid through providing mainly technical support 
and funding of the SNJG and monitoring agencies. Overall, I argue that the ‘technical’ and 
‘apolitical’ support to gacaca from international donors became entangled in different regional 
and national political dynamics through: the teaching of the definition of crimes of genocide 
and crimes against humanity in legal training, turning the interpretation of what type of crime 
can be brought to gacaca courts into political battles (chapter 5); the difficult procedures to 
obtain monitoring authorisations and accreditations that formed the bureaucratic obligations 
imposed by Rwandan authorities to silence critical voices (chapter 4); diplomats undertaking 
ineffective political dialogue to protect local NGOs (chapter 4); broadcasting simple jingles 
promoting Truth and Reconciliation, which imposed an automatic relationship between the 
two to encourage the vision of a ‘new reconciled Rwanda’ (chapter 5); or dismissing socio-
legal critiques to promote a positive view of gacaca (chapter 6). None of these areas addressed 
in the empirical chapters is free of politics. 
Rather, all these activities are part of the micro and macro battles related to the representations 
of the past and its consequences in the present. At the macro level, they also depict a nation 
that was able to move beyond the consequences of genocide and construct a united Rwanda 
by imposing a very specific understanding of past violence. At the micro level, the gacaca 
process was a vehicle to more specific representative battles among various TJ practitioners ‒ 
who engaged in battles about what gacaca had been about, or what it achieved or failed on. 
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The battlefield was particularly disadvantageous for organisations contradicting the 
government’s view. 
Finally, the gacaca process was an ambitious project with many concurrent aims to rebuild 
Rwandan society after the 1994 genocide. It involved battles about interpretations of the past 
and implications for the present. These battles cannot, however, be reduced to pro- and anti-
gacaca tendencies. Even the most critical organisations recognised some benefits of the gacaca 
process, and raised contradictory critiques – even within single organisations. Still, there 
remains a difficult representation battle over what gacaca contributed to and inadvertently 
caused. Some previous stakeholders preferred to leave the battle, and others were forced to do 
so. Such interpretation battles have severe implications for the communities and individuals 
dealing with the actual consequences of the gacaca process.  
Overall, my ethnographic scrutiny of gacaca practitioners (by looking into their role in policy 
making, and into donors’ involvement, representation battles and disenrollment) calls for more 
policy and academic attention to the long-term effects of the gacaca process on various 
communities in the Rwandan hills. Furthermore, my research also calls for more critical 
research on international aid for TJ and related areas such as peacebuilding and post-conflict 
development. Moving beyond blaming only the local context, such research underlines the 
political role of aid, encourages donors to take responsibility for the inevitable long-term 
effects of their involvement, and acknowledges the limits of the policy frameworks to which 
they contribute. 
While the sensitivity of the gacaca process would be acknowledged, it was convenient for 
donors to ignore the political dynamics in place at the end of the process, so as to be cleared 
of political responsibility. This raises ethical issues related to the effect of depoliticisation. It 
is undeniable that the political manipulation that took place at national and micro-social levels 
has been silenced. By being complicit in silencing and not addressing adequately political 
intrusions in the judicial process of gacaca, donors have inevitably enabled Rwandan 
authorities to win the battle of the representation of the past, if not legitimise the RPF position 
on Rwandan history. 
A number of authors have previously underlined how international interventions have 
contributed to the structures of violence in Rwanda (e.g., Uvin 1998; Pottier 2002; Barnett 
2003). For example, Uvin (1998, 226) observes: 
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For decades, foreign aid contributed to structural violence both directly and indirectly, through 
action and inaction, through its mode of functioning and its ideology. The reach of the state, the 
survival and reproduction of the elite, the unfolding of the processes of exclusion, inequality, and 
humiliation are all so intertwined with the presence of foreign aid – and in some cases, impossible 
to envision without foreign aid – that any separation between them is artificial if not meaningless. 
His analysis remains relevant to illustrating how aid today silences and/or fails to address 
politics and power dynamics resulting from intervention – even when supposedly dealing with 
the violent past. While there is already research on the depoliticisation of aid in Rwanda, my 
research adds to Uvin’s analysis by demonstrating that even recent international aid reforms 
embraced by the New Aid Paradigm (see chapter 2) have been, not only unable to tackle this 
problem, but have also exacerbated it through increasing technocratisation and 
professionalisation. 
Critical Review of Aid towards the Burundian TJ process 
The situation in Burundi has worsened with the current political and security crisis. 
Meanwhile, TJ practitioners have prepared their constituencies and the population through 
‘technical’ training and sensitisation. This thesis demonstrates that they have given limited 
attention to micro-politics while undertaking these activities. In other words, rather than being 
purely technical exercises, there have been battles among TJ practitioners and their audiences 
about different positions in relation to what kind of truth or justice should be sought. Other 
major battles also took place between TJ practitioners in relation to the legal framework and 
appointed institutional actors. In this section, I review the overall progress of the process by 
highlighting the politics behind technical dimensions. I also explain how the current crisis has 
affected the TJ progress and reveal further the politicisation of aid-dependent actors involved 
in TJ. 
TJ Politics and the Current Political Crisis 
In 2014, some progress was made in the official TJ implementation by the adoption of a TRC 
law and the appointment of the TRC commissioners. Again, political disagreements between 
the media, civil society and Burundian authorities emerged. Once I returned from fieldwork, 
a TRC law was finally adopted in May 2014 (République du Burundi 2014) and its 
commissioners were appointed in December 2014. Even then, local media and civil society 
organisations were expressing doubts about the future work of the TRC, given the identity of 
newly appointed commissioners and the appointing process. In a press article presenting these 
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commissioners, Iwacu journalists listed them, describing their trajectory, background and 
explaining why they would not be credible (Ngendakumana and Bigirimana 2014). The 
conclusion of the news article explains the view of the representative of the Forum of Civil 
Society (Forum des Organisations de la Société Civile ‒ FORSC): most of the commissioners 
were political personalities in the regimes under which these crimes were committed. 
“Therefore, it is difficult to believe in their impartiality, neutrality and integrity, qualities that 
each member of the commission should have” (Ibid., Author’s translation). 
Civil society and private media have presented themselves as apolitical and neutral. They have 
denounced others for having been affected by past violence that would make them partial – 
but have continued to see themselves as impartial, as if their own position has not been affected 
by their political position and their own suffering of the conflicts. So while the institutional 
process was moving forward, there was political opposition (e.g., UPRONA did not participate 
in the parliamentary session appointing the commissioners as they did not find it credible) and 
civil society organisations boycotted and heavily criticised the process. More importantly, the 
current political crisis will inevitably slow down the progress. At the same time, sequences of 
the crisis clearly underline the political positioning of all local actors, including TJ 
practitioners. 
However, as I write this conclusion (in the summer of 2015, with additional corrections in the 
summer of 2016), Burundi is going through a major political and security crisis, and the idea 
of a TRC taking place in ideal conditions in Burundi is at its most distant since I started my 
research. On 26th April 2015, the CNDD-FDD, the ruling party, announced that the current 
president, Pierre Nkurunziza, was running for a third mandate. Shortly after this, 
demonstrations against his candidacy started to take place in Bujumbura; the police were 
ordered to stop demonstrators from coming into the town centre (BBC 2015a). After a failed 
coup d’état on 13th May the situation quickly escalated with more violence and arrests as 
demonstrators (who had celebrated the coup) were then seen as putschists (e.g., BBC 2015).  
The Imbonerakure (the young members of the ruling party who have been accused of using 
violence and terror for political purposes for a number of years) increasingly became a source 
of problems and violence. In June 2015, the UN reported that it had received 50 complaints a 
day related to the activities of these militia (Centre d’actualité de l’ONU 2015). 
In personal communication from fieldwork friends over the summer of 2015, there was a very 
high level of fear for a relapse of wider violence. Particularly after the failed coup d’état in 
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May, many stayed within their houses and hired additional guards, or even left the country. 
Many international aid organisations sent back their non-essential expatriate staff. The main 
donors for the electoral process cut their funding and encouraged the delay of elections until 
the situation improved (Aljazeera 2015). The EU electoral observation mission that had gone 
to Burundi was sent back to Europe (Iwacu 2015). The UN Security Council appointed a 
mediator; the African Union and heads of African States were actively involved in encouraging 
a rapid resolution of the situation. The immediate future of Burundi remains very uncertain, 
with no easy solution, and these events are of course relevant for TJ matters. 
By the end of June, after two months, 70 deaths, hundreds of injured and hundreds arrested 
were been reported; so far at least 150,000 people have been registered by UNHCR as fleeing 
to neighbouring countries due to fear of violence (e.g., Human Rights Watch 2015; 
International Crisis Group 2015). In May, an opposition leader, Zedi Feruzi, from the Union 
for Peace and Democracy (Union pour la paix et la démocratie – UPD), was murdered in front 
of his house (RFI 2015). Since I started my research on Burundi, the country has never received 
so much international attention in the media and politics. 
More importantly for my research on TJ, most of the organisations, which played a prominent 
role in these ongoing events, are aid-dependent and involved in TJ sensitisation (as mentioned 
in chapters 4 and 5). For example, an increasing repression of private radio has been noticeable 
over recent months, particularly since the announcement of the third mandate. At the beginning 
of demonstrations, the Radio Publique africaine (RPA) was first closed down, Isanganiro and 
Radio Bonesha were forbidden to broadcast outside of the capital, and the other private radio 
broadcasters were forbidden from following demonstrations in live broadcasts. Civil society 
organisations associated with the opposition encouraged demonstration against the third 
mandate. All these organisations are also involved in TJ activities, as explained in chapters 4 
and 5.  
On 13th May, the private radio station Isanganiro67 gave the floor to Godefroid Niyombaré in 
his attempted coup d’état. He announced that he and his allies did not respect the president’s 
authority. In the following events, radio stations were seen as central to power dynamics. 
During the attempted coup d’état, the RNTB was one of the key targets for the putschist 
movement to be able to broadcast in the whole country. The failure to access national public 
                                                 
67 The radio station was put together with support from the INGO Search for Common Ground and is currently 
dependent on other international funding support 
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radio partly explains the failure of the coup. On the same day, Rema, the only private radio 
station associated with the CNDD-FDD, was attacked. In response, overnight, the main private 
radio stations (RPA, Insaganiro, Bonesha, and Radio-Télévision Renaissance) were burnt 
down and remained without capacity to broadcast. These are among the radio broadcasters 
receiving international funding to support the electoral process, as mentioned in chapter 4. 
A number of other organisations from the media and civil society involved in TJ sensitisation 
but that mainly cover politics (such as FORSC, FOCODE, RPA, IWACU, Insanganiro) had 
been perceived and presented by aid actors as independent and neutral, but have, since the 
recent crisis, openly stated their political positions: opposed to the ruling party and its decision 
to propose Pierre Nkurunziza for a third mandate. This supports my claim that beneath the 
apparent neutrality of aid and aid-dependent organisations, political positions are inevitable. 
While political talk between the technical lines had not been particularly effective over the 
past few years, these organisations finally paid a hard price in openly displaying their 
opposition to the regime: they became direct targets of political battles.   
Given the burden of the past, the crisis has increased feelings of fear, mistrust and anger, 
making the context even less favourable to TJ, and it will inevitably affect the future of any TJ 
process, whatever the outcome of the situation. There are crucial uncertainties about how the 
crisis will end, but it is undeniable that the context is not favourable to a credible TRC in any 
near future – as discussed, it was not favourable even before the crisis. 
Will the Burundian Context Ever be Favourable for TJ?  
Beyond the obvious implication for the country and its population, the ongoing crisis also has 
important lessons for international aid for TJ. First, TJ does not have the capacity to support a 
transition that is unwanted by ruling authorities within current aid working patterns. Second, 
international aid has not been successful in providing the promised justice, truth, 
accountability, reconciliation, democracy and sustainable peace, whether dealing with past or 
recent crimes. All these elements reinforced the central claims of my research: (1) technical 
activities undertaken in relation to TJ have no capacity to induce the promised goals, (2) 
international aid by supporting various actors with political positions becomes naturally 
entangled in national politics. 
These recent events are not only a tragic evolution of the Burundian political and security 
context – they also underline that peace remains fragile and the democratisation process 
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difficult. This reminds us that TJ is in theory supposed to consolidate sustainable peace and 
transition to democracy, but that there has been limited success. By promoting these 
mechanisms and the wider liberal peacebuilding agenda in Burundi, international donors are 
not neutral and passive actors. In her analysis of the Burundi peacebuilding process, Devon 
Curtis (2012, 74) highlights: 
[There is a] complex interplay between outside ideas and interests, and multiple Burundian ideas 
and interests. This interplay cannot simply be understood as the ‘liberal’ international peacebuilder 
facing constraints in a ‘non-liberal’ Burundi. Instead, different outside would-be peacebuilders 
promoted ideas in line with their favoured conceptions of peacebuilding, while different Burundian 
politicians renegotiated and reinterpreted these institutions or practices. This reinterpretation and 
reinscription affects a range of peacebuilding institutions such as transitional justice, disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration, and economic reforms. 
Curtis underlines that the international community conveniently “turned a blind eye to 
governance abuses, human rights violations, and militarism, when confronted with the messy 
and contested politics of transition, as long as Burundi remained generally stable” (Ibid., 75). 
Oppression and killing of political opponents, and intimidation and impunity for crimes 
committed by the Imbonerakure have been ongoing issues in recent years and widely 
denounced by various actors (see chapter 3). There was also indication that the CNDD-FDD 
had not prepared any candidate other than Nkurunziza. For people against a third mandate for 
the president (civil society, opposition and part of the population), this is the final straw rather 
than a crisis caused by the electoral process.  
On December 2014, the 11 commissioners of the TRC took an oath in front of the parliament, 
which officially launched the implementation of the TRC law. Despite the ongoing conflict 
spurred by the controversy over the third presidency of Pierre Nkurunziza (Jamar 2016), the 
TRC launched its preparation phase in March 2016. The future of the judicial mechanisms 
became even more uncertain. 
Concluding Remarks 
Complementing a wide ethnography of beneficiaries (e.g., Brown 2012; Shaw 2007; Laplante 
2007; Ross 2003), my research provides a detailed account of the structures in which TJ 
practitioners operate. This is a crucial element of the analysis of the toolkit approach. I 
maintain that TJ practices within their current framework, by trying to fix societies affected 
by irreparable experiences, are limited in achieving unachievable goals. Frictions are then 
inevitable, and such an approach, with its inevitable issues but without appropriate attention 
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being given to dealing with them, is morally questionable. In both cases studies, TJ practices 
have been taking place, and continue to take place, in complex and authoritarian political 
contexts, infused with politics of the past, where people’s life experiences are widely affected 
by political violence and political instability. These case studies suggest that claims to 
apolitical aid also constitute a waiver of responsibility for the long-term outcomes of short-
term funding cycles. 
The nature of the work of TJ practitioners is inherently political, and their gender, position in 
society, experiences of violence, personality, and trajectories all have important impacts that 
shape their contributions to the implementation of TJ. These practitioners operate within the 
same structure but have some agency. I would make the argument that further research on TJ 
practitioners’ agency and trajectories could enable a stronger understanding of the processes 
of implementing TJ, and of its outcomes, and further attend to the evolution of TJ and the 
wider socio-political contexts in Burundi and Rwanda.  
I suggest that putting aid under a more intense spotlight could encourage practitioners to better 
acknowledge their political roles and their impact on policy outcomes. Acknowledging both 
the limited power of influence and the political nature of aid and civil society is a first step 
against the imposition of an irrelevant quick fix for mass violence. At best, the imposition is 
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Appendix 1: Fieldwork Calendar and Approached Organisations 
This table summarises the research calendar. I then elaborate on the organisations I approached 
and the type of documents I gathered.  





First stage of 
ethnographic 
fieldwork  
- GRJT meetings 
- GRJT strategic day 
- Academic colloquium, gathering political and aid 
actors on state building in the Great Lake Region  
- Refugee consultancy 
- Meetings with UN-NGOs 
- Belgian King Day 
- Internal strategy meeting of an INGO 
- INGO sensitisation activity  
- TJ and gender lobbying meeting 
- Louis Joinet documentary screening 
- Interviews 
















experiments with TJ 
practitioners to 
encourage critical 
debate about TJ 
practices 
- GRJT Meetings  
- Kivyuaka meetings and press conference 
- TJ training for representatives at district levels 
- Bujumbura transitional justice summer school: 11 
sessions with local practitioners, 2 sessions with 
diplomats  
- Diplomatic festive events 
- Interviews 














- Literary Seminar on novels addressing the Rwandan 
genocide 
- Commemoration at Amahoro Station 
- Commemoration at Camp Kigali (for Belgian Blue 
Helmets and Rwandans working for the Belgian 
Government killed during the genocide) 
- Genocide commemoration at University of Rwanda, 
Butare 
- Visit of ICTR Outreach Center with representatives 
of Burundian Victim associations 
- Discussions over Gacaca with representatives of 
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As the Gacaca process came to an end, I interviewed representatives of institutions that had 
been involved with the Gacaca process in the past, and key aid actors working on human rights 
and justice matters. Among the previous donors of the Gacaca process, I contacted: 
- the Dutch Embassy - the last donor involved in Gacaca and co-chair of the Justice, 
Reconciliation, Law and Order (JRLO) Sector at the time of research;  
- the Belgian Embassy and the European Commission’s Cooperation agency - both the 
main donors of Gacaca monitoring;  
- the British Department for International Development (DFID) - the main donor in 
Rwanda today and supporter in the past of PRI’s Gacaca monitoring;  
- the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - as partner and donor of the 
National Service of Gacaca Courts (Service National des Jurisdictions Gacaca – SNJG) 
and of the Rwandan Justice sector.  
 
I also approached other embassies and aid agencies that did not return contact. Within 
Rwandan authorities, I interviewed a few members of staff at the Ministry of Justice and the 
National Commission for Human Rights (Commission National des Droits de la Personne 
CNDP).  
In terms of NGOs, I contacted and organised interviews with: 
- Human Rights Watch (HRW - followed up the human rights situation and monitored 
Gacaca Courts from the beginning of the process until 2011);  
- International Justice Mission (IJM - representative of INGOs in the JRLO meetings);  
- RCN Justice & Démocratie (the other INGO still dealing with human rights and justice 
matters in Rwanda today);  
- the Rwandan League for the Promotion and the Defence of Human Rights (Ligue 
Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défence des Droits de l’Homme – Liprodhor, the 
last independent local human rights organisation that had been widely involved in 
monitoring Gacaca and gave support to the population facing difficulties with the 
process);  
- League for Human Rights in the Great Lakes Region (Ligue des Droits de la Personne 
dans la Région des Grands Lacs – LDGL, a regional organisation based in Kigali 
working on human rights in Burundi, Rwanda and DRC);  
- the Rwandan Association for the Defence of the Rights of the Person and of Public 
Liberties (Association Rwandaise pour la Défense des Droits de la Personne et des 
Libertés Publiques – ADL, which was actively monitoring human rights before the 
genocide and still monitors prisons widely occupied by perpetrators of the genocide);  
- and the Legal Aid Forum (a local NGO initially put in place by the Danish Institute for 
Human Rights; the NGO director previously worked in the SNJG and works today with 
the Ministry of Justice to improve access to justice).  
 
From the late 1990s, both Penal Reform International (PRI) and Lawyers Without Borders 
(Avocats Sans Frontières – ASF) worked closely with judicial and prison authorities in 
Rwanda to deal with the genocide litigation and would later become the key INGOs involved 
 
 
Transitional Justice Battlefield: Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice 
 
297 
in the Gacaca monitoring. However, they since closed their Rwandan office, even before the 
closure of Gacaca. I undertook Skype interviews with representatives of both NGOs.  
In Burundi, I have met the representatives of the international organisations most involved in 
the TJ process: the Swiss Embassy, the Belgian Embassy, the Transitional Justice Unit of UN 
Office in Burundi (Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi - BNUB), the European Union 
Delegation and the Norwegian Embassy. These institutions have channelled funding to INGOs 
and local NGOs for sensitisation and training projects about TJ mechanisms; they are also the 
most active in discussions about TJ when discussions take place, and they would certainly 
become key donors of the TRC assumingly to be put in place in the following month. I also 
contacted other embassies in Bujumbura that were less involved in TJ matters (the US and 
Dutch embassies). In terms of INGOs involved in TJ, I met members of staff from Impunity 
Watch, RCN Justice & Démocratie, Global Rights and La Benevolencija (the four key INGOs 
involved in the TJ process).  
I also met representatives of the following local NGOs:  
- Forum for the Strengthening of Civil Society (Forum pour le Renforcement de la 
Société Civile – FORSC), a local platform of associations dealing with a number of 
matters including TJ; it organised TJ sensitisation projects, and its TJ programme 
received direct financial and technical support from the GIZ;  
- Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Services (THARS), a local organisation dealing 
with trauma healing and TJ. It elaborated two networks throughout the country: one to 
support economic development of the most vulnerable people and one for TJ;  
- Ministry for Peace and Reconciliation under the Cross (Ministère pour la Paix et la 
Réconciliation sous la Croix – MIPAREC), a Burundian religious association 
operating a network of peace agents promoting dialogue between victims and their 
perpetrators at the community level;  
- Association Dushirehamwe, a local women’s association put together with support 
from International Alert, with a network of 2,000 members across the country that 
promotes the protection of women’s rights and their involvement in peacebuilding; it 
undertook a few research projects on TJ and gender; 
- Network Women and Peace (Réseaux Femmes et Paix – RFP), a Burundian association 
taking the lead on TJ matters among women associations;  
- Alert Center and Conflicts Prevention conflits (CENAP - Centre d’Alerte et de 
Prévention des conflits), a Burundian independent research centre on peacebuilding 
matters which undertook several research and sensitisation projects on TJ and the 
National Consultation.  
- Association for the Memory and Protection of Humanity Against International Crimes 
(Association pour la Mémoire et la Protection de l'humanité contre les Crimes 
Internationaux – AMEPECI GIRUBUNTU), association created by Burundian NGO 
workers who had been colleagues at Search for Common Ground, bringing together 
victim associations around commemoration initiatives;  
- Support and Reflexion Centre for the Associations of Victims of Socio-Political 
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Conflicts (Centre d’Appui et de Réflexion des Associations des Victimes des Conflits 
socio- Politiques -  CARAVI), a platform organisation for victim associations that was 
put together by the same groups of local practitioners involved in AMEPECI; they 
appointed representatives across the country to organise sensitisation and training 
activities;  
- Forum for Conscience and Development (Forum pour la Conscience et le 
Développement – FOCODE), a national network of students and professionals 
gathering to discuss specific themes including TJ; 
- National Forum for the Community Representatives of Transitional Justice (Forum 
National des Relais Communautaires en Justice Transitionnelle - FORNAREC/JT), a 
Burundian network created by the TJ section of BNUB with ethnic and gender 
balanced representatives in all sectors of the country, with the aim of overcoming 
political and ethnic divisions existing in older civil society organisations; the network 
has organised sensitisation and training for its members in order to encourage local 
ownership and communication between the local population and the official TJ 
process;  
- Burundian authorities, specifically members of the Kavakure Committee, a technical 
committee created by presidential decree in July 2011 and named after the president of 
the committee Laurent Kavakure (the current Minister of Foreign Affairs). The 
committee produced a first draft of the updated TRC law in consultation with the UN, 
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Appendix 2: Lists of Policy reports gathered about Gacaca and TJ in Burundi 
List of Reports about Burundian Transitional Justice Process 




Reports Type Themes 
Addressed 
1 ASF Étude d'Impact du Projet : «Faciliter l’Accès à la 
Justice des Victimes et des Prévenus de la Crise de 
1993 en vue de Promouvoir la Réconciliation» 
1997 INGO Impact Study Access to Justice 




ligues des droits de 
l’homme (FIDH) 
Commission pour la Vérité et la Justice : Contraintes 
et Espoirs 
2003 INGO Analysis TRC  
3 UN Security 
Concerns 
Letter dated 11 March 2005 from the Secretary-
General addressed to the President of the Security 
Council (Kalomoh Report) 
2005 UN Analysis Context Analysis 
4 FORSC - Pie 
Ntakarutimana 
Etude Justice transitionnelle : quels mécanismes 
pour le Burundi ? 
2005 ONG Analysis TJ Mechanisms 
5 Swiss Peace and 
René Lemarchand 
Burundi’s Endangered Transition FAST Country 
Risk Profile Burundi 
2006 INGO Research Political Transition 
6 Accords Women Transforming Conflicts in Africa: 
Descriptive Studies from Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa and Sudan 




Transitional Justice Battlefield: Practitioners Working around Policy and Practice 
 
300 
7 CNDD-FDD Mémorandum du Parti CNDD-FDD sur la 
Commission Vérité et Réconciliation et le Tribunal 
Spécial pour le Burundi 





Un premier défi pour le processus de justice 
transitionnelle – Les Consultations Populaires 
2007 NGO/INGO Analysis National 
Consultations 
9 RCN Justice et 
Démocratie 
Paroles de Burundais sur la Justice d’après-guerre – 
Expérience de Consultations Ré́alisées auprès de la 
Population sur la Justice et le Conflit au Burundi 
2007 INGO Analysis Activity Promotion 
10 ASF Etude sur l’analyse du conflit Burundais selon le 
genre 
2008 INGO Analysis Gender and 
Conflicts 
11 BBC World 
Service Trust and 
Search Common 
Ground 
Prêts à Parler du passé – Une étude sur les attentes 
vis-à-vis de la justice transitionnelle au Burundi 
2008 INGO Research Opinion Pool – TJ 
expectations 
12 ICTJ Burundi - Submission to the Universal Periodic 
Review Of the UN Human Rights Council Third 
Session: December 1-12, 2008  
2008 INGO Analysis UPR 
13 ICTJ Contribution Substantielle à l’Elaboration d’un 
Cadre de Fonctionnement pour le Comité de 
Pilotage Tripartite des Consultations Populaires sur 
la Justice de Transition au Burundi 
2008 INGO Analysis National 
Consultations 
14 Observatoire de 
l'Action 
Gouvernementale 
Les consultations Nationales au Burundi, 
Experiences Acquises, Défis et Stratégies pour la 
Mise en Place des Mécanisme de Justice 
Traditionelle 









L’Intégration du Genre dans la Consolidation de la 
Paix au Burundi, Leçons apprises et perspectives 
2010 NGO Analysis Gender and 
Peacebuilding 
16 Association pour la 




La justice de transition dans une perspective 
communautaire - Etude de cas dans les communes 
de Mwumba et Bugisa de la Province de NGOZI 
2010 INGO/NGO Research   
17 CENAP and 
Interpeace 
Traiter du passé et construire l'avenir: La place de 
l'histoire dans la thérapie collective 
2010 NGO/INGO     
18 République du 
Burundi and 
BINUB 
Les Consultations Nationales sur la Mise en Place 
des Mécanismes de Justice de Transition au Burundi 
– Rapport 
2010 Official/UN Research Opinion Pool 
19 Amnesty 
International 
Recommandations au Comité Technique au Sujet de 
la Création d'une Commission de Vérité et de 
Réconciliation   
2011 INGO Analysis Legal 
recommendations 
20 ASF Promouvoir le Système du Statut de Rome et 
Accroitre l'Effectivité de la Cour Pénale 
Internationale - Etude de base pour le Burundi  
2011 INGO Research International 
Justice – ICC 
21 Association 
Dushirehamwe 
Analyse du Rapport des Consultations Nationales 
sur la Mise en Place des Mécanismes de Justice de 
Transition au Burundi 
2011 NGO Analysis National 
Consultations and 
Gender 
22 Astrid Jamar and 
Impunity Watch  
Abstract of Desk Study Burundi – Violence Against 
Women 
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23 FORSC Memorandum de la Société Civile Burundaise sur la 
Mise en Place de la Commission Vérité et 
Réconciliation au Burundi 
2011 NGO Analysis TRC 
Recommendations 
24 ICTJ Le processus de justice de transition au Burundi 
Défis et perspectives 
2011 INGO Analysis TJ 
25 International Crisis 
Group 
Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political 
Impasse - Africa Report N°169 
2011 INGO Analysis Political Context 
26 République du 
Burundi 
Rapport du Comité Technique Chargé de la 
Préparation de la mise en place des Mécanismes de 
Justice Transitionnelle 








Etude sur les Besoins en Accompagnement 
Psychosocial des Victimes lors du Processus de la 
Justice Transitionnelle et Particulièrement Pendant 
la Phase de Préparation et d'Exécution 
2011 NGO Research Psychosocial & TJ 
28 Impunity Watch 
(IW) 
Premier Rapport Annuel du Premier Rapporteur 
Spécial (RS) Pour la Promotion de la Vérité, la 
Justice, les Réparations, et les Garanties de Non-
Répétition des Abus (VJNR) – Pablor de Greiff – 
Lecture Croisée du Rapport avec la Situation au 
Burundi 
2012 INGO Analysis Special Rapporteur 
and Burundi 
29 IW La Destruction de la Fosse Commune de Kivuyka a 
Bubanza 
2012 INGO Analysis Mass Grave 




Les lieux de mémoire, initiatives commémoratives 
et mémorielles du conflit burundais: Souvenirs 
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2012 INGO Research Commemoration 
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composition, organisation et fonctionnement de la 
Commission Vérité et Réconciliation discuté à la 
session du Conseil des Ministres du 14 novembre 
2012 
2012 UN Analysis Draft Law 
32 RCN Justices Transitionnelles - Contributions à la 
Construction d’un Modèle Burundais - Travail de 
Capitalisation des Représentations Théâtrales et 
Groupes de Parole menées auprès des Burundais 
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Crimes du Passé et de la Justice Transitionnelle”.  
2012 INGO Analysis Activity Analysis 
33   Memorandum sur le Projet de Loi mettant en place 
la Commission Vérité et Réconciliation au Burundi 
2012 NGO/INGO Analysis TRC legal 
recommendations 
34  Diane Bernard, 
Damien Scalia 
et Thibaut 
Slingeneyer – ASF 
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programmes d’Assistance Judiciaire d'ASF au 
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2013 INGO/Academic Research Judicial analysis of 
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35 American Friends 
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Dialogue and Exchange Programs Report - Study 
tour of Burundian Parliamentarians for 
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a focus on the law) to South Africa 
2013 INGO Analysis Activity Analysis 
36 Human Rights 
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Group on the 
Universal Periodic 
Review 
Draft report of the Working Group on the Universal 
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2013 UN Analysis UPR 
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Réparation et Non-Répétition au Burundi 
2013 INGO Research Gender & TJ 
38 IW Policy Brief: Le projet de loi sur la CVR envisagée 
au Burundi 
2013 INGO Analysis TRC Draft Law 
39 IW Policy Brief: La prise en compte des violences 
basées sur le genre au Burundi 
2013 INGO Analysis Violence Against 
Women  
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41 Anne-Aël Pohu et 
Selim Mawad – 
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42 Edem Comlan – 
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INGO Analysis Chronological TJ 
Updates 








Independent External Evaluation UN Peacebuilding 
Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi 2007 – 2013  
2014 Official (UN) 
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1 La Coopération 
Suisse au Rwanda 
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2 UN OHCHR Gacaca Le Droit Coutumier au Rwanda – 
Rapport final de la Première Phase d'enquête sur 
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Gacaca Le Droit Coutumier au Rwanda – 
Rapport de la Deuxième Phase d'enquête sur le 
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of Interior and 
Communal 
Development, 
Ministry of Justice, 
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Planning  
Justice and Security of Persons and Goods - 
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5 GoR, Minister of 
Justice - Dr. Faustin 
Nteziyayo 
Participatory Justice and The Search for the Truth 1998 Official/Acadmic Analysis Truth Seeking 
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Communities in the process of Justice 
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The Gacaca Research Project in Rwanda – An 
in-depth field study concerning Gacaca and 
community service 
1999 INGO Analysis TIG 
8 LIPRODHOR Rapport d'Activités de fin de 1ère phase du 
projet de suivi des accusés de génocide mis en 
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des Accusés de Génocide Rwandais 
1999 NGO    
AccusedLiberation  
9 PRI The Gacaca Research Project in Rwanda – An 
in-depth field study concerning Gacaca and 
community service 
1999 INGO Research Gacaca and TIG 
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des poursuites desinfractions constitutives du 
crime de génocide ou de crimes contre l'humanité 
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1999 INGO Analysis Judicial Prosecution 
11 Fergus Kerrigan - 
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Résultats d'une enquête exploratoire sur les 
attitudes des membres des communautés locales 
et des prisonniers vis-à-vis de l'indemnisation 
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l'humanité 
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13 Liprodhor  Résultats de la recherche sur les attitudes et 
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14 Alice Karekezi 
NUR CCM 
Juridictions Gacaca, lutte contre l'impunité et la 
réconciliation nationale 
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: Les juridictions Gacaca 
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16 LIPRODHOR Résultats de la recherche sur les attitudes et 
opinions de la population rwandaise 
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17 Alice Karekezi 
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Juridictions Gacaca, lutte contre l'impunité et la 
réconciliation nationale 
2000 Academic Research Gacaca Policy 
18 RCN Etude sur le système judiciaire au Rwanda: Les 
juridictions Gacaca 
2000 INGO Analysis Judicial system 
19 Jeroen Corduwener Reportage. Rwandase bevolking berecht 
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A l'Ecoute des rescapés – Recherche sur la 
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2000 INGO Research Survivors opinion 
pool 
21 Martien 
Schotsmans - ASF 
L'Etat de la Jurisprudence sur l'indemnisation liée 
au contentieux du génocide 
2000 NGO Conference Compensation 
Jurisprudence 
22 Simon Gasibirege Conditions psychosociales d'efficacité de gacaca: 
contribution à la mise en oeuvre effective du projet 
national des juridictions gacaca 





After War: Reconciliation and Democratisation in 
Divided Societies – Lessons Learned, Summary 
Report 
2000 Bergen Seminar Conference TJ 
24 Fergus Kerrigan Background Paper: The proposed New Gacaca 
Tribunals in Rwanda 
2000 INGO Analysis Gacaca Policy 
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25 Daniel De Beer Les Juridictions Gacaca au Rwanda - Round Table 
Meeting –  Rapport de Mission 
2000 INGO Conference Mission Note 
26 NPI  Concern About Current Government Proposals for 
community Courts (“Gacaca”) 
2000 INGO Analysis 
 
27 Peter Uvin Mission Gacaca – Conclusions Tentatives 2000 Academic Analysis Gacaca Policy 
28 Eddy Boutmans Report on the Informal Seminar on Donor Support 
for a 'Modernised Gacaca' in Rwanda 
2000 Official (Belgium) Analysis Gacaca Policy & 
Funding 
29 Alice Karekezi, 
CCM (UNR) 
Juridictions Gacaca, lutte contre l'impunité et la 
réconciliation nationale 
2000 Academic Research Gacaca JT 
30 Stef Vandegiste Nota Betreffende het voorontwerp van wet tot 
oprichting van gacaca-tribunalen 
2000 Official (Belgium) Analysis Gacaca Policy 
31 Commission 
Nationale des 
Droits de l'Homme 
(CNDH)   
Projet de Monitoring de la mise en place et du 
fonctionnement de l'institution judicaire Gacaca 
(2000-2003) 
2000 Official Research Gacaca Monitoring 
32 Klaas de Jonge – 
PRI 
Interim Report (1) on gacaca research and its 
preparations 
2001 INGO Research Gacaca preparation 
33 Klaas de Jonge - 
PRI 
Interim Report (2) on gacaca research and its 
preparations (August-September 2001)  
2001 INGO Research Gacaca preparation 
34 Technical 
Cooperation Unit 
of the UN Field 
Operation in 
Rwanda (HRFOR) 
Gacaca - As An Alternative to Formal Legal 
Procedure to Deal with Individuals Suspected of 
Complicity in the Genocide 
2001 UN Analysis Gacaca Policy 
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35 The Danish Center 
for Human rights 
(DCHR) 
Legal Aid in Rwanda, A Report on the Legal 
Assistance available in Rwanda 
2001 INGO Analysis Legal Aid  
36 LIPRODHOR Four years of genocide trials. What basis for 
Gacaca Courts? 
2001 NGO Analysis Gacaca Policy 
37 Martien 
Schotsmans 
Mission d'appui aux systèmes du secteur de la 
justice au Rwanda 






Document d'observation des élections Gacaca sans 
titre 
2001 NGO Research Gacaca Elections 
Monitoring 
39 ECCG - CCAC Compte Rendu Du Forum Européen sur les Grands 
Lacs – Sujet Gacaca, système de juridiction 
traditionnelle rwandaise 




Mémo sur les Juridictions Gacaca 2001 
 
Analysis Gacaca  
41 Martin Imbleau Amnestie Internationale – Notes de Mission de 
Martin Imbleau Mission Gacaca Rwanda  
2001 INGO Analysis Note de Mission 
42 Alison Des Forges Rwanda Mission Notes - 28 May – 9 June 2001 2001 INGO Analysis Note de Mission 
43 IDEA The Gacaca Facilitation Initiative: A proposal to 
Support the Rwandan Modernised Gacaca 
Process 
2002 INGO Analysis Policy - NGO 
support 
44 PRI  Gacaca Research Report No.3: Jurisdictions in the 
pilot phase 
2002 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
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45 Cagep Consult – 
USAID 
Assesment of the Judicial Sector in Rwanda 2002 
 
Analysis Judicial System 
46 Heidy Rombouts Note d'observation du lancement Gacaca en 
Néerlandai 
2002 Official Analysis Gacaca Launch 
47 Evêques du 
Rwanda 
Message des Evêques du Rwanda pour la Période 
des «Juridictions Gacaca» - Pour une justie qui 
réconcilie 
2002 Church Analysis Gacaca & 
Reconciliation 
48 LIPRODHOR Juridictions Gacaca, Potentialités et Lacunes 
Révélées par les Debuts 
2003 NGO Research  Gacaca Monitoring 
49 PRI The guilty plea procedure, cornerstone of the 
Rwandan justice system, PRI Research on 
gacaca report, Report IV 
2003 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
50 LIPRODHOR Gacaca Courts - Possibilities and gaps observed 
from the start 
2003 NGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
51 PRI  Gacaca and reconciliation: Kibuye case study 1 2003 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
52 PRI  Gacaca and reconciliation: Kibuye case study 2 2003 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
53 PRI  Gacaca and reconciliation: Kibuye case study 3 2003 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
54 PRI  Gacaca Research Report No.5: Cell-level 
preparations  
2003 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
55 Cordaid, ICCO, 
KERKINACTIE, 
Novib 
Tell our government it is OK to be critised ! - 
Rwanda Monitoring Report 
2003 NGO Analysis Rwanda & Critiques 
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57   Matrice Indicative d'interventions des Partenaires 
Internationaux dans le Domaine de la Gacaca  
2003 Donor Conference Statistics 





Note sur le Processus Gacaca en Cours au Rwanda 2003 NGO Conference Gacaca  
59 CLADHO Rapport d'Enquête sur les Violations des Droits 
Humains et les Cas d'Insécurité des Témoins 
dans les Juridictions Gacaca 
2004 NGO Research Security 
60 CLADHO Rapport d'Enquête sur les Violations des Droits 
Humains et les Cas d'Insécurité des Témoins 
dans les Juridictions Gacaca 
2004 NGO Research Human Rights 
Monitoring and 
Insecurity 
61 PRI From Camp to Hill, The reintegration of 
released prisoners, Research Report on the 
Gacaca, Report VI 
2004 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
62 DFID  Security and Justice Routes to Reconciliation. 
Rwanda Case Study  
2004 Official (UK) Analysis Security and 
Reconciliation 
63 Dr. Mbonyinkebe 
Deo 
Etude sur les Elections des Juges - 
Inyangamugayo 
2005 Academic Research Gacaca Election 
64 ASF Rapport Analytique I 2005 NGO Research Gacaca & Security 
65 PRI  Gacaca Research Report No.7: Integrated report 
on the pilot phase, January 2002 - December 2004 
2005 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
66 Kris Berwouts Bujumbura refuse le statut de réfugiés aux 
Rwandais fuyant les «Gacacas» 
2005 
 
Analysis Gacaca & Refugees 
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67 SNJG Série de tableaux indiquant l'avancement des 
Juridiction Gacaca 
2005 Official Analysis Gacaca Statistics 
68 Liprodhor Etat d'Avancement des Juridictions Gacaca 2005 Declaration Gacaca Statistics 
69 SNJG Tableau indiquant l'état d'avancement des procès 
et les décisions des Juridictions Gacaca 
2005 Official Analysis Gacaca Statistics 
70 ASF Monitoring des Juridictions Gacaca – Phase de 
Jugement – Rapport Analytique N°1 (Mars–
Septembre 2005)  
2005 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
71 PRI  Gacaca Research Report No.8: Information 
gathering during the national phase 
2006 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
72 Liprodhor “Ils ont Commencé les Traveaux d'Intérêt 
Général” (et autres articles) 
2006 NGO Analysis TIG 
73 Kris Berwouts Mail “Rwanda/Gacaca: Severes Critiques de 
l'Eglise Catholique contre les proces Gacaca au 
Rwanda”  
2006 NGO Analysis Gacaca & Church 
74 SNJG  Gacaca Jurisdictions: Achievements, problems 
and future prospects 
2006 Official Analysis Gacaca statistics 
75 ASF Monitoring des Juridictions Gacaca – Phase de 
Jugement – Rapport Analytique N°2 (Octobre 
2005–Septembre 2006) 
2006 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
76 The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
Country Report: Rwanda 2007 
 
Analysis Country report  
77 PRI  Gacaca Research Report No.9: Community 
service  
2007 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
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78 PRI Gacaca Research Report No.10 : Judgments on 
property offence cases 
2007 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
79 Amnesty 
International 
Rwanda: Suspects must not be transferred to 
Rwandan Courts for trial until it is demonstrated 
that trials will comply with international standards 
of justice 
2007 INGO Analysis Suspects Transfer 
80 International Legal 
Assistance 
Consortium 
Justice in Rwanda: An assessment 2007 INGO Analysis Judicial System 
81 ASF Monitoring des Juridictions Gacaca – Phase de 
Jugement – Rapport Analytique N°3 (Octobre 
2006–Avril 2007)  
2007 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
82 HRW Law and reality - Progress in Judicial Reform in 
Rwanda 
2008 INGO Research Legal system 
83 PRI Gacaca Research Report No.11: Testimony and 
evidence in the gacaca courts 
2008 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
84 ASF Monitoring des Juridictions Gacaca – Phase de 
Jugement – Rapport Analytique N°4 (Mai –
Decembre 2007) 
2008 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
85 IBUKA, Médecins 
du Monde  
Psychological support of of the survivors of the 
Genocide against the Tutsi of Rwanda: Action 
during and after the Gacaca process 
2009 NGO/INGO Analysis Gacaca Policy and 
trauma 
86 PRI Gacaca Research Report No.12: Settlement of 
property offence cases 
2009 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
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87 PRI Eight years later: an update on the monitoring of 
the Gacaca process in Rwanda 
2010 INGO Analysis Research Summary 
88 ASF Monitoring des Juridictions Gacaca – Phase de 
Jugement – Rapport Analytique N°5 (Mars 2008–
Septembre 2006) 
2010 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
89 
 
PRI Eight years later: an update on the monitoring of 
the Gacaca process in Rwanda 
2010 INGO Analysis Research Summary 
90 HRW Justice Compromised – The legacy of Rwanda's 
Community- Based Gacaca Courts - Case 
Studies 
2011 INGO Analysis Research Summary 
91 HRW Justice Compromised – The legacy of Rwanda's 
Community-Based Gacaca Courts 
2011 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
92 HRW Justice Compromised – The legacy of Rwanda's 
Community-Based Gacaca Courts 
2011 INGO Research Gacaca Monitoring 
93 SNJG Summary Of The Report Presented At The 
Closing Of Gacaca Courts Activities 
2012 Official Analysis Research Summary 
94 SNJG Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, describing the phases 
of implementation of the Gacaca Court process 
from June 18, 2002 to June 18, 2012 
2012 Official Analysis Gacaca Evaluation 
95 SNJG - CCM 
(NUR) 
Evaluation of Gacaca Process: Achieved 
Results Per Objective 
2012 Academic/Official Research Gacaca Evaluation 
96 HRW Justice Compromised – The legacy of Rwanda's 
Community-Based Gacaca Courts - Case Studies 
2012 INGO Analysis Research Summary 
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98 SNJG Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, describing the phases 
of implementation of the Gacaca Court process 
from June 18, 2002 to June 18, 2012 
2012 Official Analysis Gacaca Evaluation 
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Evaluation of Gacaca Process: Achieved Results 
Per Objective 
2012 Academic/Official Research Gacaca Evaluation 
 
 
